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ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at competing influences in Central Asia since 1991. It looks at all five 
Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, and identifies the three main powers with competing influences as 
Russia, Islam and America. It aims at showing which o f these three powers is the most 
enduring and powerful in the region according to how strong its influences are. The 
strengths o f these influences are investigated in relation to the fields of security, 
politics, culture and economics.
This thesis argues that Russian influences are at present the strongest amongst most 
strata o f the Central Asian population. Russification (which falls under cultural 
influence) in both its linguistic and behavioural forms is a profound contributor to 
Russia’s firm role in the region. Russia’s security, economic and particularly political 
influences have gradually grown in strength, giving the other two powers a larger 
challenge.
According to this work, Islam is a growing power in the region and has gained 
momentum primarily as a result o f internal factors in the region, although regional and 
global Islamic forces are also looked at. Islam’s cultural and political influences are 
particularly effective in the development o f Islam as a power in the region.
Central Asia’s geo-strategic importance was soon realised by Washington after 
independence. This thesis argues that competition and not cooperation characterised 
the relationship between Russia and America throughout the 1990’s and in particular 
after September 11, which led to America’s increased involvement in the region. The 
USA’s economic and security-related influences have been the strongest and most 
successful. Its political influences have often been seen as counter-productive by 
pushing different segments o f the population towards the other two powers. America’s 
cultural influences come last.
This thesis has consequently provided a platform for measuring competing influences 
from Russia, Islam and America in Central Asia.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Aims of the Thesis
Throughout history Central Asia, defined here as the five ‘Islamic’ former Soviet 
Republics o f Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, has 
found itself host to battling powers aimed at wooing and triumphing as the strongest 
players in the region. The geo-political and geo-economic importance of Central Asia 
has once again pushed it to the forefront of the international stage. It rests at the 
frontier between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds; it borders some o f the most 
dynamic and Islamicised countries o f the 21st century such as Pakistan, Iran and 
Afghanistan. It lies between two regional powers, Russia and China, the former still 
over-shadowing the region from its not so distant Soviet legacy. Central Asia’s energy 
resources and geo-strategic location have tempted Washington since independence. 
The real opportunity for Washington to become engaged in the region came after 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent war on terror, which opened a new chapter in the 
history of Central Asia. All these factors have made Central Asia a battleground for 
competing influences in the post-independence period, which is what this thesis is 
aimed at researching. This thesis identifies Russia, Islam and America as the three 
main powers competing for influence over Central Asia. It looks at four types of 
influence, which enable each power to compete with the other. These four strands of 
influence are: cultural, political, economic and security-based. The definition o f what 
is meant by influences, and why this thesis regards these three powers, as the main 
competitors will be discussed below. The aim of this thesis is to research the strengths 
and weaknesses o f each power, and how they interact with each o f the five Central 
Asian countries through their four different strands o f influence. Hence the main 
research question, asks which one of these powers, Russian, Islamic or American has 
the strongest influence over Central Asia since 1991 and why?
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1.2 The Meaning o f Power and Influence
Before this section approaches the definition of ‘influence’ and the kinds of influences 
this thesis is concerned with, it is first important to explain what this thesis means 
when it refers to ‘a power’. According to this thesis, Russia, Islam and America are 
powers with competing influences. Describing Russia and America as powers fits the 
general, and broad definition o f how powers are defined in social science literature. 
Power is often understood as a combination of capacities at the disposal of a state.1 
Aron defines powers along similar lines and says it is the ‘ability possessed by one 
man or a group to establish relations conforming to his or its wishes with other people
•y
or groups’. Most definitions o f ‘a power’ refer to countries, individuals or groups and 
their ability to use their resources to affect the behaviour o f another country or 
countries or group o f people.3 As discussed above the common definition of ‘a power’ 
refers to countries. A disadvantage o f comparing powers deriving from a state to a 
power exercised by a religious tradition is that this kind o f comparison comes under 
question as it steps outside what is traditionally done.4 Other disadvantages and 
advantages o f this kind o f comparison are discussed below.
One of the main contributions o f this thesis is that it takes the meaning of ‘a power’ 
even further that what has traditionally been focused on. Islam in this thesis is also 
defined as ‘a power’ even though its capabilities are not institutionalized. Unlike 
countries it does not have a distinct set o f objectives such as domestic, economic or 
foreign policies. A single body, such as a government, does not navigate it. This can be 
seen as a disadvantage as it makes it more difficult to justify how Islamic influences 
can be compared to influences from two countries. According to this thesis this does 
not weaken the ability of Islam to produce change through its different strands of
1 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism . Pluralism. Globalism . 
and B eyond. Boston, London, 1999, pp. 64-65
2 Raymond Aron, Etudes Politiques. Paris, 1972, p. 176
3 John G. Stoessinger, The M ight o f  Nations: World Politics in Our T im es. N ew  York, 1975, pp. 26-27
4 When d iscussing m y thesis in Central Asia, many would question w hy I chose to compare two  
countries to a religion. They argued that this was not what was com m only done when looking at 
com peting influences in the region. 1 would reply that this was the w hole point o f  my work; it offered a 
different angle, with new com parisons to how com peting powers were view ed  and researched.
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influences (these will be discussed below). According to this thesis, it is this change 
that Islam can have on Central Asian politics and society, which has earned it the 
status o f ‘a power’. As this thesis shows, a power does not need to be controlled by a 
state to be able to change and affect the way a country is ruled or the way its 
population would like to be ruled, or the way they behave. This thesis focuses on what 
affects the internal dynamics of the Central Asian countries, what affects the political, 
economic, security-related and cultural directions the Central Asian countries are 
taking. Islam, as this thesis tries to show, plays a strong role in this process, equal to 
that o f ‘traditional’ country powers, and thus should be put on par with them. The 
emphasis should not be on what Islam is, but on the effects it has that are of 
importance and relevance to this thesis. Therefore, depriving it o f the status or ‘a 
power’ means very much undermining its capabilities and strengths, which this thesis 
(at times) shows to be far greater than that of a country. These are some o f the main 
advantages o f looking at Islam as ‘a power’, equal to Russia and the USA.
Cline argues that ‘a power’ is a state that causes the government o f another state to do 
something it otherwise may not do.5 This thesis is not only concerned with states and 
their impact on other states, it also looks at the way the population outside the circles 
o f the ruling elites behaves and how their behaviour could affect the state. This 
highlights how certain definitions o f ‘a power’ have limitations. As this thesis will 
show, Russia and America are capable through their influences to have an impact on 
the direction the Central Asian regimes and population pursue. They are able to affect 
the political, social and cultural orientations different strata o f the population take. 
Islam equally has the ability to do so and even change the face o f Central Asia, as we 
know it today. This thesis offers a new approach to researching powers with competing 
influences. It emphasises the essential point that ‘a power’ is any force that has the 
capabilities to instigate change in its favour. Whether this power is a country, or group 
o f people or a religion does not matter.
As this thesis is aimed at deriving which power has the greatest influence over Central 
Asia, it is also essential to define what this thesis means when influences are compared
5 Ray S. C line, World Power Trends and US Foreign Policy for the 1980’s . Boulder, 1980, p. 80
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and discussed. Before this can be done, the definition of ‘influence’ by political 
scientists is important to underline. The basic definition of ‘influence’ is when one 
party has the ability and the will to modify the behaviour of other parties or party. 
According to Rubinstein, it is when a donor commits certain resources to a recipient in 
return for short and long-term benefits. The donor’s agreement to provide aid results 
from its conviction that its involvement will be of benefit to itself. This can be defined 
in terms o f advantages promoting its strategic, political, diplomatic, economic or 
cultural aims. The policy of a third party (often another donor) is a result of its 
understanding of the relationship between the original donor and the recipient. Even if 
both donors are external powers, their influence can show in the domestic milieu of the 
recipient, this adds further substance to their presence.6 Influence in this sense strictly 
means non-military. According to this thesis influence is non-military and military, it 
can be both soft and hard power. Soft policy has more long-term benefits; its aims are 
to convince and not to dictate. Influence can be opinion shaping, often not noticed by
7 • •the recipient or seen as interference. In regards to this thesis, the first donor can be 
seen as Russia, the second donor as America and the third as Islam; the recipient is 
Central Asia. This thesis primarily looks at Islam as an internal power, although it also 
points out to instances when Islam has external influences as well. Most definitions o f 
influence fit well when discussing external powers, such as countries as donors. Islam 
as a power lacks the infrastructure which Russia and America have to help them exert 
their influences, its strengths are more related to its historic legacy and advancing its 
cultural, social and political objectives. Its economic objectives are limited. This does 
not mean that its influence is weaker; it holds strong influence over the recipient’s 
domestic scene. It is an invisible persuader, which can profoundly change and mould 
the opinion of certain groups in Central Asia. Islam’s strength comes from within 
Central Asian society, and sometimes as a result o f America’s (or Russia’s) 
relationship with Central Asia. It is hard to compete with as it lies in the hearts and 
minds o f groups and individuals within Central Asian society.
6 A lvin  Z. Rubinstein, ‘A ssessin g Influence as a Problem in Foreign P olicy A nalysis’, in A lvin Z. 
Rubinstein (ed .), Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third W orld. N ew  York, W ashington, London, 
1975, pp. 1-18
7 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign P olicy , Houndm ills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, N ew  
York, 2003 , pp. 134-136
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The term ‘competing influences’ is becoming increasingly used when referring to 
Central Asia, yet it is seldom well defined. It is easy to talk about different influences 
without having a clear definition or picture of how these influences are enhancing 
Russian, Islamic or American presence amongst all strata o f the population and 
government. The influences researched in this thesis are segmented into four branches 
related to the security of Central Asia, the domestic politics, economics and culture. It 
is the mix of these four different influences, which enables Russia, Islam or the USA 
to have the greatest say in how each country functions and works, and where each 
country sees its interests. These four strands of influence affect the pivotal concerns, 
needs and decisions o f the Central Asian governments and population. The following 
paragraphs will explain the methodology of how the above influences are measured in 
this thesis.
Politically all five Central Asia countries are closer to the Russian model of governing 
than to the American model or an Islamic one. The Soviet legacy of governing still 
looms over their political system, giving Russia a strong political influence; in addition 
four Central Asian countries are member of the Commonwealth o f Independent States 
(CIS). Turkmenistan officially stopped its permanent membership in 2005, and instead 
became an associate member. This new position, Ashghabad argued, was more in line
Q
with the country’s status o f permanent neutrality. In terms o f democratisation, both 
Russia and Central Asia have struggled to sustain the levels of liberalism and elements 
o f democratisation first seen at the beginning of the 1990’s. Russian political influence 
is less threatening than Islamic or American political influence. It accepts the status 
quo, and over the years, since the break-up of the USSR, Russia has increasingly 
edged closer to the style of governing common amongst Central Asian elites. The 
problems and criticisms that Russia faces today, in terms o f its commitment to 
democratic elements, are very similar to those found in Central Asia. Although 
Russia’s political influence over the Central Asian regimes is profound, the Central 
Asian regimes face obstacles that are less confrontational in the Russian political 
system. One o f the main threat to all Central Asian governments, regardless of the
8 Valentinas Mite, ‘CIS: Turkmenistan Reduces Ties to A ssociate M em ber’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio 
Liberty, d.o (date originated) 29 .8 .05 , d.d (date downloaded) 25 .5 .06 , 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/26dab4c9-5bal
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actual levels of Islamicisation in their country, is inspired by the fear o f increasing 
levels of Islamicisation, which may threaten the political status o f the country. Political 
Islam has a considerable amount of influence over the domestic political milieu in 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and especially in Tajikistan, where an Islamic party forms part 
o f the government. There is collective concern that the political Islamicisation of one 
country will have effects on the other countries, especially if this influence originates 
from Uzbekistan, which borders all the other Central Asian countries. Both Russia and 
Islam have political influences over Central Asia, the former by far more than the 
latter, although the latter’s influence appears to be on a rise. America’s political 
influence in terms o f the structure and attitude of the domestic political models is the 
weakest. It is important to remember that although America’s political influence is 
relatively weak compared to the other two powers, its strength in other spheres enables 
it to indirectly have a stronger political role. For example, America’s strong economic 
and security-related influences enable it to get more involved in the domestic political 
scene. This is how influences interact and link. America’s domestic political role is 
aided by its strong influence over other aspects of Central Asian affairs.
In terms o f cultural influences, the Central Asians- to different degrees depending on 
where they are from-are still under the influence o f linguistic and behavioral 
Russification. The Russian way o f life and culture is seen in the way the Central 
Asians (especially the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz) behave, think, talk, dress, and drink. 
In Kazakhstan specifically, Russia has even had an influence on the national identity of 
some sections of the population. The historic legacy has moulded the beliefs and 
attitudes of the vast majority of Central Asians, giving Russian cultural influences a 
superior position to the influences of any other power. Islam’s cultural influences 
should not be underestimated. Although they are weak in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and the north of Kyrgyzstan, Islamic cultural influences can not be ignored in 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the south of Kyrgyzstan. Headscarves are seen on women 
in the latter groups of countries, Islamic greetings are used, mosques and madrassas 
are frequently found, as are other symbols of Islam. It is the strong cultural Islamic 
influence on society that has allowed for the evolution of political Islam. This is where 
cultural and political Islamic influences are to some extent interlinked. The roots of 
Islamic extremism cannot develop without an Islamic culture, although a strong
14
Islamic culture does not have to result in Islamic extremism. Other domestic factors, 
which this thesis also covers, contribute to extremism. American cultural influences 
are weak in comparison to the other two powers, and also very badly researched, 
which is where this thesis offers another contribution. As previously mentioned, 
America’s political influence can be enhanced as a result o f Washington’s strong 
economic and security-related influences in the region; American cultural influences 
are more difficult to develop. Economic and security-related influences are the easiest 
to develop and the most susceptible to change, followed by political influence. Cultural 
influences on the other hand are more stable and permanent, as culture is a result o f 
years o f development. Nevertheless, American cultural influence cannot be 
underestimated; as Zbigniew Brzezinski states, American culture has unchallenged 
appeal.9 American food chains are not found anywhere in Central Asia, although, for 
example, hamburgers and hot-dogs and other American kinds o f food are. Washington 
is attempting to promote education in English in universities, and American pop music 
is undeniably popular.
Russia also has a strong presence in security-related influences. It has two military 
bases in the region, more than any other power, and its 201st Motor Rifle Division 
(MRD) and government played a crucial role in ending the Tajik civil war, which 
threatened to engulf the region under a green Islamic banner. The events in Andijan in 
May 2005 also raised speculation that the Russian army played a role in dealing with 
the unrest. Whether this is true or not is unknown, but the mere fact that Russia had 
been named as the only foreign power mediating and calming the situation during the 
unrest o f the Andijan events, suggests that Russia is very much seen as a security 
provider for even the least (at that time) pro-Russian Central Asian government. 
Russia has also often played a mediating role in disputes between stronger and weaker 
Central Asian countries. After Andijan, Russia has engaged in military exercises with 
Uzbekistan, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) seems to have 
developed into the strongest organisation Russia and the Central Asian countries are 
involved in. This organisation heavily depends on Chinese participation, and has 
proven to be far more effective and stable than CIS organisation. It is slowly becoming
9 Z bigniew  Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its G eo-Strategic Imperatives 
(hereafter The Grand Chessboard). N ew  York, 1997, p. 25
15
the most reliable security-concerned organisation in the region, especially at a time 
when security is becoming a vital priority in domestic policy.10
In terms o f security threats, the Taliban movement and the extremist Central Asian 
organisations that were aided by Al-Qaida and the Taliban were the greatest security 
threats the region has seen in a very long time. The survival and continued strength of 
the Taliban regime (before Operation Enduring Freedom) brought fears o f an 
uncontrollable wave o f Islamicisation across the region. The USA was the only power 
able to alleviate this fear; this was the ultimate security-providing test, and Washington 
was able to deliver what Russia could not. This brought Washington closer to the 
domestic affairs o f the region. American bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan gave 
Washington a foothold in the region, and an opportunity to diversify American 
influences. The most prominent security-providing role that Islam has played in the 
region was the Iranian participation in the cease-fire that brought an end to the Tajik 
civil war. The Islamic Republic of Iran gave Islam a security-related influence. Islam 
in this thesis is mainly seen as an internal power although the above example shows 
how Islam can have both internal and external influences on Central Asia.
American economic influences are strong in the region, and although most Central 
Asian countries have had a vast amount to gain from American investments, aid 
packages and pipeline projects, none of them have changed their internal political 
system to better suit that o f the USA. As discussed above, Central Asia’s internal 
political affairs have been consistent with the Russian model, although Washington’s 
strong economic influences have had an impact on some o f these countries’ foreign 
policy orientations. Hence economic influences have had an effect on foreign policy. 
Uzbekistan could not continue its firm relationship with Washington, and be a large 
recipient of American foreign aid without having to align its foreign policy to 
America. Kyrgyzstan’s and especially Kazakhstan’s aspirations to improve their 
economic milieu, and diversify their energy outputs has meant having to maintain and 
improve their relationship with the greatest economic power in the world. This has not
10 K. K Tokaev, M inister o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Republic o f  Kazakhstan, d iscussing ‘Kazakhstan in 
the Context o f  the G eo-P olitics o f  the Caspian’ at the International Institute o f  Strategic Studies, 
London, 9 .3 .06
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been done by introducing fundamental changes to the domestic scene, but by 
diversifying their foreign policy. Russia’s economic influence should not be under­
estimated. Moscow’s control o f most of the energy networks will for a long period of 
time keep the energy rich Central Asian countries under its fold. In addition, Russia 
does not make internal political demands on the Central Asian countries for the 
economic assistance it delivers, which consequently makes it a preferred partner.
Uzbekistan remains more aligned to Russia in its internal political model than to any of 
the other two powers. It portrayed (at least for most o f the period this thesis is 
concerned with) an interesting combination of strong Russian domestic influences but 
a pro-American foreign policy. In foreign policy, Karimov more than any other Central 
Asian leader, gave Washington the greatest amount o f influence. Uzbekistan was the 
only Central Asian country to firmly align itself in the American camp of CIS nations. 
It withdrew from the Russian led Collective Security Treaty (CST) and joined 
American-sponsored GUUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova). It allowed an American base to be set up on its soil, and gave the USA its 
undeniable support in the war on terror, consequently creating warm bilateral and 
diplomatic links. This enabled Tashkent to be the recipient o f  the largest amount of 
foreign aid given to any Central Asian country. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been 
more consistent with its domestic affairs. Its domestic political system and foreign 
policy have been aligned to Russia, although in early 2006 it showed increasing desire 
to further its relationship with NATO with the objective o f becoming the first Central 
Asian country to become a permanent member of the organisation. Kyrgyzstan has 
followed a similar pattern to Kazakhstan; its domestic and foreign policies are more 
aligned to Moscow than to America or the Islamic world, although like Kazakhstan it 
has at times shown signs of a trend to balance its foreign policy in ways that do not 
antagonise the USA. Tajikistan’s foreign policy lies firmly in the Russian camp; it has 
a Russian military base on its soil, and the Rahmonov regime is substantially loyal to 
Moscow. Turkmenistan prides itself in having a neutral foreign policy in spite of its 
Soviet internal political model. As a result o f Russia’s political, economic and cultural 
influences on the country, it appears probable that after the end o f the Niyazov regime, 
Russia is more likely to become involved in the country’s internal and external policies 
than any other power. From the above it seems that there often exists a relationship
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between different influences. For example, Russia’s strong domestic influences often 
(but not always) result in good foreign relations, while America’s strong economic 
influences also affect its foreign policy with the Central Asian countries. American 
security-related influences in Kyrgyzstan (military base) have undeniably also 
improved the two countries’ foreign links. American foreign relations with 
Turkmenistan reached a peak when the Trans-Afghan-Pipeline (TAP) was an active 
project. This relationship may be resumed if the TAP project will be reopened in the 
future.
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1.3 Contributions
Although this thesis fits the general trend o f what other academics have written in 
regards to competing influences over contemporary Central Asia, it has also offered 
some contributions in areas where research had previously been weak. In addition, it 
has provided definitions, which have in the past not been thoroughly examined. 
Competition for influence over Central Asia has been a pivotal point for this thesis 
even when the general opinion, especially at the initial stages o f the war on terror, was 
more inclined to see cooperation than competition unfold between Moscow and 
Washington. Concern at not reincarnating cold war attitudes and language between 
Washington and Moscow have at times resulted in open declarations of cooperation 
and friendship, although each power’s actions and indirect verbal rivalry has often 
gone against the interest o f the other. This was most recently seen with the SCO 
declaration in 2005, that American foreign bases in Central Asia had outlived their 
welcome and usefulness.
Islam as a power with competing influences is not widely researched. It is often 
written about as a threat, a destabilising force but not as a competing power with 
competing influences. The fact that it is an internal force and not just one derived from 
a specific external country does not weaken its claim as a power capable of changing 
the face of Central Asia as we know it today. In addition, although this thesis primarily 
argues that the main forces behind the escalation o f Islam in the region are a result o f 
internal factors, external factors also play a role on the rise o f Islamic sentiments. The
term ‘Islam’ as a competing power with influences does not only refer to the growth of
• • 1 1  12 political Islam but also to secular Islam (both these terms will be more clearly
defined in the chapter looking at Islamic influences and Central Asia), both ultimately
weaken the influences of the other two powers. As discussed in the previous section, it
is harder to define Islam as a power, as it does not have a base from which it can exert
its force. Nevertheless, its influences, as already stated, have repeatedly stirred changes
11 Political Islam is when religion plays a role in state affairs; in the w ay the country is governed.
Secular Islam is non-politicised Islam. Secular Islam is Islam ’s cultural influence on a population. It 
refers to the w ay people act, behave and perceive them selves.
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and created concern for individual Central Asian countries and the region in general. 
Islam is often overlooked by academics as a competing power with competing 
influences simply because competing powers are traditionally countries (external 
forces). Islam is a hidden power, affecting the very mindsets o f those that determine 
which power is the most enduring in the region. This is where this thesis offers another 
contribution to the academic literature; it argues that internal and external powers can 
be compared; that Russian, Islamic and American influences can be placed on the 
same level. Traditionally this has not been the common way of comparing competing 
influences. Influences do not need to be slotted in either external or internal categories. 
This thesis makes it clear that external powers, such as Russia (and America) also have 
internal influences. One o f Russia’s main advantage points is that it has such a 
profound cultural influence on Central Asian society. This is an internal influence from 
an external power. External and internal influences can overlap; separating them does 
not allow for the full understanding o f the total effects o f Russia, Islam and America 
on Central Asia. The literature review below further highlights the areas where this 
thesis has contributed to the Central Asian academic arena.
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1.4 Literature Review
As a result o f the ever-increasing amount of literature dedicated to Central Asia, which 
indicates the growing international/academic interest and importance of this region, it 
has been extremely difficult to choose what to include in this review. There are far too 
many books that deserve to be reviewed than this review has allowed for. Many items 
o f literature used in this thesis have been very beneficial and essential to any Central 
Asian specialist; this review has picked a few of these items and analysed their 
weaknesses and strengths, in addition to how this thesis has contributed to the 
literature available. This review has divided the items o f literature used into three 
groups. The first one looks at multi-authored volumes that analyse influences of 
different powers in Central Asia. These items of literature can be seen as the 
predecessors of this thesis, as they attempt to discuss or at least lay out competing 
influences in the region. The second groups o f works are single authored, and look at 
the internal and external policies of the Central Asian countries and the influences that 
affect them. Hence the second collection of books is able to compare influences more 
consistently and effectively, which is a weakness of the multi-authored volumes. The 
third group o f books looks at items o f literature, which are particularly good for 
specific chapters in the thesis.
Peter Ferdinand’s multi-authored volume, The New Central Asia and its Neighbours13, 
is a good example of a piece of literature written during the early years of 
independence when it was not yet totally clear which players would engage in the 
region. Shirin Akiner dedicates a chapter called ‘Post-Soviet Central Asia’14, primarily 
to the domestic affairs of Central Asia, such as geography, ethnic composition, historic 
legacies, political organisations, religion, the economy, social issues, and regional 
stability. There is no reference to a power, internal or external, affecting the orientation 
o f the region.
13 Peter Ferdinand (ed.), The N ew  Central A sia and its Neighbours (hereafter The N ew  Central A sia). 
London, 1994
14 Shirin Akiner, ‘Post-Soviet Central A sia ’ in Ferdinand (ed.), The N ew  Central A sia , pp. 4-36
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Grigory Bondarevsky and Peter Ferdinand’s chapter on ‘Russian Foreign Policy and 
Central Asia’15 lays out Russia’s past and present role in the region. What has to be 
kept in mind is that this volume was written in the Kozyrev period, when Russian 
foreign policy was the most distanced from Central Asian affairs, and when Russian 
influences were perhaps at their weakest in the post-Soviet era. Ultimately, this chapter 
falls short o f evidence and analysis o f Russia’s engagement in the region vis-a-vis 
other powers. The authors warn of the increasing role o f Islam, and give an indication 
o f its growing popularity. They argue that increased trends o f Islamicisation could 
cause a rift between Christian orthodox Russia and Muslim Central Asia. In their view, 
both groups o f people are searching for a new identity, which they could find in 
religion. Thus the concept of Eurasianism is marginalised, which both Russia and 
Central Asia (mainly Kazakhstan) are very dedicated to. The Kazakh government has 
even built the Gumilev Eurasian State University in Almaty; this can be interpreted as 
a symbol o f the Kazakh Eurasian identity. Consequently, the authors also overlook the 
effects o f linguistic and behavioral Russification, when they argue that religion could 
cause a breakdown in Russian Central Asian relations. In addition, the authors are not 
acknowledging that secular Islam and Russian foreign policy have in the past (inside 
and outside the region) been compatible, therefore Russia’s involvement in the region 
domestically and externally may not spark a wave o f Islamicisation, which is what the 
authors suggest.
The authors completely overlook Russian political, cultural, and security-related 
influences as well, and only make a brief acknowledgment of economic influences. 
According to Bondarevsky and Ferdinand, economic influences and other aspects of 
Russian-Central Asian interaction are primarily seen to benefit the Central Asian 
countries. Russia’s advantages from remaining prominent in the region both for its 
own economic situation and for its reputation as a ‘power’ are completely under­
estimated. In addition, there is a need for a more analytical approach when looking at 
Russian-Central Asian relations, and for an awareness that there exist different internal 
and external characteristics in each country that should be examined individually.
15 Grigory Bondarevsky and Peter Ferdinand, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Central A sia ’ in Ferdinand 
(ed .), The N ew  Central A sia , pp. 36-55
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Phil Robins’s chapter on ‘The Middle East and Central Asia’16 is characteristic o f the 
period in which the book was written. In the early 1990’s there was a certain amount 
of speculation that the Middle East would have some form of influence over the 
development o f the newly independent Central Asian countries. Robins, admittedly 
gives reasons why the Middle East as a region is not as important to Central Asia as 
first expected. The very fact that a chapter has been dedicated to the Middle East and 
Central Asia is indicative o f the controversy at the time over the orientations o f the 
region.
Anthony Hyman dedicates his chapter to the region’s relationship with Afghanistan
1 7and South Asia. This was the period when the Taliban had not yet shown the extent 
o f their extremism and destabilising affects that they later became associated with; thus 
relations with Afghanistan were not seen with as much skepticism as they were a few 
years later. Nevertheless, the author does acknowledge Afghanistan (and Tajikistan) as 
countries contributing to regional instability. The ethnic links between the Tajiks, 
Turkmens and Uzbeks in Afghanistan are some of the most important aspects that bind 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan. Hyman explains these 
connections. Afghanistan certainly played a large role in Central Asia’s domestic 
affairs throughout the 1990’s, more as a result o f the growth o f political Islam, which 
threatened to spill into Central Asia, than as a result o f ethnic fraternity. Hyman does 
not differentiate between external Islamic influences and domestic reasons for 
Islamicisation. This thesis differentiates between these two methods o f Islamic 
influences. In addition the Islamicising effects o f the Taliban were very different in 
each o f the five Central Asian countries. The author then looks at Pakistan and India’s 
effects on the region and argues that Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, having strong 
ethnic, religious and economic bonds, will continue to strengthen their relationship 
with Central Asia whether or not these countries break away from Russia’s shadow. 
These three countries have no doubt continued to have contact with the Central Asian 
region, but their economic, and ethnic bonds have not profoundly developed since
16 Philip Robins, ‘The M iddle East and Central A sia ’ in Ferdinand (ed.), The N ew  Central A sia , pp. 55- 
75
17 Anthony Hym an, ‘Central A sia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South A sia ’ in Ferdinand (ed.), The 
N ew  Central A sia , pp. 75-95
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1994. Today, these countries, especially India and Pakistan are on the periphery of 
Central Asian politics and foreign policy.
Another chapter by Ferdinand is dedicated to Central Asia and China18. This chapter 
was very beneficial to this thesis as it traces reasons for the escalation of Chinese 
influences in Central Asia. This thesis does not look at China as having competing 
influence (the reasons for this are explained in the chapter related to Russian 
influences in Central Asia) but does acknowledge the gradual growing role of China in 
the region. Ferdinand looks in particular at the Xinjiang region, and its bonds with 
Central Asia. This is very relevant today, (more so than in 1994) because it gives 
Beijing a shared area o f concern with the Central Asian countries. Xinjiang, being the 
hotbed for religious extremism in China, gives cause for Beijing to create regional 
security-based organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which 
are aimed at fighting extremism, separatism and secessionism. Ferdinand offers an 
introduction to the relationship between Beijing, Xinjiang and Central Asia. His 
chapter is generally too focused on the historical legacies between these two places, 
making it slightly out o f date even for 1994. Nevertheless it is good in the way it 
shows China to be a power difficult to ignore in Central Asia’s political affairs.
Roy Allison and Lena Jonson’s collective volume, Central Asian Security: The New 
International Context, shares many similarities with this thesis.19 This volume was one 
o f the first to offer a clear layout o f the main competing powers in the region and their 
influences, and was extremely useful when analyzing the three main powers this thesis 
is concerned with. By 2001 it had already become clear that Russia, Islam and 
America were prominent players in the Central Asian arena. Since September 11 and 
the war on terror, the main players in the region have become better defined as the 
scope of competition has unfolded. After September 11, both America and Russia 
became more overtly involved in the region, and to a much more intense level. Islam 
has also become more prominent in its affects on politics and culture. These conditions 
were not present in 2001; hence this volume can be seen as a kind of predecessor to
18 Peter Ferdinand, ‘The N ew  Central Asia and China’ in Ferdinand (ed .), The N ew  Central A sia, pp. 
95-107
19 Roy A llison and Lena Jonson (eds.), Central Asian Security: The N ew  International Context 
(hereafter Central Asian Security). W ashington, D.C, 2001
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this thesis as it does not incorporate the changes that the war on terror brought to the 
region.
The first chapter is dedicated to Central Asia’s security,20 and discusses Russia’s 
relative weakness in the region in the 1990’s, and the Central Asian countries’ quest to 
diversify their security policy relations outside the scope o f the CIS. It also offers an 
introduction to the rest of the volume. This thesis also argues that the Central Asian 
countries were eager to find new security alliances, this was seen in their participation 
in NATO’s partnership for peace programme (PFP), the creation o f Centrasbat (with 
American assistance), military training under American supervision, and the 
participation o f Uzbekistan in GUUAM. Jonson and Allison discuss the Central Asian 
security complex and how the security policies o f all five countries are very much 
interlinked. This is an issue which this thesis also covers, and argues that whether each 
Central Asian country acknowledges it or not, the stability and security o f each 
country, including Russia, is very much interlinked or at least has some effects on the 
behaviour o f other regional countries. Jonson and Allison’s analysis o f how outside 
powers can affect regional security is very similar to the analysis this thesis puts 
forwards. They argue that the dynamics between two outside powers focusing on a 
region may result in rivalry and tension, consequently affecting internal regional 
dynamics. This is what this thesis calls competing influences, which it argues have 
been building up since independence, and profoundly strengthened after September 11 
and the USA’s new role in the region. While this thesis placed two external powers as 
rivals-Russia and America, Jonson and Allison also include Iran, Turkey and China.
9  tMartha Brill Olcott’s chapter does not look at powers and competing influences, but 
gives an analysis of the history o f the region and mainly focuses on the internal issues, 
which affect the five countries. This chapter could have been more complete had it 
included more scope and detail for the lack o f democratisation in each country. Instead 
this chapter offers a brief and simple introduction to Central Asia.
20 A llison  and Jonson, ‘Central Asian Security: Internal and External D ynam ics’ in A llison  and Jonson 
(eds.), Central Asian Security, pp. 1-22
21 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia: Com m on Legacies and C onflicts’ in A llison  and Jonson (eds.), 
Central Asian Security, pp. 24-48
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99Alexei Malashenko’s chapter on Islam in Central Asia clearly acknowledges the 
Islamicisation process in the region, although he refers to Islam as a factor and not a 
power with competing influences. He clarifies that Islam is spreading amongst most 
societies, including in its political form, and points out that this is causing growing 
concern for the elites o f even the least Islamic countries, forcing them to crack down 
on Islamic opponents. He does not include the process o f cracking down on all 
opposition, Islamic or not, which is also occurring in the name of limiting political 
Islam. Malashenko places Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the Central Asian countries 
most prone to Islamicisation. This thesis also places importance on the Islamicisation 
process in Kyrgyzstan, which is slightly underestimated in this chapter. Although 
Kyrgyzstan is by no means the center o f Islamic activity, the south of the country is 
home to a growing trend o f Islamists, who often support the involvement of religion in 
state affairs. Malashenko discussed the main Islamic parties and movement in the 
region and puts forward the argument that these groups have grown in popularity as a 
result o f the elites not being able to sufficiently deal with the growing social and 
economic crisis in their countries. This thesis argues along similar lines, and 
emphasised the appeal o f religion in societies with social, economic and political 
problems.
Malashenko also discusses external Islamic influences (although he does not call them 
that), such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Similar to this thesis, he argues that concern 
over the Taliban regime was not a result o f the possibility that the Taliban would 
spread into Central Asia, but more because it was feared that political Islam and the 
spread o f extremism might spill into Central Asia and become appealing to some 
Central Asians, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. Malashenko then points out to 
events that made radical Islam a regional concern, and which ultimately also affected 
Russia. The 1999 Tashkent bombings and the Batken incursions in 1999 and 2000 by 
the Islamic Movement o f Uzbekistan (IMU) are covered. It is in this section that this 
thesis disagrees with Malashenko, who argues that during some of these incidents, the 
IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) interacted and worked together. This thesis clearly 
explains the differences between each Islamic party/movement and highlights their
22 A lexei M alashenko, ‘Islam in Central A sia’ in A llison and Jonson (eds.), Central Asian Security, pp. 
49-68
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opposing tactics, which ultimately prevent them from working together. Malashenko 
does not analyse these differences, and puts forward the idea o f collaboration, which 
this thesis disagrees with.
Malashenko places a lot of importance on the growing Islamic identity o f the people of 
Central Asia, and says that this to some extent has affected their relationship with 
Christian Orthodox Russia. This thesis does not disagree with the bases of this 
argument, but also places a lot o f emphasis on Russification in both its forms (as a 
counter-balance to this process), which Malashenko appears to have overlooked. 
Malashenko does, however, emphasize the increase of Russian security-related 
influences on Central Asia as a result o f the growth of Islamic extremism in the region. 
He argues that this phenomenon increased Russian influence (he uses the word 
influence) and consequently affected Central Asia’s foreign policies towards Russia as 
well. There is no reference to the role the USA played in the region in regards to 
security, which by the late 1990’s had become part of Washington’s strategy. 
Malashenko writes a very good chapter on Islam in Central Asia but does not 
sufficiently link his findings to other players or factors also involved in the area 
(although he does write about Russia), and how this generally affects the policies of 
each Central Asian country and the region as a whole.
As with most literature written by Lena Jonson on Russia’s role in Central Asia, her 
chapter in this volume is o f great interest and benefit to all those looking at Russian 
influences in the post-Soviet era.23 In spite o f conflicting analysis between her findings 
and those in this thesis, this chapter highlights different strands o f Russia’s role in the 
region, which took a much milder and ambiguous form than they did in the post- 
September 11 era. Jonson names the four strands of influences, economic, political, 
cultural and security-related, on which this thesis bases the strength of competing 
powers, and argues that Russia is the strongest in the security sphere than in any of the 
others. This is an indication that the approach taken by this thesis to identify the most 
determining ‘influences’ is one Jonson would agree with. Jonson argues that in the
23 Lena Jonson, ‘Russia and Central A sia ’, in A llison and Jonson (eds.), Central Asian Security, pp. 95- 
126
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security sphere, Russia is becoming increasingly undermined by the role played by 
other external powers in the region. (Thus hinting at a clash o f interest in the region).
Jonson traces the evolution of Russian interest in the region throughout the 1990’s, and 
places security related policies as a priority for Russia. She stresses the concern of 
Russia becoming marginalised in this sphere as a result o f Central Asia’s willingness 
to allow other external powers, such as America and China, to become engaged with 
its affairs. She gives the example of NATO’s PFP programme as a counter policy to 
Russia’s military involvement in Central Asia. The Islamic threat is emphasised by 
Jonson as an area o f concern uniting Russia and Central Asia in the security field; 
Islam is never referred to as a competing power like the USA or China.
Jonson’s next section is dedicated to Russia’s military and security relationship with 
the region. The first regional defence/security-related organisation bringing Russia and 
the Central Asian countries together was the CST, which Jonson hints (again) was 
challenged with the growing role o f the NATO’s PFP programme. As this section 
mainly focuses on security issues, Jonson could have gone into more detail about the 
CST, what its main aims, priorities and weaknesses were. Uzbekistan’s relationship 
with Russia is then approached. Jonson traces the change in Tashkent’s relationship 
with Moscow and its orientation away from Russia, and Russian centered regional 
groupings. The chapter concerned with Russian influences in this thesis is a more 
detailed continuation to Jonson’s work. For example it looks at Russia’s security- 
related relationship (as well as economic, cultural and political) with each of the five 
Central Asian courtiers separately. Jonson also does this in a simplified and brief 
manner; she does not give as much detail and analysis o f regional organisations, 
reasons for membership, relationship between members and competing parallel 
security-structures. This is clearly seen with her analysis o f Uzbek-Russian relations.
Jonson identifies three factors that have the potential to ignite conflict in the region. 
These are the Tajik factor, the Uzbek factor and the Afghan factor. The Tajik factor 
very much translates into an ‘Islamic factor’, which is by no means a Tajik 
phenomenon but a Central Asian one in general, in spite of Tajikistan’s partly religious 
civil war. Jonson places too much power in Uzbekistan when referring to the Uzbek
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factor, and Uzbekistan’s regional power base. This thesis argues that with so many 
competing and potentially competing influences in the region, Uzbekistan’s role as a 
‘power’ should not be over-estimated. In addition, Uzbekistan’s Islamic problems in 
the past three years have often appeared more volatile than that o f Tajikistan. The 
Afghan problem still exists today but it not so much of a ‘problem’ as it was when this 
volume was published, as the Taliban regime has in theory ceased to exist. Again this 
Afghan problem according to this thesis falls under the Islamic factor.24
As seen above, this chapter touches on all the relevant issues regarding Russia and 
Central Asia. Jonson talks about Russia having economic, cultural, security-related and 
political influences but does not show the extent o f these influences on each of the five 
Central Asian countries in as much detail and analysis as this thesis, neither does she 
show how these influences, especially in terms o f security, compare to the influences 
o f other powers. Comparing competing influences helps reveal the strength of the 
power in concern. This thesis offers this continuity.
7 ^Stephen Blank’s chapter on the United States and Central Asia clearly recognises the 
tools o f influence the United States can offer the Central Asian countries. He speaks of 
W ashington’s economic and political interests and military-security cooperations. He 
places emphasis on economic interests, especially in regards to energy relations, 
making this chapter also essential for the chapter in this thesis concerned with petro-
7Apolitics and pipelines. He identifies Central Asia’s energy resources as one of the 
reasons the United States is so concerned with the region, and exposes the competition
77between Russia and America in this field. He reiterates Washington’s rhetoric in
24 For additional reading look at: Sultan A kim bekov, ‘The Conflict in Afghanistan: Conditions, 
Problem s, and the Prospects’ in Boris Rumer (ed .), Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?. Armonk, N Y , 
London, 2 002 , pp. 69-113
25 Stephan Blank, ‘The United States and Central A sia ’ in A llison and Jonson (eds.), Central Asian  
Security, pp. 127-146
26 It is interesting to look at M ichael Kaser and Santosh Mehrotra’s chapter, ‘Natural Resources and 
their E xploitation’, in Roy A llison (ed.), C hallenges from the Former Soviet South. W ashington, DC, 
1996 and note the lack o f  em phasis on untapped and unexploited energy resources attracting 
com petition am ongst potential players in Central Asia. This thesis argues the opposite; by saying that 
energy related influences are part o f  the com petition for power in the region.
27 N ancy Lubin as early as 1994 also talked about the temptations o f  Central A sia ’s energy resources for 
the U SA . Lubin em phasises that at that stage W ashington w as concerned not to antagonise Russia in 
regards to A m erica’s dealings with Central Asia. W ashington had already seen the econom ic  
opportunities that lay behind having influences over this region. What this thesis argues is that
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regards to it proclaimed democratic values and notes that they are not as successful as 
Washington would like. It is at this point that Blank could have discussed America’s 
political influence on each of the Central Asian countries, and how they have served 
(or not) to promote democratic values. Blank touches on these issues but could have 
delved into more detail, especially in regards to Washington’s relationship with the 
Karimov regime. There is no mention o f the relevance of GUUAM, although NATO’s 
PFP is discussed. Again at this stage, it might have also been appropriate to mention 
Russia’s CST, its members and purpose, and how or if, it functioned as a parallel 
security structure rivaling America’s security and military role in Central Asia.
There is also very little mention o f Islamic extremism, and how this could destabilise 
the security of the region and infringe on America’s interests. This was an issue 
Russian security organisations were well aware of. Blank does not see Islam as a 
competing influence, or much o f an influence at all on Central Asian politics, security 
and society. Although his chapter is dedicated to America’s role in Central Asia, and a 
separate chapter on Islam exists in this volume, Blank places a lot o f emphasis on Iran, 
which by 2001 had already appeared as a peripheral influence on Central Asia, but 
hardly mentions the Islamic threat that the Tajik civil war unleashed on the region. 
Blank does not look at cultural influences, and America’s disadvantage in this sphere 
vis-a-vis all the other powers in the region. He talks about Central Asia being under the 
sovereignty o f Russia and its colonial tentacles; overlooking elements of Russification 
that would make some Central Asians give a far less critical description o f their 
relationship with Moscow.
The edition of the Journal o f International Affairs titled ‘Central Asia: The Road
9o
Ahead’ , highlights the whirlpool of competitiveness in the Central Asian arena. 
Similar to the two volumes above, the authors highlight the aims of the power 
discussed, and its vision and impact on the region. This number, written after the
throughout the 1990’s com petition has been an underlying issue between Russia and America. It has 
inevitably increased and becom e more overt over the years. Lubin writes at the early stages o f  the 
Russian-Am erican com petition and identifies that such a problem could arise. For further reading look  
at: N ancy Lubin, ‘Central Asia: Issues and C hallenges for United States P o licy ’ in Ali Banuazizi and 
Myron W einer (eds.), The N ew  G eopolitics o f  Central A sia and its Borders. London, N ew  York, 1994, 
pp. 261-272
‘Central Asia: The Road A head’, Journal o f  International A ffairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003
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events of September 11 and therefore sufficiently up to date, encompasses most of the 
issues this thesis is concerned with. Its chapters examine the main players that have an 
impact on contemporary Central Asia and the region’s evolution in the international 
arena o f the 21st century. Part one of the issue deals with the internal environment of 
the region; the first chapter looks at Islam and Islamicisation. Edward Walker 
describes Islam (political) as one o f the main methods of resistance to the regimes
90today. This situation, he argues, is one o f the main security threats to Central Asia; 
political Islam has become the core method at opposing the existing regimes in 
particularly because other methods at resisting the growing authoritarianism of the 
regimes have failed to deliver the same extent o f mobilisation. He argues that only 
Islam has offered a concrete program of social transformation able to compete with the 
repressive governments. He outlines the core strengths of Islamicisation, while at the 
same time he argues that this is not enough for political Islam to flourish in the region 
just yet. He argues that the downfall o f the Taliban regime has made the Islamicisation 
o f Central Asia less likely. Here he fails to mention other elements that profoundly halt 
the acceleration o f political Islam, such as behavioral Russification.
Walker then makes a very optimistic analysis; he says most Central Asian countries, 
with the exception o f Tajikistan, have been stable since independence. This statement 
best fits the internal situation in Kazakhstan, but is rather hopeful for the other three 
Central Asian countries (Tajikistan not included). Throughout Akayev’s tenure, 
hostility and protest towards his regime sharply rose throughout the 1990’s and finally 
reached its climax with the events that led to the Tulip revolution, and consequently 
his removal from power. Walker does make distinctions between the Islamic 
environment in the south and north of the country but does not sufficiently highlight 
the rising threat o f Islamicisation in the south, and how this has created a north/south 
divide. Not enough is said about HT and the level o f its support, and how it acquires 
this support.
Walker’s assumption that political Islam will not flourish in Kazakhstan is supported 
by this argument that the economic performance o f the country on the whole is high,
29 Edward W. Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central A sia ’, Journal o f  International 
A ffairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003 , pp. 21-43
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and that a good standard o f living often diminishes the need to seek refuge in Islam. 
He does not, however, mention that Islam does not need to flourish in Kazakhstan in 
order to create an unstable environment for it. If Islam dominates the political scene or 
increases in strength in any of the other Central Asian countries, then this could have a 
destabilising effect on Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan has not had the type of protests seen 
in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but that does not mean that it is more stable or immune 
to Islamicisation. The Turkmenbashi’s suffocating grip on power and on his people 
makes it difficult to assess what the most dynamic forces are.
Walker argues that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have witnessed the most amount of 
Islamic instability. The Uzbek regime has been struggling with the rise in 
Islamicisation since the late 1990’s. Walker makes strong parallels between the 
increase in government repression against all forms of opposition, and the rise in 
number of individuals joining Islamic organisations, especially since Karimov’s warm 
relationship with America after September 11. A brief analysis is made of the main 
Islamic organisations in Uzbekistan, such as the IMU and HT. Walker, when 
discussing these organisations, does not make a clear distinction between them, and 
how each one’s methods and tactics differ immensely. Walker gives a good analysis of 
the Tajik civil war, and the role that Islam played throughout it. He argues that the 
limited support of the IRP by the Tajik population (after the end of the civil war) is 
seen by the amount o f votes it received in the 2000 parliamentary elections. It has 
frequently been argued that the low percentage o f votes received in support of the IRP 
had not been a result o f their diminishing popularity but a result of the growing 
authoritarianism of the Rahmonov regime, and its control over the voting system. 
Generally Walker needs to dig deeper into the characters, methods and objectives of 
the different Islamic organisations and why they are increasing in popularity.
Part two o f the journal looks at Russian, Iranian and American foreign policy towards 
Central Asia. Dmitri Trenin has a different point of view concerning Russia’s 
relationship with the USA in regards to Central Asia; he argues that the Central Asian
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region will become an area of cooperation.30 This thesis argues the opposite; there is a
common goal to defeat Islamic extremism but the tactics o f Moscow and Washington
are very much different, as is each power’s understanding o f ‘an Islamic threat’. In
addition, the struggle against Islamic extremism is only part of the reason why
Washington is so keen on promoting its presence in the region. The other aims of
Washington, such as promoting its political, economic, cultural and other security-
related influences come head to head with Russia’s domestic and foreign ties with the
Central Asian countries. The article on American involvement in the region highlights
the dangers Washington could face in the future if  it continues to woo the region’s 
■> |
dictators. The final part deals with Afghanistan, and examines its role and impact on 
the region, and how it has affected the internal and external situation in the five Central 
Asian countries. A common weakness in the study of issues that affect contemporary 
Central Asia is the assumption that Russian and American interaction with the Central 
Asian countries is an issue of foreign policy alone. This attitude completely overlooks 
the domestic influence (mainly cultural and political) that the powers have over the 
region. A discussed previously in this introduction, this thesis looks at how foreign 
powers can have domestic effect.
One o f the leading specialists on the region, Martha Brill Olcott, has written a range of
'X'0)literature o f importance and value to all those interested in Central Asian affairs. Her 
latest book, Central Asia’s Second Chance , is o f particular interest as it covers most 
o f the issues this thesis is concerned with and belongs to the second group of literature 
discussed in the introduction. Olcott argues that Central Asia’s ‘Second Chance’ to 
reposition itself on the platform of change and reform came after September 11 and its 
new status as a region o f strategic importance for the war on terror. Central Asia’s first 
chance seems to have been missed with the growing wave o f authoritarianism that 
swept the region soon after independence. She is very clear about how each country’s
30 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Southern Watch: R ussia’s P olicy in Central A sia ’, Journal o f  International A ffairs, pp. 
119-133
31 Ehsan Ahrari, ‘The Strategic Future o f  Central Asia: A V iew  from W ashington’, Journal o f  
International A ffairs, pp. 157-166
32 Tw o o f  O lcott’s prominent books on the region are: Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled  
Prom ise, W ashington, D.C, 2002  and The Kazakhs, Stanford, 1997
33 Martha Brill O lcott, Central A sia’s Second Chance, W ashington, D .C, 2005
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internal and external milieu is different to the others, and like this thesis, she dedicates 
separate sections to each of the five Central Asian countries throughout her book.
Olcott analyses Central Asia’s (missed) ‘Second Chance’, which came as a result of 
the war on terror; ultimately a lot of emphasis is on America’s role in the region. 
Olcott is often reluctant to use the word ‘influence’ and very much downplays any 
form of competition in Central Asia. Choosing to ignore or undermine clear signs of 
competition, specifically between Russia and the USA, does not allow for a full 
understanding o f the internal and external politics of the region; this can be seen as one 
o f the main weaknesses o f this book. The most amount o f reference she makes to any 
form o f competition over the region between Moscow and Washington is in the field 
o f petro-politics and pipeline routes. In this field she acknowledges that America has 
been increasing its interest in the resources the region has to offer, and argues that this 
is one of the main reasons Washington is so concerned with Central Asia.34 She does 
not clearly compare economic, political, cultural and security-related interactions 
between Russia and Central Asia and America and Central Asia. She mentions 
Russia’s role and America’s role but does not measure them out vis-a-vis one another 
and how their influences affect the region. She discusses the decision by the USA to 
cut economic funding to Tashkent as a result of poor progress in reform, and continued 
abuse of human rights, but does not discuss how a few months after this incident 
(October 2004), Karimov invited Russia to join the Central Asian countries in the 
Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO). This brought Russia closer to the 
economies o f the Central Asian countries, and consequently gave it more scope for 
influence in the region. She also fails to clarify that GUUAM was very much seen as 
an American sponsored organisation, aimed at grouping all countries wanting to 
distance themselves from Russia. The decision o f Karimov to leave the CST and join 
GUUAM in 1999 had been a clear sign that he was gearing his country towards the 
American sphere and away from the Russian one. Olcott over looks these types of 
comparisons and links, which ultimately downplay competition for influence in the 
region. She also places little emphasis and importance on Washington’s relationship 
with Uzbekistan; instead she repeats that Uzbekistan was of no significant importance
34 Olcott does make som e remarks about com petition in the security sphere, for exam ple she says that 
US oil com panies ‘were pleased by the increased US security presence’, pp. 175
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to American interests. She says that Washington was not comfortable with being 
associated to a country with poor human rights record. Olcott appears too defensive of 
American foreign policy as Washington has numerous allies and friends with 
extremely poor human rights records.
Olcott argues that because the Russian state is relatively weak, its capacity to increase 
its national interests in the region is in doubt. This thesis argues that because Russia 
has lost most o f its former influence globally; its motivation not to lose Central Asia to 
any power, especially its cold war foe, has increased. Olcott supports her argument by 
stating that Russia’s invitation to join the CACO will not reinvigorate the organisation. 
This, however, is not the point. Russia by being allowed to join what had previously 
been an exclusively Central Asia organisation means that Russia’s domestic and 
external influences on Central Asia have been boosted. Olcott’s analysis o f events is at 
times too narrow, and does not give enough scope for one type o f influence to affect 
the others. This is what this thesis examines.
Olcott’s lack of acknowledgement of certain events and policies, which emphasize the 
growth of competition between Russia and America over Central Asia, is not as 
overwhelming as her lack o f emphasis on Islam. She definitely does not see Islam as 
being a competing influence. She briefly mentions some o f the most prominent Islamic 
organisation, but fails to explain why such organisations have come to exist, how they 
have evolved, their similarities and differences, what their objectives are and most 
important why they are gradually become stronger and more popular. The American 
campaign in Afghanistan and the destruction of the IMU camps have only marginally 
reduced the threat o f political Islam. She also fails to give a clear picture of how the 
regimes are helping to fuel Islamicisation.
Olcott undoubtedly offers an in depth look at Central Asian’s internal and external 
politics. She offers a clear country-by-country analysis of the economic and political 
scene in each of the countries and their interaction with foreign countries. The main 
weakness is in the failure to compare the actions of external (and internal) forces 
towards similar policies affecting each o f the Central Asian countries. Her language, in 
reference to the lack of Russian-American competitiveness in the region and under-
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estimation of Islam, is similar to the kind of language used in the early 1990’s, when 
competing influences in Central Asia were not as widely researched and analysed as 
they are today. Olcott has firmly stuck to official American foreign policy language 
that a great game scenario is not developing in the region, and that competing 
influences are exaggerated.
Like Olcott above, John Anderson in ' The International Politics of Central Asia’35, 
approaches internal and external factors and influences that affect the region in one 
single authored volume. In many aspects this thesis is built up on items of literature 
such as Anderson’s, which tackle the dynamics o f the region as a whole, and are thus 
able to create continuity in the issues they analyse. From the very first page of the 
introduction, Anderson talks about the 'great game’ in the nineteenth century and the 
unfolding ‘new great game’ in the post-Soviet era. He mentions various forces, which 
this thesis calls powers, that struggle to influence political, economic and ideological 
matters in the region. Unlike Olcott, Anderson appears to believe that the region is 
being subjected to competing influences resulting in a new great game scenario. What 
is interesting is that Anderson wrote this book in 1997, before it became widely 
discussed whether or not the region was re-living a new great game.
The first three chapters o f this book are not o f great concern to this thesis as they look 
at the pre-independence period. Chapter four looks at the internal politics of each of 
the five countries. Anderson discusses the president-centered political systems, and 
places Niyazov and Karimov as the most authoritarian leaders from the start o f the 
independence period. The first chapter in this thesis looks at most o f the issues looked 
at in this chapter by Anderson, including the role of civil and political society in the 
region and the growth o f authoritarianism. While Anderson stops in 1997, this thesis 
provides a continuation and discusses similar issues post-1997 and into the era o f the 
war on terror.
The next chapter tackles the issue of laying down an economic base for the newly 
independent states, this chapter also looks at natural resources and the economic
35 John Anderson, The International Politics o f  Central A sia , N ew  York, 1997
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strength this can bring some of the countries in the region. Anderson’s following 
chapter on the search for identity, nation building and especially the Islamic factor, 
was very beneficial and interesting to this thesis. Anderson clearly points out the lack 
o f enthusiasm on placing too much importance on Islam as a result of the Soviet- 
educated and secular elites, although he acknowledges the cultural and social 
importance Islam has on the lives of many Central Asians. The language and tone 
Anderson uses when discussing the role o f Islam in Central Asia is mild, and does not 
portray Islam as a growing threat to the stability of the region. This could be because 
Islam from independence to 1997 was not seen in the same light as it is today, 
although the Taliban had already caused fear and concern for their neighbours. This 
was also the time when the secular elites were not as paranoid about the spread of 
Islam amongst their population. The 1999 Tashkent bombings and the Batken 
incursions had not yet planted the fear that still lives today amongst the ruling elites, 
and particularly for Karimov. This thesis provides an update to the volatile situation 
that Anderson has touched upon in this chapter. Hence Anderson talks about a mild 
Islamic influence, very different to the way Ahmad Rashid refers to Islam in the region 
leading up to the war on terror and afterwards. Anderson focuses more on secular 
Islam than political Islam, and highlights the role o f religion on everyday life.
Anderson links his last chapter to the starting point o f his book, which looks at the 
region’s relationship with external powers, and the prospect o f a new great game 
unfolding. He argues that political and economic developments after independence 
bore many similarities to the great game o f the nineteenth century. He states that 
Turkey, backed by America, was one o f the potential key players against the growing 
role o f Islam, backed by Iran. Anderson then dedicates different sections o f the chapter 
to countries and regions that can pull Central Asian towards their sphere. Russia’s 
continued role in the region is covered in this chapter. In other words, he examines the 
potential competing influences over the region. This thesis places Russia as a 
competing power for influence along-side America and Islam. As the years progressed 
it became clearer that Turkey and Iran could not evolve as leading powers in the 
region, instead the powers that Anderson argues backed Turkey and Iran appeared to 
have usurped that role.
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The remaining items o f literature mainly do not aim to compare competing influences, 
nor analyse the internal and external influences and dynamics of Central Asia as a 
whole. Many o f the items mentioned below are particularly good for specific chapters 
in this thesis.
Yaacov Ro’i edits an essential volume of great value to all academics whose work 
concentrates on the internal politics o f Central Asia. It provides a contribution to the 
study o f the evolution o f democracy in the region. The chapters cover a wide range of 
issues which help determine why the Central Asian successor states have not achieved 
the levels o f democratisation and pluralism seen in most non-Islamic former Soviet 
Republics.
Richard Pomfref s work is o f importance to the study o f the internal politics of the
I Q
region. He analyses the impact o f western economic influences on economic and 
political developments in the region. The chapter’s weaknesses are related to its 
narrow definition o f western economic support. It primarily looks at aid from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Although both these 
institutions are very much under the supervision o f America, a clearer understanding 
o f western economic support is useful. This thesis offers this detail, it looks at purely 
American economic influences on Central Asia, consequently offering an insight on 
how American economic influences affect political trends in the successor states and 
hence the approach taken towards democratisation. Pom fref s work can, therefore, 
appear to be missing a bulk o f the puzzle, which shows the extent to which western
36 Y aacov R o’i (ed.), D em ocracy and Pluralism In M uslim  Eurasia (hereafter D em ocracy and 
Pluralism ). London, N ew  York, 2001
37 For a detailed and clear accounts o f  the criteria which constitutes a dem ocratic system  and how  
dem ocracy can be consolidated look at: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f  Dem ocratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe. South America, and Post-Com m unist Europe. 
Baltim ore, London, 1996
38 Richard Pomfret, ‘Aid and Ideas: The Impact o f  Western Econom ic Support on Muslim Successor 
States’ in Y aacov R o’i (ed .), Dem ocracy and Pluralism, pp. 77-95
39 M ichael M andelbaum ’s volum e is o f  interest in this field, especially  in what it does not include rather 
than in what it does. Written in 1994, it has a wide range o f  chapters, none o f  which look at the 
relationship between Islam and the people o f  the region or between Am erica and Central Asia, this is 
quite characteristic o f  literature written in the first half o f  the 1990’s. Martha Brill O lcott’s chapter is 
relevant to look at when researching the internal politics o f  the region. For further reading look at: 
Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Cerem ony o f  Substance: The Illusion o f  Unity in Central A sia ’ in M ichael 
Mandelbaum (ed.), Central A sia and the World: Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan. Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan (hereafter Central A sia and the World), N ew  York, 1994, pp. 17-46
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economic assistance can affect the internal milieu in the region. This chapter briefly 
mentions the special relationship between Uzbekistan and American without providing 
a full picture o f the consequences o f America’s involvement. The author talks about 
Russia’s power in the region waning after 1995; in fact the opposite can be argued. 
Russia did not attempt to regain its lost influences in the region until the late Kozyrev 
period. By 1995, Russia had re-orientated its attention to Central Asia, and had already 
become involved in the Tajik civil war, which it helped to end. In general Pomfret’s 
chapter could benefit from a more analytical approach toward how the specific western 
countries and international institutions have influenced economic and political 
developments in Central Asia.
Vladimir Babak’s40 work also fits in with the analysis o f the internal politics of the 
Central Asian countries; it looks at the formation of political parties and movements. 
The topic of political parties and movements encompasses some issues that also relate 
to the chapter on Islamic influences in Central Asia. Babak writes an account detailing 
all internal organisations, parties and movements in all five Central Asian countries 
since independence. The weakness o f this chapter lies in the references made to 
Islamic political parties and organisations. The author groups all Islamic parties, 
movements and organisations together, insinuating that they all have a similar agenda 
and common tactics. Islamic parties in Central Asia are diverse in nature, character and 
methods. There is only a brief mention of HT, one o f the most influential and 
widespread Islamic groups in the region. The personality and methods of this group are 
pivotal to those that have an interest in Islam and Islamic parties in the region.
Leonid Levitin’s41 chapter is concerned with the successes and failures of 
liberalization and democratisation in Kyrgyzstan. It also has some aspects that are of 
relevance to the chapter dealing with Islam in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan stands out as a 
unique case in regards to the internal politics of Central Asia, and has consequently 
been a topic of steamy debate amongst academics. Levitin writes an impressive 
account of how and why Kyrgyzstan surfaced as an ‘island of democracy’, and why
40 Vladim ir Babak, ‘The Formation o f  Political Parties and M ovem ents in Central A sia ’ in R o’i (ed.), 
D em ocracy and Pluralism, pp. 143-162
41 Leonid Levitin, ‘An Island o f  D em ocracy’ in R o’i (ed.), Dem ocracy and Pluralism , pp. 187-211
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this island is starting to look less democratic. Like Babak there is a general 
underestimation o f Islamic influences in the region. He gives Islam a more important 
role than Babak, and says that Islam’s position in Kyrgyzstan is vital; he refers to 
Islam as a factor and not an influence. This thesis fills the void in regards to the power 
o f Islam in the region and the motives, agendas and differences between different 
Islamic parties and movements. Levitin also appears to overestimate Kyrgyzstan’s 
democratic nature, as by the time he wrote this chapter (2001), Kyrgyzstan could no 
longer boast of being ‘an island of democracy’. John Anderson has dedicated work 
particularly on Kyrgyzstan, which is o f profound benefit to all those interested in the 
domestic political scene o f that country and in the elements of democratisation, which 
helped Kyrgyzstan be viewed as the political exception to other Central Asian 
countries.42 Anderson clearly points out the reformist characteristics of the early years 
o f the Akayev regime. Regardless o f Akayev’s reformist attitude, Kyrgyzstan has 
never resembled a western model of government and has consistently been closer to 
the Soviet model. Most of the individuals in power had also been prominent during the 
Soviet period, and were thus mentally and politically Russified. Some of the most 
prominent people in government, such as Felix Kulov, were only fluent in Russian. 
Ironically Kulov, now Prime Minister in Bakiyev’s government, is still only fluent in 
Russian. Anderson points out that Akayev clearly saw the benefits from balancing his 
foreign relations; maintaining good relations with Russia was important as was 
searching for foreign partners to help economically rebuild his country. Anderson 
makes it clear that Bishkek consistently oriented itself towards Russia, and this thesis 
identifies two of the most compelling and long lived influences which align these two 
countries together: cultural and political influences.43
Lena Jonson writes a remarkable book on the relationship between Russia and Central 
Asia44, which should be on the reading list o f all who are interested in Russian 
influences in Central Asia. She covers a wide range o f issues, which she analyses and 
justifies sufficiently, but there are some areas this book has not thoroughly covered.
42 For further analysis o f  civil society in Kyrgyzstan look at: John Anderson, ‘Creating a Framework for 
C ivil Society  in K yrgyzstan’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, no. 1, 2000 , pp. 77-93
43 John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central A sia ’s Island o f  D em ocracy, Amsterdam, 1999
44 Lena Jonson, Vladim ir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping o f  Russian Foreign P olicy . London, N ew  
York, 2004
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Jonson argues that throughout the 1990’s, the Central Asian countries oriented their 
foreign policy away from Russia. This seems certainly true for Uzbekistan, but not for 
the other four countries. Turkmenistan’s declared status of permanent neutrality cannot 
be seen as an attempt to move away from the Russian fold. Regardless of 
Turkmenistan’s status, the Turkmenbashi showed profound flexibility towards his 
country’s language laws and was not hesitant in declaring Russian a state language 
alongside Turkmen. His dual citizenship law also seemed extremely accommodating 
towards the ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan, and further showed that regardless of 
Niyazov’s ambitions for isolationism and lack o f interest in politicised organisations, 
Moscow remained his main channel for outside cooperation, especially in regards to 
gas exports. Niyazov’s orientation towards the Taliban and American oil ventures 
(Trans-Afghan-Pipeline) was not so much a symbol of Niyazov’s ambitions to 
orientate his foreign policy away from Russia, but an opportunity for Turkmenistan to 
diversify its resource networks and improve the economic situation of Turkmenistan 
and the Turkmenbashi. Unlike Karimov joining GUUAM and leaving the CST, the 
aim was not to move away from the Russian sphere but to attract foreign investment. 
Therefore, Turkmenistan cannot be seen, as argued by Jonson, to have re-oriented its 
foreign policy away from Russia.
Jonson also argues that both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were bent on diversification. 
Tajikistan was in no position to do so, especially after the contributions made by the 
Russia’s 201st MRD throughout the civil war. Jonson acknowledges this point but 
generally argues that Tajikistan, being the only Persian-speaking country and having 
close ties with Afghanistan, was prone to move away from Russia. Tajikistan still 
remains one of the most pro-Russian successor states in the former Soviet sphere, and 
its Persian language and ethnic kinfolk in Afghanistan do not appear to have 
influenced Russian-Tajik relations. As for Kyrgyzstan, its problems with Islamic 
extremism and concern over hegemonic neighbours have further encouraged it to stay 
under the Russian fold. Jonson talks about Russia’s influences in Central Asia but 
overlooks one o f the most essential influences that has guaranteed Central Asian 
loyalty, that is the effects of Russification, particularly behavioral Russification on the 
Central Asian population. Jonson does not clearly explain how Kazakhstan re­
orientated its foreign policy away from Russia. It has often appeared that Nazarbayev
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saw the creation o f the CIS as a tool to guarantee Russian involvement in Central Asia. 
This thesis argues that although Russian influences were challenged throughout the 
1990’s, since September 11 its role in the region is coming more and more under 
challenge.
The late Oumirserik Kasenov writes about security-related influences in Central Asia, 
although his main emphasis appears to be on Kazakhstan. He does not use the 
definition ‘security-related influences’ but analyses the role o f different actors on 
Central Asian security. He places emphasis and importance on Russia being the greater 
security provider than any other country. His work has some limitations to it; he does 
not discuss the role and aims o f the Collective Security Treaty or the Shanghai Five, 
which are essential when discussing security in Central Asia. He does, however, 
mention Russia’s concern with the emergence of a rival power in the region (America) 
and its desire to remain the most influential power over Central Asia. This shows how 
the role of the USA had always been of concern to Russia, especially by the 1990’s, 
when America’s economic interests (energy resources) in the region had become 
relatively prominent.45
As with most o f Ahmed Rashid’s contributions, their strength outweighs their 
weakness, and Jihad: The Rise o f Militant Islam in Central Asia is not an exception.46 
Rashid looks thoroughly at the internal and external reasons, which give birth to 
political Islam and extremism. This book not only gives a clear analysis of the main 
Islamic organisations and movements in the region, but also discusses the relationship 
between the Central Asian governments and these organisations. Rashid’s main 
argument revolves around the issue o f Islam becoming more important and prominent 
in Central Asia and dedicates this book to the rise of Islamic extremism, therefore 
predominantly looking at Islam’s political influence on the region, which this thesis is 
also concerned with. He looks at the history of Islam, and how it has gradually evolved 
with the people of Central Asia, therefore also looking at Islam’s cultural influence. 
Where his work is weakest is in the area o f secular Islamicisation. The result o f
45 Oumirserik Kasenov, ‘Central Asia: National, Regional and Global A spects o f  Security’ in Roy 
A llison  and Christoph Bluth (eds.), Security D ilem m as in Russia and Eurasia, London, 1998, pp. 188- 
205
46 A hm ed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise o f  Militant Islam in Central A sia (hereafter Jihad). London, 2003
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W ashington’s political influences in Central Asia is often seen as supportive towards 
the authoritarian leaderships and a far cry from notions of democratisation. This thesis 
argues that this has helped created a rise in secular Islamicisation, which is when the 
secular population becomes more inclined to and less critical of Islamic behavior. 
Therefore, although this book is strong in its analysis of Islamic extremism, it is weak 
in its analysis o f secular Islam. Rashid does not look at Islam in terms of influences, 
and although he makes clear the destabilising effect Islam has had on the region, he 
does not refer to it as a competing power head to head with America and Russia over 
influence in Central Asia. Therefore, Rashid’s work is a contribution to the study of 
political Islam, and not to the analysis of competing influences.
Rashid’s analysis o f Islamic influences in the region is o f profound use, Taliban: The 
Story o f the Afghan Warlords also contributes to understanding the link between 
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and Islam in Central Asia.47 This thesis shows how 
Islamic influences coming from Afghanistan helped make Islam an external power. 
Islam is predominantly thought o f as an internal influence, but when the Taliban had 
an impact on the Islamic evolution o f Central Asian movements, then Islam became an 
external force as well. This is a point that Rashid does not make. The bonds between 
external and internal influences and their interaction are specific to this thesis.
Since the early years o f independence, Washington’s relationship with Tashkent has 
appeared different to its relationship with the other Central Asian countries. Over the 
years there has been a wide range of literature regarding the relationship between these 
two countries. Shahram Akbarzadeh48 offers an in-depth analysis o f the evolution of 
this ‘special’ friendship in one book. America’s role in Central Asia has become an 
integral part of the study of the region. This cannot be fully done without emphasis on 
the Karimov regime, and its role in aiding America’s position in the region.
Akbarzadeh gives a good account o f Uzbekistan’s internal imbroglio after 
independence and the Islamic challenges the Karimov regime was faced with. In his
47 Ahm ed Rashid, Taliban: The Story o f  the Afghan Warlords (hereafter Taliban). 2001
48 Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the Unites States: Authoritarianism. Islamism  and 
W ashington’s Security A genda, London, N ew  York, 2005
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chapter concerning Uzbekistan’s Islamic challenge, Akbarzadeh makes a profound 
point when he argues that the IRP of Uzbekistan, which came to existence in 1991 and 
ceased to exist by 1992, were not driven by the notion or belief in the creation o f an 
‘Umma’, and were not really interested in the greater Islamic word. This is a point, 
which this thesis takes further; it argues that all o f the Islamic movements and 
organisations in Central Asia are primarily concerned with regional Islam. The IRP, 
IMU and HT (in Central Asia), became prominent as a result o f the domestic pressures 
imposed on the population. They seek to find a regional solution; they do not function 
in accordance with other Islamic organisations outside Central Asia. They are not like 
Al-Qaida, with a global agenda; they are regional phenomena resulting from regional 
issues, and working towards regional control and influence. Even HT, which is not a 
homegrown organisation, has a regional agenda; it may have sympathy with its sister 
organisations in the Middle East, but does not function with them nor have similar 
objectives.
Akbarzadeh does not place enough emphasis on the reasons behind the growth of 
Islamic organisations and Islamic sentiment. He does not approach what this thesis 
argues are the reasons behind the rising Islamic force, such as economic, social, and 
political injustices. Akbarzadeh’s main emphasis is on the evolution of the relationship 
between Tashkent and Washington. He argues that since the early years of 
independence Uzbekistan has tried to find an alternative to counterweigh Russia’s role 
in the region.49 This was not easy for Karimov to achieve at the beginning, especially 
as the Clinton administration and the State Department were vocal in their 
disappointment with the lack of democratic elements in the country. The reaction of 
the Pentagon was unsurprisingly positive towards Karimov; it had the United States 
national security interests in mind.
Akbarzadeh analyses the intensification o f American influences over Uzbekistan and 
its avoidance to criticise the Karimov regime. He fails to make three points, which this 
thesis deems as essential. Firstly he does not examine the effect Washington’s support 
o f the Karimov regime had on the other Central Asian countries. He ignores their
49 For further reading on Uzbek dom estic policy and U zbekistan’s relationship with its neighbours and 
Russia look at: Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign P olicy . London, 1998
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further re-orientation towards Russia fearing the increasing hegemonic attitude of 
Uzbekistan with US backing. Secondly, he hardly makes any references to the 
relationship between Russia and Washington as a result o f the latter’s increased 
involvement with Uzbekistan, consequently downplaying the competition for influence 
between these two powers. He mentions Russia’s reaction to some of Washington’s 
security influences, such as the creation of military bases on Central Asian soil, but 
does not analyse the parallel security structures that the region was tom between. 
Lastly, he does not look at the Islamicising results American influences in Uzbekistan 
were creating. He either does not believe America’s tolerance o f Karimov’s abuses 
towards his population were creating an Islamic backlash or simply fails to mention it. 
This was most clearly seen with the bombings o f the American and Israeli embassies 
in Tashkent in 2004.
Akbarzadeh generally writes a well-structured book on Uzbekistan’s politics and 
foreign policy. The omission of the points mentioned above create some weaknesses, 
in addition events resulting from the incident in Andijan in May 2005, have changed 
the relationship dramatically between Uzbekistan and America.
As already stated, the literature on contemporary Central Asia is extensive. The 
literature available fits in different categories. One group o f books attempts to compare 
influences or at least lays out the powers involved in the whirlpool of competition, 
which has become know as the ‘new great game’. This set o f literature has a 
disadvantage of not being able to sufficiently compare the strengths and weaknesses of 
the influences these powers have over every single Central Asian country. As the 
chapters are multi-authored and not linked, they fail to create a continuity in the 
general argument o f how each power has become more appealing or prominent 
(compared to the others) in each country. The second set o f books is the most similar 
to this thesis. Only a few items of literature have approached how internal and external 
influences from different powers have affected the orientation o f the region as a whole. 
This thesis also places emphasis on Islam as a competing power on par with Russia 
and America, which is often not as thoroughly examined. The third group of works 
looks at more specific issues concerned with Central Asia, for example, 
democratisation in the region or Uzbek-American relations. They do not offer an
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analysis o f Central Asian politics or foreign policy, but are only concerned with a 
specific aspect of either. This thesis has also contributed to this area as it has offered 
research on specifics that have previously created a void in the academic literature, 
such as the impact of American cultural influence on Central Asian society, or the 
effects o f behavioral Russification on the political orientations o f a country.
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1.5 M ethodology
Research for this thesis was done by reading primary and secondary literature on 
issues related to my research question. Speaking to Central Asian, Russian and 
Chinese diplomats outside Central Asia also helped with my research. Two visits were 
made to Central Asia in September 2004 and November 2005; the countries visited 
were Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The reasons to visit these three 
countries will be explained below. One o f the most important ways of gathering 
information, while in Central Asia, was to approach academics, politicians, officials, 
Imams, and economists, and conduct a series o f interviews. In addition speaking to 
students, and asking about their views on certain issues such as religion, Russification 
or globalisation was very beneficial for understanding how the young educated strata 
o f the population perceived contemporary issues, which affected their lives and future. 
Students from Bishkek who participated in the Tulip revolution were particularly 
informative as they played a direct role in the political development o f the country. 
Speaking to members o f civil youth movements and other local organisations was also 
very informative as was speaking to ordinary citizens distanced from the world of 
politics. Visiting mosques and madrassas in the region also allowed me to see how 
Islam can be so differently and similarly perceived in different Muslim countries. 
Material was also gathered from items o f literature (articles, leaflets, books and 
speeches) given to me from people interviewed in Central Asia on specific issues 
related to my thesis, which were not found or difficult to find outside the region. 
Newspapers from the region were also used, as were various Internet sites.
Cultural influences on all strata of Central Asian society, such as linguistic and 
behavioral Russification, secular Islam and the presence of American culture, have 
been very badly researched in the past. Research in specifically this sphere can 
primarily develop from analytical observation. This means that research was not only 
conducted in terms of what was read and who was interviewed but also according to 
what was seen and observed. This meant that certain characteristics (which are covered 
in detail in the chapters that cover cultural influence) that indicate the powers’
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competing cultural influences was continuously looked for and compared with other 
areas o f the same country and other countries in the region.
There were undeniably many limitations in conducting the kind o f research mentioned 
above, especially in regards to access to institutions and individuals, language barriers 
and openness during interviews. Turkmenistan seemed difficult to conduct interviews 
in and acquire views that may have criticised or disagreed with the official government 
line. In addition, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are the least linguistically Russified, 
hence some knowledge o f the titular language may have been necessary. For this 
reason it was decided to visit only Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is 
important to point out that access to institutions and conducting interviews in the three 
countries visited was not always a straightforward task. Often I had to persuade people 
to talk and explain in detail the reasons behind my questions. Openness in regards to 
certain issues, such as politics and religion had limitations even in the commonly 
perceived ‘more liberal’ countries of the region.
Access to information and individuals was by far the easiest in Kyrgyzstan. People, 
especially after but also before the Tulip revolution, were more willing to speak about 
the political, economic, security-related and religious state of affairs in the country. 
Often during interviews, however, there would be a third person taking notes of the 
questions asked and the answers given. In Kyrgyzstan, the topic individuals were the 
least open about was the extent of Islamicisation. Many Kyrgyz would argue that their 
country has no Islamic extremism and preferred to downplay activities in the Ferghana 
Valley and the growing role o f Islamic organisations in the south of the country. These 
comments would often frustrate the Uzbeks, who would accuse the Kyrgyz of badly 
tackling the rise of extremism in their country.
Where as in Kyrgyzstan people were more inclined to openly criticise the regime both 
before and after the revolution, in Kazakhstan people preferred not to talk about the 
internal political situation. Academic faculties were difficult to gain access to, and at 
times I felt I was the one being interviewed. Both in the Islamic University in Almaty 
and in various mosques and madrassas in Uzbekistan, some knowledge of Arabic 
helped ease initial tension concerning politics and Islam and further persuaded
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religious teachers and Imams to speak to me. Access to politicians, economists and 
academics was difficult in Tashkent and almost all interviews conducted were 
arranged weeks in advance. Many o f my contacts in Tashkent were made with the help 
o f the Uzbek Embassy in London. Access to diplomats at the embassy was extremely 
difficult as most of them were concerned about the kind of questions I would ask them 
and the kind of question I would ask in Tashkent. This was a clear reflection o f the 
lack of openness and xenophobia present in Uzbekistan. It was also important in 
Uzbekistan to tone down some of the questions asked, as it was a concern o f mine not 
to appear in any way critical o f the regime and its policies. In general what helped ease 
some o f the limitations inevitably to be found, was to make at least one strong contact 
in each o f the countries visited, who would often help in gaining access to other 
individuals in the field.
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1.6 Outline o f Chapters
This thesis will be composed of seven chapters including the introduction and the 
conclusion. The second chapter deals with the internal politics of each of the Central 
Asian countries. The first section o f this chapter looks at the Central Asian countries’ 
reaction to perestroika and the disintegration of the USSR. As this chapter is concerned 
with democratisation, the second section is on democratisation theory, and the third 
section examines the reasons behind the failure o f democratisation in Central Asia. It 
would be impossible to dedicate a thesis to competing influences in Central Asia 
without having an insight into the internal life of the region. After all it is the internal 
climate o f each Central Asian country that enables certain influences by different 
powers to have a strong presence.
The third chapter looks at Russian influences in Central Asia. The first section looks at 
Russia’s historic legacy over the region. Although Russia’s interaction with Central 
Asia during the Tsarist and Soviet periods has been the focus of numerous literatures, 
it is important to stress that Moscow’s military expansion was not regarded with the 
same amount o f hostility as in other regions incorporated into the Russian sphere. This 
has been one of the reasons why perestroika and the disintegration o f the USSR were 
not received with the same amount o f enthusiasm seen elsewhere.
The following six sections of the chapter deal with Russian influences over Central 
Asian since 1991. The second section traces the patterns of Russian foreign policy 
towards Central Asia since independence, and highlights the importance of Central 
Asia to Russian foreign policy today. The third section looks at Russia’s political 
influence over Central Asia and the growing similarities between the Russian and 
Central Asian political systems and how this enables Russia to maintain strong 
political influence over the regimes. The fear of coloured or Islamic revolutions in the 
region has made Russia’s political support even more valuable. The fourth section is 
dedicated to the cultural influences Russia has on each of the five countries. This is an 
area o f Russian influences previously not researched thoroughly. It is primarily
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concerned with the impact of linguistic and behavioral Russification, and how these 
two strands o f Russification are essential in helping to place Central Asia under the 
Russian fold. This section also makes distinctions between Russification and 
Sovietization.
The following two sections look at the issue o f security in Russian-Central Asian 
relations. The first section concerned with security examines the importance of Russia 
in guaranteeing security for the Central Asian countries. It focuses on Russia’s task as 
security provider, primarily against the threat o f Islamic extremism through Russian- 
sponsored anti-terrorist centers and organisations such as the CST, the CSTO and the 
SCO, which is led by China as well as Russia. It highlights Central Asia’s need for the 
creation of such organisations as a guarantee that Russia will not leave them to deal 
with destabilising forces by themselves, especially as they have proved unable to 
create effective purely Central Asian security structures. Russia, through such 
organisations, also functions as a protector of weaker countries against more powerful 
neighbours. Russia’s stabilising role throughout the Tajik civil war is looked at in this 
section. This section also highlights how not only the threat from Islamic extremism 
has pushed Central Asian closer to Russia, but also on how the war on terror, and the 
increasing American involvement in the region, particularly with Uzbekistan, has 
pushed some countries further into the arms of Russia out of fear that American- 
backed Karimov might violate some o f his neighbours’ national integrity and 
sovereignty. This further exposes the creation o f two competing security fields.
The second section o f Russia’s security influences focuses on the role Central Asia 
plays in the security o f Russia. The main question asked here is: why is it essential for 
Russia’s security and national interests to remain influential in Central Asia? This 
section aims to show the links between the security o f both Russia and Central Asia. 
The threat and rise of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is an issue that poses a direct 
threat to the security of Russia. It is feared that if Islamic forces triumph in one Central 
Asian country then the rest would follow suit, consequently putting the whole region, 
including Russia, in a vulnerable situation. This section is, therefore, concerned with 
the links between Chechen separatists and Islamic extremism and organisations in 
Central Asia. It is a Russian security concern to avoid the formation of a joint regional
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Islamic force encompassing Central Asia and Russia. This is how stability for Central 
Asia and Russia are very much part of the same equation.
This section also discusses the role of the ethnic Russians living in Central Asia, and 
Russia’s pledge to guarantee their security and welfare. It also looks at the role Central 
Asia plays in providing for Russia an image of continued power. Russia’s global status 
has been very much dwarfed by that o f the USA, but it still has a regional power 
status, which it does not want to lose to Washington. Central Asia is one of the last 
bastions where Russian influences can still dominate and rival that of the USA. 
Washington’s military presence in Central Asia has caused concern for Moscow; this 
consequently led to the creation of two Russian military bases, one in Bishkek the 
other near Dushanbe. The creation of two parallel security structures further reveals the 
underlying competition between Russia and the USA. This is seen as a method by 
which Russia is reiterating its security role in the region. The relationship between 
Russia and Iran is also covered in this section, as this has not only created further 
tension between Moscow and Washington, but also highlighted Washington and 
Moscow’s differing concepts of Islamic threat. This section, therefore, also looks at 
conflicting understanding of ‘threat’ and different tactics o f fighting Islamic 
extremism.
Russia’s economic influence over Central Asia is the last section in this chapter. It 
aims to highlight Russia and Central Asia’s reciprocal relationship in the economic 
arena, especially after Russia’s disappointment with its economic developments with 
the west. This section will discuss Russia’s increasing emphasis on regional economic 
cooperation and will pay particular attention to the CACO, and the decision made by 
the Central Asian leaders to invite Russia into this previously strictly Central Asian 
economic group, which later merged with the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEc).
The following chapter is concerned with American influences in Central Asia. It not 
only aims to look at the effectiveness of the four different strands of influences 
America has on Central Asia, it also traces the seeds of competition between 
Washington and Moscow since the collapse of the USSR. This chapter follows a very
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similar framework to the chapter concerned with Russian influences in Central Asia. 
The first section looks at the patterns of American foreign policy towards Central Asia 
since 1991. The second section is divided into two sub-sections, which looks at 
America’s security-related influences in Central Asia. The first sub-section is 
concerned with NATO’s partnership for peace, Centrasbat and GUUAM. The second 
sub-section is concerned with the war on terror, and how it has very much 
strengthened America’s security influence over the region. Washington’s security 
influences are looked at for each of the five Central Asian countries. Washington’s 
military role in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (up until the events in Andijan in May 
2005, which led to the closing o f Karshi-Khanabad military base) strengthened 
America’s security-related influences not only over these two countries but also of the 
region; the creation of these bases and the implications and consequences behind them 
will be looked at thoroughly in this sub-section. In addition, America’s attempts to 
reinstate its security influences (and other influences) and its regional reputation after 
its divorce with Uzbekistan in 2005 will be looked at.
The next section in this chapter looks at America’s political influence over Central 
Asia. This section looks at America’s rhetoric in support o f reforms, which help create 
pluralistic, democratic systems that respect human rights and civil liberties. It looks at 
instances where American policies contradict this rhetoric. America’s blind support of 
regimes such as the Karimov regime has very much undermined its credibility of 
promoting democracy and protecting human rights. Uzbek-American relations are 
looked at closely in this section, as is the reaction of the Uzbek population to what it 
perceives as American double standards, and how this could have been partially 
responsible for the wave o f Islamicisation in Uzbekistan. American-Uzbek relations 
are looked at pre-and post-Andijan, as are America’s political influences over the four 
other Central Asian countries.
America’s economic influences over each Central Asian country follow. Economic 
influences in this chapter do not include the energy sphere and the world of petro- 
politics; these issues have been given a separate chapter. This sub-section is 
particularly important, as America has a successful economic relationship with the 
Central Asian countries, one that promotes its position as a competing power over the
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region. This section also looks at how Washington’s economic superpower status has 
helped it promote some of its other influences.
America’s cultural influences in Central Asia create the last section of this chapter. 
Here the effects o f American culture and globalisation are analysed. The popularity of 
American food, music, films and other elements of every-day life are looked at for 
each of the five Central Asian countries, as is American-sponsored education.
The fifth chapter is in many ways a continuation of American influences in Central 
Asia. It looks at the resource wars over Central Asia’s most important assets. This 
thesis argues that energy is one of the most important reasons why the USA is so 
interested in maintaining strong influences over the region. The first section of this 
chapter deals with the competition between Russia and America over the resources and 
pipelines o f Central Asia, and how Washington’s tense relationship with the Arabic 
Gulf States has further intensified Washington’s resolve to remain active in the 
Caspian region. Therefore, this chapter is predominantly concerned with Kazakh and 
Turkmen energy-related relationships with both Russia and America. There is one 
section in this chapter, which is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section 
explains the controversy over the status o f the Caspian Sea. The second and third sub­
sections look at competing influences over Kazakh and Turkmen energy resources 
respectively. The fourth sub-section looks at energy deals and projects between these 
two powers and the other three Central Asian countries. Therefore, this chapter 
highlights the intense competition between Russia and America over pipelines and 
energy deals with the Central Asian countries. Influence over the energy sector of the 
Central Asian countries is essential, as it is not only economically beneficial but also 
enables Russia and America to have more weight over the other branches of influence 
that this thesis is concerned with.
The sixth chapter looks at the Islamic influences over Central Asia. It gives definitions 
o f what is meant by, extremist, fundamentalist, political and secular Islam and how 
much they overlap and differ. The layout o f this chapter slightly differs to the chapters 
dealing with Russian and American influences, as the main strands o f influence that 
Islam has are on culture and politics. The first section of this chapter looks at the
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Islamic legacy in Central Asia. The next section in this chapter deals with Islam as a 
domestic religion and cultural phenomenon. It looks at secular Islam and its gradual 
rise in the region and the impact this has over the population and their identity. Central 
Asia’s increasing Islamic awareness is one of the greatest challenges to Russia and the 
USA. The following section examines state sponsored Islam in each of the five 
countries. The section on political Islam and Islamic organisations follows; it provides 
analysis behind the evolution of extremism and the increasing support-base of some 
Islamic organisations. The final section of this chapter looks at external Islamic 
influences mainly coming from Afghanistan and the Middle East.
Finally the conclusion has three sections. The first section re-states that competition 
and not cooperation has prevailed between the powers involved in Central Asia, in 
particularly between Russia and America. The second section gives a summary of 
what was researched and concluded in each of the chapters; it is consequently divided 
into five sub-sections. The third section discusses which of the three powers this thesis 
regards as having the most influence and why.
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2.0 The Internal Politics o f Central Asia
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this thesis is on competing influences in 
Central Asia. The three powers competing for influence are Russia, Islam and 
America. This thesis is about the Central Asian choice of which influences they choose 
to align themselves with and why. The competition between these external and internal 
powers is researched from the point o f view of the five countries and amongst different 
strata of the population. Having set these grounds it becomes essential to analyse the 
internal politics of these countries and the reasons behind the failure of 
democratisation, which is what this chapter is concerned with. There are three sections 
in this chapter; the first looks at the Central Asian attitude to perestroika and the 
disintegration of the USSR. As this chapter is concerned with the internal politics of 
the region since 1991, democratisation theories are covered in the second section. The 
third section sees how far each Central Asian country has travelled down democratic 
paths and why they have failed in achieving democracy.
2.1 Perestroika and the Disintegration of the USSR
Gregory Gleason gives a very accurate summary of the effects o f perestroika on the 
region. He says, “Within the old USSR, Central Asia was the most unaffected area by 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms under perestroika. It was the area most resistant to 
democratic change”.50
As the quote above suggests, Central Asia experienced perestroika and all the other 
reforms introduced during the Gorbachev era, with relative calmness and even 
disinterest. Being one of the poorest regions in the USSR and highly dependent on 
Moscow, Central Asia unsurprisingly lacked enthusiasm for independence. The five 
Central Asian Republics were creations of the Soviet era, and ultimately lacked the 
experience of self-governing and nation building.51 The prospect of facing the outside 
world by themselves, and losing the security and support o f the Soviet system was a
50 Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States. D iscovering Independence (hereafter The Central Asian 
States). Boulder, Colorado, Oxford, 1997, p. 38
51 Vladim ir M esam ed, ‘Linguistic Policy and the Process o f  Dem ocratisation on U zbekistan’ in R o’i 
(ed .), D em ocracy and Pluralism, p. 233
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daunting task that the Central Asian leaderships were not prepared to face. Hence 
independence was accidental, and not achieved by structured ideas of a well-formed 
intelligentsia.
Nevertheless by 1989, Uzbekistan showed limited signs that it was acknowledging the 
tide of reforms and change sweeping across Eastern Europe and the USSR. A socio­
political organisation called Birlik was the first o f its kind to emerge in Tashkent. The 
main goal o f this movement was for the recognition o f Uzbek as the state language. 
Unfortunately for its members the government agreed to their demands, consequently 
leaving them with little to unite around.53
Gorbachev’s reforms also had a mild impact on Tajikistan. There were no radical 
demands for political independence as seen in other areas of the USSR. As with most 
o f the other Central Asian countries, the main issue that surfaced as an aftermath to the 
regional changes, focused around the topic of the status of the titular language. One of 
the main nationality inspired parties to evolve during that period was called Rastokhez 
(Rebirth) and was made up mainly o f the urbanized intelligentsia.54 Although 
Tajikistan experienced a relatively peaceful perestroika, not all change went without an 
escalation of tension. This was more apparent near the end o f the Gorbachev era when 
Tajik national sentiments became a more sensitive issue for the ethnic Tajiks. The 
most severe incident happened in February 1990 when demonstrators protested against 
the government following rumors that Armenian refugees were going to be given 
housing in Tajikistan. These events revealed a profound polarisation of Tajik society 
and gave an indication of events to come. What was happening in Tajikistan was the 
formation of an opposition.55
Glasnost and perestroika came late to Kyrgyzstan. As with Uzbekistan, it was not until 
1989 that some of the elements of change, which had occurred in other areas of the 
communist bloc, were showing signs in Kyrgyzstan. Social organisations began to
52 A hm ed Rashid, Taliban, p. 145
53 Shirin Akiner, ‘Uzbekistan and the U zbeks’ in Graham Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question in the 
Post-Soviet States (hereafter The Nationalities Q uestion). London, N ew  York, 1996, p. 339
54 John Anderson, The International Politics o f  Central A sia , p. 167
55 ibid. p. 168
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emerge and change brought with it some signs of violence and inter-ethnic tension, 
such as the violence that erupted in the Osh region in 1990 between the Kyrgyz and 
Uzbek communities. In May 1990 a social organisation was created called the 
‘Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan’, which called for democratisation and 
economic reform.56
The few national democratic movements that evolved in Kyrgyzstan were very 
different in character to the ones found elsewhere in the communist bloc; they had no 
dissident elements. In other words they did not really have the will or the desire to 
constitute an opposition. This is one o f the reasons independence was so challenging 
and unwanted. There were no individuals offering a solid alternative to the status quo. 
The reforms o f perestroika, however, did bring reform minded people to power, such 
as the president.
As a nomadic structured society, Turkmenistan was not profoundly affected by 
perestroika. Tribal restrictions and deep rooted historical and cultural traditions 
overcame the changes that perestroika introduced elsewhere. The low levels o f social 
and economic development limited many embryonic movements. As elsewhere in 
Central Asia, this phenomenon was often paralleled with the lack of an urbanized 
intelligentsia, which made reform even harder to achieve.
Perestroika in Kazakhstan followed a similar pattern to the other Central Asian 
countries, although the perestroika period revealed elements of national self- 
awareness. This was most clearly seen in December 1986, when demonstrations broke 
out as a result o f Gennady Kolbin’s (an ethnic Russian from Moscow) appointment as 
Kazakh First Party Secretary, replacing an ethnic Kazakh.58 Nevertheless, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan was very much opposed to the disintegration of the USSR 
and supportive of Gorbachev’s Union plan. Unlike many other First Party Secretaries,
56 John Anderson, ‘Creating a Framework for Civil Society in K yrgyzstan’, Europe-Asia Studies, p. 79
57 Annette Bohr, ‘Turkmenistan and the Turkmen’ in Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Q uestion, p. 353
58 Sally N . Cum m ings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elites, London, N ew  York, 2005, p. 21
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he was eager for the survival of a transnational union, and aware of the difficulties 
some republics would experience as separate entities.59
59 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Cerem ony and Substance: The Illusion o f  Unity in Central A sia, in Mandelbaum  
(ed .), Central A sia and the W orld, p. 29
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2.2 Democratisation Theory
This section offers an analysis of the fundamental aspects and arguments of different 
theories of democratisation. The chapter is concerned with the internal politics of 
Central Asia and the failure of democratisation; it is therefore essential to talk about 
the different levels o f democratisation in all five countries, and the different political 
and economic transitions (or lack of) in the name of democratisation each country has 
taken since 1991. Before this can be done, it is first useful to discuss democratisation 
theories and democratic characteristics. This will help in the understanding of the fault 
lines behind democratisation in Central Asia.
Many scholars have offered their own definition to what they interpret as democracy. 
Barrington Moore gives a brief and clear description of democracy when he says: it is 
the long and incomplete struggle to do three things: to check arbitrary rulers, to replace 
arbitrary rulers with just and rational ones, and finally to obtain a share for the 
underlying population in the making of rules.60 Samuel Huntington describes 
democracy as when powerful collective decision makers are selected fairly after a 
popular voting procedure has occurred in which all adults were eligible to vote. He 
consequently gives democratisation two branches-contestation and participation. 
Huntington is very clear on what he defines democratic and non-democratic. A system 
where part of the adult population is not allowed to vote he describes as undemocratic, 
he also defines undemocratic a system that places limitations on the participation of 
the opposition, or when votes are manipulated, or even worse when the main 
opposition is totally banned.61 With this definition, all the Central Asian countries are 
far from achieving the slightest elements of democracy. There are many weaknesses to 
all democratisation theories, such as those concerning political legitimacy of a group 
that does not fit the democratic stereotype. In addition, in some countries, such as in
60 Barrington M oore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and D em ocracy, M iddlesex, N ew  York, 1966, p. 
414
61 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (hereafter The 
Third W ave) Norman, London, 1991, p. 7
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the USA, criminals are deprived of their right to vote, while in Russia they are not. 
Does that make America less democratic than Russia?
Joseph A. Schumpeter has developed what is often called the Schumpeterian or 
electoralist definition regarding democracy. He challenges what he calls the classical 
theory o f democracy. The classical theory argues that all individuals hold their own 
opinion, and that in a democracy they safeguard their views by choosing a 
representative who will implement their opinions in the best way he or she can. 
Consequently the selection of the representative is given a secondary place in relations 
to the democratic arrangement, which is to give power to the electorate in regards to 
deciding political issues. Schumpeter does not like this. He prefers to make the 
deciding of issues by the electorate secondary in comparison to the election of the men 
who are to do the deciding. It is the competitive struggle to win the people’s vote that 
is of prime importance to Schumpeter; his definition of democracy very much focuses 
on the pivotal role of free elections. He argues that the electoral method in competitive 
elections is available for communities o f any size. In a democracy, the main function 
of voting is to produce a government, in other words deciding whom the leading voice
fi0)or voices of the state will belong to.
Robert A. Dahl has his own views on democratisation. His concept of democracy does 
not give elections alone the same level o f importance as Schumpeter; he regards other 
characteristics as equally essential. Dahl places a lot of emphasis on the role of the 
citizen in a state. He argues that there are three necessary conditions for a democracy 
to flourish, such as the ability for individuals to formulate their preferences, to portray 
their preferences to other citizens and the government by individual or collective 
action and to have their preferences weighed equally by the government without 
discrimination. He also argues that for these conditions to survive a system needs to 
exist that will allow for certain conditions such as the freedom to join organisations, 
the freedom to express oneself, voting, contested and fair elections and no censorship. 
These are the institutional guarantees that should be in a democracy.63
62 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism  and D em ocracy. London, 1976, pp. 269-283
63 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (hereafter Polyarchy), N ew  Haven, London, 
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S.M. Lipset states that democracy in a complex society must be composed of political 
systems that offer systematic constitutional opportunities, which often involve a 
change of government officials. This allows for a large proportion of the population to 
play a role in and influence decisions related to the state by choosing contenders in a 
fair and competitive environment. Some goals behind this concept rely on other works 
such as those of Schumpeter. Lipset has three main components, which constitute a 
democratic system. The first one is a clear set of beliefs specifying the legitimacy of 
institutions, such as political parties and free press, the second is a group of political 
leaders in government, and the third is another group of political leaders competing to 
gain office. Lipset gives importance to two elements of society that have profound 
consequences on the stability of democracy. These two characteristics are economic 
development and legitimacy (the level at which institutions are valued and considered 
trustworthy). Lipset’s emphasis on precisely these two notions makes his work 
different to Schumpeter and other scholars. He focuses and endorses the concept that 
economic development, most often than not, brings a society closer to democracy. An 
environment o f poverty and oppression rarely induces democratic thinking and 
aspirations.64 This offers an explanation why regions such as Central Asia are moving 
further and further away from democracy. In Ghassan Salame’s edition- Democracy 
without Democrats?- Arab-Islamic exceptionalism is blamed for the lack of 
democracy65, while Lipset offers another explanation. Tyrannical and oligarchic 
systems (that are not necessarily Islamic), with impoverished masses are prime cases 
where democracy appears to have no place. What often tends to happen in such cases 
(where the population is Islamic) is an upsurge in religious sentiment as a response to 
the status quo (this point is thoroughly covered in this thesis). Alfred Stepan and 
Graeme Robertson engage in a an interesting debate, where they put forward their 
views as a result o f their research, that Islamic exceptionalism, meaning the lack of 
democracy in Muslim countries, does not really exist. They argue that this commonly 
thought Islamic exceptionalism should in fact be called Arab exceptionalism. They
64 S.M . Lipset, Political Man. London, 1963, pp. 45-50
65 Ghassan Salame, ‘ Introduction: Where are the Dem ocrats?’, John Waterbury, ‘Dem ocracy without 
Democrats?: the Potential for Political Liberalisation in the M iddle East’ in Ghassan Salame (ed.), 
D em ocracy Without Democrats?: The Renewal o f  Politics in the M uslim World (hereafter Dem ocracy 
W ithout Dem ocrats?), London, N ew  York, 1994, pp. 1-3, 8-17, 23-25
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argue that Islamic countries can be and are democratic in many ways (they support this 
claim) and that the main problem lies within the Arab world.66 Sanford Lakoff 
challenges Stepan and Robertson by arguing that Arab exceptionalism does not exist 
but that it is solely a question o f Muslim exceptionalism, which also encompasses the 
Arab world.67
Lipset makes another important point that although there exists a high correlation 
between industrialization, urbanization, wealth, education and democracy, the former 
does not always lead to the latter. Certain historical events play a role in the 
development or failure o f democracy. Once established, a democracy tries to 
strengthen its institutions, which ultimately contribute towards its continued existence. 
Lipset’s argument relating to the correlation between democracy and education is less 
convincing. Lipset argues that education is necessary for democracy but not that a high 
level of education will necessarily mean an easier transition to democracy. Central 
Asia is a good example o f this. High levels of education and gender equality 
throughout the Soviet era do not appear to have placed the region in a particularly
zo
advantageous position. In Whitehead’s volume, Adam Przeworski also talks about 
micro-oriented paths towards democratisation. This theory, very much in tune to 
Lipset’s, argues that democracy is a consequence o f economic development and 
increased education.69
Przeworski studies the transition process of an authoritarian state to a democratic one. 
He argues that there are four conditions that weaken an authoritarian state, and force it 
to reconsider its policies. These conditions may lead to liberalisation. The first 
condition is when the authoritarian state realises that its survival is no longer necessary 
or possible and collapses. The second condition is when the regime loses its legitimacy 
and collapses. The third reason is when there is a conflict within the ruling bloc. If this
66 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, ‘Arab, N ot M uslim, E xceptionalism ’, Journal o f  
D em ocracy, vol. 15, no. 4, October 2004 , pp. 140-146
67 For further reading on this issue: Sanford Lakoff, ‘The Reality o f  M uslim  Exceptionalism ’, Journal o f  
D em ocracy, vol. 15, no, 4, October 2004 , pp. 133-139
68 Lipset, Political Man, pp. 55-58
69 Adam Przeworski, ‘Som e Problems in the Study o f  the Transition to D em ocracy’, in Laurence 
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conflict cannot be reconciled the regime collapses. The fourth condition it a result of 
foreign pressure to introduce democratisation.70 The fourth condition had troubled 
Richard Sakwa71, Alexis De Tocqueville72 and Laurence Whitehead73, who argue that 
democratisation has to come from within and suit the needs of the country involved 
and not come moulded in a foreign package. This is one of the reasons that despite 
numerous American-sponsored democratic organisations in Central Asia, 
democratisation is not proving to be as successful as they expected it to be.74 One of 
the main reasons for the failure o f democratisation has resulted from the lack of 
pressure from below, from the population, to democratize. This is mainly the result of 
the Central Asian countries having no experience in nationhood prior to their creation 
by the USSR in the 1920’s. Their limited experience with nationalism has made them 
more acceptable to the authoritarianism o f their leaderships. The ruling elites on the 
other hand are content with the failure of democratisation as this allows more political 
control. These points will be covered in more detail in the following section.
As we have seen above, there are certain pillars in the process o f democratisation that 
have to be satisfied and completed before democracy can be described as consolidated. 
Most scholars concerned with democratisation theories will argue that there exist five 
conditions, which indicate that the process of democratisation has been a success. The 
first o f these conditions is that a free and lively civil society is in function. A lot of 
emphasis is placed on the ability o f self-organised groups, movements and individuals 
to flourish, articulate their values and advance their interests without feeling pressure 
from the state. This is greatly lacking in Central Asia; the Central Asians are in the 
process of rediscovering their national identity and still do not have a clear vision of 
how they would like their country to evolve. This has resulted in the failure of 
democratisation.
70 ibid. p. 50
71 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society . London, N ew  York, 2002, pp.463-465
72 A lex is De T ocqueville, Dem ocracy in Am erica. London, N ew  York, 2003, p. 369
73 Laurence W hitehead, ‘International Aspects o f  Dem ocratisation’ in W hitehead (ed.), Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, pp. 3-14
741 was told this by an American working in Bishkek on a dem ocracy-prom oting project. This person 
did not want to be named in this thesis. Alm aty, Novem ber 2005
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Democratisation through civil society is becoming more and more the common tool to 
promote political and economic transitions. The main problem with this concept is that 
it applies to all countries regardless of differing political and cultural aspects. 
Democracy in the west is an outcome of a long and complex social phenomenon, not a
nc
sudden struggle carried out by organised groups. Creating a civil society is a difficult 
job. A nation has to want and be prepared for this task; civil society and thus
7Ademocratisation is not something that can be forced onto people, it has to be rooted. 
This is why democratisation has failed and will continue to fail in Central Asia under 
the present regimes. Alexis De Tocqueville warns against democratic despotism, in the 
cases where democracy is forced from the top downwards. This is almost certainly not 
going to happen in any o f the Central Asian countries unless there is a complete 
change in leadership and elites. It is in the regimes’ favour not to democratize and thus 
maintain their authority. In addition, they have Russia’s political support in doing so. 
Tocqueville stresses that he does not recommend all nations with a democratic agenda 
to imitate the laws and customs of the Anglo-American world. He argues that countries 
have different influences and histories, which should be taken into consideration. He
77says it would be a misfortune if freedom were to take the same shape everywhere.
A civil society seeking a stable route towards democratisation should involve all 
political actors; after all it is political legitimacy that is being groomed through the 
process of democratisation. The concept of civil society rests on this point: to create 
political actors. However, what happens when these political actors do not fit the 
definition o f ‘democratic’ political actors by western standards (although they may 
have popular legitimacy)? What if their democratic characteristics are not what are 
usually considered as democratic? This issue is one of the most controversial in
78countries in the Middle East and becoming slowly more important in Central Asia.
A political society is the second prerequisite to the achievement of consolidated 
democracy. A civil society can bring down an authoritarian regime, but for a fully
75 Ghassan Salame, ‘Introduction: Where are the Dem ocrats?’ in Ghassan Salame (ed.), Dem ocracy 
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78 Olivier Roy, ‘C ivil Society in Central A sia and the Greater M iddle East’ (hereafter ‘Civil S ociety ’), 
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democratic transition, a political society is essential. Political parties, electoral rules, 
political leadership and interplay alliances are some of the components of a political 
society. Central Asia is far from achieving any of the above, especially as most Central 
Asian societies are still heavily based around clan and tribal structures.79
The rule of law is the third condition, which has to be met before a democracy can 
truly be consolidated. It is often the rule of the individual and not the rule of law that
on
separates the consolidated democracies from the rest. The rule o f law does not exist 
in Central Asia; it is the rule of the president that prevails. State bureaucracy 
compatible with a democratic government, such as the ability to command and 
regulate legitimately and an institutionalized economic society are the last two 
preconditions for a consolidated democracy. A free market is seen as a prerequisite for 
the evolution o f democracy and the encouragement towards private ownership and
o 1
entrepreneurship.
These are the main concepts, which relate to democratisation. The next section will 
examine how each country approached democratisation and analyse the reasons behind 
the failure o f democracy.
79 Vladimir Khanin, ‘Political Clans and Political Conflict in Contemporary K yrgyzstan’, in Yaacov  
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2.3 The Reversal and Failure of Democratisation in Central Asia
This section is concerned with the democratic developments of each Central Asian 
country and how each country took steps towards and away from democratisation. It 
also offers an analysis of why democratisation failed in the region.
One of the main reasons behind the failure o f democratisation lay in the fact that all 
five Central Asian countries were products of the USSR. They had been created as 
national entities in the 1920’s and developed a sense of nationhood during the Soviet 
era, one very much focused on the Russian language and culture. This is one of the 
main reasons why Russia’s cultural influences are so strong today. This point will be 
covered thoroughly in the following chapter. National identities such as Uzbek, 
Kazakh, and Kyrgyz were introduced into Central Asian political life soon after the 
creation of the USSR.82 The replacement of the Kazakh, Uzbek and other Central 
Asian languages with Russian and the introduction of the Cyrillic script resulted in the 
successful linguistic Russification o f the entire region. This allowed the Central Asians 
to develop a shared identity based on language with one another and with Russia. 
Language became a pivotal point where the Central Asians experienced a sense of 
nationalism. It is generally believed that language is one of the most important 
components for nations and nationalism.
The strength of ethnic nationalism was more commonly seen in countries such as, 
Georgia and Armenia where these countries had previously existed as nations.84 The 
extent of ethnic nationalism varied greatly from each Republic, according to 
Rakowska-Harmstone, the historic nationalities, such as in the Baltic States, Georgia 
and Armenia, very much preserved their national identity during the Soviet era. This 
added a great amount of strength to the success they experienced as independent
82 Arne Haugen, The Establishment o f  National Republics in Soviet Central Asia. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, 2003 , p. 111
83 ibid. p. 126
84 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘The D ialects o f  Nationalism  in the U S S R ’, in Rachel Denber (ed.),
The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context, (hereafter The Soviet Nationality Reader) 
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countries, and to their adaptability to democratic reform.85 This was certainly not the 
case for any o f the Central Asian countries. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, modem 
day Central Asia had little concept of what nationalism was, and had no experience 
with national self-determination. The lack of nationalism has inevitably placed 
considerable strains on the success o f any democratic process.86 Consequently, the post 
Soviet era appears to have offered no or little pressure from below to fight and push for 
democratisation, as was more prominent in the Baltic and other countries with a long 
history of nationhood and hence a stronger sense o f national identity.
During the Soviet period, there had never been any prominent nationalist movement 
challenging the authority of Moscow. Therefore, the lack of a nationalist intelligentsia 
after independence appears to have killed the process of democratisation almost as 
soon as it had started. The lack of a nationalist intelligentsia was evident in three broad 
areas. Firstly, other than the 1986 protests in Almaty, triggered by the appointment of 
an ethnic Russian, Gennadii Kolbin as first secretary of the Communist Party87 of 
Kazakhstan, there appeared to be very few indications that broader political autonomy 
was a relevant issue for the Central Asian countries. Secondly, Central Asia never 
demanded more economic authority (in fact the opposite scenario existed as will be 
explained below). Thirdly, there never appeared to be any pressure from within Central
oo
Asia to promote local national culture. National culture appears to have greatly been 
influences by Russian culture and in some areas also by Islamic culture. This is what 
makes some Central Asians susceptible to Russian and Islamic influences.
The lack o f a national identity was not the only factor that aided in the failure of 
democratisation; economic factors also played a role. The demand for democratisation 
in Central Asia was also not as high as in the more economically advanced former 
Soviet Republics. The economic benefits that both the population and the elites
85 ibid. p. 405
86 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, Oxford, 1997, pp. 256-7
87 Ingvar Svanberg, ‘Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs’, in Graham Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question  
in the Post-Soviet States (hereafter The N ationalities Q uestion), London, N ew  York, 1996, p. 321
88 Rakowska-Harmstone, ‘The Dialects o f  Nationalism  in the U SS R ’, in Denber (ed.), The Soviet 
Nationality Reader, pp. 400-401
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89received from Moscow played a role in diminishing their enthusiasm to break away 
from the Russian fold and implement real change in the form of democratisation. 
Central Asian societies (when they existed) were often very much agrarian based. As a 
result most people were more concerned with subsistence living than politics.90 These 
are some of the reasons that make Central Asia more susceptible to Russian influences 
than to the other two powers this thesis is concerned with.
The Sovietised ruling elites also played a vital role in the lack of democratisation; they 
did not see themselves exploited by the USSR and reluctantly followed Gorbachev’s 
reforms.91 After the end o f totalitarian rule, it was also in their favour not to 
democratize as this helped them maintain their power base, which resulted in the 
growth of authoritarianism. The Soviet styled ruling systems coupled with a population 
that lacks distinct notions of national identity and all concepts o f a civil and political 
society, while also having an attitude not to challenge those above them in power, 
resulted in, as some scholars have called it, a form of post-Soviet nationalism evolving. 
This translated into an unconscious or unavoidable continuation of Soviet habits in the 
post independence period. This helps explain why democratisation will continue to 
fail in Central Asia so long as the Soviet era elites maintain power and gradually 
increase their authority over all aspect of civil life. The population needs to equally 
accelerate their national rediscovery and carve out an identity that allows them to 
dislocate themselves from their past.
The growth of authoritarianism has not threatened the regime’s relationship with 
Russia, if anything it has strengthened it. Russian political influences in Central Asia 
have increased with Moscow’s accommodating and supportive attitude towards the 
leaders in the face o f internal turmoil and international criticism. The Andijan events in 
2005 (this will be covered in more detail in the section on Uzbekistan) were the perfect
89 Gertrude E. Schroeder, ‘ Nationalities and the Soviet Econom y’, in Denber (ed.), The Soviet 
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example for this. While Karimov’s relationship improved with Russia after Andijan, it 
worsened with America and further ignited and revealed Islam’s influence over areas 
of the Ferghana Valley. Political power in Central Asia has slowly resembled political 
power under the Soviet political model, ultimately making the political systems of the 
region more susceptible to Russian political influence. Thus a situation developed 
where democratisation was being undermined from the ruling elites and a large bulk of 
the population. In addition, Russia’s strong cultural influence (as will be discussed in 
the following chapter) facilitated in the growing role of Russia’s political influence in 
the region. The failure o f democratisation was therefore an advantage to Russia’s 
competing influences. These issues will be further analysed below.
One of the main characteristics that all the Central Asian countries have in common is 
that after independence the leaders of all five countries had been the first secretaries of 
the Communist Party, with the exception of Askar Akayev, who was nevertheless part 
o f the Soviet nomenklatura. Even the present president of Kyrgyzstan, Kirmanbek 
Bakiyev, was part of Akayev’s ruling elite, and therefore also accustomed to Soviet 
styled ruling. Thus Communist Party elites have remained in power. This has 
ultimately affected the democratisation process in each of the five countries and is one 
of the main reasons why democratisation has failed. With these leaders in power it was 
not a surprise that the Communist Parties did not disappear from the political arenas; 
often the only characteristic that changed (but not always) was the name. In 
Kazakhstan the Communist Party renamed itself the Socialist Party, and was 
supportive of Nazarbayev’s economic reform program. In the early 1990’s it was one 
o f the largest parties in the country. In Kyrgyzstan, the Communist Party was 
originally banned, and then renamed the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan. As with 
the other Central Asian countries, the party has a broad base of support. Officially the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan ceased to exist during the early months of 
independence. Instead many of the members of the former Communist Party joined the 
People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU). The PDPU became the new fac^ade 
for the Communist Party. As will be seen below the parties that exist in Uzbekistan 
(and elsewhere in Central Asia) are designed to give an image o f political pluralism, 
while in fact the only effective ruling body is that of the president. In Turkmenistan the 
Communist Party, renamed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), totally
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dominated the political scene. The situation in Tajikistan differed, as the Communist 
Party became directly involved in the civil war. It remained popular in spite of this, 
and the only other party that can compete with it in terms of popularity is the Islamic 
Renaissance Party.93
2.3.1 Kyrgyzstan
Since independence, this small mountainous country has captured the attention of 
academics and proved exceptional in its domestic political environment. It has 
oscillated back and forth from elements of democratisation and liberalisation to 
authoritarianism. Its domestic scene has been the least consistent in nature and the 
most surprising in events. Kyrgyz exceptionalism, in regards to its openness in 
comparison to its neighbours, has ultimately contributed to this country becoming the 
third former Soviet Republic to undergo a revolution, and remove the leadership. 
These issues will be covered below.
From the very early years o f independence, Akayev spoke about the importance o f a 
civil society to pave the way towards democratisation. The number of social 
organisations, political parties, religious communities and journalists that evolved, 
with the president’s encouragement, was incomparable to any of the other Central 
Asian countries. Social pluralism flourished and the country, as Anderson calls it, 
became ‘An Island o f Democracy’.94 One of the main movements to emerge on the 
Kyrgyz political scene during the latter stages o f perestroika and into the era of 
independence was the Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (DDK). This group’s 
framework was a combination of social and political notions. One of the main splinter 
groups to tear away from the DDK was called Erkin Kyrgyzstan (ErK). This group 
described itself as a democratic group; ErK also began to show signs of taking a 
nationalistic position, which was also critical of the government. This party was 
exposed to many divisions, while its criticism of Akayev became more and more 
intense as the regime grew in authoritarianism. The most nationalistic party to emerge 
in Kyrgyzstan was Asaba. This party was only interested in defending the rights and
93 Vladimir Babak, ‘The Formation o f  Political Parties and M ovem ents in Central A sia ’ in R o’i (ed.), 
D em ocracy and Pluralism, pp. 156-158
94 John Anderson, ‘Creating a Framework’, pp. 77-88
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interest of the Kyrgyz people, and therefore not interested in the other nationalities in 
the country. It was often also opposed to Akayev, as he was seen too tolerant towards 
elements of Russification, such as the status of the Russian language. Most other 
parties that emerged were predominantly centralists and only moderately critical of 
Akayev. Despite the different social and political groups that emerged during the 
earlier half of the 1990’s, the population was far from acquiring a clear party 
identification. This can be seen as one of the reasons that caused the failure of 
democratisation almost as soon as it had started. Political parties appeared to have 
failed as major political forces, thus putting at stake the evolution of a civil society. 
Tocqueville and Sakwa (in the previous section) warn against this and argue that 
democratisation cannot be forced on a society. They argue that the evolution towards 
democracy does not and should not follow a consistent pattern, and that every society 
has different characteristics and historical backgrounds, which have to be taken into 
consideration.
Aspiring towards the creation of a civil and political society, and identifying the 
importance of developing a multi-party system with strong political leaders was a very 
difficult task for the Central Asians as they have not had any experience which such 
concepts and developments before, nor have they ever fought for such principles; 
especially when they are compared to other nationalities, previously mentioned, in the 
former Soviet Union. The failure of democratisation, in many ways, is a result of the 
population not wishing to express or exhibit anything new or different to what has 
always been prescribed. Independence told a very different story in the Baltic States, 
which had a very strong sense of national liberation and emancipation from anything 
Soviet or in fact Russian.95 The Baltic States’ pre-Soviet existence also included some 
experience of pluralistic democracy.96 This was very different to the Central Asian 
nomadic and clan-structured society. In Lithuania political parties (which mushroomed 
from the late 1980’s) and the population made giant leaps and concrete moves in the 
direction o f political and social pluralism.97 This is clearly seen in these countries’
95 V. Stanley Vardys, ‘Lithuanian National P olitics’ in Denber (ed.), The Soviet Nationality Reader, p. 
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antagonistic nationalization policies towards their Russian population. The Central 
Asian countries’ lack for the need of national emancipation has not only resulted in the 
failure of democratisation but has also made the country far more susceptible to 
Russian influences.
One of the main weaknesses of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan was the failure to create 
strong political actors. The failure of these political parties to grasp the attention of the 
population is partially because many officials remained skeptical of alternative power 
structures. Secondly these organisations were too often based on personalities and 
regions with no firm political base. In addition, many o f the country’s traditional 
characteristics o f tribalism and clan loyalty also contributed in the failure of an 
effective pluralistic political system,98 which resulted in the failure of democratisation. 
According to Linz and Stepan in the previous section, Kyrgyzstan appears to have 
experienced a high dosage o f liberalisation, which entailed the political and social 
changes mentioned above. It would be difficult to describe this process as 
democratisation as a voting procedure had not yet taken place, although most of the 
signs of an evolving democracy appeared initially visible including the evolution of a 
civil, and political society and the rule of law. This pattern had to be maintained in 
order for democratisation to properly be maintained. Unfortunately for Kyrgyzstan, 
this would not to be the case.
Kyrgyz exceptionalism99 showed few faults during the first few years of independence. 
By 1994, however, the first signs of change away from the notions of democratisation 
were slowly surfacing. The president appeared to be distancing himself from political, 
economic and social reform. Kyrgyz exceptionalism, due to the nature of the 
leadership, was short lived. Akayev, just like his counterparts in the other Central 
Asian countries was a product of the Soviet system and was easily tempted to revert 
back to authoritarian rule. He had the support for doing this from Russia and the other 
Central Asian countries, whose leaders were also increasing their grip on power. Thus
98 John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central A sia ’s Island o f  D em ocracy, pp. 34-38
99 K yrgyz exceptionalism  refers to Kyrgyzstan’s positive and enthusiastic approach towards accepting  
and attempting to im plem ent characteristics o f  democratisation. ‘Exceptional’ because it was the Central 
Asian country that took preconditions to democratisation the m ost seriously, and hence was the most 
successful in achieving them.
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the failure o f democratisation was a product of his method of rule and the Kyrgyz 
population’s lack o f understanding of characteristics of democratisation, such as 
political society. This was a traditional country, where modern forms of organisation 
had not developed before 1989; experience in liberal democratic rule was alien. 
Attempts at democratisation and creation of a civil society occurred at the same time in 
Kyrgyzstan, while in most successful democracies the latter always preceded the 
former.100
From 1994 onwards, Akayev engaged in disputes with the media and began to 
strengthen his grip on this important element of an open and free political system. The 
concept of civil society came even more under attack after the parliamentary elections 
in 2000. Akayev was accused of neutralizing the political potentials of most of the 
country’s opposition leaders and barring them from participating. In 1999 Felix Kulov, 
once part of Akayev’s governing elite, created the political party Ar-Namys (Dignity), 
which with other opposition parties participated in the 2000 parliamentary elections. 
All opposition candidates came under strong attack from the government, and Kulov 
was even detained. The OSCE voiced its concern over the fraud behind these elections, 
and strongly criticised the Kyrgyz government. The government authorities continued 
targeting the opposition and even arrested the leader of ErK.101
The 2000 Presidential elections were equally undemocratic. Since the mid 1990’s, 
Akayev had totally marginalised the two features of democratisation that Huntington 
placed so much importance on. Neither contestation nor participation have been 
carried out fairly, and elections have been a democratic facade, aimed at Akayev’s 
reelection.102 Kulov faced even more challenges, and was eventually imprisoned when 
he announced that he would be participating in the elections. The general opinion 
domestically and internationally was that Kulov’s arrest and accusations were totally
103politically motivated to remove him as a threat to Akayev’s power base.
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The elites and the president’s extreme grip on power has been one of the reasons why 
Kyrgyzstan failed to democratize. Even after the Tulip revolution, which will be 
discussed below, Bakiyev’s resistance to curb executive power has gone against the 
wish of his population and stamped out hopes for democratisation to develop.104 Both 
the Russian and Kyrgyz regimes do not want to see an escalation to the unrest that 
triggered the Tulip revolution. Russia is very hostile to coloured revolutions in the 
former Soviet Union and has consequently supported all Central Asian regimes in spite 
o f their treatment towards their population. This has promoted Russia’s political 
influence amongst the Central Asian presidents.
The 2005 parliamentary elections created the final spark of discontent amongst the 
population. The elections were a clear indication of the extent the country had moved 
away from liberalisation and democratisation. Even before the election results became 
public, unrest had been manifesting in the south of the country over speculations that 
the regime had manipulated the results to its own advantage. As a result, the entire 
political atmosphere in the country was highly charged. It had been a mere few months 
since the protests in Ukraine, resulting from controversial election results, had brought 
about another coloured revolution in the former Soviet Union. Leading up to the 
parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, anger at the marginalisation of the opposition 
and the victory o f the pro-Akayev candidates finally triggered a wave of protest that 
reached Bishkek.
On March 24 2005 hundreds of people stormed government buildings, including the 
parliament and the president’s palace, in protest to the rigged election results. The 
scene and atmosphere that prevailed was unseen during any o f the other coloured 
revolutions. There was no clear organisation to the protests, no clear objectives or 
agenda and most important, there was no clear opposition or leadership. There existed 
a kind o f mob mentality, which took control o f events in the capital. Looting and 
violence spread, and the country appeared too often too close to the brink of total 
anarchy. The revolution was a protest with no long-term strategy or aim. The people 
that were involved were predominantly angry people, not intellectuals. The
104 Al-Jazeera.Net. ‘K yrgyz Leader Faces Calls to Q uit’, d.o 19.2.07, d.d 22.2 .07, 
http://english.aliazeera.net/NR/exeres/EF71 D 13D -D 87B -419A -A C A 0-A B 0957
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intellectuals stood at the periphery of the revolution. This is one main reason why 
many today see the Kyrgyz Tulip revolution as a failure, which brought with it very 
little change. What some educated Kyrgyz argue today is that an intellectual revolution 
is now needed, one with a strategy and an agenda o f change and reform.105
The main issues o f concern today revolve around the kind of changes that have been 
introduced in the country since Akayev’s ousting from power, and the appointment of 
Bakiyev as president in July 2005. Has the country’s Tulip revolution and the removal 
of Akayev from power reverted the country back to its previous route of liberalisation 
and democratisation? Unfortunately, the answer according to Kyrgyz political 
scientists and most importantly to the Kyrgyz people is no. Real change did not occur 
anywhere in the country. Bakiyev was not prepared to be president; he was a member 
of parliament with no anticipations of becoming a prominent political figure. The 
revolution was a result o f the growing hatred towards Akayev and his family. Years of 
nepotism and fraud had motivated the Kyrgyz people to reject the corruptness of the 
regime and achieve a revolution. Kyrgyzstan’s relatively open society, and the 
acceptance o f some political maneuvering allowed protesters to mobilize and carry out 
a revolt against the same body of authority, which had given them this power.106
What lessons could be learnt from the Kyrgyz example? Each Central Asian country 
reacted differently to it, although all leaders were extremely wary of a replica in their 
own country. Did the Kyrgyz example of allowing too much reform and freedom result 
in a population not scared to rebel against the leadership? If this was the case, then 
should other authoritarian regimes isolate themselves completely from liberalisation 
and democratisation in order not to encourage a revolution or is each country 
different? Did external powers play a role in sparking events? Did the hard political, 
economic and social domestic environment help fuel the Tulip revolution? Is 
Kyrgyzstan a special case or a mix of all of the above? Some of these questions are 
answered below; some are tackled with more detail in the chapters related to Russian 
and American influences in the region.
105 Interview with Iris Beybutova, Dean, Professor, Kyrgyz State National University: School o f  
International Relations, Bishkek, Novem ber 2005
106 ibid.
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Kyrgyzstan’s unmatched levels of freedom inevitably played a role in encouraging 
vast numbers of the population to take to the streets. The Kyrgyz people were no 
longer going to tolerate the conditions and deceit, which Akayev had exposed them 
to .107 The political, economic and social situation in the country has not only led to the 
rise of Islamic sentiments, but also inevitably played a large role in the eruption of the 
protests that led to the removal of Akayev from power. Political suffocation and 
economic difficulties were blamed on the regime; injustice was coupled with
1 OKhardship. The USA’s role in the series of coloured revolutions hitting the region has 
not had equal affects in the three countries affected by this. As seen in both chapters 
concerned with Russian and American influences in Central Asia, American NGO’s 
and democracy promoting initiatives have always been regarded with skepticism, yet 
their presence cannot be ignored. The USA played a role in supporting local NGO’s to 
step up their opposition to the Akayev regime. They indirectly encouraged what little 
existed of civil society to fight back.109
This mix of predominantly internal and some external characteristics, which led to the 
events of March 2005, have not contributed to any form o f real domestic change in 
Kyrgyzstan today. Bakiyev is not a reformer, and has changed very little of the 
country’s external and internal politics. He has faced growing criticism and political 
opposition, there are few media outlets that are prepared to criticise him and the press 
is wary of the regime just as it was during the Akayev era.110 Although he cannot be 
compared to Akayev, his authority is slowly increasing. Civil youth organisations such 
as Kel Kel (revitalization), played a big role in the Tulip Revolution, and were 
originally very much pro-Bakiyev. The organisation is made up of around 1000 
students who want to see political reform and electoral transparency in the country. 
They promote notions of liberalisation and democratisation. This has consequently
107 This was the general reaction 1 got when speaking to students from the State National University in 
Bishkek w ho had participated in the events that led to the Tulip revolution. It often seem ed that the main 
spark for the revolution was more concerned with rem oving A kayev from power, than to enforce long 
lasting reforms.
108 When speaking to som e o f  the students that participated in the revolution, most agreed that this was 
one o f  the root causes why people were so angry.
109 Interview with Bakyt Beshim ov, Vice-President for Academ ic Affairs, American University o f  
Central A sia, Bishkek, N ovem ber 2005
110 The Bishkek Observer. ‘ Promoting Media Freedom Proving More D ifficu lt’, 17.11.05
77
moved them further away from the Bakiyev regime. They have reached an extent 
where they are even calling themselves opposed to the present regime.111
Kyrgyzstan’s failure to democratize is fairly typical of a country that not only places 
too much relevance to tribal and clan politics but also appears unable to break from 
authoritarian rule and Soviet-styled governing. This makes it more sympathetic to 
Russian influences than American or Islamic. As seen above, its relationship with 
Russia further allows the regime to hold onto power and receive political support in the 
face of international and domestic pressure. The fault lines also lay in the population’s 
mentality and their lack of national and political direction.
2.3.2 Kazakhstan
This advantaged country in economic potential often stands out from the other Central 
Asian countries in terms of general population wealth, modernisation, Russification 
and high proportion of ethnic Russians. However, in terms of liberalisation and 
democratisation it fits the general path the other countries have taken. Democratisation 
has failed and the reasons for this are similar to the reasons in the other Central Asian 
countries despite Kazakhstan’s distinct characteristics. Since independence it has not 
enjoyed the same positive reputation related to freedom and liberty as Kyrgyzstan, but 
has remained more liberal than the other three Central Asian countries. In more ways 
than not, Nazarbayev has maintained stability and security in this country. Kazakhstan 
has showed resistance to the types of instability and violence the other Central Asian 
countries have experiences since independence.
From the initial stages of independence, Nazarbayev unlike Karimov and Niyazov, did 
not set about creating a cult o f personality; he appeared genuinely interested in 
promoting his country’s economic potentials and consequently took a more liberal 
approach to politics that the other two leaders. Nevertheless, he has not been prepared 
to tolerate criticism or challenges and has been known to show no reservations in
111 A member o f  Kel Kel, who did not want to be named, told me about the non-partisan, pro-reform  
characteristics o f  this organisation, which is m ainly com posed o f  university students. Bishkek, 
N ovem ber 2005
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getting rid o f those he does not approve off. This attitude has played a large role in the 
failure of democratisation in Kazakhstan. In addition, Nazarbayev belongs to a 
particular tribe that has throughout the Soviet period, dominated the political scene of
I 1 9Kazakhstan. Therefore, Nazarbayev is never likely to step down from power and 
allow democratisation to evolve as a result o f his tribal history and reputation. He 
made attempts at creating a party conscious society, although his attitudes towards the 
establishment of a civil and political society fell short of U pset’s expectations of a 
developing civil society. Nazarbayev focused his attention on the economic as opposed 
to the political growth of his country.
Nazarbayev, nevertheless, did attempt to make some efforts at creating a multi-party
environment. One o f the first parties to be registered a couple of months before the
disintegration of the USSR was the People’s Congress. This party appealed to both
Kazakhs and Russians, and was initially supportive of the president before its
chairman acquired personal ambitions. The Union of People’s Unity for Kazakhstan
(SNEK) was one of the first parties to register after independence. This party’s
cohesiveness was marred by its leaders competition for influence and wider political
ambitions. There also existed four Kazakh nationalist movement during the early years
of independence. Three of them-Azat, the Republic Party, and Zheltokstan- had similar
roots. The fourth party Alash, or sometimes referred to as Alash-Orda advocated
nationalism along a pro-Islamic line (this is discussed in the chapter related to Islamic
influences in Central Asia). All four parties called for a multi-party and multi-ethnic
future for the country. Nazarbayev’s lack of commitment to civil liberties and other
essential elements o f democratisation made him as early as 1992 crack down on the
1 1 *5
activities of these movements, and target newspapers that supported them. These 
organisations were not strong enough to challenge his rule, as the Kazakh population 
seemed unable to outline a distinct Kazakh identity, separate from what the elites 
dictated.
One of the reasons democratisation in Kazakhstan appears to have failed is because the 
country is still in the process of nation building. Nation building, creating a civil and
112 Svanberg, ‘Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs’, in Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question, pp. 322-324
113 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. California, 1995, pp. 278-279
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political society and achieving democracy are not processes that can occur at the same 
time. Nazarbayev’s grip on power has achieved stability but at the same time has 
confirmed his authoritarianism, which has played a large role in the failure of 
democratisation.114
Nazarbayev’s economic agenda was far more impressive than his political. He filled 
his first administration with reformers, particularly economist reformers, in order to 
help him promote political and economic liberalisation. Nazarbayev’s problems with 
parliament started from an early stage. Many of the members of parliament had 
different economic plans to the president and his economic reformers. This friction 
intensified after the passing of the first constitution in 1993. One of the issues the 
parliament was opposed to was the IMF-stabilization program, which Nazarbayev was 
very keen to promote. Nazarbayev had promoted privatization since 1991, yet still the 
country was behind Russia in its economic reform program. He realised that the 
economic recovery for Kazakhstan was facing some unwanted challenges, which 
resulted in Nazarbayev dissolving parliament in 1993, as he saw some of its members 
as the main obstacles to economic change.115
Nazarbayev succeeded in pushing through a new constitution in August 1995, which 
increased his power. He was able to achieve this by conducting a referendum, which 
allowed him to do so. This is a pattern seen throughout the Central Asian countries: 
referendums abused to grant the leadership what it wants. In the case of Kazakhstan 
democratisation was not what the leadership wanted. The 1995 constitution 
concentrated power in the hands of the executive.116 Kazakhstan was firmly on its way 
towards authoritarianism. By 1998 Nazarbayev had further control of the political 
milieu. He brought forward the presidential election from 2000 to 1999, consequently 
giving less time and opportunity for opposition leaders to organize a competing 
presidential campaign. The failure of democratisation was sealed with these tactics. 
Nazarbayev was comfortably re-elected in 1999, as were his supporters in the
1,4 Roger D. Kangas, ‘State Building and Civil Society in Central A sia ’, in Tismaneanu (ed.), Political 
Culture, p. 271
115 Sally N. Cum mings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite. London, N ew  York, 2005, pp. 23-25
116 ibid. p. 26
80
parliamentary elections of that year.117 It was also during this period that the media 
experienced some of the most brutal crackdowns. Independent radio and television
network were targeted and shut down, and national television fell under the control of
118a company run by the president’s daughter.
Unsurprisingly, the parliamentary election in 2004 followed a similar pattern to the 
previous elections. The coloured revolution epidemic had not yet caused concern for 
the authoritarian leaders in the region. The three main pro-Nazarbayev parties- Otan, 
Asar and the AIST bloc- won the majority of the seats in the lower house. One seat 
went to the moderate opposition group Ak Zhol, while the radical opposition group 
composed of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and the Communist party of 
Kazakhstan won no seats.119 The presidential elections in December 2005, as the 
parliamentary elections the previous year, fell short of all the criteria of 
democratisation in regards to transparent, fair and competitive elections, putting 
Kazakhstan far from the threshold of democratizing countries. Some scholarly 
literature has suggested, especially in regards to the presidential elections, that 
Nazarbayev would almost certainly have won even if he had given the opposition a fair 
challenge, along the lines of Schumpeter and Dahl’s rules regarding the electorate 
process. This argument suggests that Nazarbayev could have achieved some levels of 
democratisation and remained in power. However, as a Soviet-era dictator accustomed 
to a certain style o f rule, he could not adapt to change, even if the outcome would be in 
his favour. Nazarbayev has offered political and especially economic stability; this 
appears to have been more important than democratic details of elections.
Although Nazarbayev showed signs o f concern at the prospect of a coloured revolution 
in the run up to the presidential elections in 2005, many were confident this would not 
be the case for Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev’s rule is not democratic, yet he has managed
I 90to provide for his population stability and relative wealth. His accommodating 
attitude towards Kazakhstan’s ethnic Russians has also helped make him relatively
117 The Econom ist Intelligence Unit, ‘Kazakhstan’, London, N ew  York, Hong Kong, 2005, p. 4
118 Cum m ings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, p. 27
119 Bhavna Dave, ‘Kazakhstan’s 2004 Parliamentary Elections: M anaging Loyalty and Support for the 
R egim e’, Problems o f  Post-Com m unism , vol. 52, no. 1, January/February 2005, pp.3-14
120 Interview with Iris Beybutova
81
popular with them. Bhavna Dave agrees that Nazarbayev has achieved legitimacy with 
his population. She argues that the regime of Nazarbayev, although deeply 
authoritarian, cannot be compared to that of Karimov or Niyazov. These two leaders 
have shown the most resistance to any form of political or economic reform. 
Nazarbayev, on the complete contrary, has made Kazakhstan an economic power base 
for the region. As stated above, his country enjoys the levels of stability unmatched 
anywhere else in Central Asia. Most importantly, Kazakhstan has achieved recognition
| 'y I
from the EU and the USA of having a market economy.
2.3.3 Uzbekistan
From the outset of independence, Karimov did not share the same reformist language 
used by Akayev or Nazarbayev. Karimov has emphasised the importance of creating 
stability before reform can be tackled. The regime’s repression has gradually been 
increasing since independence; although the change has been less dramatic than in the 
two countries mentioned above. Karimov has consistently consolidated political power 
in the office of the president, and increasingly strengthened his hold on all aspects of 
civil society. Linz and Stepan’s civil society most definitely does not exist. 
Consequently the internal situation in this country is very eruptive, and Karimov’s 
hold on all political activity is resulting in the radicalisation of some movements. The 
internal imbroglio is very different to that of Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has a volatile 
internal situation; it has problems with the rise in Islamicisation, hence a large 
challenge to the power base of the president. The rise in Islam is a threat to the 
Karimov regime as much as it is a result o f it (this point is explained in more detail in 
the chapter related to Islamic influences in Central Asia). This kind of situation does 
not exist in Kazakhstan; in addition the economic reforms in Kazakhstan have played a 
role in defusing the tension that could have mounted against the regime. Uzbekistan 
does not enjoy such privileges. Thus, it is in a situation of internal turmoil in the shape 
of political oppression, economic stagnation and social dislocation.
As elsewhere in Central Asia, Uzbekistan experienced little change during the 
Gorbachev years. One of the main reasons for this was due to the lack of national
121 Dave, ‘Kazakhstan’s 2004 Parliamentary Elections: M anaging Loyalty and Support for the R egim e’, 
pp. 3-14
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consciousness that existed in Uzbekistan. As a result, the Uzbeks appeared to have a 
weaker incentive to introduce change and thus allow a democratisation process to 
evolve, as Armenia for example. The Armenians strong national identity aided them in 
distancing themselves from Russia. They had their own distinct Armenian identity to
1 99fill in the vacuum left by the Soviet identity. Uzbekistan was not in this situation, 
although in comparison to most of the other Central Asian countries, they have the 
strongest national identity. Their firm and long Islamic history filled some of the gaps 
left behind by the Soviet identity, especially in comparison to the two Central Asian 
countries discussed above. Uzbekistan’s stronger Islamic identity does not appear to 
have played a role in the country’s failure to democratize. This is most evident by the 
fact that all Central Asian countries have failed to democratize, irrespective of how 
strong Islamic influences are. In addition, the Uzbeks have a strong autocratic tradition 
dating back to Tamerlane and Genghis Khan. The country’s strong Islamic identity has 
made the Uzbeks less susceptible to Russian influences.
The first presidential election witnessed the most amounts o f political pluralism and 
openness seen in the history of the country. Even from that early stage restrictions 
were made on rival parties and movements, although movements such as Birlik were 
able to operate with some amount of freedom. Birlik was formed prior to the 
disintegration o f the USSR, but only gained momentum afterwards. It presented itself 
as a national democratic movement, and its objectives were/are primarily concerned 
with democratic principles, and Uzbek national revival. Birlik was allowed to register 
at the end of 1991 but was banned in December 1992. It has tried to register since then
199but has failed in the face of increasing challenges from the Uzbek authorities. Birlik 
has acquired a certain amount of flexibility and has even worked with Islamic oriented 
organisations, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan and Adolat.124 The 
only party it has refused to cooperate with has been the Communist Party, which was 
known for its alignment with the government. Birlik shares many characteristics with 
Erk, which is Birlik’s sister party. While both movements are national-democratic,
122 Edmund M. Herzig, ‘Armenia and the Arm enians’, in Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question, pp. 
248-264
123 Babak, ‘ The Formation o f  Political Parties’ in R o’i (ed.), Dem ocracy and Pluralism, p. 152
124 Yaacov R o’i, ‘Islam in the FSU: An Inevitable Impediment to D em ocracy?’ (hereafter ‘Islam in the 
F SU ’) in Yaacov R o’i (ed.), Dem ocracy and Pluralism, pp. 108-109
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Birlik’s emphasis is more on nationalism, while Erk places democracy first. Both these 
parties and in particular Erk, are relatively active underground secular movements 
today. Throughout the 1990’s, Birlik and Erk’s leaders, o f whom the most prominent 
has been Muhammad Solih the chairman of Erk, have either left the country or are 
continuously being targeted and undermined. Birlik and Erk have also helped in 
revealing to the international community the kind of human rights abuses and lack of 
all elements of democratisation that the Uzbek regime is guilty of.125 Karimov accused 
Solih of being behind the 1999 Tashkent bombings. One o f the main reasons for 
Karimov’s hatred of Solih is not only because of his emphasis on the abuse of human 
rights by the authorities, but also because he ran against him in the 1991 presidential
1 9Aelections. In the early 1990’s, Karimov also targeted Solih’s family as a way to 
punish him for his political activities. Erk’s newspaper has come under increased 
scrutiny; this was especially the case in 1994 when a huge wave of arrests was 
launched against all the Uzbek opposition. Most of Erk’s activists were jailed. The 
reasons for the distinct targeting of Erk were a result of the party’s newspaper being
1 77resumed by the emigre members of the organisation.
As stated above Birlik and Erk are movements that stand for democratisation and 
nationalism, and although they are relatively active abroad and voice out their 
complaints and criticisms o f the Karimov regime, they do not affect the political scene 
in Tashkent. They are ultimately weak organisations, which have a relatively small 
power base and not much popular support. Their failure as national political 
organisations is further evidence that Uzbek society has not reached a stage in its 
evolution where it acknowledges and supports parties that promote its national 
consciousness, such as in the Baltic or the Caucasus. This is one of the main reasons 
behind the failure of democratisation, national parties need to evolve and promote an 
alternative to the Soviet styled rule offered by the present elites. In order for this to be 
successful, a distinct national identity needs to first evolve and the population needs to
125 Talib Yakub, ‘Human Rights in Uzbekistan: The Atmosphere o f  Terror and V io lence’, Popular 
M ovem ent Birlik Party, d.o 1.11.01, d.d 2.2 .06, http://www.birlik.net/page-4.uk
126 Abdummanob Polat, ‘Can Uzbekistan Build Dem ocracy and Civil S ociety?’ in M. Holt Ruffin and 
Daniel Waugh (eds.), Civil Society in Central A sia. Seattle, London, 1999, p. 140
127 N.I. Petrov, ‘ Political Stability in the Conditions o f  the Comm and-Adm inistrative R egim e’ in A lexei 
V assiliev (ed.), Central Asia: Political and Econom ic Challenges in the Post-Soviet Era (hereafter 
Political and Econom ic C hallenges). London, 2001, pp. 86-87
84
change their Soviet perception of ‘the authorities’ and realise that they can challenge 
them if they have an alternative path to follow. In general, the blind acceptance the 
population tends to give the regime allows those in power not to take responsibility for
1 98their actions. This is one of the reasons why democratisation is doomed to fail in 
such a society.
The only time the Uzbek population did challenge the authorities and show resistance 
to the ruthless policies of the Karimov regime was during the Andijan events that 
occurred in May 2005. These events are thoroughly covered and discussed in the 
chapter analyzing Islamic influences in Central Asia. A group of religious men in 
Andijan in the Ferghana Valley were imprisoned for belonging to an Islamic 
organisation called Akramiya. These men also held small businesses, which provided 
jobs for a number of men in the region. Protests broke out (the details related to these 
events are covered in chapter 6) in support of the Akramiya men and in protest of the 
socio-economic situation in the Valley. The authorities’ reaction to the protestors not 
only caused a huge number of casualties but also triggered a large outcry from the
190international arena and human rights organisations. The Andijan events highlighted 
two very important issues. The first one was related to the support the Karimov regime 
received from the Russian government at a time when it was being heavily criticised 
by the international arena. This incident clearly showed that Putin’s policies were 
going to be supportive o f authoritarian leaders in Central Asia. This support not only 
made the Karimov regime stronger but also pushed it closer to Russia. It was a 
message to other Central Asian leaders that Russia was going to support the 
continuation of their power so long as they were loyal in return. This explains why 
Russian influences are becoming stronger in the region. This also helps explain the 
failure of democratisation. Russia is promoting these elites that do not want to 
democratize in order to stay in power. So long as they preserve the status quo 
democratisation will always fail, and the status quo looks to be preserved with the help 
of Russia.
128 Shirin Akiner, ‘Uzbekistan and the U zbeks’, in Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question, p. 339
129 Paolo Verme, ‘M acroeconom ic Policies and Social Unrest in Uzbekistan’, Post Soviet Affairs, vol. 
22, no. 3, July-Septem ber 2006, pp 276-287
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The second issue that was highlighted as a result o f Andijan was that the most 
powerful challenge to the growing authoritarianism for the Karimov regime came 
within Islam. This is why Islamic influences are also gaining strength amongst certain 
strata of the Uzbek population. This second point is expanded on in the chapter 
looking at Islamic influences in Central Asia.
Adolat was another organisation to evolve during the early years of independence.
This was the first Islamicised movement Karimov had to deal with. This group evolved
in the Ferghana Valley, and is seen today as the predecessor o f the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan. In March 1992, Karimov targeted Adolat and suppressed most of its 
• • • 110activities. By that early stage, Karimov’s rule had already shown signs of increased 
authoritarianism; he had removed some of his main opponents from office, and created 
posts to help him control the country’s twelve regions. The 1992 constitution 
confirmed Karimov head of state, and declared the republic secular and democratic, 
where freedom of expression and religion were guaranteed. Nothing of that sort was 
guaranteed in reality.
Steven Fish refers to regimes, such as the Uzbek one as suffering from ‘super- 
presidentialism’, which is characterised by investing all power in the president and 
consequently giving him great amount of control on political life and institutions. 
Attacking the media, torturing journalists, punishing opponents and engaging in anti­
democratic behaviour, such as what happened in Andijan, reconfirms Karimov’s status
119as a fully fledged dictator. Officially, Uzbekistan claims to have free media and 
respect freedom of worship. Since 1995 the government has been continuously 
cracking down on independent media sources and increasing censorship. Censorship 
reached such unimagined levels that many ordinary citizens in Uzbekistan were not 
aware of the magnitude of events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan that resulted in the Tulip 
revolution. Coverage of the riots in Bishkek, and the ousting of Akayev from power
130 Petrov, ‘ Political Stability in the Conditions o f  the Comm and-Adm inistrative R egim e’ in V assiliev  
(ed.), Central Asia: Political and Econom ic Challenges, pp. 86-99
131 N eil J. M elvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road. London, 2000, pp. 29- 
33
132 Fish, ‘C onclusion’, pp. 228-234
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were not broadcast on Uzbek television during the period they were happening.133 
Prior to the Andijan events, which have further intensified control over the media, 
television and radio stations, the 1999 Tashkent bombings contributed to a massive 
wave of government control, oppression and abuse of civil rights. Not only were 
opposition parties and movements (Islamic and non-Islamic) all targeted, their leaders 
were also subjected to all kinds of accusations. A vast number o f mosques were shut 
down throughout the country. Functioning mosques were under government 
surveillance, increasing the amount of tension and fear for those who went to pray.134
In regards to elections, Karimov’s election record falls extremely short of all the 
criteria for democratisation. In March 1995, a nationwide referendum was carried out, 
which consequently allowed him to remain president till 2000. In so doing, he avoided 
election in 1996. Other than the banning of some movements and parties from legally 
registering, Uzbekistan’s first parliamentary elections in 1994 were in theory multi­
candidate, although in reality they were far from democratic. The candidates allowed 
to contest came from only two political parties, both of which were pro-govemment. 
The Popular Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) (former Communist Party) was 
one; the other was the Progress of the Homeland Party. This latter party was founded 
very soon after independence and is in essence an extension of the PDPU. Even though 
the candidates were fielded from two parties only, the election of these candidates was 
also marred with fraud.
In 2000 two candidates took part in the presidential elections. The PDPU, with the 
consent of the president, nominated Abdulhafiz Djalalov. Karimov, registered as a 
candidate for the newly established Fidokorlar party, was the second candidate. The 
latter party has its own newspaper and helps give the impression that a party culture 
does exist in Uzbekistan; it is a party made by the president for the president. The 
victory of Karimov in the elections was undisputed. The existence of a second 
candidate was nothing more than a symbol of competition for the sake of a democratic
133 I heard this from Uzbek friends and acquaintances. During the Tulip revolution and during the 
clashes in Andijan many felt com pletely isolated from the world. It is believed that Karimov was uneasy 
about his population knowing the facts about these two events.
134 I saw many o f  the non-functioning m osques in Tashkent and Samarkand, and was told that they had 
been closed down since the 1999 Tashkent bombings.
135 Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign P olicy. London, 1998, pp. 4-6
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facade. In reality the principles of free election, and the will to create a polyarchal state 
were far from Karimov’s intentions. Solih (from exile) strongly attacked the 
predictable victory of Karimov, and further highlighted the undemocratic nature of the 
regime. The 2004 parliamentary elections were very far from all principles of 
democratisation. Birlik and Erk were automatically excluded, not to mention the 
Islamic parties that have never had the opportunity to legally function. The climate of 
severe harassment aimed at the opposition meant that the pro-govemment parties were 
the only parties allowed to participate in the pretence multi-party elections. The media 
played a subdued role, while the Uzbek authorities targeted independent sources of
• 1T7information, including western NGO’s.
2.3.4 Turkmenistan
Democratisation in Turkmenistan is a phenomenon completely alien to the leadership 
and absolutely unfelt by the population, not even in the most basic forms of 
liberalisation. The process of democratisation never started. The character of the 
Turkmenbashi is perhaps the main reason why democratisation completely failed in 
Turkmenistan. In theory he encouraged nationalism in his country, in practice
1 TO
everything he promoted rotated around his cult o f personality. His idea of 
nationalism focused on himself being the father of the Turkmens and dictating to his 
population how they ought to be nationalistic. Any ripple effects of a wave of 
democratisation appear to have bypassed Turkmenistan. The country’s tribal origins 
and the lack of a prominent individual or movement pushing for reform, may have 
contributed to the failure of democratisation. Nevertheless, the character of 
Saparmurad Niyazov has been pivotal in this country’s total rejection of democratic 
and liberal principles. Stephen Sestanovich makes this observation when comparing 
Akayev to Niyazov, he says, “ Personality definitely matters....the single most
136 Eurasianet.org. ‘Presidential Elections in Uzbekistan 2 0 0 0 ’, d.d 12.2.06, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/election/uzbekistan/presanal 119.html
137 Adolat Najim ova, ‘Analysis: How Real are Prospects for Free and Democratic Elections in 
Uzbekistan?’. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, d.o 16.12.04, d.d 23.1.06, 
http://www.rferl.org/features/features Article.aspx?m=:12&v=:2004& id:::::2D F64049
138 Annette Bohr, ‘Turkmenistan and the Turkmens’, in Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Q uestion, pp. 
354-358
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important factor that has put the two countries on different trajectories is the character 
of the two leaders”.139
Niyazov has created a cult of personality unmatched in the region. It is at times very 
difficult to evaluate what is happening in Turkmenistan and what the main threats are 
as a result o f Niyazov’s domination of state matters and Turkmen life. All power 
resides in the hands of Niyazov, and all other mechanisms of state are just facades; the 
legislature and judiciary have absolutely no power and no control over the affairs of 
the country. The Niyazov regime is not only a dictatorship, such as in Uzbekistan, but 
an entire system spun around the ideology and character of the president, which is 
often not only harmful to the internal stability o f the country but also to its foreign 
policy. Niyazov has also isolated himself from the other Central Asian countries. From 
the early years of independence, he carved a separate path for the Turkmen people, 
separating them from their neighbours.140
Independent Turkmenistan’s first constitution in 1992 placed all power in the hands of 
the executive. Such strong executive power was justified as necessary for the 
transitional period from totalitarianism to democracy. Like all the other Central Asian 
regimes, Niyazov’s authoritarianism and control over his population has steadily been 
increasing since independence. The Democratic Party o f Turkmenistan (DPT), which 
was the former Communist Party, is the only legal and registered political party in the 
country.141 The Turkmens today are not party conscious; hence the characteristics o f a 
civil and political society are far from being achieved. Niyazov faces the most amount 
of opposition from the emigres, such as from the United Democratic Opposition of 
Turkmenistan; the other opposition in exile is the United Democratic Forces of 
Turkmenistan.142 Both these opposition groups have not been a source of major 
challenge to the Niyazov regime.
139 Stephen Sestanovich, ‘ Promoting D em ocracy’, Journal o f  International Affairs, vol. 56, 2003 , p. 152
140 O lcott,’ Ceremony and Substance’ in Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, p. 31
141 K..P. Dudarev, ‘A Post-Communist Authoritarian R egim e’ in V assiliev (ed.), Political and Econom ic 
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In the first presidential elections held in 1992, Niyazov stood as the sole candidate for 
the job. Niyazov has never pretended to engage in competitive campaigning to win the 
people’s vote. A flawed referendum, as also seen in the other Central Asian countries, 
held in 1994 cancelled the 1997 presidential elections and guaranteed Niyazov the 
presidency till 2002. In 1999, however, the constitution was altered making Niyazov 
president for life.143 Therefore, independent Turkmenistan has never witness any form 
of a free, fair, transparent and contested electorate system. Democratisation never 
started in order for it to fail.
Niyazov’s crackdowns on the opposition and total monopoly of all aspects of civil 
society have also meant a severe grip on the media and other information networks. 
There is no independent media, and all information is very much controlled and 
monitored by the authorities. Even during the Brezhnev era, Turkmenistan saw more 
freedom, especially in regards to censorship and press, than it does under Niyazov.144 
Travelling has become increasingly difficult, with severe restrictions on entering and 
leaving the country. The situation became even worse after the 2002 failed 
assassination attempt on the president; a wave of purges and arrests followed, putting 
Turkmenistan’s human rights record at an all time low. The OSCE was particularly 
alarmed by the severity of the authorities’ reaction to anyone who was suspected to 
have known about the attempted assassination.145
The Rukhnama is a prime example of how power has affected the Turkmenbashi. This 
book alone is a contradiction to the free and liberal society that scholars of 
democratisation envisage. It is a book, which calls itself equal to the Koran and the 
Bible, and its principles are forced on the lives of the Turkmen people. The principles 
of the Rukhnama are given by far greater priority that those related to democratisation. 
The only ideology the Turkmenbashi is promoting is that, which he has created for his 
citizens. This book does not only hinder the development of democracy but also 
interferes with Islam and its teachings.146 Niyazov says, ‘my main guideline is the
143 The Econom ist Intelligence Unit, ‘Turkmenistan’, 2005, p. 5
144 Boris Rumer, ‘The Search for Stability in Central A sia’, in Boris Rumer (ed.), Central Asia: A 
Gathering Storm?. N ew  York, 2002, p. 4
145 Olcott, Central A sia’s Second Chance, p. 162
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90
Rukhnama. As a systematic worldview, with civil content and methods o f use in 
different areas of society.’147
Reasons for the failure of democratisation in Turkmenistan include the lack of a 
national identity to help the Turkmens develop political parties and create a cohesive 
political path for their country, and the existence of a profoundly tribal based society. 
The biggest challenge, however, appeared to be the Turkmenbashi himself. 
Democratisation will always fail when there is a leader like the Turkmenbashi in 
power and if a leader is in power for many years then even after his death the system 
cannot change overnight if  it will change at all.
2.3.5 Tajikistan
Tajik nationalism differs from the other Central Asian countries. Tajikistan was 
initially included in the Uzbek SSR before its status was elevated to SSR. Some of the 
literature available indicates that the Tajik identity started to evolve as a result of the 
national delimitation that allowed Tajikistan to become a separate national entity. 
Following its national delimitation, Tajikistan became more involved in Central Asia’s
| 40
political life and started to develop a stronger identity of its own. The lack of a 
cohesive Tajik national identity in the early years o f the development of the USSR was 
further evident when in 1924 the Tajiks accepted (without the slightest resistance) the 
Uzbek-Tajik delimitation, which deprived them of the ancient cities of Samarkand and 
Bukhara.149 Until today these cities, although in Uzbekistan, are vastly populated by 
ethnic Tajiks and Persian is the main language used in non-official functions.150
Tajikistan’s story with democracy differs in comparison to its neighbours. Although 
each Central Asian country has its own approach towards democratisation, Tajikistan 
was distinct because it never had the chance to experiment with it during the period 
when elements of democratisation and liberalisation reached their post independence 
peak in the region. The country plunged into a civil war at the outset of independence,
147 Saparmurad N iyazov, Rukhnama: Reflections on the Spiritual Values o f  the Turkmen, Ashghabad, 
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which lasted for five years (1992-97). As the civil war was predominantly fought 
between the Islamists and the former Communists, the details of the civil war will be 
analysed in the chapter related to Islamic influences in Central Asia.
Tajikistan became the only Central Asian country not to follow the same pattern of 
gradual increased authoritarianism during the early 1990’s. The civil war was an 
indication that Islam played a large role in the Tajik national identity, enough to spark 
a conflict that lasted five years. The civil war cannot be blamed for the failure of 
democratisation; evidence for this is that the more stable Central Asian countries are 
not more democratic today than Tajikistan. At present, democratisation is continuing 
to fail because neither the Tajik population nor the elites are willing to change the 
status quo. The Rahmonov regime is growing in authoritarianism and is mimicking the 
regimes of the other Central Asian countries. This is in its favour as it further 
consolidates its power base and marginalizes the opposition, while at the same time 
maintaining political support from Russia. The population exhausted by the 
devastation and instability caused by the civil war appear unwilling to resist the 
increasing repression from the regime. Thus democratisation has inevitably failed.
The appointment of Rakhmon Nabiev, a former Communist First Secretary, by the 
Supreme Soviet as leader of independent Tajikistan in 1991, evoked a wave of protest 
against what people saw a restoration of communist control. This revealed a form of 
national unity and consciousness rarely seen in the other Central Asian countries. This 
willingness to attack the ruling elites was later to play a large role in the eruption of the 
civil war. The individual most of the population wanted as president was Abkhar 
Turadzhonzoda, an Islamic spiritual leader. These early signs were indications of the 
role religion would play in the politics and lives of Tajikistan and the Tajiks.
The first presidential elections held in November 1991 were far from being 
democratic, but there did appear to be some form of competition between the two 
candidates. At that stage Tajikistan appeared to be affected by the ripple effects of 
democratisation experienced in the wider region. The first presidential elections had
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two candidates, Nabiev and the opposition leader Davlat Khudonazarov. Nabiev 
received 57% of the vote and Khudonazarov 37%.151
A trigger of demonstrations against the regime unfolded after the elections and 
escalated into what became the Tajik civil war. In a tactical move, the opposition 
united and called itself the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and was composed mainly 
o f IRP members and democrats; the backbone of the opposition were the Islamists, 
headed by the IRP leader, Said Abdullah Nuri. Their popularity and strength grew
1 Othrough the media and opposition publications.
The violence and bloodshed that unfolded between 1992-1997 served as a threat not 
only to the future of Tajikistan, but also to its neighbours. Nabiev resigned as a result 
of the escalating violence, and was replaced by Emomali Rahmonov in 1992. Once the 
civil war started, Tajikistan lost all chances of a transition towards reform. In many 
ways, Tajikistan has been robbed of its transitional period; it was neither given 
sufficient time nor opportunity to experiment. The Islamic character of the UTO grew 
in strength, this was mainly as a result of the IRP’s own evolution as an Islamic party, 
and as a result o f the Taliban’s rise to power in neighbouring Afghanistan. By the late 
1990’s, the unsettled situation in Tajikistan was becoming of serious concern to Russia 
and the other Central Asian countries. In June 1997, the General Agreement on Peace 
and National Reconciliation was signed between the Rahmonov regime and the UTO. 
This ceasefire was primarily achieved with the help of the Russians, and also as a 
result of the Uzbek and Iranian governments’ mediating role. According to the 
agreement, the IRP would disarm. In return the government agreed to give the UTO 
30% of all government posts and guaranteed them participation in political life. For the 
first time in Central Asian history, a step was taken to legitimize an Islamic party, and
153give it a role in governing the country. It is therefore unsurprising that the Tajik elite 
is susceptible to Russian political influence, not only did their survival rest on Russia’s 
role in the peace treaty with the IRP, they are also guaranteed Russian security from
151 Anderson, The International Politics o f  Central A sia, pp. 168-169
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the largest Russian military base outside Dushanbe (this will be covered in more detail 
in the following chapter).
Since 1997, the Rahmonov government has slowly become increasingly dominant and 
authoritarian, resembling more and more the regimes of its neighbours. In 1999, 
changes were made to the constitution enhancing the power of the president. In 2000 
the country had its first multi-party parliamentary elections. Rahmonov could not stop 
the IRP from participating in these elections, as that was one of the main conditions of 
the National Reconciliation Agreement. Nevertheless, the elections were carried out 
under increased authoritarianism.154
The existence of an opposition in all theories of democratisation is given a lot of 
importance, as is the ability of the opposition to achieve political power if the 
population gives it the legitimacy to do so. Ghassan Salame in ‘Democracy without 
Democrats’ (previously discussed), places a lot of emphasis on Arab/Islamic 
exceptionalism, which would automatically rule out any aspects of liberalism that the 
Tajik government could have achieved by incorporating the Islamicised opposition. In 
theory, Tajikistan has a more genuine multi-party system, with a real opposition than 
any other Central Asian country. Nevertheless, by 2000 elite centered authoritarianism, 
seen in the other four Central Asian countries, had also included Rahmonov.155 The 
opposition’s incorporation into the government is becoming nothing more than a 
fa9ade. The Rahmonov regime is increasingly being accused of abusing the ceasefire 
agreement reached in 1997 by pushing the IRP further and further away from politics. 
The 2000 parliamentary elections caused great outrage amongst the IRP members. 
Many felt that Rahmonov had conducted the elections illegally and manipulated the 
results in order to thwart their power.156
154 ibid. pp. 258-260
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2.4 Conclusion
As seen above, every single Central Asian country appeared to have been closer to the 
road of democratisation in 1991 than they are today. The transition towards democracy 
has taken a reverse route, and geared the Central Asian countries towards increased 
authoritarianism. Democratisation appears to have failed in every single country. Since 
independence, former members of the Soviet nomenklatura have navigated Central 
Asian politics, and have been unable to let go o f certain characteristics of the Soviet 
political model.
The strength o f the Soviet legacy has in some ways made the transition towards 
democratisation very difficult to accomplish. The fact that all Central Asian leaders 
were part of the Soviet nomenklatura has made them unable to accept certain reforms, 
which may threaten their power base. Instead the protection of their power has become 
the most important and challenging task to maintain. The strong Soviet legacy has 
been one of the reasons the Central Asian leaders have time and time again turned to 
Moscow for guidance and assistance. This has consequently made them more 
susceptible to Russian influences. Increased authoritarianism is also a pattern seen in 
Russian politics, although in a much milder form. Russia in 1991 was by far more 
democratically oriented than it is today. It appears that Russia has followed (within 
limits) Central Asia in the way democratisation has been reversed. The similar political 
paths both Russia and Central Asia have taken have given Russia increased political 
influence over the region. Moscow has not challenged in action or in words the 
governing methods in Central Asia; it places no real pressure on change, reform or 
democratisation. This accommodating Russian role has become even stronger since the 
epidemic of coloured revolutions started in Georgia. Central Asian leaders have felt 
threatened that too much American meddling in their internal affairs may result in 
changes to the status quo. The Rose, Orange and Tulip revolutions, the events in 
Andijan and the increasing disapproval of certain regimes by Washington have pushed 
the Central Asian leaders further into the arms of Moscow. The failure of
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democratisation in Central Asia cannot be blamed on Russia’s strong political 
influence but is an indication of Russia’s growing role in the region.
The characters of the leaderships have played an essential role in the failure of 
democratisation. Often their character plays an integral role in the method in which the 
country is run. Even if these leaderships die or get ousted from power democratisation 
will still not develop as long as the country is still run by like-minded people, from the 
same ruling elite. Tribal and clan structures still play a role in contemporary Central 
Asian politics, these dividing structures need to become less influential and allow for 
the evolution of a single and united national identity. Until this occurs democratisation 
will struggle to succeed.
The lack o f nationalism and a distinct national identity have also played a role in the 
failure o f democratisation. The Central Asian countries never existed as national 
entities before their creation by the USSR. This has affected the development of a civil 
and political society, as experience in these matters is limited. This was very different 
in former Soviet Republics that had previous experience in nation building. Many of 
the political parties in Central Asia that claimed to have a democratic of nationalist 
base never evolved into strong bodies. This was not only a result o f the regimes’ harsh 
treatment but also because they did not have a strong popular base. It appeared that the 
failure of these parties could be attributed to attacks from above and lack of support 
from below. These parties did not win the hearts and minds of the masses as a result of 
weak national consciousness. Often these parties were also badly organised with no 
distinct political path or identity.
The failure of democratisation reveals a lot about the strength of the powers this thesis 
is concerned with. As mentioned above, Russia’s unconditional approval of the nature 
of the regimes in Central Asia have given it strong political influence over the region. 
America’s political influence cannot be undermined because the Central Asian leaders 
are now politically orienting themselves closer to Russia. American political 
involvement in Central Asia entered a new and more serious stage in the post- 
September 11 era. The American democratisation rhetoric has had positive and 
negative affects on the political situation of the five countries. No doubt western
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backed NGOs, institutions for the development of democracy, education programmes 
abroad, universities, and support for free media have been better than nothing in 
pushing for the creation of a civil society and creating the scope for a more free and 
open political environment.
The promotion of democracy has become the face of American foreign policy, 
particularly for the Bush Administration, and it is in this light that American political 
influence appears to be weak, even counter productive. America’s competing political 
influence over Central Asian societies and governments has appeared fragile in 
comparison to Russia. Washington’s support of authoritarian leaders has made them 
more authoritarian and oppressive, resulting in an upsurge in political Islam. Although 
the rise of political Islam cannot be blamed on Washington’s relationship with some 
Central Asian regimes, it has contributed to its rise. Therefore, the failure of 
democratisation has strengthened Islam as a political power. The two powers that have 
gained the most political influence from the lack of democratisation have undeniably 
been Russia and Islam. As this thesis shows, competing influences are not only bound 
to one type of influence, there are other influences, which tilt the balance of the 
powers.
In order for democratisation to succeed, the population must also be ready to accept it 
and allow for it to evolve. The Tulip revolution was unable to introduce such changes 
because there did not appear to be an agenda or understanding of what political change 
could involve. Democratisation in Kazakhstan does not appear to be profoundly 
needed. As seen above, people appear to have prioritised stability and economic 
security. Uzbekistan today has the most unstable regime in the region. Not only is the 
Karimov regime under pressure externally to introduce reform, it also has to deal with 
the increasing power of political Islam, which it has helped to create. These external 
and internal pressures have made Karimov more authoritarian; this is explained in 
more detail in chapters related to Islam and American influences in Central Asia. 
Tajikistan’s increased authoritarianism is a result o f Rahmonov’s lack of commitment 
to reform and increased interest in consolidating power. Even if Rahmonov’s policies 
were more liberal and allowed for the participation of the opposition, Tajik society 
does not appear ready for democratisation. For example, the creation of a civil society,
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and rebuilding the economy in a war-torn country will need time to evolve, in addition 
to compromising with the Islamic tide in the country. The process of democratisation 
in Turkmenistan is non-existent. In general, the five Central Asian countries appear to 
be continuously moving further away from democratisation. Russia appears to have the 
greatest amount of political influence, in the sense that its influence is by far less 
threatening to the status quo than the other two influences have the potential to be. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the regimes of Central Asian are increasingly looking to 
Russia for support in the face of increasing internal and external demand for change. 
Democratisation, for the time being, looks to have lost in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz 
revolution is an example that change will not necessarily be achieved when the present 
leaders die or if they are replaced. As most scholars writing about democratisation will 
agree, change needs to come from within society and be allowed to develop slowly.
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3.0 Russian Influences in Central Asia since 1991
The aim of this chapter is to examine Russian influences in Central Asia after 
independence. Before the contemporary period can be approached it is important to 
discuss the historical legacy between Russia and the people of Central Asia, in 
particularly during the Soviet era. Although this period has been profoundly researched 
in the past, it is important to trace certain elements of the Soviet legacy, which give 
Russia today an advantage in its competing influences over the region.
3.1 Russia’s Historical Legacy in Central Asia
3.1.1 The Tsarist Empire and Central Asia
The area known today as Central Asia has been subjected to Russian contact for 
centuries. Although the Russian Empire did not start its campaigns of encompassing 
what is now known as Central Asia till the latter half of the nineteenth century, it had 
already infiltrated into certain parts of this region as early as the seventeenth century. 
The area that first came in contact with Russian rule was part of modern-day
Kazakhstan. As Elizabeth Bacon argues, “Long before the Russian conquest of
  1
Tashkent in 1865, the Kazakhs had been subject to strong Russian influences”.
What is modern-day Kazakhstan in the seventeenth century was divided amongst three 
hordes: the Great Horde, the Middle Horde and the Small Horde. In spite of their 
differences and loyalties, there existed a common harmony amongst them, one that 
could unite them against common enemies. One of the most threatening external 
groups that the hordes were exposed to were the Kalmuks, who inhabited a state called 
Dzhungaria. Previously the Kazakhs had discouraged Russian expansion into their 
territory, but during the wars with the Kalmuks the Russians were asked to intervene 
and help them in their crisis.158 This was to have long lasting effects on the Kazakhs 
and their future. The Kalmuks had also waged a series of raids on Russian towns but
157 Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asia Under Russian Rule: A Study in Cultural Change (hereafter Under 
Russian Rule). Ithaca, N Y , 1966, p. 92
158 Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (hereafter Turkism), London, 1957, p. 59
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had found these hard to capture; their real success lay with nomadic areas where the 
Kalmuk offensive was a lot stronger.159
Russia’s security-providing role with the Kalmuks was not the only time the Kazakhs 
were exposed to direct Russian contact. By the first quarter of the eighteenth century, 
Cossack fortresses spread from the Irtysh River in the north from Omsk to 
Semipalatinsk and in the West through Kazakh land finally stopping at the Caspian 
Sea. Throughout that century the Cossack fortresses continued to spread into the 
steppe. Therefore, by the time Tashkent was captured, most Kazakhs had been under 
Russian administrative control for years. The Russian Empire never imposed itself too 
much on the Kazakh hordes and their leaders; it recognized and respected the Kazakh 
way of life, in return earning respect and the role of security provider against external 
forces.160
Russia’s military campaign in Central Asia did not start till 1864. By that date it had 
captured the cities of Turkistan and Chimkent, while also ending the sovereignty of the 
Kokand khanate over southern Kazakhstan. On 17 June 1865 Tashkent, not without a 
struggle, fell to the Russian Empire and subsequently became the centre of Central 
Asia under its rule.161
After Tashkent the next target was Bukhara in 1868. The Russians had many concerns 
regarding Bukhara; they feared that it was militarily strong, and were cautious in areas 
where Islam was a strong force. In reality, the government had greatly exaggerated the 
strength of the army and the will of the people to resist Russian rule. The Russians had 
overestimated the level of resistance coming from the Bukharans, who had endured 
many social and economic difficulties and were ready to rebel against their own
1 69authorities. The conquest of Bukhara was soon followed by that of Samarkand, 
Khokand and finally Khiva. Throughout its campaigns, Russia was able to successfully 
bring the territories under its control with relatively little resistance. In general the
159 M ichael Khodarkovsky, The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nom ads, 1600-1771. Ithaca, London, 
1992, p. 50
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100
khans were mistrusted and treated their people in an oppressive and often ruthless 
manner, consequently allowing the Russians to capture each khanate with relative 
ease. By 1875 all the khanates had lost their independence.
The Turkmens were the last group of Central Asians to come under Russian rule. In 
fact they fought the Russians in a series of bloody battles that finally came to an end in 
1885, the most violent of them was the battle of Geok Tepe in 1881. Prior to the 
conquest of the Turkmens in modem day Turkmenistan (then known as Transcaspia), 
Central Asia was divided into two sections: the gubemiia of the Steppe (Kazakhstan) 
and the gubemiia of Turkestan. In the 1890’s the gubemiia of Turkestan also included
  I /->
Transcaspia. The annexation of Kazakhstan and the other four Central Asia 
countries occurred in two stages. First that of the Steppes, now northwest Kazakhstan, 
followed by that of Turkestan, now Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan. These annexations expanded Russia’s frontiers to Persia, Afghanistan 
and China.164
The Russian Empire’s conduct in both the gubemiia of the Steppe and the gubemiia of 
Turkestan differed considerably to that of other colonialist powers towards their 
subjects. There are two reasons that contribute to this fact. Firstly in many of the 
occupied regions, Russia was either welcomed to exert its influence for reasons 
already mentioned, or easily accepted after a wave of resistance. Therefore, Russia was 
not regarded as a forceful, ruthless occupying power; in a way many other colonialist 
powers were seen. This is a phenomenon that started at that early stage of Russian and 
Central Asian history, and still remains vital in the relationship between contemporary 
Russia and Central Asia.
Certain factors helped with the relatively easy acceptance of Russian rule. One of these 
factors was the lack of nation states, or even the lack of general nationalism. These 
concepts did not start to evolve till the very end of the Tsarist regime (the Soviet 
regime rose at the same time as the tide of nationalism across many parts of the world).
163 Carrere d ’Encausse, ‘System atic Conquest’, p. 157
164 Geoffrey W heeler, The M odem  History o f  Soviet Central Asia (hereafter The Modern History), 
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Movements such as the Basmachis or Alash-Orda, which were not accommodating to 
Russian rule, gained momentum.165 These movements should not be overstated as they 
never matured, nor developed a sophisticated agenda. Both Russia and Central Asia 
had been subjected to years of Mongol rule, giving them a shared history even at that 
early stage. The Russian government was also able to co-exist in peace with the 
natives because it showed a large degree of religious tolerance towards the Muslim 
population.166
The Russian Empire’s tolerant attitude also stemmed from the knowledge that they 
would not be able to effectively run their new territories without help from the local 
elites. In fact many members of the local elites were even welcomed to join the 
Russian aristocracy, so long as they carried out the right duties, not even a conversion 
to Orthodoxy was required. There appeared to be many benefits from co-opting the 
local leaders, such as their ability to encourage the local soldiers in joining the Russian 
army. Russia’s dependence on the locals eliminated opportunities to show signs of 
racism.167
It is important to also point out that Russian rule did not exist completely without 
resistance. The most violent clashes that the government faced in Central Asia were 
those of 1916. It was only at this stage that a native intelligentsia started to evolve; the 
believers in modem national consciousness had developed their ideas from the Jadid 
ideology. In general this was a time where anti-Russian sentiments reached their peak. 
Real problems, however, did not manifest until the summer of 1916. Already existing 
anti-Russian feelings were fuelled when a decree ordering the mobilisation of half a 
million Central Asian men for military service was passed. This decree ignited a chain 
reaction of rebellions throughout major areas of the region. The fact these rebellions 
occurred in a domino pattern and not simultaneously made it a lot easier for the 
authorities to crush them. The rebellions were crushed in a very brutal manner, and 
Central Asian casualties were exceedingly high; as a result many Kyrgyz fled to 
Xinjiang, and Turkmens to Iran. These rebellions did not result in a threat to the
165 ibid. p. 52-3
166 ibid. p. 50
167 S. Frederick Starr, ‘Tsarist Government: The Imperial D im ension’ (hereafter ‘Tsarist Government’), 
in Jeremy R. Azrael (ed.), Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices. N ew  York, 1978, p. 19
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continuation of Russian rule but a shock to the long-established accommodating 
attitude between Russia and modern day Central Asia.168
3.1.2 The Soviet Union and Central Asia
The importance of this sub-section is to show why the Soviet legacy is still so 
prominent in contemporary Central Asia, and how this has inevitably strengthened 
some strands of Russian influences today. It is important not to over-emphasize the 
historical legacy as a reason for Central Asian affinity with Russia today. At the same 
time certain elements of the historical legacy need to be mentioned.
Shortly after the revolution the Central Asian region was divided into five Republics; 
hence all the Central Asian countries as we know them today are the creation of the 
Soviet regime.169 The aim of the Soviet government was to develop this region so that 
it could be used for the general advancement of the Soviet Union. It was common 
knowledge that Central Asia had the potential to make vast contributions to the 
economy, it was also common knowledge that Moscow would have to commit heavily 
to the development of Central Asia along Soviet norms in order to help this region 
reach a level of successful productivity. This proved to be a long and draining mission 
for the Soviet government, but it also proved to be a mission that would integrate 
Russians and Central Asians for years, giving them not only a common past but also a 
similar future.
It was decided that Russian should be introduced in all non-Russian schools as a 
language equal to the native language for three main reasons. The Central government 
decided that it was the right time to implement a common language, which was needed 
in a multi-national state. The knowledge of Russian was to many Central Asians an 
advantage because it meant they could have advanced training alongside the Russian 
cadre. Finally in a world with growing tension and suspicion between East and West, a
168 Seym our Becker, ‘The Russian Conquest o f  Central Asia and Kazakhstan: M otives, Methods, 
C onsequences’ (hereafter ‘M otives, Methods, C onsequences’), in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its 
Strategic Importance and Future Prospects. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1994, pp. 
33-35
169 Muriel Atkin, ‘ R eligious, National, and other Identities in Central A sia’, in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), 
M uslims in Central Asia: Expressions o f  Identity and Change. Durham, London, 1992, p. 48
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common language for defence reasons was essential.170 The Soviet government also 
introduced two other changes to the nature of the native languages; between 1927-30 
all five languages were forced to abandon the Arabic script and adopt the Latin 
alphabet. From the late 1930’s to the early 1940’s one essential change was further
| n i
introduced; the Cyrillic script replaced the Latin alphabet. This was a major step in 
the direction of linguistic Russification; Moscow was slowly replacing Islamic and 
Turkic influences with its own. According to Stephen Blank, “ Latinisation served as a 
way to shatter Muslim unity and lay the groundwork for an eventual turn to
1 79Russification”. Today as a method to enhance notions of nationalism, Central Asian 
leaders are promoting a return to the native language. Their policies are proving hard 
to implement as linguistic Russification has merged with Central Asian national 
identity.
Nationalism was the enemy of the state, and Great Russian chauvinism was very much 
feared. Therefore, the Soviet government had the very difficult task of promoting the
1 7Tnotion of ‘one Soviet people’ inevitably based around the Russian national core 
while at the same time curtailing Russian nationalism and notions of superiority. 
Sovietization, therefore, was a form of Russification without Russian nationalism. The 
non-Russians were expected to adopt the Russian language and accept Russian styled 
politics and Russo-oriented history, the ethnic Russians also had to accommodate to 
the fusion of non-Russian elements in the Soviet policy.174 The continuation of Soviet- 
styled politics and the Soviet political model in current Central Asian governments 
(even more so than in Russia) appears to be the result o f two factors. The five Central 
Asian countries, created by Moscow, have never experienced a political system other 
than the Soviet one. The Soviet system provided more advantages than existed in the 
nomadic or khanate-based systems, where distribution of resources, economic and
170 Peter A. Blitstein, ‘Nation-Building or Russification? Obligatory Russian Instruction in the Soviet 
Non-Russian Schools, 1938-1953’, in Ronald Grigor Suny & Terry Martin (eds.), A State o f  Nations: 
Empire and Nation Making in the A ge o f  Lenin and Stalin, N ew  York, 2001, p. 258
171 John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central A sia, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, N ew  York, 
2003 p. 81
172 Stephen Blank, ‘Soviet Re-conquest o f  Central A sia’, in Malik (ed.), Central Asia: Its Strategic 
Importance and Future Prospects. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, 1994, p.52
173 Michael Rywkin, ‘Religion, M odem  Nationalism and Political Power in Soviet Central A sia’, p. 197
174 N eil J. M elvin, ‘The Russians: Diaspora and the End o f  Em pire’ (hereafter ‘The Russians’), in 
Charles King & N eil J. M elvin (eds.), Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International relations in 
the Former Soviet U nion, Boulder, Co, Oxford, 1998, p. 33
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agricultural development, and education and equal gender opportunities were less 
common. Secondly, the ruling elites of Central Asia are all part of or very much 
influenced by the old system of governing. No political figure has been able to 
properly break away from the old Soviet political system.
The experience of the Tsarist and Soviet rule in Central Asia is not badly seen, 
especially when compared with other former Republics of the USSR. Most people in 
Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, do not view their contact 
with Russia, whether during the Tsarist or Soviet periods as a time of invasion,
1 7^occupation and hardship. They often acknowledge the fact that Moscow provided 
the people of the region with aspects of modernisation and development, which did not 
previously exist. Women praise the Soviet era as a time that gave them the opportunity 
to rise in society and enjoy equal status to men. It is important to highlight certain 
characteristics of both the Tsarist and Soviet periods as they provide an introduction to 
certain phenomena that exist in Central Asia today, such as, Central Asian 
Russification and Soviet-styled political systems.
175 At the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Department o f  International Relations in Almaty, 
Novem ber 2005, I interviewed a young ethnic Kazakh lecturer called Karina Narymbetova. She stressed 
that Tsarist Russia incorporated modern-day Kazakhstan into its empire and she criticised non-Kazakhs 
when they used the word invaded or occupied. She said that Tsarist Russia saved Kazakhstan by 
incorporating it into the Russian Empire and providing assistance, and modernisation.
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The following sections analyse Russia’s cultural, security-related, political and 
economic influences with each of the five Central Asian countries. As Russia has both 
internal and external influences in Central Asia, it is first important to trace the 
evolution of Russian Foreign Policy over the region since independence.
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3.2 Patterns of Russian Foreign Policy since the Disintegration of the 
USSR
As the then Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov wrote, “No state can recreate its 
foreign policy from scratch simply because of particular domestic political changes, 
even if such change is profound. Foreign policy objectively reflects the characteristics 
o f how a country- its culture, economy, geopolitical situation- have historically 
developed, and therefore is a complex alloy, comprising elements of both continuity
1 7 f \and renewal”. This is the character of Russian foreign policy today. Russia’s historic 
development has been linked in many ways, as detailed in the previous section, to that 
of Central Asia, therefore the quote correctly implies that Russian interests in Central 
Asia, or in fact anywhere else in its former sphere of influence, have not greatly been 
altered as a result of the changes in the international arena; they have simply been 
remodeled to adapt to the current situation. Foreign policy is a reflection of the 
objectives and interests of the Russian state- the Tsarist Empire, the USSR or the
1 77Russian Federation.
This attitude, in regards to foreign policy, has not always prevailed in Moscow. The 
Russian Federation’s foreign policy has not always been a clear-cut equation. Its 
character is very much different today than it was in the early 1990’s. Russian foreign 
policy in its early years was very much a reflection, and a reaction to the new world 
order that came into existence after the end o f the Cold War. To add further 
complications, Russian national identity, similar to Central Asian national identities, 
had been very much over-shadowed by the Soviet identity. The Central Asians and the 
Russians were both searching for similar answers in regards to their national identity. 
Was Russia, similar to Central Asia, going to adopt religion as a pillar of its identity? 
(All the Central Asian countries have done this to different levels). According to 
Huntington, “Several scholars distinguish a separate Orthodox civilisation, centered in
176 Igor S. Ivanov, The N ew  Russian Diplom acy. Washington D.C, 2002 , p. 18
177 Ivanov, The N ew  Russian D iplom acy, p. 19
107
1 7RRussia”. Or was it going to declare itself a European or an Asian country? Were 
religion, European-ness and Asian-ness going to be combined to form a unique 
Russian identity? The latter combination appears to have corresponded with how most 
Russians regard themselves-Eurasian. O’Loughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov report that, 
“71% of respondents to the All-Russian Centre for Research and Public Opinion 
survey held in November 2004 agreed with the statement that Russia belonged to a
• 17Q
Eurasian civilisation”.
In regards to religion, it appears that Russia has taken a diverse approach. Russia is 
predominantly an Orthodox Christian country, and is primarily thought of as belonging 
to the Christian world; it must also be emphasized that around 20 million of the 
Russian population are Muslims. After 11 September, and the American increased 
presence in Central Asia, Russia felt its influences in the region threatened; it was at 
this stage that Russia decided to restate its Islamic identity. There appears to be three 
main reasons behind this decision. The first is the fact that 20 million people are a 
considerable number of people; therefore Russia should not only be considered a 
Christian country but also a Muslim one. Secondly, its Eurasian identity by definition 
should have an Islamic touch to it. This corresponds perfectly with Russia’s 
declarations of being the bridge between West and East-between Christianity and 
Islam (Kazakhstan also likes to define itself in this way). Thirdly, it is essential for 
Russia to remain the most powerful competing influence in Central Asia; re-stating its 
Islamic identity, for example, by acquiring observer status in 2005 at the Organisation 
of Islamic Conference (OIC) has helped it do so. This ultimately puts Russia at a more 
advantageous position than America, in regards to Central Asia, and also in regards to 
the rest of the Muslim and Arab world. By doing so, Russia also hopes it will be 
criticised less over its actions in Chechnya. Being part of an Islamic organisation, or 
even just an observer, may avoid or at least cushion the wrath of Islamic extremism 
toward itself.
178 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order, London, N ew  
York, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Singapore, 1998, p. 45
179 John O ’Loughlin, Gearoid Tuathail and Vladimir K olossov, ‘A Risky Westward Turn? Putin’s 9-11 
Script and Ordinary R ussians’ (hereafter ‘A Risky Westward Turn?’), Europe-Asian Studies, vol.56, 
no. 1, January 2004, p. 5
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The Eurasian identity over the years has helped pave the way for change in Russian 
foreign policy. The Eurasianist way of thinking did not manifest itself in policy until 
the mid 1990’s, and especially after the appointment of Primakov as foreign minister. 
The early years of Russian foreign policy were characterized by pro-western policies;
I 80this was the peak of Atlanticism in Russian foreign policy. It was also the time that 
Central Asia was the most neglected by Russia; one of the main reasons for this was 
that Russia was still in the process of discovering its national interests.181 It was not 
until the late Kozyrev period that change in foreign policy was detected. Although the 
USSR had disintegrated and the Cold War had ended, the sentiment and mistrust 
between Russia and the West, which had manifested over decades could not disappear 
so quickly. The West was not as willing to help the ‘new’ Russia as the 1991 Russian 
euphoria had hoped for. By 1993 Russia’s relationship with the West began to weaken. 
This was particularly evident with issues such as NATO enlargement and the war in
| o9
Bosnia. On 24 February 1994, El’tsin re-emphasised the shift in foreign policy when 
he stated, “A major element of the Russian foreign policy in 1994 will concern 
relations with the new independent states, which maintain borders with Russia, as well 
as the comprehensive development of the CIS. This is a sphere of special responsibility 
and special mutual interests of Russia and its neighbours. This country is bound with 
them more tightly than any other neighbour. This reality must be taken into account, if 
we want to retain control over economic and social processes and ensure an acceptable
1 83level of security”.
Although Russia was in desperate need for economic assistance from the west, it soon 
became obvious to those in the Kremlin that no partnership could be firmly 
consolidated so long as the west did not see Russia as an equal partner. This 
phenomenon would slowly push Russia into realising that its interests still differed to
180 N icolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State. 
N ew  York, Harlow, 1997, pp. 99-100
181 Peter Shearman, ‘Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Dom estic Politics’ 
(hereafter ‘ Defining the National Interest’), in Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin (eds.), 
The Foreign Policy o f  the Russian Federation, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, 1997, p. 3
182 Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End o f  the Cold War. Aldershot, Hants, Brookfield, 
1997 p. 205
183 Boris E l’tsin, Address o f  the President o f  the Russian Federation to the Federal Assem bly on the 
Consolidation o f  the Russian State (D om estic and Foreign Policy G uidelines). London, 1994, p. 42
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those of the west.184 Moscow started to look back at its former spheres of influence; its 
main concern was its integrity, security, and economic development. These created the
185pillars of Russian influences in Central Asia.
Igor Ivanov (1998-2004) and Sergei Lavrov (2004-), the two foreign ministers under 
Putin, have continued conducting foreign policy along a similar path to that of 
Primakov. Russia today seems to have finally found its place in the international arena, 
and has a clearer foreign policy agenda. Its concern with Central Asia has slowly been 
increasing since the mid 1990’s, and reached a peak in the post-September 11 era. This 
has made Central Asia once again a playground for competing powers and influences. 
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s weakened role as a political power in the 
international arena has often been very obvious. It has consequently made strong 
efforts to show its distinct imprint on issues that are of global interest, especially if it is 
able to show a different approach to the one adopted by the USA. This has become 
evident in Russia’s relationship with the government of the Iranian president 
Mohamed Ahmadinijad and with its helping hand to Hamas. Competition between
1 fiARussia and the USA is not bound to Central Asia it merely intensifies there.
184 Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End o f  the Cold War, p. 206
185 F. Seth Singleton, ‘Russia and Asia: The Emergence o f ‘Normal Relations’ in Kanet and 
Kozhemiakin (eds.), The Foreign Policy o f  the Russian Federation, p. 105
186 The Econom ist. ‘Russia is not a Piece o f  Furniture’, April 22nd-28th 2006, pp.41-42
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3.3 Russia’s Political Influence in Central Asia
Russia’s political influence on the region has already been touched on in the chapter 
related to the internal politics of Central Asia. Growing similarities between the 
Russian and Central Asian political systems were identified. Over the years both 
Russia and Central Asia appear to have reverted back to some of the characteristics of 
the Soviet political model. The Russian political system seems to be imitating that of 
some of the Central Asian countries in regards to gradual growing authoritarianism, 
and the control of the development of civil society. Putin, very much like the Central 
Asian leaders has geared Russia’s politics to consolidate his own power and eliminate
i on
opponents. Central Asia’s experiment with democracy has been a failure and many
1 R Rwill argue that so has Russia’s. The steady distancing from most preconditions to 
democratisation is by far more profound in the Central Asian countries than in Russia. 
Thus, it is inevitable that Russia’s political influences are strong in Central Asia as 
they will be supportive of the policies taken by the ruling elites.
Even if the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries is not always aligned to 
Russia, as was particularly the case with Uzbekistan before the Andijan massacre in 
May 2005, domestic politics has so far (throughout Central Asia) been aligned to 
Moscow. Most literature on Russian and Central Asian politics and foreign policy 
discusses the links and similarities between Russian and Central Asian foreign policy 
but not between Russian and Central Asian domestic politics. This is a point that this 
thesis highlights. Putin’s conduct of politics and that of his counterparts in Central 
Asia can display a striking resemblance. As Bobo Lo says, “It is somewhat ironic that 
the post-Soviet era, with its powerful images of democracy and freedom, should give 
rise to a man (Putin) whose political standing and control over policy exceeds that of 
more authoritarian figures of the past, such as Khrushchev, Gorbachev and El’tsin”.189 
In addition, politician reshuffling is an increasing phenomenon in both Russia and
187 Masha Lipman and Michael McFaul, ‘Putin and the M edia’, in Dale R. Herspring (ed.), Putin’s 
Russia. Lanham, Boulder, N ew  York, Oxford, 2003, p. 63
188 Timothy J. Colton and M ichael McFaul, ‘Putin and Dem ocratisation’, in Herspring (ed.), Putin’s 
Russia, p. 13
189 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution o f  Russian Foreign Policy , London, 2003, p. 2
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Central Asia and guarantees the interests of only the groups in power. This often 
results in very few changes and reforms being implemented as a result the creation of a 
police-like state becomes more inevitable.190 Russia’s political influence on all five 
Central Asian countries is a major challenge to the other two competing powers 
political influence.
190 Mikhail Stoliarov, Federalism and the Dictatorship o f  Power in Russia, London, N ew  York, 2003, p. 
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3.4 Russification in Central Asia
Russification in Central Asia is Russia’s cultural influence on the region. When 
Russification is referred to it often implies linguistic Russification. Linguistic 
Russification should not be underestimated or over looked as language forms a core 
part of a people’s identity. The other type of Russification this section examines, I 
have called ‘behavioural’ Russification. Behavioral Russification reflects Russia’s 
influence on the mind-set of the Central Asian people. This is revealed in the way the 
Central Asians dress, what they eat and drink, the general way they perceive 
themselves and in their national identity. This is a phenomenon distinct to Central 
Asia, and is hard to research as most of the signs of behavioral Russification are 
detected by observation. Behavioral Russification has previously been under­
researched, aspects of it have been written about but not linked together or identified 
as a single phenomenon explaining what Central Asian Russification is (other than 
linguistically) and its degrees in different countries The following section will analyse 
the importance and impact of both forms of Russification on Central Asian society.
It is important to point out that although Russification is part of Sovietization it is also 
distinct from it. As seen above, Russification refers to the Russian language and 
Russian behaviour. Drinking alcohol, eating pork were not encouraged under the 
Soviet system, they exist today in Central Asia because they are part of Russian 
culture. This is an example of Russification and not Sovietization. Sovietization 
focused on (amongst other things) campaigns against religion, on state ideology, 
integration of different nationalities, collectivization and state ownership of industry. 
Therefore a Kazakh who is an atheist is an example of Sovietization but a Kazakh who 
speaks Russian and drinks vodka is an example of Russification. This section focuses 
on and gives examples of characteristics of Russification distinct from Sovietization.
In an attempt to limit linguistic Russification and reinforce national consciousness, the 
Central Asian countries have passed language laws, which put the status of the native 
language at a higher level to the Russian language, and encourage its use as the official
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state language. In some countries these laws have not amounted to much change. In 
Kazakhstan, for, example, the government has not taken this law very seriously itself. 
The Russified Kazakh elite still uses Russian officially; they have consequently killed 
the Kazakh language revival at its very early stages.191 In spite of Nazarbayev’s 
language laws, Kazakhstan is one of the most linguistically Russified Central Asian 
countries. What has to be observed are not the laws regarding language but the 
practical implementation of language in society. For example, at the Al-Farabi Kazakh 
National University only Russian is the teaching language. Outside of class only 
Russian is used amongst students and teachers. In fact many ethnic Kazakh students 
admitted not to be comfortable in using the Kazakh language because they were not 
fluent, and therefore preferred speaking in Russian. Most of them even said that they 
did not feel the need to improve their fluency in Kazakh because they spoke
• 192Russian.
Kazakhstan is one of the most linguistically and behaviorally Russified Central Asian 
countries. It is in this country that behavioral Russification seemed so strong that it has 
infiltrated into the Kazakh national identity. Kazakhs will openly speak about the 
profound level of Russian cultural influence in their country, which affects the 
behaviour of the population. They argue that Russification is in the hearts and minds of 
the people, affecting the very core of their national identity. One of the reasons for this, 
they argue, is because the Kazakhs are still in the process of discovering their own
1 QTnational identity, which they never considered until after independence. Amongst 
the more religious strata of the Kazakh population, Islam is seen as an alternative to 
Russification in filling the vacuum in Kazakh national identity left after the collapse of 
the USSR. It is only when Kazakhs are in Muslim countries learning more about Islam 
that they realise how strong the influence of Russification is on them. According to
191 Yilm az Bingol, ‘Nationalism  and Democracy in Post-Communist Central A sia’ (hereafter 
‘Nationalism and D em ocracy’), Asian Ethnicity, vo l.5, n o .l, February 2004, p. 56
192 This information was gathered during one o f  two visits to Al-Farabi University. I was allowed to 
speak to som e o f  the student from the Department o f  International Affairs and ask them about their own  
personal experiences and opinions regarding the use o f  the Russian language in Kazakhstan. Almaty, 
Novem ber 2005.
193 This information was gathered while interviewing academ ics (o f  all age groups) at the Al-Farabi 
University in Almaty. One o f  the Kazakh academics I spoke to even said that she felt more Russian than 
Kazakh. When asked by her colleague what country she would say she was from when abroad (outside 
Central Asia) she said Kazakhstan, but before she replied to her co lleague’s question she hesitated and 
thought about her answer.
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Alima Bissenova, it is then that it “becomes clear to what extent Russian-ness has been 
internalised and has in fact become an integral part of post-Soviet Kazakh and post- 
Soviet Muslim identity” .194 Kazakh Russification is also seen when Kazakhs prefer 
Russian hospitals or see Russian-educated doctors when they get sick abroad.195 
Russian and Kazakh common perceptions further interlink when it comes to the ideas 
of the political and cultural movement know as neo-Eurasianism. The Gumilev 
Eurasian University in Almaty further stresses the importance of Eurasianism for the 
Kazakhs. According to Trenin, “In terms of ethnicity and prevailing culture, 
Kazakhstan is a truly Eurasian state”.196 Russian food chains are more numerous in 
Kazakhstan than anywhere else in Central Asia; alcohol and pork are accepted as part 
of Kazakh culture.
In other countries, the language laws have been used as a tool to crack down on other 
native languages. The Karimov government has launched a campaign banning the 
teaching of Tajik anywhere in Uzbekistan, and closing down all Tajik schools. This 
has caused some tension is cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara, where the vast 
majority of the inhabitants are ethnic Tajiks.197 In Uzbekistan, Uzbek was made the 
sole official language; Russian is still widely used, but Uzbek is by far more spoken in 
both the private and public sectors than Kyrgyz or Kazakh in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan. This has consequently made Uzbeks less linguistically Russified than 
other Central Asians. It is important to point out that although the Uzbeks speak less
1 O RRussian amongst themselves, most of them can speak Russian. Karimov has also 
insisted that the use of the Cyrillic script be limited. He wants to re-introduce the Latin 
script, which he sees as a method to encourage the use of Uzbek. As in Kazakhstan,
194 Alim a Bissenova, ‘Central Asian Encounters in the Middle East: Nationalism , Islam and Post- 
Coloniality in Al-Azhar’ (hereafter ‘Central Asian Encounters in the M iddle East’), Religion. State & 
Society, vol. 33, no. 3, September 2005, pp. 261-262
195 ibid. p. 261
196 Dmitri Trenin, ‘ Southern Watch: Russia’s Policy in Central A sia ’, International Affairs, vol. 56, 
no.2, Spring 2002, p. 125
197 This information was gathered from local Tajiks spoken to in Samarkand. Most regarded this m ove 
by Karimov as an attempt to limit the influence o f  the Tajiks in Uzbekistan, who constitute the majority 
o f  inhabitants in both Samarkand and Bukhara. Many Tajiks saw this as ethnic discrimination.
198 This observation was made by spending time in Tashkent and Samarkand. Even in Samarkand, where 
Tajik was the predominant language used, almost everyone I met could speak Russian.
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the theory behind these laws dictating the use of a certain language or alphabet is 
different to the practice.199
Behavioral Russification in Uzbekistan is less noticeable at first glance. The Uzbeks 
are less conscious of it than the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz. In Uzbekistan there exists a 
sub-conscious Russian-ness. Aspects of behavioral Russification are at times shocking 
in this country that also exhibits strong Islamic characteristics; women are more 
conservatively dressed than in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, and veils are more 
frequently seen. Nevertheless, religious men will finish their prayers at a mosque and 
then drink vodka and eat pork at home with friends and family without the slightest 
concern regarding the contradictions of both events.200 Even on Uzbekistan’s national 
airlines, pork sandwiches are offered.
Kyrgyzstan, similar to Kazakhstan is very linguistically Russified. Russian is so 
prominent in all echelons of society that the prime minister-Felix Kulov, who at some 
point was even considered a candidate for the presidential elections after the Tulip 
revolution, cannot speak Kyrgyz but only Russian. The use of the titular language, as 
in all the other Central Asian countries, became an issue of importance after 
independence. Laws were set that favoured those who could speak the titular language,
901inevitably causing some concern for the ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan. These laws 
are not fully implemented, as the example above is evidence of this. The main 
language used for teaching at the Kyrgyz State National University is Russian, and 
students outside of class speak Russian to one another and to the staff. The Kyrgyz 
professors and lecturers (some of them ethnic Russians) only speak Russian at 
University. Two types of schools exist in Kyrgyzstan; those that educate in Russian 
and those that educate in Kyrgyz. Parents have the choice of which type of school to
199 From my experience, most people were unable to read the Latin script. When inquiring for street 
names, museums, restaurants, and Universities written in the Latin script, people frequently could not 
understand.
200 Interview with Jamshid Farrukhovich Karimov, Head o f  International Relations Department at the 
Tashkent Islamic University, and member o f  the Cabinet o f  Ministers o f  the Republic o f  Uzbekistan, 
Tashkent, September 2004. Karimov said that many Uzbeks, regardless o f  how religious they are, find it 
difficult to implement som e Islamic principles because vodka and pork have been part o f  Uzbek culture 
for decades.
201 Vladimir M esamed, ‘Linguistic Policy and the Process o f  Democratisation in Uzbekistan’, in R o’i 
(ed.), Dem ocracy and Pluralism, p. 236
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send their children to. Both types of school also have language classes in the other 
language.202
The Kyrgyz people also exhibit strong signs of behavioral Russification, especially in 
the north. The way people dress, especially women in Bishkek, is very different to how 
women dress in other Muslim countries. Veils, long skirts and long sleeves are almost 
never seen (in summer). Russian music is popular amongst the ethnic Kyrgyz as is 
Central Asian music amongst the ethnic Russians. There is a great amount of inter- 
ethnic mixing in Bishkek, where one in three people are ethnically Russian. In 
parties, restaurants, and discos all Kyrgyz people, including Russians, mix, socialise, 
drink and dance together. One of Bakiyev’s political advisors and formed deputy 
foreign minister is an ethnic Russian; this helps explain the Kyrgyz identity when they 
feel it is normal to have ethnic Russians in such sensitive political positions.204
In the late 1990’s the Turkmens appeared to be the most flexible toward language laws 
and dual citizenship in regards to Russia. As Bingol says, “Here the language law 
declared Russian as a state language alongside Turkmen, and Turkmen citizens of 
Russian origins were granted dual citizenship”. Russian is still widely used in 
Turkmen constitutional matters, such as presidential and parliamentary elections as 
was the case in the latest parliamentary elections on 19 December 2004, where election 
information, results and all documentation was publicly announced to be available in 
both Turkmen and Russian.206
Like the other Central Asian countries, the enhancement of the titular language in 
Tajikistan was given importance. According to the constitution the language of
207Tajikistan is Tajik, and Russian is the language o f inter-ethnic communication.
202 Interview with Iris Beybutova, Dean, Professor, Kyrgyz State National University: School o f  
International Relations, Bishkek, September 2004
203 Interview with Iris Beybutova
204 Interview with Yevgenni Kablukov, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister, September 2004. During my 
second visit to Kyrgyzstan in Novem ber 2005, he told me that he had becom e one o f  Bakiyev’s political 
advisors.
205 Yilm az Bingol, ‘Nationalism  and D em ocracy’, p .57
206 ‘Turkmenistan to Set Up 1,610 Poll Stations for Parliamentary E lection’, The Times o f  Central Asia 
(Bishkek), 11.11.04
207 Constitution o f  the Republic o f  Tajikistan, Article 2, Dushanbe, 1994
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Russian is no longer the language used for conducting official business, while schools
'J A O
are permitted to conduct classes in Tajik, Russian and Uzbek. In addition, Russian is 
the sole language in which the Central Asian countries can communicate with one 
another.209
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are the least behaviorally Russified Central Asian 
countries. Both Turkmens and Tajiks are more attached to their customs and culture 
than seen anywhere else in the region. Tajik dependence on Russia during the civil war 
and the Rahmonov regime’s support from Moscow has made Tajikistan particularly 
aligned to Russia. Both Niyazov and Rahmonov are from Russified elites. Niyazov 
showed the most amount of flexibility towards the Russian Turkmens by granting them 
dual citizenship. This changed in 2003, and the Russian Turkmens had to decide which
• 710citizenship they would keep. Consequently this caused tension with Moscow. 
Russians throughout Central Asia had more sophisticated, and technical jobs than the 
rest of the population; therefore discouraging them to remain often affected the
711functionality o f the country.
208 Language and Ethnicity Issues in Tajikistan, d.d 4.4.06, 
http://www.ismaili.net/mirrors/l 12 tajik/tajkethn.html
209 This is particularly the case for Tajikistan as it is the only non-Turkic language in Central Asia. Its 
roots com e from the Persian language.
210 ‘Dual C itizenship’, Central Asia N ew sfile, vol.2. n o.l (15), 1994, p.4
211 All the internal Central Asian flights that 1 took had ethnic Russian pilots.
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3.5 Russia’s Contribution to Central Asian Security
Central Asian security concerns have guaranteed that Russian influences remain strong 
in the region. The argument that Central Asia, or at least some countries in Central 
Asia, can replace Russia’s role as a security provider with that of the USA (or any 
other country) remains a sensitive issue, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
There are certain factors that bond Central Asia and Russia. Russia has national 
interests and national prestige to protect, and the Central Asian countries have been for 
years consumers of security from Russia. In terms of security, both Russia and Central 
Asia need one another. One of the main threats to Russian and Central Asian security 
is Islamic extremism. By the mid 1990’s, Russia was showing concern that the tide of 
Islamic extremism was gaining momentum, and feared that its power in Central Asia 
might be challenged and its national security threatened. This was a time when 
American influences were still weak; the only other potentially threatening force was 
Islam. As Kulchick says, “The fundamentalist threat has forced the present Central
9 1 9Asian elite to prepare for integration with Russia”.
In regards to security, Russia is responsible for a series of organizations created in 
order to provide security for the CIS. The creation of the CIS by itself was reassuring 
for many Central Asian countries as it bound them to Russia, which in the 1990s was 
the only power willing to invest time and money into Central Asian security. However 
the main pillar for security in the framework of the CIS was founded in Tashkent in
1992 with the creation of the Collective Security Treaty (CST), whose members by
1993 were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
9 1 3Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In fact, for some Russian deputies the CST was an 
organisation purely for the advantage of weak CIS countries that were unable to 
defend their own national interests, and needed Russia to do so for them. According to 
Allison, “The agreement could automatically involve Russia in conflicts between the
212 Yuriy Kulchick, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, Central Asia after the Empire. London, Chicago, 
IL, 1996, p. 46
213 Andrei Zagorski, ‘Regional Structures o f  Security Policy Within the C IS’ (hereafter ‘Regional 
Structures’), in Roy A llison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), Security D ilem m as in Russia and Eurasia. 
London, 1998, p. 281
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other signatory states (or in broader conflicts provoked by them) regardless of Russia’s 
own interests”.214 The main test for collective security came with the eruption of the 
Tajik civil war in 1992. This was the first incident where it became clear that regional 
Central Asian security had to include Russia. It terms of regional participation in the 
Tajik civil war, Russia (Uzbekistan and Iran to a lesser effect) seemed to be the spine 
of the whole region. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russian influences would 
endure for long, as Russia in the past has proved willing and capable of providing 
security.
This was a time where Islam was one of the main sources of instability; at that point 
the USA did not appear too concerned about Tajikistan. The threat of political Islam 
spreading in the region and creating security risks for regional and non-regional 
countries was still not commonly believed. The Tashkent agreement was a form of
I c
guarantee that Russia would get directly involved in the problems of Central Asia. 
The reluctance of the other Central Asian countries on agreeing to participate in the 
peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan, by at least guarding the Tajik borders, showed 
their weakness and lack of willingness to create a purely Central Asian defence
• 9 1 f\system. Instead they opted for dependence on Russian security. Had it not been for 
Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD), the country might have been taken over 
by Islamic extremists, and utilized as a safe haven for the Taliban and other extremist 
movements. Consequently, these movements could have used their position in 
Tajikistan to launch offensives on the rest of Central Asia, eventually reaching Russia. 
This is when Russian security and Central Asian security become part of the same 
issue.
Internal tension between Central Asian countries, weak political infrastructure and lack 
of experience and initiative has resulted in an inability to create meaningful regional 
security organisations that do not include Russia. The Central Asian Union- 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which later evolved into the Central Asian
214 Roy A llison, ‘The Military and Political Security Landscape in Russia and the South’ (hereafter ‘ The 
Military and Political Security’), in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia (eds.), Russia, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment, Armonk, N Y , London, 1999, p. 40
215 Zagorski, ‘Regional Structures’, p. 287
216 ibid. p. 288
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Economic Union in 1998, took the initiative in 1995 to create a joint Council of 
Defence Ministers in order to deal with regional security issues. The result was the 
creation of Centrasbat, which will be discussed in detail in the chapter concerning 
American influences in the region. Centrasbat was neither used in the Tajik civil war, 
nor in countering threats from Afghanistan. In essence, this organisation is nothing but 
a false facade of Central Asian regional security initiative. In general, regional 
organisations in the CIS have proved to be less efficient than expected. Purely Central 
Asian organisations have proved to be even more ineffective as each country has 
chosen its own path with little attention paid to its neighbours or the region. Although 
the Central Asian countries belong to a wide range of organisations related mainly to 
security and economic objectives, the vast majority of them (especially the ones that 
are the most effective) are either Russian initiatives or shared Russian initiatives.217
The Central Asian countries attempted to work together, without the participation of 
Russia or any other non Central Asia country prior to 11 September, in fighting 
terrorism, extremism and transnational organised crime. Regional cooperation was 
destroyed when growing suspicion between all Central Asian countries, especially 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan erupted over the issue of joint military actions. At 
the Central Asian Economic Community summit in 2000, all four leaders (Niyazov not 
included) abandoned what little hope they had for Central Asian regional security and 
self-dependence, and proceeded to invite Russia in their anti-terrorism agreements and 
asked the CIS Collective Security Council to guide them in defeating the terrorist 
threat.218
The CIS anti-terrorist centre (ATC) located in Tashkent is another Russian initiative 
aimed at countering Islamic militant groups and narcotic trading; the center is headed 
by the Russian Federal Security Services. The escalation of tension prior to 11 
September (in regards to narcotics trafficking and the general threat from Islamic 
extremists especially from the Taliban) led to the creation, in May 2001, of a 
Collective Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
217 Annette Bohr, ‘Regionalism  in Central Asia: N ew  G eopolitics, Old Regional Order’ (hereafter ‘N ew  
G eopolitics’), International Affairs, vo l.80, no.3, May 2004, p. 489
218 BBC Monitoring, Inside Central A sia, no. 338, 14-20 August 2000, no. 339, 21-27 August 2000
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Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus as members. It was with the help of the ATC in 
Bishkek that the RDF was established; the RDF is a security force based on battalions 
from each of the participating countries; the first live military exercise was held in
J 1QOctober 2001 in Kyrgyzstan. According to Khachatrian, “The creation of rapid 
deployment forces marks a potential watershed for the Collective Security Treaty, 
which is striving to carve out a far reaching role as a security organisation”.
The events of 11 September have in many aspects strengthened the resolve of Russia 
and the Central Asian countries to create a stronger counter-terrorism shield. 
Consequently they have tried to form a stronger CIS Collective Security System; in 
May 2002 the Collective Security Treaty became the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) encompassing Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Belarus and Armenia. Uzbekistan had left the CST in 1997, and jointed the pro- 
American alliance known as GUUAM. The CST and the CSTO have the same goal, 
which is to create a regional security organisation. However, the CSTO has molded 
itself to adapt to the changes that have occurred in the international system since 11 
September. The aims of the CST were to guarantee regional security- under the 
supervision of Russia. The CST did not only seek to protect the region from external 
threats, but also to protect members of the CST from one another. This was of huge 
importance to the weaker countries of Central Asia. What the treaty did not mention 
was what measures would be taken in case the member countries had to fight Islamic 
insurgents, religious extremism and separatism. These were major weaknesses of the 
CST, weakness that the CSTO has tried to deal with.221
The CSTO has a joint military battalion in Moscow, one defence system, and 
coordinated maneuvers in foreign, security and defence matters. According to Allison, 
“ Even if these goals are only partially achieved, Russia is dominant in the CSTO and
219 Vitaly V. Naumkin, ‘Russian Policy Towards Kazakhstan’, in Robert Legvold (ed.), Thinking 
Strategically: The Major Powers. Kazakhstan, and the Central A sia N exu s. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, 2003, p. 60
220 Haroutiun Khachatrian, ‘Creation o f  Rapid Deploym ent Force Marks Potential Watershed in 
Collective Security Treaty D evelopm ent’, Eurasianet.org, d.o 30.5.01, d.d 20.11.04, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/department/insight/articles/eav053001 .shtml
221 Murad Esenov, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Campaign and the Regional Security System ’ (hereafter Anti- 
Terrorist Campaign’), Central Asia and the Caucasus Press, http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/esenov-anti- 
terror-campain-IlSS.shtml
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evidently hopes that the system will enhance Moscow’s standing as a ‘security 
manager’ for Central Asia”. The Central Asian members are much more enthusiastic 
about the CSTO than they were about the CST, this is due to the extent of Russian- 
provided benefits they achieve as a result of their membership. What these countries 
seek is military-technical cooperation with Russia. The armies of each of the Central 
Asian (and the non-Central Asian countries) member countries are in desperate need 
for new modem weapons and communication technology. Membership in the CSTO 
will allow them to purchase arms and technology at Russian prices. Moscow hopes 
that the CSTO will be able to launch large-scale military activity224; this was achieved 
in August 2004 in Kyrgyzstan days after the suicide bombings in Tashkent of the 
Israeli and American embassies and the State Prosecutor’s office. The organisation’s 
position was elevated when on 23 December 2003 the procedure of registration of the 
statute of the CSTO with the secretariat of the UN was completed. According to the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, “This important event in the life of the CSTO member states 
is evidence of the recognition by the world community of the role and place of the 
CSTO in the matters of safeguarding regional and international security and 
stability”.225
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including the four Central Asian 
countries (Turkmenistan excluded) China and Russia, is another regional organisation 
aimed at providing security for Central Asia (and its other two members). Before 
discussing the role of the SCO it is important to trace its origins in the Shanghai Five 
(S5). The character of the SCO has very much developed since it was the S5, as has its 
agenda. The origins of the S5 can even be traced back to the Soviet era, when in 1989, 
border negotiations were discussed between China and the Soviet Union. In 1992 
negotiations started on a bilateral basis, therefore, border issues where the foundations
222 Roy A llison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia P olicy’, International Affairs, vol. 80, 
no.2, March 2004, p. 286
223 Esenov, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Campaign’
224 ‘Putin to Attend Summit o f  C ollective Security Treaty Organisation’, Pravda, d.o 26.4.03, d.d
29.11.03, http://newsfrom russia.com /m ain/2003/04/26/4641Q.html
225 ‘C ollective Security Treaty Organisation Statute Registered with the United Nations Secretariat’, 
Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation: Information and Press Department, d.o 8.1.04, 
d.d 23.11.04, http://w w w . 1 n.mid.ru/brp 4
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99A 997of this regional organisation. The S5, was not formally created until 1997 , its
members were Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Uzbekistan did 
not become part of this organisation till June 2001 (more on Uzbekistan joining the 
SCO below). This organisation is not a purely Russia initiative, China has a large role; 
its role appears to be even more important than that of Russia. An indication of this is 
that the SCO’s secretariat is based in Beijing. Russia’s role, however, should not be 
belittled, not only is Russia affected by many of the issues concerning the SCO (and 
previously the S5), but also the participation of Russia has encouraged the Central 
Asian countries to join. Any regional organisation involving China and only the 
Central Asian countries would have appeared to be weakening Russia’s influences in 
the region and signifying Chinese dominance, consequently antagonising Russia. This 
would be disadvantageous to China, which wants to create a strong alliance in the face 
of other powers in the region, such as Islam and the USA. In addition, China (for the
time being) has officially repeated that with regards to Russia, it is not a competitor but
228a partner.
The first agenda of the S5 involved limiting military activities in a 100 km frontier 
zone, fighting trade in narcotics, creating an ATC in Bishkek and cooperating in
990economic issues, mainly to the advantage of China. The S5 experienced its first 
wave of evolution in August 1999 at the Bishkek summit. This meeting occurred after 
the Tashkent bombings of 1999, and during the same month as the first IMU incursion 
on Kyrgyzstan; not surprisingly the S5 focused its future role on fighting religious 
extremism, separatism and narcotic trading. At this summit all the leaders agreed that 
combating terrorism was of primary importance to the stability of the entire region.230 
These concerns became critical during a time where the Taliban resembled a profound
226 Richard W. X. Hu, ‘China and Central Asia: The Role o f  the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ 
(hereafter ‘China and Central A sia’), in Boris Rumer and Lau Sim Yee (eds.), Central A sia and South 
Caucasus Affairs, Tokyo, 2003, pp. 52-53
227 It is interesting to point out that this organisation was called after an important Chinese city that is far 
from Central Asia and Central Asian problems. This can be interpreted as a signal that Central Asia is 
important to China, but not o f  primary concern. There is another side to China that is very much distant 
from Central A sia in terms o f  security and religious concerns, in addition to profound cultural diversity.
228 Interview with Zhou Xiuhua, Ambassador o f  the People’s Republic o f  China to the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Damascus, September 2005
229 E. Wayne Merry, ‘ M oscow ’s Retreat and B eijing’s Rise as Regional Great Power’ (hereafter ‘ 
M oscow ’s Retreat’), Problems o f  Post-Communism , vo l.50, no.3, May/June 2003, p. 25
230 Hu, ‘China and Central A sia’, p. 55
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security threat to all the countries involved in the S5. Russia was concerned that the 
growing role of the Taliban would further fuel Chechen separatism, China was 
concerned with the Uighur separatists in Xinjiang, and the Central Asians knew that 
the IMU had used Afghanistan as a safe-haven before launching its strikes. It appeared 
in everyone’s interest to put a limit to the Taliban threat. The new agenda of the S5 
was an attempt to achieve this (in practice the S5 was completely powerless in the face 
of the Taliban). At this summit security was such a serious concern (especially for 
Central Asia) that Uzbekistan was invited, especially as the IMU was an Uzbek 
Islamic movement, primarily aimed at the Uzbek government. “ The Shanghai Five 
invited Uzbekistan to participate as an observer with the intention of extending their 
cooperation beyond border issues to include broad diplomatic initiatives including 
security cooperation against Taliban-inspired insurrectionism”.
It was not until the Shanghai summit in June 2001 that the S5 underwent its final stage 
of evolution. The S5 became the SCO; this time Uzbekistan was a full-fledged 
member. The reasons for this were related to Uzbekistan’s concern with the growing 
threat of extremism, the disappointment with other regional security organisations such 
as GUUAM, and the financial benefits that Uzbekistan could receive from China as a 
result of its participation. Since Uzbekistan’s involvement in the SCO, President Hu 
Jintao has signed numerous agreements with Karimov (and other Central Asian 
leaders) related to technical, economic, and financial cooperations and investments.232 
It is important to remember that the creation of the SCO occurred before 11 
September; although this organisation today does resemble an instrument by which 
Russia and China are able to limit and challenge growing American influences, it was 
not created on this basis. Its main challenge at that time came from Islamic 
extremism, and the Taliban; therefore the SCO was designed to fight a competing 
influence in the region, an influence that looked to be a direct challenge to the 
authority and security of all the countries in the SCO. Today the SCO has two 
challenges to fight, that of Islamic extremism and increased American influences. “The
231 Gregory Gleason, ‘The Politics o f  Counterinsurgency in Central A sia’ (hereafter 
‘Counterinsurgency’), Problems o f  Post-Communism, vol.49, no.2, March/April 2002, p. 11
232 Frank Ching, ‘China Boosts Ties with Central A sia’, N ew  Straits Times-M alaysia N ew s O nline, d.o
24.6.04, d.d 2 .11.04,
http://www.nst.com.mv/Current N ews/NST/Thursdav/Colum ns/20040624080705/Article
233 Hu, ‘China and Central A sia’, pp. 5 land 57
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SCO, as well as the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, are sometimes described as 
tools to foster the concept of a multi-polar world intended to offset perceived US 
global domination”.234 The SCO’s main aims are fighting (what it calls the ‘three 
evils’) terrorism, separatism and extremism. Like Russia and Uzbekistan, China has 
also played the ‘Islamic extremist’ card after 11 September, as an excuse or 
justification for its treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The SCO provides a level of 
cooperation and understanding, which not only allows China to have more control of 
its own Uighurs, but also of the Uighurs in Central Asia. It is estimated at around one 
million Uighurs live in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China wants to guarantee that the 
entire region works together in fighting a threat that can very easily spread from one 
country to another and challenge the political and economic environment of the 
region.235
The SCO appears to be another organisation binding Russia in the sphere of security to 
Central Asia. “It is a cooperation mechanism based on the two wheels of security and 
economy, of which security is primary”. In many aspects the idea behind the 
creation of the CSTO and the SCO is similar. However, the CSTO and the SCO have 
differences. Russia likes to think of the CSTO and not the SCO, as the main security 
provider for Central Asia, although the SCO prominence and importance in the region 
is growing and outdoing that of the CSTO. The method in which the SCO tries to 
provide security is very much different to that of the CSTO. The CSTO is more a 
military oriented organisation than the SCO. It has military operating organs, and a 
joint military force, which is trained to deal with extremism and terrorism. “The 
concept of the CSTO is aimed more at repulsing a military attack, whereas the SCO is
234 Akihiro Iwashita, ‘ The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its Implications for Eurasian 
Security: A N ew  Dim ension o f  Partnership After the Post-Cold War Period’ (hereafter ‘A N ew  
D im ension’), in Shinichiro Tabata and Akihiro Iwashita (eds.), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the 
World Econom y and Comm unitv-Slavic Eurasian Studies 2 . Tokyo, 2004, p. 259
235 Merry, ‘M oscow ’s Retreat’, p. 25
236 Huasheng Zhao, ‘Security Building in Central A sia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ 
(hereafter ‘ Security Building’), in Shinichiro Tabata and Akihiro Iwashita (eds.), Slavic Eurasia’s 
Integration into the World Economy and Communitv-Slavic Eurasian Studies 2 . Tokyo, 2004, p. 311
237 The Minister o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Republic o f  Kazakhstan-K.K Tokaev, at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, speaking about ‘Kazakhstan in the Context o f  the Geo-Politics o f  the 
Caspian’, mentioned the importance o f  the SCO in regards to security before he mentioned the CSTO. 
This shows the growing importance o f  the SCO in the region. London, 9 March 2006
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oriented to preventing new threats to security”. The other purpose of the SCO is that 
it brings the two most powerful regional countries together. It unites them in the face 
of any unwanted guests in the region. This characteristic of the SCO did not evolve 
until after 11 September, and the entrance of additional competing influences into the 
Central Asian arena. This characteristic has given the SCO added strength, especially 
when its members (mainly Russia and China) make political statements and 
declaration that are then implemented, such as not wanting foreign troops and bases 
(American) on Central Asian soil. The result of this declaration was followed by an 
American withdrawal from Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and a statement by 
Bakiyev (this came to nothing) considering closing the American military base in 
Manas (this point has been discussed in more detail in the chapter concerning 
American influences in Central Asia). Before the USA’s increased interference in the 
region, the main competing influences were from Russia and Islam; China was 
evolving its influences. Had 11 September not occurred then China could have 
developed into the third power in the new great game. Today China cannot (does not 
want to) challenge Russia over Central Asia when there is a more threatening force 
that has to be controlled. Although the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline-connecting 
Kazakhstan to China is at times seen as a threat to Russia’s energy control of the 
region, it has neither been portrayed by the Chinese government nor interpreted by the
9 90Russian one as part of a strategy to push Russia out of the Kazakh energy market.
So long as the USA remains in the region, China will not threaten Russia’s role; the 
focus will be for Russia and China to work together in marginalising the role of the 
USA. The SCO is a vital platform for such an operation.
Russia has also offered protection or at least mediation between weaker Central Asian 
countries from stronger ones. The country most feared by its neighbours is Uzbekistan. 
According to Celeste Wallander, “Eurasia’s countries are surrounded by unattractive
238 Erlan Karin, ‘ The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its Implementations for Central A sia’, in 
Shinichiro Tabata and Akihiro Iwashita (eds.), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the World Economy and 
Comm unitv-Slavic Eurasian Studies 2 , Tokyo, 2004, p. 322
239 Sergei Blagov, ‘Russian Oil to Flow to China even before Pipeline Com pleted’, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, d.o 1.5.06, d.d 20.5.06, http://iamestown.org/edm/article.php7article id = 2371037
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neighbours, would-be hegemons and war-torn states, including one another”.240 Russia 
in many ways acts as a limiting force to Uzbek hegemony; Kyrgyzstan specifically 
favoured this kind of Russian involvement after the Uzbek authorities violated Kyrgyz 
sovereignty and launched attacks on Kyrgyz territory against Islamic insurgents in 
1999/2000, without first taking permission from the Kyrgyz government. The domestic 
instability in Uzbekistan has thus affected the stability and security of its 
neighbours.241 Uzbekistan has insisted in the past, that both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
were partially responsible for the success of the IMU in launching attacks on the 
Uzbek government by being able to use both countries as safe havens and transit 
locations.242 Karimov has often showed disrespect, and tried to intimidate the 
leadership in Kyrgyzstan by insulting Akayev on Uzbek radio and television, which is 
received by hundreds of thousands of ethnic Uzbeks living in the Kyrgyz part of the 
Ferghana Valley.243 Internal Central Asian tension is certainly prominent; in many 
aspects Uzbekistan and not Russia is regarded as the hegemonic power in Central Asia. 
In Kyrgyzstan, reactions to events in Uzbekistan are often analysed with suspicion, 
even a touch of resentment. A Kyrgyz view was that it was unfortunate for Uzbekistan 
that its relationship with Russia was not as good as Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with 
Russia.244
After 11 September, and the American led campaign in Afghanistan, the Central Asian 
countries appeared even more divided in their support for Russia and the USA. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, being more inclined to Russia in their domestic and 
foreign affairs, did not threaten to change the geo-political balance of the region. 
However, as explained in the introduction, even these two countries did not like to be 
seen by the USA as too supportive of Russian influences as they still wanted to 
maintain benefits arising from American influences (as previously explained, this is
240 Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Underbelly? The N ew  US-Russian  
Relationship and Implications for Eurasia’ (hereafter ‘Silk Road’), Journal o f  SouthEast European and 
Black Sea Studies. London, vol.3, no.3, Sept 2003, p. 98
241 Lena Jonson, ‘Russia and Central A sia’, in Roy A llison and Lena Jonson (eds.), Central Asian 
Security: The N ew  International Context. Washington, D.C, 2001, p. 112
242 Eugene Huskey, ‘An Econom y o f  Authoritarianism? Askar Akaev and Presidential Leadership in 
Kyrgyzstan’, in Sally N. Cummings (ed.), Power and Change in Central A sia. London, N ew  York, 2002,
p.88
243 ibid. pp. 88-89
244 Interview with Iris Beybutova
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how influences interlink). According to the Kyrgyz deputy foreign minister in 2004, 
Akayev did not want to look like he was favouring one power over the other.245 
Karimov’s re-vitalized relationship with Washington after 11 September re-instated 
America’s security-related influence, consequently re-awakened other Central Asian 
countries fears of increasing Uzbek prominence in the region. This at times resulted in 
pushing other Central Asian countries further into Russia’s arms for reassurance. 
According to Bohr, “ While all five Central Asian states have been attempting to use 
the renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States, which is being played out in 
the Central Asian region, to maximize their strategic and economic benefits, the 
formation of the United States-Uzbekistan strategic partnership has increased the 
resolve of the other Central Asian states to balance Uzbekistan’s preponderance by 
enthusiastically pursuing regional projects involving Russia and, to a lesser extent 
China”.246
Competing influences between Russia and the USA are not only limited to Central 
Asia, but to other parts of the CIS. Russia’s loss of influence and mediating power 
(often to the USA) in most of the Middle East has been a painful experience, one that 
Russia does not wish to be repeated in the CIS.247 Pravda’s reaction to the Ukrainian 
elections was that the west was meddling in other country’s politics, and backing their
JAO
puppet candidate. The reaction from Central Asian leaders, after the results of the 
original Ukrainian elections, sheds light on the relationship between each Central 
Asian country and the two powers in question. All the leaders (other than Niyazov, 
who does not like to get involved in any issue not related to Turkmenistan) supported 
Yanukovich. This highlights their support for Russia’s political influence in the CIS. 
Even Karimov was supportive of Yanukovich’s victory.249 Karimov’s pro-American 
foreign policy did not appear to stop him from backing Russia in domestic political
245 Interview with Yevgenni Kablukov, September 2004
246 Annette Bohr, ‘ N ew  G eopolitics’, International Affairs, p. 489
247 Loss o f  influence in the CIS would be a terrible blow to Russian prestige, by far more devastating 
than loss o f  influence in the Middle East, which always (in theory) was part o f  the non-alignment 
movement, in addition to being very much culturally different and geographically distant.
248 Timothy Bancroft Hinchey, ‘The OTPOR Factor in the Ukraine: Interference in the Internal Affairs 
o f  the C IS’, Pravda, http://english.pravda.ru/m ailbox/22/101/399/14629 ukraine.html. d.o. 23.11.04, 
d.d. 24.11.04
249 Shamil Baigin, ‘Central Asia Hails Yanukovich as Leader’, Reuters, d.o 26.11.04, d.d 2 .12.04, 
http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.ihtm l?tvpe=topNews& storyID=628063
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issues regarding the CIS. Islam has, to a certain extent, helped defuse the tension 
between the USA and Russia; Islamic extremism is a uniting threat for both Russia and 
the USA. It is in both their interest to fight extremism. According to Peshkov, “Russia
9 SOand the US are facing a common enemy in international terrorism” At the same time 
Islam has a multi-dimensional role, it can either make American influences more 
popular, as America is seen as the main fighter in the war against terror, or unite anger 
against American hegemony (war against terror is often seen as a war against Islam). 
Therefore, Islam has the ability to effect how the influences of the other two powers 
are perceived, especially the American one.
It appears that Russia remains more favoured as a security provider by the Central 
Asian elites than the USA. It does not threaten to alter the domestic political scene in 
the Central Asian countries, which is of concern to the leaderships. As seen above, 
Russia’s political system is more aligned to that of Central Asia than America’s and 
therefore does not threaten the status quo. The governments of Central Asia perceive 
American political influence in Central Asia as unaccommodating and risky. 
According to Kablukov, “The Americans are from a different planet”.251 This 
consequently affects Washington’s security providing role. Security organisations with 
Russian participation are the most effective in Central Asia. This does not mean that 
these organisations are particularly successful. There exists a general lack of regional 
security organisations; most agreements concerning security and the economy are done 
on a bilateral basis. This is not always very effective as security is a regional issue. In 
addition, Russia is a regional country itself and its national security is affected by 
instability in Central Asia. It is important to remember that Washington provided the 
most important security-providing role in the region in the post-independence era. 
America’s campaign in Afghanistan, and consequent toppling of the Taliban regime, 
alleviated one of the region’s most troubling concerns. This gave America increased 
influence over other spheres concerning Central Asia, consequently fuelling 
competition over the region.
250 Maksim Peshkov- Russia’s envoy to Tajikistan, ‘The US Ambassador to Tajikistan Visits Russian 
Military B ase’, The Times o f  Central Asia (Bishkek), 11.11.04
251 Interview with Yevgenni Kablukov
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3.6 The Role of Central Asia in the Security of the Russian 
Federation
In 3.5 security concerns between Russia and Central Asia were analysed, but the 
security issues discussed focused on Central Asia being a security consumer and 
Russia a security provider. This section does not focus on Central Asian security but 
on Russian security. The main questions asked in this section are: why is it essential 
for Russia’s security interests, and therefore national interests, to remain profoundly 
influential in Central Asia? How is Russian security linked with the Central Asian 
countries? It can be said that the Central Asian countries are security stabilisers for 
Russia, or even passive security providers. They do not actively provide for security, 
as Russia does for them. However, in regards to the main security threat, which is 
Islamic extremism, instability in Central Asia is a serious security threat to Russia. 
This is a point which Shireen T. Hunter emphasises when she says “the Islamic factor, 
especially the fear of Islamic extremism and its destabilizing potential, has played a 
key role in shaping Russian policies towards these regions, particularly Central 
Asia”.252 She also says, “Russian policy toward Central Asia since 1992 has been 
influenced by economic and political interests, as well as a genuine fear of the rise of
253Islamic extremism and its impact on Russian security”.
It is in Russia’s interest to guarantee that the Central Asian countries remain immune 
from Islamic extremism. If Islamic extremism was to further develop and become a 
political force in any of the Central Asian countries, then the entire region could be 
affected, including Russia. In addition, if an Islamic force were to triumph in Central 
Asia, then this would further complicate Russia’s role in Chechnya. This section is 
therefore also concerned with the links between Chechen Islamic extremists and 
extremism found in Central Asia. It is in Russia’s interest to prevent the formation of a 
joint regional Islamic force that could include Central Asian groups and Chechens. 
Stability for Russia and Central Asia is part of the same equation.
252 Shireen T. Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics o f  Identity and Security (hereafter Islam in Russia). 
Armonk, N Y , London, 2004, p.327
253 ibid.
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The role of the ethnic Russian minorities living in Central Asia, especially in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will also be discussed. The main question asked here will 
be: how important is the role o f the ethnic Russians in guaranteeing that Russia 
maintains a large presence in Central Asia? This section will also look at the 
importance of Central Asia in providing for Russia an image of continued power and 
importance. Russia’s role in the international arena often appears dwarfed by the USA. 
Russia does not want to see this also happen regionally. Central Asia is one of the last 
places Russia can still portray its might and strength. This section will also examine 
the relationship between Russia and its Islamic ally and neighbour, Iran. This will aid 
in explaining how Russia’s relationship with Islam and Muslim countries is very much 
different to that of the USA’s. Although both countries are fighting Islamic extremism, 
they appear to be fighting different forces and have different enemies and different 
agendas. Security-related issues, and the links between Islamic extremism and 
Chechen extremism will first be discussed.
Before discussing the links or potential links between Chechen separatists and Central 
Asian extremists it is first important to briefly discuss the actual conflict between 
Russia and Chechnya. The conflict has resulted in a scenario where Chechen and 
Central Asian extremists could create a common security threat to Russia. The failed 
August putsch in 1991 triggered the Soviet Republics to declare independence. This 
included the Central Asian Republics and the Chechen Autonomous Republic. 
According to Gorbachev, “not content with the breakup of the fifteen former Soviet 
Republics, which in and of itself was a huge historical shock, leaders and activists in 
several autonomous regions undertook the much more dangerous project of further 
disintegration of the country”.254 The Chechen-Ingush ASSR had been incorporated 
into Russia since 1924. Throughout the Soviet period this region had continuously 
been volatile, and armed confrontation between the centre and the Chechen people 
never seemed to cease. The independence of the Soviet Republics in 1991 was 
something that Russia could not, and did not want to halt, especially as Russia itself
254 Foreword by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2004
255 Ivan Rybkin, Consent in Chechnya. Consent in Russia. M oscow, 1998, p.32
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had declared sovereignty in June 1990. For Moscow, the loss of the Chechen-Ingush 
region was a completely different issue to the loss of the Republics. This was part of 
Russia; losing it would not only mean the possibility for the further disintegration of 
Russia (as other autonomous regions might follow), but also the loss of Russian 
prestige and pride. It is also essential to mention that the Chechen-Ingoush region is 
rich in natural resources, and a vital pipeline transit route for oil and gas coming into 
Russia from other areas of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the loss of this region 
also has economic implications. For example, the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline has been 
affected the most by the conflict; this pipeline crosses through Chechnya before 
reaching Novorossiisk. Many Chechens believe that one of the main reasons the 
Russians are ready to fight for Chechnya lies in the sphere of pipeline politics.
In September 1991, General Dzhohar Dudayev who was the Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People announced the 
deposition of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Two months later 
Dudayev declared that the Chechen Republic had become a sovereign state. Moscow 
did not recognise the newly elected Chechen president or the newly created Chechen 
parliament. The situation between Chechnya and Moscow slowly became worse. The 
Russian authorities at that early stage had no desire to send their troops into Chechnya. 
Instead, El’tsin, the President of the RSFSR, declared a state of emergency following 
what he called the illegal Chechen elections. This was also a time when the El’tsin- 
Gorbachev rivalry was at its peak, and the country (and the world) was trying to come 
to terms with the new political situation that resulted from the disintegration of the 
USSR. These preconditions may have encouraged Dudayev to pursue his own agenda 
for Chechen independence. Dudayev’s independent Chechnya was not stable. Violence 
and crime increased, as did ethnic discrimination towards everyone not Chechen, 
especially if they were Russian. Consequently, the social conditions degenerated, 
resulting in an economic crisis. Chechnya began to resemble what is often referred to 
as a ‘failed state’. It was up to Dudayev to maintain control in what was appearing 
to be an uncontrollable situation.
256 Sergey Zhiltsov, ‘Russia in the Caspian’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 4(28), 2002, p .57
257 Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. London, 2004, p.65
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Growing opposition to Dudayev, and numerous failed attempts to oust him from power 
intensified Russia’s resolve to turn to military action. Another important reason for 
going to war was the desire of the hard-liners around El’tsin for a ‘small victorious 
war’ in order to boost the presidents popularity. The result was the first Chechen war, 
which lasted from 1994-96. Russia’s Chechen campaigns have not only caused 
concern amongst the west and the USA, but also amongst many of Russia’s Muslim 
friends and allies. The main threat for Russia is that the Chechen separatists have used 
Islam as a major political tool for their cause. This may have had the effect of not only 
causing an Islamic backlash amongst Russia’s own Islamic population, but also 
drawing in foreign Muslim fighters from neighbouring countries. When Russia 
invaded Chechnya with around 23,800 army soldiers and 4,700 interior ministry 
troops, Russian soldiers were told that their work in Chechnya was for the protecting 
of Russian integrity. Dudayev equally inspired his men with similar talk of pride and
258national duty. In such situations Islam plays a profound mobilising and invigorating 
role. Invasion, by what is perceived as a foreign occupying force, is one of many 
conditions that have the capability to politicise Islam. Islam offers a unity of purpose 
in front of a common threat or enemy.
Under the terms of the Khasavyurt agreement in August 1996, Chechnya became 
independent; the Kazakh-born Aslan Maskhadov became the new president (Dudayev 
had been killed). From 1996 to 1999, the Republic plunged into further chaos and 
anarchy, encouraging Russia once more to intervene. For Putin, the second Chechen 
war was about safeguarding Russia’s pride, and avoiding a repetition of the Yugoslav 
syndrome in the Russian Federation. Chechnya in his eyes was the potential start for 
the disintegration of Russia.259 Putin said in support of the decision to launch a second 
Chechen campaign, “I was convinced that if we didn’t stop the extremists right away, 
we’d be facing a second Yugoslavia on the entire territory of the Russian Federation- 
the Yugoslavization of Russia”.260 Putin even warned that instability in Chechnya 
could lead to instability in other Muslim former Soviet Republics, such as Kyrgyzstan
258 Robert Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict. 1800-2000. London, Portland, OR, 2001, p. 225-226
259 Henry E. Hale and Rein Taagepera, ‘Russia: Consolidation or C ollapse?’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
54, no.7, 2002, p. 1102
260 Vladimir Putin, First Person. London, 2000, p. 141
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and Uzbekistan. It appears he was referring to the threat of Islamic extremism. He 
mentions Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan specifically because of the 1999 Tashkent 
bombings, and the IMU’s incursions into Kyrgyzstan aimed at the destruction of the 
Karimov regime in Uzbekistan.
The first Chechen war seems to have been more of an issue of nationalism, and the 
right of Chechen self-determination. The second Chechen war has a different 
character; it has become far more Islamicised than the first. Islam has been far more 
widely used as a political tool to add further cause to the Chechen demands of 
separatism. By 1999, Islam was starting to be seen as a major destabilising power in 
the region, which could not be confined to boundaries. The threat that Islamic 
extremism could sweep across the Islamic territory of the FSU was becoming more 
and more probable. Today Putin talks about Russian military action in Chechnya as 
part of an anti-terrorist operation. This style of language is very much in tune with the 
language used by the American administration. Since September 11, and the American 
campaign in Iraq, the USA’s criticism regarding Russia and Chechnya has become 
softer. However, this does not mean that both countries see eye to eye in the war 
against terror. As will be seen below, the Russian government’s idea of terrorism, and 
countries that harbour and sponsor terrorism is very much different to that of the 
American administration. At the same time, the explosion of two Russian civilian 
aircrafts in August 2004, and the Beslan school incident in September 2004, have only 
highlighted that Russia has serious security concerns in regards to Islamic extremism.
Religious opposition, especially the Islamic type, has the ability to draw Islamic 
fighters from across the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Islamic elements 
in the two Chechen wars, the Tajik civil war or any other Islamic extremist act in 
Central Asia are either already interlinked or have the potential of becoming one 
strong regional force if not dealt with correctly. Chechen extremists have even found 
their way into Kazakhstan, one of the least Islamicised Central Asian countries. 
According to Vladimir Bozhko, the deputy chairman of the Kazakh National Security 
Committee, “Kazakhstan has extradited a number of alleged Chechen militants to
261 Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s C hoice. London, N ew  York, 2004, p. 171
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Russia after they were found hiding out in the country”. It is undisputed that the 
security of Central Asia and Russia are part of the same puzzle. However, the potential 
bonds between Chechen extremists, and Central Asian extremists do not mean, as 
Putin suggested, that all Islamic movements speak through one voice. Putin has argued 
that the events of September 11 were proof that Islamic terrorism knows no borders 
(Bush has the same views; this will be discussed in the chapter on American influences 
in Central Asia). He called this ‘the plague of the twenty first century’. Putin went as
' j f S i
far as calling the events of September 11 a ‘global Chechnya’.
The term ‘international terrorism’ is far too easily used as a justification of policies. 
This often results in a lack of comprehension of the real reasons that create Islamic 
aggression, and therefore prevents a real solution. For example, the motives of Hamas, 
which is called a terrorist group by the west, are very much different to those of the 
IMU, which is also called a terrorist group by the west. They have both been involved 
in acts of violence, but the essence of their foundation, the reasons for their 
development, gives both these organisations a very different character. It is important 
to remember that these two organisations are both regional organisations not global. 
Hamas (elected into government in 2006) has been concerned with Palestinian 
resistance, and not with achieving an Islamic state (it is also a social/humanitarian 
organisation, which provides for a huge portion of Palestinian welfare). This point is 
very clearly made by Gunning when he says, “The Hamas leadership has by and large 
dropped its absolutist demands regarding an Islamic state”.264 The IMU’s motives are 
very much guided by their determination to create an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, and 
destroy the Karimov regime. These two organisations are fighting different wars with 
different agendas. It appears that the problems Putin and the Central Asian leaders 
have are mainly with regional Islamic extremism. Al-Qaida is the only organisation 
with a global agenda and the ability and will to infiltrate to all regions of the world.
262 Vladimir Bozhko, ‘Kazakhstan: Minorities Concerned at Anti-Terror M oves’, The Times o f  Central 
Asia (Bishkek), vol.6, no.48 (229), 2 December 2004
263 O ’Loughlin, Tuathail, Kolossov, ‘A Risky Westward Turn?’, pp. 3-4
264 Jeroen Gunning, ‘Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential o f  Political Participation’, 
International Affairs, vo l.80, no.2, March 2004, p. 247
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The links between Al-Qaida and Islamic groups in Central Asia are prominent because 
Al-Qaida’s training camps were in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and provided a 
safe haven and training for the men of the two leaders of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, Juma Namangani and Tohir Yuldeshev, as well as to the IRP before the 
1997 peace agreement. As Jane’s Sentinel argued in 1996, “There is concern over the 
cross-border insurgency/counter-insurgency war currently being waged with Afghan 
supporters of the Tajik opposition. Attacks on government forces by the Islamic 
opposition in 1996 were initiated by rebels based in Afghanistan crossing the border
' yf.z
into central Tajikistan”. As M A Smith rightly points out, “Moscow has argued that 
the perceived increase in a threat of Islamic extremism throughout Central Asia, 
backed by forces outside the former Soviet Union, gives Moscow and the Central 
Asian states a common security interest that serves as a basis for closer security 
cooperation”. Chechen extremists and other Islamic forces in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan are therefore part of the same regional threat. Gleason backs this view 
when he says, “the Russian imbroglio in Chechnya and the related terrorist war against 
civilians in Russia was a major factor in Russia’s effort to defuse jihad movements that 
it believed were intellectually and financially supported from Afghanistan. Moscow 
believed that the war in Chechnya, terrorist attacks in Russia and Uzbekistan and the 
hostage taking in Kyrgyzstan all had links to Islamic extremism that led back to
9 A7training camps in Afghanistan”.
As already mentioned, the fear that Chechen rebels and Central Asian extremists have 
and will continue to cooperate together, has made Central Asia appear even more 
essential for Russia’s national and security interests. This is a view agreed on by 
Trenin and Malashenko especially when they say, “Chechnya has become, with certain 
limits, an exporter of radical Islam to Muslim regions of Russia and the
9 ASCommonwealth of Independent States”. Active radical Islam is not something that 
can be exported easily. Radicalisation can be exported from the Caucasus to Central
265 ‘Tajikistan’, Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS, Coulsdon, Surrey, 1996, section 9.0.3
266 M A Smith, ‘Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad’, Conflict Studies Research Centre. 
Sandhurst, Decem ber 2000, p. 13
267 Gregory Gleason, ‘The Politics o f  Counterinsurgency in Central A sia’, Problems o f  Post- 
Communism, vol.49, no.2, March-April 2002, p .l 1
268 Dmitri V. Trenin and Aleksei V. Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechen Factor in 
Post-Soviet Russia (hereafter Russia’s Restless Frontier). Washington, D.C, 2004, p. 72
137
Asia or Afghanistan because each country or group of countries belong to the same 
region, with similar social, political, economic ethnic and historic roots. In reality the 
Chechen wars received very little help or recognition from Arab and Muslim countries. 
The Taliban were the only regime to recognise the existence of an independent 
Chechnya.
The rise of Islamic awareness amongst the Muslims of the world (after September 11) 
further intensified with America’s strong rhetoric aimed at Iran, and other Muslim 
countries. The ongoing war in Iraq and the continuation of American presence in 
Afghanistan has fuelled the situation even more. This has also had an effect on Central 
Asia. This is a form of non-radical Islamicisation or passive Islamicisation, which is 
coming from outside Central Asia; it is an external Islamic influence. As mentioned in 
the second chapter, the political situation is slowly worsening in all five Central Asian 
countries. The regimes are becoming more and more authoritarian, and all opposition 
is crushed. This is coupled with bad economic and social conditions, and an 
antagonistic global (American-led) attitude towards Islam. As a result there has 
evolved an increase in Islamic awareness and a rise in tension in the region. The 
combination of internal and passive external pressure has caused Islamic extremist 
movements to diversify their aims and targets. The most recent and revealing examples 
were the suicide bombing operations aimed at the American and Israeli embassies in 
Tashkent in the summer of 2004. This highlights a reaction to events that go beyond 
domestic grievances. These two suicide-bombing operations were not only aimed at 
destabilising the Karimov regime, but also to show discontent and anger in regards to 
the policies of the USA and Israel; both these countries’ policies are seen as anti- 
Islamic. According to Igor Rotar, “Military operations by the U.S and its allies also 
elicited very negative reactions amongst the religious parts of Uzbek society”.269
In 1996 the threat of terrorism of the Islamic type was an alien phenomenon (in 
Central Asia) as shown in the following quote made by Jane’s Sentinel. “Since the 
unrest of the 1980s and early 1990s, neither terrorism nor political violence has been a
269 Igor Rotar, ‘Why Extremism is on the Rise in Uzbekistan’, The Jamestown Foundation, vol.2, 
issue. 16, d.o 12.8.04, d.d 3.3.05,
http://www.iam estown.org/publications details.php?volume id=400& issue id=3047&article id=33684 
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major problem...Insurgent action has also been contained since the problems caused
270by the transition from communism to democracy”. The political Islamicisation of 
Central Asia, and the fear of terrorist acts are more present today than ever before; this 
is due to domestic hardship and external antagonism (as explained above). This 
situation becomes even more threatening when it is realised that the Taliban movement 
in Afghanistan has not been completely defeated; it is simply functioning underground, 
waiting for the right moment to re-emerge. Instability, and the continuation of 
American military presence in Afghanistan are indicators that the country is still not 
safe. The Americans appear to have weakened the Islamic extremist threat but not 
killed it. This is causing great concern for Central Asia. It is feared that instability in 
Afghanistan still has the potential to create instability in Central Asia, and therefore 
also in Russia. Arman supports this argument when he says, “they (the Tajiks) also 
worry that US-led stabilization efforts in neighbouring Afghanistan are flagging,
971posing a serious security threat for the entire region”.
Just like the Taliban, who were officially sponsored and influenced by Bin Laden and 
Al-Qaida, are still unofficially in function in Afghanistan today, so could the IMU. 
According to some sources the IMU is also functioning in Pakistan. However it is 
unclear how strong they are after having been targeted by the Americans in
272Afghanistan. The Islamic threat appears to be thriving and growing underground, 
waiting for the right moment to engulf the region or at least cause profound instability. 
Russia appears aware of this risk, and tries to highlight the possibility that regional
979Islamic groups communicate. September 11 for Russia and Central Asia occurred in 
1999, with the bombing of apartment buildings both in Moscow and Tashkent. Since 
1999, Putin has spoken of ‘international terrorism’ in regards to Chechnya, Central 
Asia and the Balkans.274 Both these events were blamed on Islamic extremists and 
indicate a rising wave of regional Islamic violence and tension throughout the region.
270 ‘Kyrgyzstan’, Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS, section 6.7.4
271 Kambiz Arman, ‘Tajikistan Shuns United States, Tilts Toward Russia’, Eurasianet.org. d.o 14.06.04, 
d.d 26.06.04, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061404a.shtml
272 Daan van der Schriek, ‘Fish in Search o f  a Sea’, Transitions Online, d.o 10.3.05, d.d 12.3.05, 
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273 Mark A Smith, ‘Russian Perspectives’, p. 10
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One of the reasons why he referred to such acts as ‘international terrorism’ and not 
‘regional terrorism’ was so he could get international support for his campaign in 
Chechnya. Since September 11, Putin has taken advantage of the international 
atmosphere, and further emphasised the links between Chechen separatists and Islamic
jnc
extremists of Al-Qaida and the Taliban.
After September 11, the international environment appeared more understanding to 
Putin’s anti-Chechen rhetoric. This did not affect his relationship with the Arab and 
Muslim world. Many Muslim countries sympathise with the Chechen cause because of 
its Islamic elements, yet remain unwilling to lose Russia as an ally and friend for a 
cause that is not theirs. This comes at a time when many Muslim countries have their 
own regional dilemmas to deal with. As Trenin and Malashenko say “The most 
important misinterpretation is the exaggerated impression of an international Islamic 
presence in the North Caucasus....According to Chechen rebels, foreigners account for 
1-2 percent of the total rebel strength and, therefore, they cannot decisively influence 
the course of the war. Local politicians (Russian) privately agree with that estimate”.
The need to fight Islamic extremism is an issue that unites both the USA and Russia. 
However, it appears that they each prefer to do it independently. Even though Putin 
talks about global terrorism and aligns himself with the USA in this struggle, their 
understanding of ‘threat’ and their cooperation in the war on terror seems to have 
started and ended in Afghanistan. Russia’s war on terror appears more regional than 
global. This became extremely clear over the disputes and disagreements regarding the 
invasion of Iraq. The possibility of yet another American invasion, this time of Iran, is 
an extremely sensitive topic for Moscow. The reasons for this will be discussed below.
Iran’s relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia has not always been consistent. 
The Iranian revolution in 1979, and the ousting of the pro-American shah were the first 
signals that Tehran’s relationship with Moscow could experience a positive 
development. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the end of any chance of a
275 John Russell, ‘Exploitation o f  the Islamic Factor in the Russo-Chechen Conflict Before and After 11 
September 2001 ’, European Security, London, vol. 11, no.4, Winter 2002, p.97
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rapprochement between these two neighbours. The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan 
meant that the Ayatollahs were unwelcoming of Soviet aid throughout the Iranian-Iraqi 
war, which further caused deterioration in Iranian-Russian relations. The situation 
worsened when Moscow started collaborating with the Saddam regime in Iraq. It was 
not until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the disintegration of the USSR
977that relations seriously started to improve. Iran had always tried to maintain some 
contact with the USSR’s Muslims. This, however, was done with Moscow’s 
knowledge and approval. Iran was very much concerned not to appear to be a 
destabilising force for the Muslim SSRs. It emphasised that although it recognised, and 
supported the Soviet Muslim demand to worship freely, it also emphasised its positive
978relationship with the Soviet government.
Russia, after the collapse of the USSR, did not fear that the clerics in Iran would try to
970export their form of Islamic fundamentalism to Central Asia. One of the main 
reasons for this is because the Central Asians are Sunni Muslims, and the Iranians are 
Shia Muslims. Another reason is Iran’s good relationship with Russia, and its interests 
in maintaining good political and economic ties with the regional superpower. In 
addition, Iran has enough dilemmas and problems of its own. It is important to point 
out that although Iranian-Russian relations were not always at their best throughout the 
Soviet period, there never existed outright hostility between these two countries. 
According to the Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Iran places its relationship 
with its direct neighbours in first position. The area of second importance to Iran is the 
Middle East. The third most important entity is the Islamic world (in general). Iran’s 
relationship with Russia is put in fourth place, followed by Central Asia in fifth. Its 
relationship with the USA comes near the bottom of the list.280
Moscow’s sale of conventional weapons and nuclear technology to Tehran became a 
topic of high sensitivity after Bush included Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’. Since 
1991, Russia’s arms cooperation with Iran has not been entirely smooth and consistent.
277 Edmund Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South. London, 1995, p.8
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It was during ETtsin’s first tenure that the relationship between Iran and Russia cooled 
down; this was done as a result of Washington’s pressure on Russia. Washington 
persuaded Moscow to pledge that it would no longer strike any deals with Iran in 
regards to arms sales. Russia was also persuaded to promise that it would end any 
existing nuclear programs with Iran by 1999. These promises were not enduring, and 
by December 2000 Sergei Ivanov withdrew from the 1995 agreement and resumed 
links with Iran.281 According to Bukkvoll, “There has been three distinct policy phases. 
The Russian state actively supported exports to Iran in the early 1990’s, renounced 
exports in 1994-95, then resumed sales in November 2000”. Russia began to realise 
that both itself and Iran had a lot to benefit from one another. Russia sees no harm in 
providing for Iran a nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel as long as it feels safe that Iran 
will not use this technology in creating a nuclear bomb or in becoming a nuclear 
power. Russia has continuously repeated that its actions are fully legitimate, and under 
the supervision of the IAEA.
Russia has geo-strategic and geo-economic interests to protect in the Iranian region. 
Iran, like Iraq is a rich country in natural resources, and is one of the five littoral states 
of the Caspian Sea. As will be discussed in the chapter concerned with pipelines and 
the natural resources, the USA has frequently tried to construct and sponsor pipelines 
and other energy-related projects, which attempt to marginalise both Russia and Iran. 
A kind of resource war is evolving between the major powers in the region. If the USA 
were to invade Iran, it would gain direct access to the natural resources of the Caspian 
Sea, and consequently have a larger role in the energy projects of not only Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan but also Russia. It would become an even more powerful economic 
hegemon than it is today. This issue clearly highlights the augmenting competing 
Russian and American influences over the Central Asian region and the Caspian Sea.
As Moscow was realising, in the few years after the disintegration of the USSR, that 
its concerns differed to those of the west, two incidents occurred that further confirmed
281 Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in R ussia’s Iran Policy, Problems o f  Post- 
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this assessment. It was during this period that the Tajik civil war erupted, and the 
regime of the Soviet-backed Muhammad Najibullah fell in Kabul. Flemming 
Splidsboel-Hansen emphasises the importance of these two events when he says, “the 
main event triggering the Russian concern was the beginning of the Tajik unrest, 
which entered its first phase in the spring of 1992 and which, coinciding as it did with 
the downfall of Afghan president Najibullah in April 1992, undoubtedly gave rise to
JO A
serious speculation in Russia”. These two events were alarming to Moscow, as they 
symbolised an appearance of political Islam in the region. The 1993 and 2000 Foreign 
Policy Concepts point to the escalating threat of extremism. The 2000 Foreign Policy 
Concept says, “Russia’s interests are directly related to other tendencies as well, such 
as: military-political rivalry among regional powers, growth of separatism, ethnic-
^QC
national and religious extremism”. These events encouraged Russia to declare that 
its external borders coincided with those of the CIS, consequently meaning that 
Russian security was dependent on the security of some of the former Soviet 
Republics. This was a way of saying that it was in Russia’s national interest to 
remain strong in its former sphere of influence.
Russia’s vital role was highlighted when Russia’s 201st MRD was able to halt the 
escalation of tension in the Tajik civil war. Russia had to protect its own national 
security by intervening, and even though not all Central Asians were happy with this, it 
was in their interest to accept it. As Legvold says, “Everywhere the sources of 
instability or unease create hinges linking the security interests of states, even when 
some want little to do with those from whom they cannot free themselves”.287 The 
events of September 11 further endorsed Putin’s argument that political Islam was a 
growing force, and that his actions in Chechnya were justified, as was Russia’s 
military presence in Central Asia.288 However, American foreign policy after 
September 11 symbolised an equal challenge to the one Putin had previously been
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fighting. Today, Russia’s interests are even more under threat. The USA is no longer 
only a global rival, but also a regional rival. Concern in the Russian Duma prompted 
the Duma chairman, after visiting Tajikistan, in criticising the increasing military
9RQpresence of the USA, and suggesting that Russia should do the same. In October 
2004, Tajikistan granted Russian forces a permanent military base. In acquiring this 
base, Russia can now pursue its policy to guarantee regional security, and can also 
show the USA that it will not allow this part of its former sphere of influence to be 
usurped. This Russian military base will be the new home to the 201st MRD; it is also 
the largest Russian military base in the former Soviet Union. This ultimately means 
that Russia will invest heavily in Tajikistan, and turn a blind eye to their escalating 
debt.290 According to Kambiz Arman, “Russia appears to be the winner in the 
geopolitical struggle for Tajikistan. At a recent summit, Moscow secured a dominant
901economic and military position in Tajikistan for the foreseeable future”. This 
occurred shortly after Rahmonov had shown growing interest in a strategic partnership 
with the USA (more on this in the chapter related to American influences in Central 
Asia).
Even President Karimov has said that Central Asia needs Russian security and that
909Russia has strong interests in the Central Asian region ; this means economic, 
political and security interests. Karimov declared to Putin on a visit to Uzbekistan in 
2004, “ Your visits are not something unusual. Every visit of yours means solution to
293problems”. Regardless of Uzbekistan’s lack of enthusiasm to Russia’s growing role 
in the region, and support for other competing powers, it remains unwilling to distance 
itself from Russia. One of the reasons for this is because both these countries are 
strong trading partner with reciprocal benefits. This form of inter-state economic 
dependency could not be so easily implemented with other powers. Uzbekistan neither
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has the ability to produce high quality products nor the marketing experience to start 
exporting to the west, or in fact anywhere outside the CIS.294 Around 20% of Uzbek
90Simports and exports are carried out with Russia. A distinct pro-Russian shift 
occurred in the latter half of 2004; this was due to the decision by America to cut 
US$18m of aid from a total of US$55m after Karimov failed to introduce proper
• 9 0  f \  •reforms, especially those related to democratisation and human rights. America’s 
decision to cut aid pushed Karimov into the arms of Moscow. Shortly afterwards, 
Karimov initiated Russian membership to the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation. 
Washington’s decision to cut aid came after increased pressure and criticism that it 
was turning a blind eye to Karimov’s oppressive policies simply because he had 
welcomed them in Central Asia more than any of his counterparts had. Uzbekistan was 
also the only Central Asian country in GUUAM, and Karimov had always been vocal 
in his suspicions of Russia influences in Central Asia. Although Uzbekistan has had 
many shifts towards and away from Russia, this shift appears more serious as it has put 
Russia right in the heart of Central Asia’s economic policies.
Even in Turkmenistan, Russia feels it has to repel any traces of extremism that could 
affect the safety of the region; these two countries are also very much oriented towards 
strong and friendly cooperation with Iran. “The relationship (Russian-Turkmen) is 
based both on Turkmenistan’s geo-political location and Moscow’s perception of the
9Q7Russo-Turkmen partnership as a barrier to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism”. 
Russia’s relationship with Turkmenistan is not the strongest from the Central Asian 
countries. Nevertheless, Putin is very keen not to let the USA have a bigger role in the 
affairs of this globally and regionally isolated country. Niyazov has not only shown 
warmth in his relationship to Moscow, but also to the USA, especially after September
9QO
11. He has appeared interested in gas pipeline projects that are initiated by the USA. 
Niyazov, even before September 11, had been involved in dialogue with the USA over 
the construction o f the Trans-Afghan Pipeline (Turkmenistan’s involvement in
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pipeline deals will be discussed in chapter 5). Russia’s main cooperation with 
Turkmenistan is in the energy sphere, as it is in Russia’s advantage to remain the most 
influential over Turkmenistan’s gas deposits.
Putin was also insistent not to let relations between Moscow and Ashghabad become 
sour over the issue of dual citizenship. In 2003, Niyazov wanted to abolish the dual 
citizenship law he had agreed on with Moscow in 1993. The issue of the Russian 
diaspora in the FSU is of importance to Moscow; therefore it was not surprising that 
Moscow feared that many of the ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan might become 
outcasts and consequently mistreated. Moscow also did not want a large stream of 
ethnic Russians from Turkmenistan coming to Russia to find work. The Russian Duma 
was agitated by Niyazov’s new law, but could not react too harshly because of the 25- 
year gas deal with Turkmenistan agreed to in April 2003. The deal gave Gazprom the 
right to purchase all Turkmen gas. This caused an outcry amongst many of the Russian 
elites who felt they had sold the rights of the ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan for gas. 
Gazprom’s deal has very much helped secure the continuation of Russian influences in 
Turkmenistan.299
The USA’s increasing military presence in Central Asia has prompted Russia to 
increase its own military role. Shortly after September 11, the role of the USA military 
seemed to have more importance than that of the Russian. Since that time, Russia has 
pursued an active policy in making a re-entry into Central Asia as a profound force 
that cannot be marginalised. As ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ continued, American 
presence in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was starting to cause concern for 
Moscow. In January 2002, the US congress sent a delegation to Central Asia in order 
to discuss further military and economic assistance. This was an indication that the 
USA had long-term plans in the region. Russia responded by also sending some of its 
own delegates to discuss the situation in the region, and provide for any needed 
assistance.300 Putin was coming under pressure not only from the political elite but also 
from ordinary Russians who did not want to see Russia making concessions in regards 
to its role in Central Asia. No one wanted to see a repetition of the Gorbachev and
299 ibid. p. 106-107
300 ibid. p .94
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EFtsin years.301 Jonson summarises the situation very precisely when she says, “ the 
post-11 September developments in Central Asia radically changed the strategic 
situation in the region. Two parallel security arrangements were in the making-one led 
by Russia and the other by the USA”.302
In October 2003, Russia obtained a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan. This was a clear 
indication that Russia was not going to allow its influence to wane in Central Asia. The 
creation of an American military base at Manas had caused great discomfort to the 
Russian leadership and military. The Russian base has 500 military and civilian 
personnel, 20 aircraft including attack planes, fighter planes, transport planes, and 
helicopters. This has helped Russia feel and demonstrate that its influence has not been 
overshadowed by that of the USA. Akayev’s words at the opening ceremony were 
equally reassuring to Moscow, and its future role in Kyrgyzstan. He said, “the opening 
of the military base is evidence of Russia’s important role in the cause of ensuring 
stability and security in Central Asia...in recent years our countries have encountered 
new threats and challenges. The base will be a bulwark in the struggle against them 
and will enable our countries to ensure stability in development”.304 The new Russia 
military base in Kant and the temporary base in Dushambe (this later became a 
permanent Russian base) gave Russia the opportunity to cover surveillance and 
maintain control in the Ferghana Valley, which is known to be the hotbed of Islamic 
extremist. The opening of the new base in Kyrgyzstan, reflected Russia’s long-term 
interests in maintaining influence in the region-both for its advantage and for the
1Af
advantage of the Kyrgyz people. Akayev strongly condemned the Rose revolution in 
Georgia and the Orange revolution in Ukraine. He regarded this as American meddling 
in domestic affairs of independent countries. This has triggered Russian enthusiasm to 
double the amount of equipment and personnel in the Russian military base at Kant. A 
further blow to the USA came when the Akayev government announced that in
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agreement with the members of the CSTO and the SCO, it would refuse the
A/
deployment of US AWACS surveillance aircraft at Manas.
Russia has made it clear that its duty is to protect all ethnic Russians in the former 
Soviet Republics. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept argues that it is Russia’s goal “to 
protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad on the basis
T07of international law and operative bilateral agreements”. This concern with the 
interests of the ethnic Russian minorities, in the former Soviet Republics is likely to 
have evolved for two reasons. The first is the fact that Moscow is genuinely concerned 
about the ethnic Russians living outside Russian borders, especially in areas such as 
the Baltic, where Russia is very much regarded with hostility. As Hyman pointed out, 
“For the Yeltsin government, the problem of 25 million Russians outside Russia had 
grown steadily in importance since mid-1993. Even if it wished to, Russia simply
TORcannot shake off responsibility for their welfare”.
The second reason for Russia’s interest in its diaspora could be so that it remains 
influential in its former Republics. Its diaspora is a good reason for its continued 
pivotal role in the policies of its neighbours, while at the same time protecting its 
security concerns and national interests. Those critical of Russian Foreign Policy 
towards the region have often called this, ‘Russian hegemony’. “Even if the Yeltsin 
government lacks expansionist designs, the collapse of the Soviet Union has left 
Russia with great residual power over all the smaller CIS Republics. This creates 
opportunities to pursue specific interests and to develop a role in the former Soviet 
Republics, which Russian leaders are now determined to exploit.”.309 In reality 
however, Russia does not use the minorities’ argument to force itself into Central 
Asian affairs. There are other far greater reasons that bind Russia and Central Asia.
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After independence, Central Asia in general adopted an accommodating brand of
nationalism towards its Russian minorities. This was very much in contrast to the
antagonistic brand of nationalism the Baltic States took in regards to their Russian
citizens. As Commercio argues, “Latvia and Kyrgyzstan differ in the degree to which
they are nationalizing states. While Latvia has adopted an exceptionally antagonistic
nationalization strategy that promotes Latvians at the expense of Russians, Kyrgyzstan
has adopted an accommodating nationalization strategy that attempts to balance the
conflicting interests of Kyrgyz and Russians”.310 The Baltic people, to a certain extent,
have a discriminatory attitude towards Russians in their country; the Russians go to
different schools, bars, and restaurants than the rest of the titular population. There is
little integration between these two groups. This is very different in Central Asia; the
ethnic Russians are very much integrated with the Central Asian population, even in
Uzbekistan. They socialise and work together; even diplomats and politicians
representing different Central Asian countries in the international arena are often 
1^1ethnic Russians. This is further revealed by the accommodating language laws 
(these have already been discussed under Russification), which have been adopted in 
the Central Asian countries, none of which exist in the Baltic countries. Therefore, it 
does not appear too surprising that Russia feels it has a duty to protect the ethnic 
Russians in the former Soviet Republics, as often (but not in Central Asia) their rights 
are vague. Carlisle reminds us that even in Uzbekistan the Russian minorities were 
never really treated as foreigners, “ It is clear that all Russian inhabitants cannot be 
viewed as foreigners and outsiders. Some have lived in Central Asian for generations. 
Many-indeed most- of the non-native cadres are drawn from such an indigenous yet 
non-Muslim local community”.
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Kazakhstan is the strongest, richest and most stable Central Asian country; it is also 
one of the most pro-Russian Central Asian countries. Nazarbaev has always advocated 
strong and positive ties with Russia. This was clearly seen over Kazakhstan’s support
T1 ^to Russia over the Ukraine crisis. Nazarbaev believed that the USA was meddling 
too much in the internal politics of some countries. Kazakhstan does not border the 
Ferghana Valley and does not appear to have strong Islamic extremist movement on 
the same scale as those in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, Russia’s main 
concerns in Kazakhstan are related to energy resources, pipelines, and the large ethnic 
Russian minority in the country. Putin is very concerned not to let this oil-rich country 
fall to the temptations of the USA. Competing influences over Kazakhstan’s energy 
resources will be discussed in chapter 5.
Kazakhstan at the time of independence was the only Soviet Republic where the titular 
nationality was not the majority. In 1991 there were more ethnic Russians living in 
Kazakhstan than Kazakhs. The majority of the Russians lived in the north of the 
country, while the Kazakhs and other nationalities lived in the south and west. After 
independence the ethnic balances slightly changed. Many Kazakhs living outside their 
homeland were encouraged to return to Kazakhstan. This occurred at the same time as 
many Russians immigrated to Russia. Although Kazakhs today are the majority in 
their country, Russia still exerts a profound amount of influence over this former 
Soviet Republic. One of the reasons is due to the remaining large Russian minority 
who still live there.314 Nazarbaev’s concern about the large Russian diaspora, and 
Russia’s role in Kazakh affairs has forced him to move the capital from Almaty, which 
is in the south-east to Astana, which is in the north. The reason for this is because the 
Russian community in Kazakhstan resides in the north. This rather extreme measure is 
to ensure that the Kazakh authorities remain in control of the Russian populated north. 
This move came after some concern that northern Kazakhstan could join Russia,
QIC
consequently dividing the country.
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The Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan has helped build and maintain the friendly 
relationship between the regime in Moscow and the regime in Astana. The Russians in 
Kazakhstan appear well respected and well treated by the Nazarbaev regime, 
especially when their situation is compared with the situation of other ethnic Russians 
living in the FSU. The Russian population is particularly supportive of Nazarbaev, and 
sees him as a protector of their rights. Nazarbaev, a Russian-speaking member of the 
former Soviet nomenklatura has always emphasised Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity
316and its close cooperation with Moscow. In many ways the guaranteed protection of 
the ethnic Russians, lies in the continuation of his presidency. It remains essential to 
remember that Kazakhstan’s strong relationship with Moscow goes beyond the issue 
of the Russian minority in the country.
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3.7 Economic Developments between Russia and Central Asia
This section will focus on the economic factors that contribute to Russia’s influence in 
Central Asia. This will not include discussion on energy resources and pipelines. A 
separate chapter is dedicated to Central Asia’s energy resources and pipeline 
infrastructures. Over the years Russia’s interest in creating a strong economic regional 
complex with the countries of Central Asia has greatly increased. This initiative has 
recently appeared reciprocal, as the countries of Central Asia and Russia seem to be 
taking joint steps in the sphere of economic regionalisation. The reasons for Russian 
and Central Asian economic engagement will be discussed below.
Just after the disintegration of the USSR, Moscow not only politically showed 
disinterest in Central Asia but also economically. Russia saw many of the FSR’s as
*3 i 7
free riders, curtailing its potential economic strength. It took the path of quick and 
profound economic reform in the direction of globalisation, and creation of a market 
economy. This was not the case for the Central Asian countries, which had hoped for 
closer economic integration with Russia, instead they found themselves outside the
• T 1 Rrouble zone, having to invent their own currency, and deal with economic obstacles 
and institutional differences that they had never dealt with before. At that time, many 
in the Russian political and economic arena were caught in the euphoria that 
characterised the disintegration of the USSR. It was genuinely believed that Russia 
would have to simply open up its markets to the world, and foreign investment would
7 t Q
flow, resulting in economic prosperity.
By the late Kozyrev period, Russia was realising that the political image it had first 
adopted for itself, after the collapse of the USSR, was not the one that best suited it.
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Consequently, as was discussed in the previous sections, it re-orientated itself to a 
political position that best suited its national interests. In terms of economic interests, 
according to Paramonov and Strokov, Russia (after September 11) has made bold 
statements and clear indications and decisions to concentrate its attention regionally. 
This does not only mean in the political and security spheres, but also in the economic 
one, and specifically on Central Asia’s economic integration. A number of 
agreements have supported the above view, such as the signing of the Agreement on 
the Establishment of a Single Economic Space (SES) by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan in September 2003 at the CIS summit in Yalta. Although the SES only 
involves one Central Asian country, it exposes Russia’s regional economic integration 
agenda with some of the former Soviet Republics, and its enthusiasm to adopt its own 
economic shield. It is hoped by some members of this organisation that this common 
economic space will reincarnate an economic union similar to the one before the 
collapse of the USSR. The next step would be to reach an agreement over common 
tariff codes and a customs union, in addition to the possibility of establishing a 
common currency for the entire bloc. Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the SES is 
also an indication that it welcomes regional economic integration with Russia as a 
main player.
The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is an example of an attempt towards 
economic integration that has not always appeared very successful. The organisation 
started in 1995, when it was decided between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to 
create a customs Union (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined later). The Customs Union 
agreement was renewed in 1999 and developed into the EurAsEC in 2000. Many of its 
members hoped to see this organisation develop into a regional structure, like NAFTA 
or ASEAN, recognised by international organisations such as the UN.322 The EurAsEC 
in theory unites some of the world’s richest countries in natural resources, covers vast 
expanses of territory and encompassed a population of around 189 million people; it 
has the potential of being a major player in the world markets. This organisation also
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gears its members to joining the WTO.323 Until 2005, the EurAsEC did not look 
capable of making a positive change to its member countries. On October 6 2005, it 
was agreed at a summit of the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO-this 
organisation will be discussed in more detail below) to merge these two regional 
economic organisations together. It was hoped that merging these two economic 
regional complexes would accelerate and facilitate economic integration in the 
region.324 After the merger, membership of the EurAsEC included all the CACO
99 cmember countries minus Uzbekistan and including Belarus. On 25 January 2006,
99 f%Uzbekistan joined the EurAsEC at a summit in St. Petersburg.
The disappointing results of regional integration have pushed each country to focus on 
its own economy, regardless of what stage of development its neighbours are in. This 
has also happened as a result of hostility between the Central Asian countries (this has 
been mentioned in the previous section). For example, if one Central Asian country 
upsets another, for whatever reason, it has often been the case that the angered country 
will react in a way that will cause harm to its neighbour, such as turning the oil or gas 
taps off. This has often occurred between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It is this kind of 
aggressive bilateral behaviour, which has distanced the prospects of regional
997integration. The advantages of regional cooperation do not always seem to be fully 
understood amongst the Central Asians; however, as seen below this trend is slowly 
starting to change. As Green says, “Although not sufficient in itself to provide for a
9 9 0
high level of growth, regional economic cooperation is necessary”. In fact a country 
like Tajikistan is in desperate need for any form of regionalisation. It appears that 
independence has done more harm than good for that country, which is often given as 
an example of a ‘failed state’. Independence has meant loss of security, especially due
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to ethnic and religious strife, which plunged the country into 5 years of civil war, in 
addition to drug trafficking and illegal smuggling. Since 1991 there has also occurred a 
huge decrease in the standards of living, as well as the disintegration of the social and 
urban services.329 According to Gofurov and Abdullakhanov the lack of regionalism is 
not an unusual phenomenon for newly independent countries. They say, “While 
analyzing the situation of the Central Asian region as a whole, it may be considered 
that it is not exceptional. Such a situation occurred in the process of de-Stalinization 
and transition to political self-dependence in the regions of south and east Asia, 
including in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and also in other regions of the world”.
As seen above, and in previous sections, most regional organisations involving Central 
Asia, or in fact all of the CIS are not as effective as they promised to be. This is of 
course not to say that they are useless; their most useful characteristic is the fact that 
they have been created out of the positive initiatives of their members. It is almost 
more important that the Central Asian countries and Russia are willing and ready to 
form an economic or security based organisation, than how effective the organisation 
really is. It should be remembered that these former Soviet Republics, in addition to 
Russia, have not been independent, self-sufficient countries for long. As seen in 
previous sections, Russia did not develop its Foreign Policy identity until the mid 
1990’s. The EU, for example, and other regional organisations, took years to develop 
into what they are today. Proper integration takes years, and the attempt made by 
Russia and Central Asia should not be disregarded, but given time to mature and 
develop.
Russia’s most important step in economic integration with Central Asia has been its 
membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) in October 2004. 
Russia’s membership in this organisation went beyond mutual economic interests and 
benefits. In the past few years there has been a clear intensification of Russian efforts 
in the economic and political sphere in connection with Central Asia. Russian 
economic integration with Central Asia has played the leading role on Russia’s
330 O. Gofurov and R. Abdullakhanov, ‘Integration or Economic Nationalism ?’, Contemporary Central 
A sia, vo l.5, no.2, August 2001, pp. 17-21
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1political stage. The origins of the CACO first started with the creation of the Central 
Asian Union (CAU) in 1994; this was an economic union with Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as its participants. Ironically this union was initially 
created as a buffer to Russian influences. The CACO decision to allow Russia to join 
in 2004 was an indication of the change in the level of Russia’s influence in Central 
Asia. The three member countries (especially Uzbekistan) had hoped to further 
economic cooperation amongst one another by creating a common economic area. As 
with most regional organisations (especially those excluding Russia) the CAU never 
made an outstanding contribution to the political and economic arena. It was these 
three Central Asian countries that developed Centrasbat in 1995, by first creating the 
Council of Defence Ministers. In 1998 the CAU transformed itself into the Central 
Asian Economic Union (CAEU) and then the Central Asian Economic Community 
(CAEC). Tajikistan was finally able to join this organisation after its economy had 
been ripped apart for five years during the civil war. At the end of 2001 the CAEC 
became the CACO. The Central Asian invitation to Russia to join them in the CACO 
marked the start of a profound Russian economic influence over the region. As stated 
above, in October 2005, the CACO underwent further transformation by merging with 
the EurAsEC.
Paramonov believes that one of the main reasons why Russia opted for regionalisation 
was because globalisation was not as successful as it originally hoped it would be.334 
Igor Ivanov even called Russia’s participation in the CACO a result of the “challenges
o  o  r
of globalisation”. This view has many followers, but there is more than one 
component that has triggered Russia’s regional personality. The intentions of the USA, 
perceived as invading what Russia sees as its political, security and economic roles in 
Central Asia, have made it fight back for what it regards as its own influences. 
Increasing American presence in the region in all spheres is one of the most important
331 Interview with Vladimir V. Paramonov, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Economic 
Research, Tashkent, September 2004
332 Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy, London, 1998, p.44
333 Roy A llison, ‘Regionalism and Security in Central A sia’, International Affairs, vol.80, no.3, May 
2004, p.473
334 Interview with Vladimir Paramonov, September 2004
335Igor Ivanov, ‘With Eyes on the US, Russia Bolsters Central Asian Presence’, Eurasianet.org. d.o
22.6.04, d.d 3.5.06, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062204a.shtml
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reasons behind Russian enthusiasm to join what had previously been an entirely 
Central Asian organisation. As Sahgal says, “this move (joining the CACO) is 
increasingly seen as a check of the US...push into the region”. The CACO tried to 
broaden its scope; although it primarily remained an economic organisation, it also had 
a political and defence agenda. Russia expanded the aims of the CACO in order for 
this organisation to have greater regional control. According to the Kyrgyz press, 
Russia wanted to intensify cooperation between member countries, especially in 
regards to the effective use of water and energy resources. Russia also wanted to create 
a single transport space and a network of international transport corridors on the 
territories of CACO member countries. It wanted to intensify its cooperation with the 
other members of the CACO in regards to combating terrorism, extremism, drug 
trafficking and organised crime. The EurAsEC has dedicated particular attention not 
to lose the diverse and positive characteristics of the CACO during the merger. It 
appears that the CACO/EurAsEC, the CSTO and the SCO have very similar agendas, 
and all have Russian participation. Russia seems to be persistent in not allowing any 
other country to take its role in Central Asia. The CSTO focuses on keeping Russia 
dominant in the defence and security spheres; inside the SCO Russia is able to keep an 
eye on Chinese influences by giving the organisation a joint anti-American 
characteristic. The SCO also allows Russia to maintain its powerful traditional role in 
regards to security, secessionism and Islamic extremism. The CACO/EurAsEC aims to 
achieve Russian dominance through economic tactics, which also encompassed 
elements of security and defense. The results all lead to a similar conclusion, that 
Russia is now supporting a regional strategy in order not to also see its influences 
wane in Central Asia, as it has in some of the other former Soviet Republics and the 
Middle East.
Russia joined the CACO because it was invited into the organisation at a CACO 
summit in Dushanbe in October 2004. Perhaps slightly unusual, was the fact that
336 Arun Sahgal, ‘Growing Russian Influences in Central A sia’, Pravda, d.o 5.11.04, d.d 24.11.04, 
http://english.pravda.ru/world/20/91/366/14545 Central Asia.html
337 Kyrgyzstan New s: Comprehensive Development Framework and National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, ‘Russian President w ill take part in Central Asian Cooperation Organisation Summit’, d.o 
19.10.04, d.d 22.10.04, http://cdf.gov.kg/en/news/?id=4026
3j8 Itar-Tass, ‘EurAsEC Head if  Government Meeting begins in M insk’, d.o 19.5.06, d.d 26.5.06, 
http://www.tass. ru/eng/level2.htm l?NewsID=:8434655& PageNum
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Russia’s participation in the CACO came at the initiative of Uzbekistan. At the CACO 
summit, President Karimov highlighted the significance of Russia in such an 
organisation. He discussed the positive potential that Russia could bring into the 
organisation in regards to strengthening the bonds of cooperation and integration, 
especially as Russia had proven to be an undisputed asset in the region in terms of 
providing security and stability. The other CACO members supported the Uzbek 
leader’s proposal to invite Russia as a full-fledged member of the CACO. This was 
a sign of increased Russian influence in Uzbekistan. Karimov appeared to have 
realised that his country needed to create a single economic body with Russia in order 
for the Uzbek economic situation to improve. He also realised that this kind of body 
can never be achieved with the USA, which had recently cut down the amount of aid it 
provided Uzbekistan. After the events in Andijan, Karimov became even more 
resolved on Russian-centered economic integration, and as stated above became the 
latest member to join the EurAsEC in 2006. Regional economic integration is useful to 
both Russia and the Central Asian countries; it is a reciprocal relationship.340
339 Radio Tashkent International. ‘Presidents o f  Central Asian Countries meet in Astana’, d.o 31.5.04,
13.2.05, d.d 15.2.05, http://ino.uzpak.uz/eng/coment eng/coment eng 3105.html
340 Interview with Vladimir V. Paramonov, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Economic 
Research, Tashkent, September 2004
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3.8 Conclusion
Russia’s influence on culture, the economy, security and politics has been analysed in 
this chapter on the region, and on the separate Central Asian countries. Russia’s 
historic legacy has been very important in allowing Russia to maintain a pivotal role in 
Central Asia over a decade after independence. Analysis of the historic legacy helps 
explain why Russia is not perceived today as having been an occupier of the territory 
of present day Central Asia. This aids in explaining the lack of hostility seen between 
Central Asians and Russians, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
This generally accommodating attitude towards Russia and Russians has resulted in a 
strong Russian cultural influence in the region. As this chapter has shown, the amount 
of Russification in Central Asia differs considerably from country to country. 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are the most linguistically and behaviorally Russified, 
followed by Uzbekistan and then Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Behavioural 
Russification has played a role in the evolution of the Central Asian identity; as 
previously discussed the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz (especially in the north), other than 
being the Central Asians that are the most linguistically Russified, also are the closest 
to the Russian way of living, thinking, eating etc. In addition, six million ethnic 
Russians still live in Kazakhstan. These characteristics are also seen in the other 
Central Asian countries even in the most Islamicised ones. Russification in both its 
forms has ultimately played a large role in Central Asian’s orientation towards Russia 
and the way the Central Asians perceive the growing role of the other two powers in 
the region.
Politically Russia is also seen as having a strong influence as all the Central Asian 
countries (to varying degrees) are imitations of the Soviet political model. Even a 
coloured revolution in Kyrgyzstan was not able to help the country break away from 
its political past. Even if the Foreign Policy of a country is oriented away from Russia 
the domestic milieu still favours Russian political influence. This was most clearly 
seen in Uzbekistan. Karimov, like his counterparts in Central Asia is the product of the
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Soviet political system. The Central Asian leaders’ internal politics will remain more 
acceptable to Russia than to any other power.
Russia’s influence in regards to security has increasingly become challenged by the 
USA. Since independence, and particularly before the war on terror, Russia was the 
most favoured (and effective) security provider for the region. This was particularly 
seen during the Tajik civil war and various other instances of friction between weaker 
and stronger Central Asian countries. Its security providing role has not only earned it 
loyalty from the Rahmonov regime and consequently a Russian military base outside 
Dushanbe, but also helped create regional security structures aimed at fighting regional 
threats, such as extremism, terrorism, crime and drug trafficking. Security based 
organisations have also enabled Russia to remain active in the security sphere of the 
region, especially when faced with competing security organisation and military bases 
from the USA. Russia’s security-related influence was strongly challenged by 
America’s defeat of the Taliban regime, and the creation of an American military base 
both in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The creation of a Russian military base at Kant 
was a way for Russia to counterbalance American military presence in Kyrgyzstan and 
remain prominent in the country’s security. Karimov’s demands for the American 
military withdrawal from Karshi-Khanabad after Andijan reinforced Russia’s 
ambitions to remain the strongest security providing power in the region.
Economically Russia also attempts to expand its influence over the region. It faces 
growing competition in the energy sphere, and tries to maintain strong regional 
(including other countries of the CIS other than Central Asia) economic organisations 
such as the SES, and the CACO/EurAsEC. These kinds of organisations have not in 
the past been very promising, and Russia’s influence in this sphere is challenged by 
America’s bilateral economic relationship with the Central Asian countries.
Thus, it appears that Russia’s strongest and most enduring influences lie in the political 
and cultural spheres. The former can be challenged by fundamental changes to the 
political infrastructure, resulting from the death of the leaderships (on the condition 
that they will not be succeeded by their children or like-minded individuals), or by 
effective revolutions. The latter can be challenged by other cultural influences on the
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Central Asian population or by the introduction of either a new culture or the 
development of an already existing one.
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4.0 American Influences in Central Asia since 1991
This chapter examines the USA’s role in Central Asia, and traces the seeds of 
competition with Russia since 1991. The definition of influences corresponds to the 
same definition as in the chapter dealing with Russia. There are five sections in this 
chapter. The first section traces the evolution of American foreign policy towards the 
region since the collapse of communism, and the first signs of challenge and tension 
between the USA and Russia. The following four sections deal with the different kinds 
of influences that America has on the Central Asian regimes and on the population. As 
with the chapter related to Russia, American influences over Central Asia refer to 
security, politics, economics and culture. Each of these influences mentioned above 
will be examined for each of the five Central Asian countries individually. It seems 
important also to point out that there was surprisingly a lack of material and resources 
for research, especially when dealing with American political influences in the Central 
Asia, and particularly when looking at American influences on culture. There was 
plenty of material on America’s political role in Uzbekistan but a profound lack of 
sources for the other Central Asian countries. American influence on Central Asian 
culture was even more difficult to find. There seems to be a vast void of academic 
work in this field. Therefore, most of the citations have either been from interviews 
conducted in Central Asia, or from personal observations while out there. In addition, 
some Internet sources have been quoted which would have otherwise not have been 
used due to their non-academic background, with the limited amount of non-electronic 
and electronic literature to work with, they have occasionally been used. I hope that 
this chapter will contribute to the very much-needed research on American influences 
in Central Asia since 1991.
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4.1 Patterns of American Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia Since 
1991
The nature and extent of American interest in Central Asia appears to follow a similar 
route to that of Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia after 1991; both have been 
on a gradual increase, especially since September 11. According to S. Neil Macfarlane, 
American foreign policy towards Central Asia can be divided into three stages. The 
first stage occurred from 1992-94, when the USA established relations with the new 
states of the region and underlined its interests to support their independence and 
transition to democracy and economic reform. In addition, the Clinton administration 
was particularly interested in creating a non-nuclear zone, and the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction in the region. In spite of this concern, Central Asia 
remained in the early 1990’s on the periphery of U.S foreign policy priorities. By the 
mid 1990’s (second stage) both Russian and American objectives towards the region 
began to take new forms. It was at this point that Washington realised the region’s 
untapped wealth, and the positive potentials of becoming a player in Caspian affairs.341 
Washington argued that increased US involvement in the region would not only be 
prosperous for the USA, as it would ensure access to natural gas resources and provide 
for American business opportunities, but would be equally beneficial for the region. It 
was at this stage that projects such as the B-T-C pipeline began to evolve. The Clinton 
administration also spoke about its determination in assisting with market reforms, 
developing the rule of law, boosting educational exchanges and strengthening civil 
society.342 From that early stage American foreign policy was focused on having long­
term effects, which would also infiltrate the population. The USA was making its first 
steps in becoming a geo-strategic power in Central Asia.
341 S. N eil Macfarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central A sia’, International Affairs, vol. 
80, no. 3, May 2004, pp.450-451
342 Ariel Cohen, ‘U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a N ew ’, The Heritage 
Foundation: Policy Research and A nalysis, d.o 24.6.97, d.d 19.7.05, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasi/BG 1132.cfm
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The USA’s tactics in evolving its power in Central Asia did not take a subtle approach 
for the sake of not antagonising its cold war foe-Russia. By 1996, the Clinton 
administration had openly declared that it was its goal to achieve eastward expansion 
for NATO. The USA had previously involved the Central Asian countries in NATO’s 
partnership for peace (PFP), which was seen by Russia as not only a threat but also as 
an introduction to full membership at a later stage. NATO’s PFP with the Central 
Asian countries will be discussed in the following section. According to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, the USA could have had a less antagonistic approach towards Russia with 
NATO expansion by offering Russia (in the early 1990’s) a special role in its 
relationship with the organisation.343 From the start of the USA’s early involvement in 
Central Asia, it seemed apparent that the USA was not a power willing to change its 
priorities in order to create a partnership with Russia. Organisations such as GUUAM, 
and projects designed to exclude Russia and Iran from pipeline projects, proved this 
point at the early stages of US involvement in Central Asia.344 The only underlying 
relationship appeared to be one of competition. These points will be covered in more 
detail in the coming sections.
It is unclear how involved the USA would have become in Central Asia had the events 
of September 11 not occurred. The gradual increase of American interest in the 
Caspian region, and the development of US-initiated and US-sponsored projects 
suggest that Washington, from the start, was determined to acquire some sort of 
influence in the region. The events of September 11 gave it the opportunity to expand 
its power base from mainly economic objectives regarding the Caspian basin, to also 
political, social and security ones. Therefore, the third stage of American involvement 
in Central Asia began as a result of September 11. However, for a brief period after 
September 11, it appeared that partnership rather than competition would prevail 
between Russia and the USA.345 Putin was in full support of the creation of American 
bases in some of the Central Asian countries (this will be covered in more detail
343 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geo-strategic Imperatives 
(hereafter The Grand Chessboard). N ew  York, 1997, p. 101
344 Ehsan Ahrari, ‘The Strategic Future o f  Central Asia: A V iew  from W ashington’ (hereafter ‘The 
Strategic Future o f  Central A sia’), Journal o f  International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 162
345 Anatol Lieven, ‘The Secret Policem en’s Ball: The United States, Russia and International Order 
After 11 September’ (hereafter ‘The Secret Policem en’s B all’), International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, April 
2002, p. 252
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below), in addition to his open support of the American-led campaign against 
terrorism. The reasons behind this support have already been discussed in the chapter 
dealing with Russian influences in Central Asia.
The second honeymoon period between the USA and Russia appeared to have been 
even shorter than the first, which occurred after the disintegration of the USSR and 
lasted until the late Kozyrev period. The second honeymoon was short lived as the 
USA’s multi-vectored interests began to show long-term interests, making the USA a 
regional power and a threat to Moscow’s status in Central Asia. The brief partnership 
between these two countries was also tarnished as a result of both US and Russian 
security, political and media establishments mistrusting one another. This reveals the 
extent at which cold war hostilities remain deeply embedded in both camps. It became 
widely believed that Washington was pursuing a policy, which would include Central 
Asia and the Caucasus in its own sphere of influence.346
America’s renewed role in Central Asia since September 11 has created an arena of 
geo-strategic rivalry, which has affected the overall power balance of the region. This 
situation is of particular concern to Russia and China who have consequently 
strengthened their cooperation. Not only is the SCO becoming one of the most 
influential regional organisations, it is also seen as a defence against American 
hegemony. The geo-strategic alliance between these two regional powers is also 
showing signs of stretching its arms towards Iran.347 In 2005, the SCO was considering
• • 348Iranian membership. All three regional countries have similar objective, such as 
creating a bloc against American influences, defeating terrorism, Wahhabism, 
separatism and strengthening their economic, and energy related links.349 In regards to 
Central Asia, it is in Russian and Chinese interests to remain aligned and united so 
long as the USA poses a threat to both of them. As mentioned previously, this 
phenomenon prevents China from becoming a competing influence over Central Asia.
346 Martin M cCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: a M odem History p. 140
347 Jephraim P. Gundzig, ‘The Ties that Bind China, Russia and Iran’, Asia Times Online, d.o 4.6.05, d.d
1.7.05, http://www.atim es.com /atim es/china/GF04Ad07.html
348 Islamic Republic N ew s A gency. ‘China’s SCO Terms Iran Important, Influential State’, d.o 1.7.05, 
d.d 1.7.05. http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/m enu-234/0507010346133402.htm l
349 Gundzig, ‘The Ties that Bind China, Russia and Iran’
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4.2 America’s Contribution to Central Asian Security
4.2.1 NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Centrasbat and GUUAM
Prior to September 11 American focus on security in Central Asia was limited, 
although the growing power of the Taliban, the IMU incursions into Batken in 1999 
and 2000, the bombings of Tashkent in 1999, and the Tajik civil war should have been 
alarming indications of a strong wave of Islamicisation gaining momentum in the 
region. It was not until the post-September 11 era that security became one of the most 
important issues binding the USA to Central Asia. This was the issue that brought the 
American military to the heart of the former Soviet Union, an act unimaginable before 
September 11. Once the USA was physically present in the region to fight the war 
against terror, Russia’s traditional role as security provider was challenged. Before 
focusing on the war on terror and the creation of military bases that followed, 
America’s security-based agenda prior to September 11 will be discussed.
The USA’s determination to spread its influence in the former Communist bloc came 
in the form of NATO expansion. According to Brzezinski, “even the former Soviet 
space is permeated by various American-sponsored arrangements for closer 
cooperation with NATO, such as the Partnership for Peace”.350 The USA consolidated 
its role in the security sector of the Central Asian countries by extending NATO 
activities to them via the PFP programme. This programme reflects the USA’s agenda 
of spreading its influence over regions that it was previously alien to, regardless of 
Russia’s discomfort with this. In 1994, all the Central Asian countries other than 
Tajikistan, which was experiencing a civil war, became members of the PFP 
programme. Russo-centric security structures were seen as being undermined by
351this. PFP allowed NATO to enter a dialogue with the member countries that were 
geographically far, and to develop a relationship with them. According to NATO PFP 
representatives, the organisation’s main focus for cooperation with Central Asia was to 
achieve consultation in regards to security concerns. NATO was also keen to offer US
350 Brezezinski, The Grand Chessboard, p.27
351 Macfarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central A sia’, p. 453
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assistance for defence reforms.352 NATO’s PFP appears to be the American twin of the 
CSTO. Both these organisations are aimed at providing security, assistance and 
defence planning, in addition to providing military exercises. US forces participated in 
military exercises in the region in 1997, 1998 and 2000. In 2002, Tajikistan became 
the final Central Asian country to participate in the programme. Therefore, it is not a 
surprise that in 2001 the CST signatories faced up to the challenge, and transformed 
themselves into the more focused and more efficient CSTO.
America’s involvement in security and defence structures has not been confined to the 
PFP programme. With the encouragement of the USA, Centrasbat was created in 
1995/96. This battalion compromises Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz troops; it was 
established under NATO auspices and with Centcom support.353 The origins of this 
organisation are trilateral and regional; the defence ministers of the CAEC decided to 
address military and security cooperations, which resulted in the creation of 
Centrasbat. This battalion was designed to improve the cooperation between the 
member states’ forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In August 1997, the 
Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz forces conducted their first overseas exercise in North 
Carolina. US troops have also been involved in exercises in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan in 1997 and 1998.354 The actual achievements of Centrasbat are limited, 
and the battalion often appears effective only on paper. The main importance of this 
structure is that it is heavily supported and sponsored by the USA, in ways that often 
appear solely beneficial for Washington’s status as an active player in Central Asia’s 
security and defence structures.
The creation of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in 1997 and 
GUUAM (with the addition of Uzbekistan) in 1999 marked a profound step in the 
latter countries’ westward orientation. Karimov’s withdrawal from the CST and 
membership to GUUAM firmly highlighted the common objectives he had with the
352 Video interview with Robert Simmons, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Security Cooperation 
and Partnership and Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, ‘Cooperation with the 
Caucasus and Central A sia’, NATO Multimedia Video Interviews, d.o 15.9.04, d.d 20.7.05, 
http://www.nato.int/m ulti/video/2004/040910-sim m ons/v04091 Oe.htm
353 Macfarlane, ‘The United States and regionalism in Central A sia’, p. 453
j54 GlobalSecuritv.org. ‘Military: Centrasbat’, d.o 27.4.04, d.d 18.7.05, 
http://www.globalsecuritv.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm
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USA in challenging Russia’s role as security provider. Some of GUUAM’s objectives 
were to fight terrorism, extremism, separatism, illegal arms deliveries, illicit drug and 
human trafficking and assistance in the peaceful settlement of conflicts.355 GUUAM 
remains one of the only regional cooperation organisations to be fully promoted and 
funded by the USA. This is how the USA has tried to make its mark, and spread its 
influence in the former Soviet Union. In reality, GUUAM’s influence barely has 
effects; the organisation has never materialised into an effective alliance, it simply 
separates those countries which are wary of Russia’s role in the region from those that 
are in favour of Russia. The USA has not appeared to take GUUAM too seriously 
either. Uzbekistan’s suspended membership in 2002 did not appear to tarnish the 
Uzbek-American alliance. Uzbekistan’s membership to the SCO further reiterated the 
country’s double-faced/multi-vectored policies. After September 11, the USA tried to 
revive this paralyzed grouping by granting its members approximately two billion 
dollars, but this rehabilitation policy also seemed to have limited effects.357 
GUUAM’s attempted comeback was aimed at re-attempting to provide a 
counterweight to Russian influences in the Caspian basin and Central Asia. During the 
organisation’s Yalta gathering in 2003, the group pledged to recover from the malaise 
it had contracted during its early years. In spite of these efforts, Karimov withdrew 
his country from the organisation in early May 2005 (before the Andijan incidents). 
The organisation’s dormant character still prevails; an indication of this is that 
Uzbekistan is still listed as a member country on GUUAM’s official website. The 
reason for this is that no one has deemed it relevant to update the website since
3592000. Throughout Uzbekistan’s non-eventful life in GUUAM, the main message it 
sent to its neighbours was that it approved, and supported a counterbalance to Russia’s 
influence and Russo-centric organisations in the region. For the USA, Uzbekistan was 
the window to Central Asia.
355 Iaroslav Matiichik, ‘GUUAM: Its Current State, Risks, and Prospects’ (hereafter ‘G U U A M ’), 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 5(29), 2004, p. 126
356 Macfarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central A sia’, p. 453
357 Matiichik, ‘G U U A M ’, p. 126
358 Taras Kuzio and Sergai Blagov, ‘Eurasia Insight: GUUAM  makes Comeback Bid with US Support’, 
ArtUkraine.com. d.o 7.7 .03,d.d 23.7.05, http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/kuzio6.htm
359 G U U A M . d.o 1996-2000, d.d 19.7.06, http://www.guuam.org/
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4.2.2 The War on Terror
The war on terror produced the most prominent changes in American involvement in 
Central Asia. After September 11, countering extremism and terrorism was the new 
focus of American foreign policy. It was in the USA’s national interest to station its 
troops in countries that would make its operation in Afghanistan easier. This way the 
USA would also be close to the tide of extremism that was affecting Central Asia. This 
fitted perfectly with Washington’s agenda to fight terrorism, and at the time appeared 
mutually beneficial for all those involved in the region.
The Central Asian leaders’ keenness to participate in the US-led operations, and their 
enthusiasm to allow for the creation of American bases on their territories was 
alarming to Russia. Putin, although an eager supporter of the war on terror, realised 
that opposing the USA’s military deployments in Central Asia would risk reducing
361 •Russia’s influence in the region. In spite of Russification particularly in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan, the vital role of the 201st MRD in Tajikistan, the compromise dual 
citizenship laws in Turkmenistan, the efforts of the CST to build a security bloc, and 
the economic- and energy-related ties between the Central Asian countries and Russia, 
Central Asian leaders appeared willing to allow the USA into their midst. One of the 
most important reasons that united the feelings of the Central Asian countries to accept 
American involvement, was their desire to fight the growing influence of Islam, and 
defeat one of the sources of unrest in the region-the Taliban. The USA was the only 
country able and willing to engage itself in a fight with the Taliban. Washington was 
strong enough to save Central Asia from the increasing threat of the Taliban. For this 
reason some in Central Asia view America’s security-providing role as irreplaceable 
with that of any other power. America’s security and defence role in the region in 
defeating the Taliban regime dwarfed all efforts made by the CST/CSTO and the
367SCO. Moscow also had much to gain from the destruction of the Taliban, and their 
Al-Qaida training camps. Putin could not afford to be left out of the engagements
360 Joseph S. N ye JR, ‘The American National Interest and Global Public G oods’, International Affairs, 
vol. 78, no. 2, April 2002, p. 235
361 Mark A Smith, ‘Russia, the USA and Central A sia’, Conflict Studies Research Centre. May 2002, p.3
362 Interview with Bakyt Beshim ov, Vice-President for Academic Affairs, American University Central 
Asia, Bishkek, Novem ber 2005
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between Central Asia and Washington, and so he endorsed the decision to allow the 
US military into Russia’s traditional comer of the chessboard.
Unsurprisingly, Uzbekistan was very enthusiastic to render its assistance to the USA in 
the war on terror. Since the latter half of the 1990’s, Karimov had challenged Russia’s 
role in his country, and had distanced Uzbekistan from Russo-centric organisations 
such as the CST. He regarded Moscow’s influence as a limitation to Uzbekistan’s 
leading role in Central Asia. In 1998 he conducted what is sometimes referred to as a 
‘secret alliance’ with the USA. Two events provoked such cooperation, the first was 
the success of the Taliban’s offensive, which brought them 125 km from the Uzbek- 
Afghan border, and the second were the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. US Special Forces were given permission by Karimov to conduct 
clandestine efforts against Osama bin Laden and his supporters. It was, therefore, 
expected that Uzbekistan would be host to American troops after September 11,364
Uzbekistan was in a highly advantageous position after September 11. It had already 
proved to Washington that it was supportive of its policies, and critical of Russia’s role 
in the former Soviet space. On 12 October 2001, Washington and Tashkent signed a 
statement defining their partnership as a qualitatively new relationship, while stressing 
the USA’s new role as security guarantor for Uzbekistan.365 This was Karimov’s 
declaration that his country belonged in the American camp.
The first American troops arrived in late September 2001 and were located in the 
Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base, ninety miles away from Afghanistan. Karimov repeatedly 
reiterated his decision to pursue a strategy of increased security cooperation with the 
USA, and consequently was not prepared to give a withdrawal deadline for the troops. 
He declared that the USA was there to carry out a task, and would remain until the job 
was done. It appeared that the USA was a security provider not only against the
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threat from the Taliban, the increasing threat of terrorism, but also against Russian 
interference in Uzbek affairs.
The presence and consequence of US forces in Uzbekistan was a topic of tension and 
controversy between the State Department and the Pentagon, and amongst Uzbek 
domestic circles. The intensification of the USA’s hegemonic character after 
September 11 was a result of the Pentagon’s growing role in foreign policy decision­
making. The State Department wanted to see less military components in America’s 
foreign policy and more emphasis on democratisation, human rights and reform. A tug
• TA7of war appeared to have evolved within the American political system. The State 
Department repeatedly spoke out against Karimov’s authoritarianism, and
TARUzbekistan’s appalling civil rights record. The struggle between the State 
Department and the Pentagon in formulating a single foreign policy is also very 
relevant for the section on the USA’s political influence over Central Asia. It appears 
that both Bush administrations have, at first, preferred to comply with the wishes of the 
Pentagon, even if this meant a more aggressive foreign policy, which often disregarded 
the abuses of the Karimov regime for the sake of maintaining a military strategy in the 
country. Washington realised that if it consolidated a strong military presence in one 
Central Asian country which it regards as a strong ally, then this would place it in an
T AQadvantage position vis-a-vis the other Central Asian countries in the future. This 
bilateral-based strategy is not always successful as will be explained in the section 
dealing with the USA’s political influences in Central Asia.
The events in the Ferghana Valley, which started on 13 May 2005, caused a 
breakdown in the strong relationship between the USA and Karimov. Those in the 
State Department spoke more loudly than ever before. The Bush administration found 
it difficult to pursue its relationship with the Karimov regime without igniting rage at 
the abuses the authorities carried out on its people during this incident. The USA’s 
insistence (under pressure from other western governments as well) to open an
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investigation in the events of the Andijan episode have caused a massive rift with the 
Uzbek regime. The State Department’s views over this incident were that the Uzbek 
government owes the international community, and its own people, a credible 
investigation into the events. The State Department refused to dilute the seriousness of
7^0what happened, even if this affected America’s role in the region. This followed 
only a year after the US government cut assistance to Uzbekistan, resulting from the 
State Department’s continuous insistence that the Uzbek government had not made
^7 i
sufficient progress in regards to political and economic reform. The details of the 
amount of aid cut have already been discussed in the chapter dealing with Russian 
influence in Central Asia. Karimov’s reaction to the reduction of financial aid in 2004 
made him turn towards Russia. Shortly after this event, Karimov invited Russia into 
the CACO. His reactions to the State Department’s criticism over the Andijan events 
have caused him to act even more drastically. Both Russia and China refrained from 
criticising the tactics of Karimov in response to the Andijan unrest, and made it public 
that they did not support the calls for an international investigation. China even signed 
a $600m oil deal with Uzbekistan only weeks after the Karimov regime became the
• 'Xll •focus of international criticism. Their priority seems more focused on winning back 
Uzbekistan, consequently limiting the influence of the USA in the region.
The SCO summit on July 5 2005 launched a verbal offensive on the USA’s military 
role in Central Asia. Karimov, having endured strong criticism from the USA, 
supported the declarations made at this summit. The SCO called for the non­
interference in the international affairs of sovereign states; this was a message to 
Washington that its role in the region was unwelcomed. The members of the SCO, 
including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, made their intentions clear about curbing the 
American military presence in their countries.373 At the summit, the members 
demanded from the USA a clear timeframe, and deadline for the withdrawal of 
coalition forces from Central Asian bases, especially as the phase of active military 
operations in Afghanistan had ended. The request for a deadline was reported to have
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come at the initiative of Karimov.374 According to Benjamin Robertson, “The SCO’s 
notice to Washington was followed by statements from the Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
governments suggesting they were reconsidering the future of American bases on their 
territory”. Karimov initially reduced the flying rights of the American troops from 
K2, criticised the way the base was being run, and pointed to the accumulating debt
T76from landing and takeoff fees. A notice from the Uzbek government followed 
requesting the removal of US troops from K2. The USA tried to downplay the 
potential consequences of this declaration. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, rejected the calls for a deadline for US forces to withdraw from the region, and
T77argued that US troops were still needed in Central Asia. This outlines the hurricanes 
of influences crashing together in Central Asia. It is also important to point out that the 
reasons for lack of cooperation amongst the strategic powers in the region is not 
entirely the fault of the USA. Such statements made by the SCO eradicate any hope of 
an alliance or partnership, and highlight the growing tension and determination by the 
competing powers to outdo one another. This does not mean that the USA will allow 
for its role to be belittled in a region it regards of essential geo-strategic and geo­
political interest. It is not in the character of US foreign policy in general, and the Bush 
administration in particular to be bullied into a situation that they consider 
unfavorable. The Karimov regime is known to stand where the strongest political
T7Rwinds blow. His growing concern that the USA was eventually going to instigate an 
orange or rose styled revolution to oust him from power, as he believed happened with 
Shevardnadze and Yanukovich, has caused him to align himself closer to the leaders of 
the SCO. Karimov seems to have learnt the lesson well from his CIS neighbours; too 
much US interference in politics could become counterproductive. Karimov has stated 
that the Andijan riots were triggered by outside interference, and hinted that the USA 
aimed at creating instability in order to impose its own political and economic
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agenda.379 Unlike in Georgia, Karimov is certain that the USA will not support the 
opposition, as it is primarily Islamic. The eviction of the American troops from K2 is a 
geo-strategic defeat for the USA, and a win for Russia and China. A counter-reaction 
from Washington is inevitable in due course, especially as they have declared that they 
will maintain their military presence in Central Asia despite the closedown of K2. It 
appears that relocation is being discussed; rumors seems to point to Tajikistan, 
although it is still too early to tell.380
A first-time visitor to Manas international airport may be overwhelmed at the number 
of ‘US Air Force’ planes in this former Soviet Republic. Manas airport is the largest 
location of US troops in Central Asia (the Americans call their base at Manas ‘Ganci’ 
after the New York Fire Department Chief, Peter J.Ganci, who died on September 11). 
Kyrgyzstan, one of the most Russified Central Asian countries and active participant 
of all Russo-centric organisations, overtly showed its enthusiasm and willingness to 
allow its territory to be used by the US military for their missions in Afghanistan. As a 
member of the CST, Akayev did have to officially coordinate his plans with Moscow. 
By the end of December 2001, the Kyrgyz parliament officially agreed to allow the US 
forces to set up a military base at the same location as its main civilian airport-Manas.
O O 1
The air base is designed to accommodate five thousand people. Officially this base 
is international, used by multi-national coalition forces, but in reality it is a symbol of 
America’s military might. It is an American base, used predominantly by American 
troops with the official aim of fighting terrorism, and the unofficial one of placing the 
USA at the heart of a region it wishes to have influence over.
It appeared that the Central Asian leaders, regardless of their relationship with 
Moscow, were ready to engage with the USA as a result of the benefits this brought. 
Other than financial assistance, these autocratic leaders hoped that by bringing the 
USA closer to their internal affairs they could strengthen their grip on power. Having 
US support would put them in an advantageous and strong position vis-a-vis the
379 Benjamin Robertson, Central Asia Nations Rethink US presence’, AlJazeera.Net. d.o 17.7.05, d.d
15.8.05, http://english.aliazeera.net/NR/exeres/A7A5EC54-C516-4618-A277-52CE6622BCC3.htm
380 M osNews.CO M . ‘US to Stay in Central Asia After Uzbekistan Pullout’, d.o 8.5.05, d.d 9.8.05, 
http.y/www.mosnews.com/news/2005/08/05/ustostav/shtml
381 Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia, pp.85-89
382 Interview with Yevgenni Kablukov, September 2004
174
growing domestic dissatisfaction. Alignment with the USA, with its focus to eradicate 
terrorism, would also enable the leaders to crack down on Islamic movements,
TO! # .
irrespective of how dangerous or moderate they were. This was a very tempting 
situation for Akayev.
Although the Kyrgyz leadership was very supportive of the USA’s new role in Central 
Asia and the stationing of troops on Kyrgyz soil, this enthusiasm waned after the 
Georgian revolution, which ousted Shevardnadze from power in 2003. The Kyrgyz 
leadership’s relationship with the USA entered a new phase once America’s role in the 
ousting of the Georgian president became clear. Shevardnadze, the former Soviet 
Foreign Minister, during the revolutionary Gorbachev years had been the west’s man, 
and yet there was no reluctance in supporting those who wanted his removal from 
power once the American tide had turned against him.384 This was alarming to most of 
the Central Asian leaders, who had welcomed American arrival in their region, but 
particularly alarming to Akayev. This caused some tension between Bishkek and
'1QC
Washington. Akayev was very vocal on his views regarding the ‘rose revolution’ 
and insisted that outsiders had initiated it. He also argued that such foreign 
involvement was a challenge to the CIS. Although he never mentioned the USA, it is
o oz
clear that he was referring to it when he talked about ‘outsiders’.
The Kyrgyz revolution in March 2005 ousted president Akayev from power. Unlike 
the case in Georgia, the USA’s role was indirect. It was mainly channeled through 
American-sponsored NGO’s that indirectly and over a period of time helped the
^07
Kyrgyz people see the profound faults in the Akayev regime. Bakiyev, his 
successor, has not introduced any major changes in the country’s foreign and political 
allegiances. In many aspects the Kyrgyz revolution was more the outcome of the 
flawed parliamentary elections that triggered the wave of unrest, which ultimately led
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to the removal of Akayev, than a revolution with a clear political and economic reform 
agenda. Bakiyev was once part of Akayev’s government, and his political orientations 
differ little to the former president. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan’s relationship to both Russia 
and America had not experienced fundamental change. America was concerned with 
the Kyrgyz government’s approval of the views aired at the SCO summit on July 5, 
and Bakiyev’s comments one day after his presidential victory. Soon after his electoral 
victory he stated that the presence of a US base and US troops in his country would be
-joo #
seriously re-considered. This was a shock to Washington, as Bakiyev had said 
before the presidential elections that no changes would be made in respect to American 
presence in Manas. Washington acted very quickly in light of these alarming notices 
made by the SCO in general and the Central Asian countries in particular. Soon after 
these announcements were made, Donald Rumsfeld, American Secretary of Defence, 
travelled to Bishkek to gain assurance that the USA’s military role in the region was 
not going to be threatened. Rumsfeld received the assurance he had come for from 
Kyrgyz officials that the US base at Manas would remain as long as the situation in
'X fiQAfghanistan required it.
The presence of US troops from Kyrgyzstan does not appear to be an issue that would 
anger the Kyrgyz people. What had initially upset the population was the fact that 
American troops were stationed in their capital without their permission. The Kyrgyz 
people played a very limited role in the decision-making process which led to the 
creation of the Manas military base. The opinion on the Kyrgyz street appears to be 
that the Americans are there to stay for the long haul.390 It is also important to point out 
that the older generations in Bishkek were more inclined to reject the American 
presence than the generation of those still at university.
Tajikistan was the third Central Asian country to be used by American forces in the 
war on terror. From all the Central Asian countries, Tajikistan was the most dependent 
on Russia for security. The Rahmonov coalition government emerged to power
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primarily as a result of Russia’s 201st MRD, and its participation in the cease-fire 
negotiations. Unsurprisingly, Tajikistan appeared to be one of the most pro-Russian 
countries in the CIS after 1997. Dushanbe’s enthusiasm towards Washington after 
September 11 was particularly uncomfortable for Moscow. The Tajik government, 
after consulting Moscow, declared that it was willing to allow America access to its 
territory to help with the war on terror, even if that meant creating a US military 
base.391 Although Russia gave its consent, its relationship deteriorated with Tajikistan. 
Their disapproval of Tajik engagement with Washington was clearly portrayed with 
the harassment of Tajik migrant laborers in Russia, and at times even their 
deportation.392
Rahmonov’s persistent praise of America, and its ability to deal with the threat of 
terrorism was a blow to Russian pride. He spoke of the USA as the only power able to 
destroy the Taliban and their radicalising influence in the region, hinting that they were 
more capable of stabilising the region than Russia. In regards to the destruction of the 
Taliban regime, America was the only power able to take on this challenge. What 
has to be kept in mind is that instability was not the result of the Taliban regime solely, 
but also a consequence of other factors. Today, the Taliban regime has been destroyed, 
yet instability in Central Asia is on the rise. However, in the early months after 
September 11, the role of the USA as security provider was magnified as a result of the 
success of destroying the Taliban power base.
The USA has set up a small military base in Dushanbe. This base is not as 
sophisticated as the one in Kyrgyzstan and the one that used to be in Uzbekistan. The 
state of most airfields in Tajikistan, which were all offered to American forces, was not 
sufficient enough for heavy aircraft; only an airfield in Dushanbe is used for small 
sized operations as it has limited capacity. Rahmonov was keen to establish military- 
to-military contact with America, as well as intelligence sharing in regards to anti-
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terrorist operations.394 Tajikistan went as far as granting US soldiers immunity from 
prosecution at the International Criminal Court. This further showed the Tajik 
government’s keenness at winning American support. The consequence of this caused
' J Q C
further damage to Tajik-Russian relations. In early 2002, in return for Tajik 
cooperation, the USA lifted the ban on the export of weapons to Tajikistan. Tajikistan 
also joined NATO’s PFP programme.396
As a result of September 11, the USA was able to position itself in three Central Asian 
countries, which had previously been out of its bounds. Anchoring its military in the 
region allowed it not only to have a security role, but also enabled it to intersect with 
the political, economic and cultural dynamics of the region. Although the US military 
is not located in the Central Asian Caspian countries, its effect over the other Central 
Asian countries where it does have a physical presence has increased its overall 
influence on the region, and brought it closer to the Caspian Basin. In the process of 
fighting the war on terror, the USA had also sought to secure an important source of 
natural resources.397
President Bush’s rhetoric in regards to the war on terror and his repeated notion of 
‘either you are with us or with the terrorists’, even had an affect on the Turkmenbashi. 
Niyazov was the most reluctant Central Asian leader to engage with the USA in the 
war on terror. This was not surprising as he has been consistent in his policies of 
limited (or no) involvement and partnerships with any power or neighbour. Yet after 
some reluctance, the Turkmenbashi did allow blanket over-flight and refuelling 
permission on his territory. He insisted that his country only be involved in 
humanitarian operations; this was his way of supporting the war on terror and not 
being totally deprived from all the privileges that came with supporting the 
Americans.
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Kazakhstan’s willingness to declared its support for the war on terror equalled that of 
other Central Asian countries. Its loyalty and fraternity to Russia did not seem to 
hinder its announcements that it was going to take several steps to increase its 
participation in the anti-terror efforts. These declarations were intensified after 
Rumsfeld’s visit to Astana to hold talks with his counterpart, Altynbayev, and 
Nazarbayev on 28 April 2002. At this meeting, Altynbayev said he would allow US 
and coalition aircraft to use Kazakh airspace and railways to transport humanitarian 
cargo. It was also decided that three Kazakh airports might become available to US 
aircraft in bad weather and during emergencies; Kazakhstan has already allowed over­
flight rights for American and coalition aircraft heading to Afghanistan.399 In general, 
Kazakhstan played a small role in Operation Enduring Freedom. The main reason for 
this was due to geography; the Americans could not easily justify the need for a base 
there, as Kazakhstan did not border Afghanistan. In addition, the economic benefits 
that came with allowing an American base to be set up were not as tempting as they 
were for the other much poorer Central Asian countries.400 Having an American base 
there would have further irritated the Russians, as Kazakhstan borders Russian 
territory.
Kazakhstan, however, does appear to have a relatively firm bilateral defence 
relationship with the USA beyond the region. Other than being member of the PFP 
programme, it has a peacekeeping unit in Iraq called Kazbat, which could potentially 
put it at risk from extremists dedicated to punish all who get involved in Iraq. Its 
commitment to be part of the ‘civilized world’ in the war on terror has undeniably 
brought it closer to the USA. According to the Americans, Nazarbayev supported the 
SCO’s decision to limit the role of the USA in the region because he fell victim to 
Russian and Chinese pressure. The Kazakhs on the other hand argued that they 
favoured the organisation’s tough stance on the USA out of fear that ‘coloured
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revolutions were going to spread throughout Central Asia at the instigation of the 
USA”.401
401 Roger McDermott, ‘Kazakhstan Questions U.S Military Role in Central A sia’, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, d.o 18.8.05, d.d 19.8.05, http://iamestown.org/edm/article.php7article id=2370152
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4.3 America’s Political Influence in Central Asia
“American global power is exercised through a global system of distinctively 
American design that mirrors the domestic American experience. Central to that 
American experience is the pluralistic character of both the American society and its 
political system”.402
It is this political system described above which is of interest to this section. It is not 
the American values themselves that are a matter of controversy in Central Asia, or 
any other region of the world where the USA has tried to spread democratisation and 
liberal values, it is the method by which these values are implemented and spread that 
is of concern. The USA’s efforts to spread pluralistic systems and protest against the 
abuse of human rights is a very honorable mission, yet it is Washington’s policies to 
guarantee its definition of ‘national interest’, which has distanced it from properly 
implementing the rhetoric it likes to spread globally. Nowhere is this more obvious 
than in Central Asia, and specifically in Uzbekistan.
It is wrong to assume that this is a post-September 11 phenomena; in fact this had been 
the case years before the attacks on New York and Washington. As seen in the 
previous section, Washington’s interest in Uzbekistan developed before the war on 
terror started. However, from the start it seemed evident that Washington’s short-term 
strategic interests to secure energy deals and limit the regional power of Russia worked 
against other goals, such as the promotion of political and economic reform or the 
protection of human rights.403
The USA’s blind support of Karimov has undermined its reputation as the main force 
behind the promotion of democracy and the guarantor of human rights. This policy of 
double standards has resulted in a ripple of troubling signals for other countries,
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especially as America’s policies in Uzbekistan are on a bilateral basis. In regards to the 
domestic situation in Uzbekistan (prior to September 11), Karimov appeared to have 
increased his hard-handed approach to any form of opposition. Thus, the USA’s 
support of Karimov and his regime has provoked precisely the opposite outcome to the 
one US involvement was trying to achieve. Washington’s policies, which were 
profoundly influenced by the Pentagon, were very much guided by the obsessive 
notion that Uzbekistan could act as a buffer to Russian and Iranian influences. Once it 
was realised that Karimov could help them achieve this, it became far more important 
than cracking down on his numerous abuses against his population.404 Karimov in 
return appeased the Americans in as many ways as he could; his most important 
gesture before September 2001 was his backing of the American trade embargo against 
Iran, aimed primarily at the sale of Russian nuclear reactors.405 Thus, competition and 
not cooperation had more often prevailed amongst the different powers in the Central 
Asian region.
As seen above, America’s political and security-related involvement in Central Asia 
prior to September 11 appears to have been focused on Uzbekistan. After September 
11, America’s rhetoric on democratisation and human rights increased, as did 
Karimov’s abuse of these very notions. The post-September 11 era witnessed a peak 
for competing influences over Central Asia. The USA became a major regional power 
as a result of the war on terror, which opened doors for other kinds of involvement, 
which this chapter has already dealt with or will deal with in the following section. 
Russia’s role in the region intensified out of concern that the USA may usurp its 
position, as did the Islamic influence. Karimov’s crack-down on all opposition, abuse 
of human rights, lack of any sort of political freedom and dire economic conditions, 
which were all happening under the supervision of the Americans, were creating a 
wave of Islamicisation, both secular and extremist. Islamic organisations were the 
perfect tools for the population to channel out its anger at the Karimov regime and its 
supporters. In addition, US foreign policy regarding the Islamic world was helping to
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fuel the already volatile Islamic situation. Therefore, Washington’s involvement in 
Uzbekistan often appeared to be worsening the very problems it needed to solve.406
The USA’s silent political role in Uzbekistan has caused global and domestic concern 
and criticism. The Uzbek government’s narrow sanctioned form of Islam, which is 
approved by the US government, is responsible for many abuses. The term ‘country of 
particular concern’ is how the US government refers to countries that abuse religious 
freedom. The 1998 International Religious Freedom Act has sanctioned this 
terminology; the USA in April 2003 refused to include Uzbekistan amongst the 
countries of ‘particular concern’, regardless of the evidence that people are regularly 
jailed, killed and tortured for simply exercising their right to freedom of expression 
and religion.407 By supporting authoritarian regimes, such as that of Karimov’s (for the 
majority of the time this thesis is concerned with), Washington was running a very 
high risk of losing the support of the population. Washington was in danger of finding 
itself in a position where it appeared to be opposing the wishes of the vast bulk of the 
population, consequently fuelling Islamic sentiment.408
It appears that the USA’s political influence on Uzbekistan has been generally negative 
for the population, positive for the regime and often counter-productive for 
Washington. After the Andijan events, which were the turning point in Uzbek- 
American relations, the US State Department could no longer be silenced, nor could 
international criticism of Karimov’s authoritarian methods. Not only were the 
international arena and worldwide human rights organisations appalled at the level of 
violence the Uzbek authorities used in dealing with the situation, they were also 
concerned with the role of Islam in areas of unrest such as in the Ferghana Valley. On 
Wednesday 18 May, a few days after the riots started, a town in the Ferghana Valley 
called Korasuv (this event has been discussed in more detail in the chapter looking at 
Islamic influences in Central Asia) was out of the hands of the Uzbek authorities and
406 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, ‘N ew  friends, N ew  Fears in Central A sia’, Foreign Affairs. 
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in the hand of people that wanted to establish an Islamic state.409 Washington’s 
ineffectiveness at promoting civil liberties and political reform in Uzbekistan were on 
full display.
The USA’s political impact on Kyrgyzstan has been less alarming than in Uzbekistan. 
Akayev never aligned himself to Washington at the same level as Karimov. This 
predominantly Russo-centric country, which lacks the natural resources of its Uzbek 
neighbour, was never prioritised by any American administration. In the early years of 
independence this country stood out as the freest and most open in the region. Political 
parties for and against the regime were allowed to exist, and the press and media had 
more liberty than in any of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours. It was known as the ‘island of 
democracy’ for reasons already explained in the chapter dealing with the internal 
politics of Central Asia. Therefore, if the USA were genuinely concerned with helping 
to promote democratisation and reform, Kyrgyzstan should have been its main concern 
and focus. Yet in correspondence with its willingness to pursue reform it received very 
little political support, especially when compared to Uzbekistan.410 The conclusion to 
draw is that Washington was not as concerned with democratisation as it was with its 
own national interests in the region.
The post-September 11 era saw the USA becoming involved in Kyrgyzstan’s political 
affairs. This was not surprising as Washington had acquired a military presence in the 
country, and intensified its democratisation rhetoric globally. It could not fight the war 
on terror in the region without making concrete attempts at improving the political 
atmosphere of the countries it was involved with. Yet according to many Kyrgyz, these 
attempt were not always sincere. The Kyrgyz people’s skepticism of American 
democratisation has developed from American projects set up in the country, which 
appear of no use to anyone except the Americans themselves. For example, in order to 
promote and encourage free press, printing and publishing houses have been paid for 
and set up by the USA. Most of these publishing houses are designed for the 
publication of opposition papers, such as ‘Our Capital’, with the pretext of 
encouraging the development of a multi-party system in which the opposition’s views
409 C.J. Chivers, ‘Uzbek Government Retakes Border Town’, International Herald Tribune. 20.5.05, p. 4
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are well known. According to the Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister, the opposition has 
to pay a price much higher than it can possible afford to print and publish at these 
printing houses. The reason behind this high price is so the USA can recover most of 
the money it spent in setting up these printing houses. The end result is that no one can 
afford to print and publish, and so the democratisation process is a failure, but on the 
record the USA has set up printing houses to promote and aid the peaceful opposition, 
and the development of a multi-party system.411 In addition, the Kyrgyz government is 
uneasy about the US support of the opposition, no matter how peaceful their objectives 
may be. In general the US political involvement is not helping the opposition for 
reasons given above, and irritating the government, which does not appreciate the USA 
meddling in its internal affairs.412
The Akayev government was generally concerned with the growing influence of 
America in the country. They blamed the USA for the ousting of Shevardnadze in 
Georgia, and believed that the USA was willing to dissolve any regime it did not like 
or at least provide support for the opposition to do so. Akayev was growing concerned 
that his turn might come if he did not appease American wishes. The USA’s support of 
the region’s hegemonic country, Uzbekistan, had also worried the Kyrgyz leadership, 
as Karimov had not always conducted his policies towards his neighbours in a 
diplomatic and civilized manner.413
After the fall of Akayev, the American government still voiced its concern about 
human rights issues and democratisation but has shown even more interest with 
protecting the status quo of its military base at Manas. Independent human rights 
organisations have been engaged in discussions with Bakiyev and his government on 
ways to break away from Kyrgyzstan’s history of human rights abuse.414 Washington 
remained silent over the prosecution and imprisonment of one of the country’s top 
opposition leaders-Felix Kulov. Former vice president, Kulov, became the leader of 
opposition party Ar-Namys and pledged to run as candidate in the 2000 presidential
411 Interview with Yevgenni Kablukov
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election. Akayev responded by introducing politically motivated charges of 
embezzlement in 2001. The International Helsinki Federation declared that the 
judiciary that convicted Kulov was under the control of the authorities, and that not 
only was Kulov wrongly convicted but that Kyrgyzstan had finally turned its back on 
the rule of law.415 The Americans, even after September 11, put no pressure on Akayev 
to reinvestigate into the charges that sentenced Kulov to seven years in prison.
With each passing year, Niyazov navigates his country further and further away from 
the road to democratisation. As seen in the chapter dealing with democratisation and 
the internal politics of Central Asia, Turkmenistan has the most oppressive regime in 
the region. It is hard to believe that the USA has done anything to improve this 
situation. The USA is not only doing very little to change the level of authoritarianism 
and oppression in the country, it also seems unwilling to even outwardly criticise the 
policies of Niyazov. At the confirmation hearing of the Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, in January 2005, she listed what the US government believed were 
the most tyrannical regimes in the world; Turkmenistan was absent from the lis t416 
She announced that there remain outposts of tyranny in the world that required close 
attention; she then named North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Burma.417 
The USA has consistently protected the Niyazov regime. On 11 May 2005, the 
commission on International Religious Freedom submitted recommendations to Rice 
on ‘countries of particular concern’ (CPC) in regards to the violation of religious 
freedom. Turkmenistan was once again mentioned as a country that should be listed on 
the CPC list, and once again the US officials chose to ignore this recommendation.418 
Although Turkmenistan is one of the least Islamic countries in Central Asia, freedom 
of religious expression is non-existent if it does not abide to the state norms. The 
Koran has been equated to Niyazov’s Rukhnama, and features in mosques and prayers
415 The Political Party o f  Kyrgyzstan Ar-Namvs. ‘Biography o f  Felix Kulov’, d.o 17.3.03, d.d 2.8.05, 
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more often than the holy book. This is a violation not only of Islam, but also of 
people’s freedom to choose how they worship.
This special treatment of the region’s worse dictator dates back to the TAP, where it 
was in the Clinton’s administrations interest to appease the Turkmenbashi in all the 
ways that it could, in order to secure American interests in the TAP, which bypassed 
both Iran and Russia. As will be seen in the chapter related to energy resources and 
pipelines, Washington was even prepared to woo the Taliban to get what it wanted. It 
does not appear in the USA’s national interest to upset the leader of one of the richest 
countries in gas resources. The TAP is still on the American pipeline agenda.
America’s policies do not appear to be promoting religious moderation. Instead 
already sensitive Islamic sentiments are being fuelled. One way of avoiding this is by 
promoting the development of political and social initiations that could help 
consolidate moderate Islam. Winning the support of the Central Asian population by 
approaching social and political issues that affect everyday life could give Washington 
long-term political influence in the region.419 The Tajik civil war, and the methods by 
which Islamic elements were dealt with in order to finally achieve peace in the 
country, should be a lesson to learn from. The conflict in Tajikistan, which had Islamic 
roots and motivations, was defused when Islamic elements and participants were 
legitimised by being incorporated into the governmental infrastructure. One way of 
doing this is by legitimising organisations like HT, which have never been proven to 
preach violence. By doing so their activities with other Islamic organisations, which do 
preach violence, can be limited. In addition, this could put a stop to their attempts at 
radicalising the population; the overall effect could result in creating a more stable 
environment, which could then be followed by reform. The Central Asian dictators do 
not seem likely to carry out such tasks out of their own initiative, but with US 
encouragement they might. The USA is showing no concern that the IRP is not being 
given equal opportunities of representation, and that the peace agreement of 1997, 
which promised them participation in the government does not fall victim to 
Rahmonov’s increasing authoritarianism. Political and economic support is desperately
419 Ahrari, ‘The Strategic Future o f  Central Asia: A V iew  from W ashington’, p. 165
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needed if the coalition government is to succeed as an example of stability via political 
inclusion of parties that are otherwise banned.420 The role of the USA could be critical.
Since the end of the civil war, Tajikistan’s human rights record has been appalling, like 
most of its neighbours. Torture and imprisonment with no trial is a common 
phenomenon. US foreign policy for years has failed to challenge these abuses. The 
USA has given its usual rhetoric of the importance of human rights and 
democratisation as a key to American support. The US government has maintained its 
relationship with Tajikistan, which is of vital geo-strategic interest, irrespective of the 
lack of reform. This has decreased the seriousness of Washington’s human rights 
message, which has further provided very little incentives to tackle human rights abuse 
and implement reform.421 It was hoped, by human rights organisations, that the USA’s 
new strategic partnership with Tajikistan, after September 11 would help impose 
change.422 This, however, does not seem to be the case; Tajikistan’s human rights 
record remains a cause for concern.
The USA has played a limited role in Kazakhstan, which has always been regarded as 
a country firmly embedded in the Russo-centric sphere of influence. As explained in 
the chapter related to the internal politics of Central Asia, Nazarbayev, like Akayev, 
was known for his gentler grip on power. Political parties do function in Kazakhstan 
although serious opposition to the president is controlled. Freedom of press is better 
than in many other places, but still limited and censored by the authorities. As will be 
explained in chapter 6, Islamic currents are not as volatile as in Kyrgyzstan or 
Uzbekistan, but organisations such as HT do function. Many of their members are in 
Kazakh prisons and do not receive better treatment than in any other Central Asian 
prison. Torture is carried out on political and religious prisoners and the human right 
records cannot be praised, nor can Nazarbayev’s increasing authoritarianism. Yet in 
2002, Kazakhstan was officially praised by members of the US congress for its human
420 Rashid, Jihad, p. 92
421 Human Rights N ew s. ‘Memorandum: US Policy in Central A sia’, d.o May 2001, d.d 2.8.05, 
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rights record, freedom of religion and unrestrained media. Nazarbayev was 
congratulated for consolidating democracy.423
423 Official Kazakhstan.’ N ew s 2 002 ’,
http://www.president.kz/articles/News/News.asp?Ing=en&art=news2002 ianuarv
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4.4 America’s Economic Influence in Central Asia
It is undisputed that America is the economic superpower, with networks that 
influence global economic organisations such as the WTO. It is also undisputed that all 
the Central Asian countries have been facing an economic crisis since independence. 
The USA’s economic assistance, enterprises and the leverage it has over global 
financial organisations place it in a very advantageous position in acquiring friends and 
allies that are in need of financial assistance. This in theory placed Washington in a far 
stronger position than Moscow vis-a-vis economic influences in the region. The USA 
conducts its policies, in the political and economic spheres, on a bilateral basis. This is 
a strength for the USA but a weakness for the Central Asian countries that need 
cohesive regional policies. The bilateral focus of US assistance causes greater 
divisions in the region, and a lack of motivation for countries to work together. The 
region needs to work as one entity in order to enhance the overall security, and 
consolidate decent levels of political and economic reform. Even attempts at creating 
regional groupings are done under the aegis of global organisations. For example, 
Centrasbat is a trans-regional grouping, which exists under the context of NATO’s 
PFP; it is not a regional collectivity.424 Bilateralism is particularly unpopular in 
Kazakhstan, where Nazarbayev is the greatest advocator of unions and collectivities as 
was shown by his enthusiasm for the creation of the CIS and other regional 
organisations. Russia’s focus, as seen in the chapter dealing with Russian influences in 
Central Asia, is on creating regional collectivities, which strengthen the region’s 
political, security and economic infrastructure. Regional organisations such as the 
CSTO and CACO/EurAsEC are what the USA has lacked to create. Russia’s focus is 
more towards regionalisation, while the USA prefers transnational methods at tackling 
Central Asian issues. It is hard to see room for cooperation between these two 
influences when their vision of the region differs so greatly.
The USA’s bilateral strategy is very clearly seen with its economic policies in Central 
Asia. Washington does not enhance the development of economic integration or
424 Macfarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central A sia’, pp.455-458
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cooperative economic reform; it works individually with each country giving each one 
different amounts of assistance. The consequence of this has often created tension 
amongst the regional countries and a tendency for unilateralism, especially by 
Uzbekistan, which has enjoyed the largest bulk of US economic assistance.425
The amount of assistance given to Uzbekistan greatly increased after the war on terror, 
but even prior to that the country had enjoyed preferential treatment from Washington. 
In 1994 the USA and Uzbekistan entered a bilateral agreement of ‘Most Favoured 
Nation’ (MFN) status. In 1998, the USA donated an additional $19 million to further 
market reforms and economic bilateral ties. This created a more favourable 
environment for US investments.426 According to William Maynes, the president of the 
Eurasia foundation, the amount of US aid to Uzbekistan after September 11 and before 
Andijan skyrocketed.427 By 2002 the amount of financial aid had reached $160
A' J Qmillion. The aid given to the Karimov regime was intended for security purposes, 
military training and equipment, as well as for the resuscitation of the fragile 
economy.429 As a result of the Andijan events, US financial aid has been greatly 
reduced and the K2 military base officially closed at the end of 2005.430
US financial aid to Kyrgyzstan also dramatically increased after September 11. Most 
of the foreign investment prior to the war on terror did not come from American 
sources. This country, which became of vital geo-strategic interest after the war on 
terror, received (before 2001) almost the same amount of American aid as Senegal or 
Malawi.431 The creation of an American military base was one way Kyrgyzstan was 
guaranteed economic help. The base provides for the greatest source of foreign 
investment in Kyrgyzstan; it adds approximately $50 million to the Kyrgyz economy
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each year.432 After the American eviction from K2 in Uzbekistan, the importance of 
the Manas base has become even more prominent; this has allowed the Bakiyev 
regime to ask for more money in return for the continuation of an American presence 
in the country.433 In July 2006, American concerns regarding the future of the Manas 
base were finally settled and a deal was made securing the continuation of the US 
military base. The United States and Kyrgyzstan agreed on long-term strategic 
cooperation and a joint commitment to fight the war on terror and improving security 
in the region. The Bakiyev government appeared to have also succeeded in making 
Washington pay more for the base. Washington is now expected to provide more that 
$150 million in rent and assistance over the next year.434
In spite of the USA’s initial disinterest in Kyrgyzstan, it remains the only Central 
Asian country belonging to the WTO; it officially joined on October 14, 1998. 
America and the EU promoted Kyrgyzstan to membership status. Washington is also 
supporting the bid for membership of the other Central Asian countries (except 
Turkmenistan).435 Belonging to the WTO is one step closer towards economic 
globalisation.
As with assistance in the political sphere, according to some Kyrgyz, economic 
assistance is of benefit mainly to the leadership, and the political elites. Although most 
Kyrgyz acknowledge the fact that their country receives more economic aid from the 
USA than from any other country, including Russia, there is a general bitterness that 
the Americans are not too concerned where this money is directed.
Tajikistan, along with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was one of the three Central Asian 
countries that received the most amount of economic aid from the USA after their 
support of the war on terror.436 Tajikistan’s importance to the USA lies in its geo­
432 Council on Foreign Relations. ‘Asia: U.S Military Bases in Central A sia’
433 Patrick Goodenough, ‘Great Game Heats Up in Central A sia’, CNSNEW S.COM . d.o 31.5.06, d.d 
2.6.06,
http://www.cnsnews.com /ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200605/lNT200605  
3 la.htm
434 David Sands, ‘U.S, Kyrgyzstan Reach Deal on Air Base Payment’, The Washington Tim es, d.o
15.7.06, d.d 16.7.06, http://washingtontimes.com/world/20060714-100731 -3908r.htm
435 Macfarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central A sia’, p. 458
436 Ahrari, ‘The Strategic Future o f  Central Asia: A V iew  from W ashington’, p. 163
192
strategic location. It shares a large border with Afghanistan, and many of the 
prominent members of the Northern Alliance were of Tajik ethnicity. Rahmonov was 
aware that support and assistance to the USA in its operation in Afghanistan meant 
American economic aid in return; economic aid of the sort that Russia could not 
provide. Shortly after September 11 this war-torn country, which received very little 
attention or assistance during its years of civil conflict, suddenly became the host of 
top American officials. On 6 November the deputy assistant to the US Secretary of 
State, M. Lynn Pascoe, and Rahmonov met in Dushanbe to discuss the new American- 
Tajik relationship and the situation in the region. Rahmonov was quick to tell Pascoe 
of his interest in establishing a strong trade and economic relationship between their 
countries.437 The Tajik leadership has clearly recognised the potential economic and 
political assets that cooperation with the USA entailed. In 2002, the USA gave 
Tajikistan $140.5 million in assistance.438 One of the many goals the US military had 
in deploying its troops in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was to create a military 
counterweight to the Russian presence in Tajikistan 439 After September 11, Rahmonov 
was seen to drift away from the Russia fold, but since then, Russia has redeveloped its 
relationship with Tajikistan. As explained in the chapter dealing with Russian 
influences in Central Asia, Tajikistan reaffirmed its strong ties with Russia, by 
allowing it (much to the disappointment of Washington) to set up a military base on its 
soil. This was one of many incidents where the competition between the USA and 
Russia over Central Asian support became prominent.
As will be discussed in the chapter related to energy resources and pipelines in Central 
Asia, America is keen to anchor itself as a major oil player in the region. This has 
ultimately meant that oil-rich Kazakhstan has been a large recipient of US economic 
investments. The USA’s economic relationship with Astana was not triggered off by 
the war on terror but by the development of petro-politics since the early 1990’s. It is 
estimated that between 1993-2003, Kazakhstan attracted around $2.5 billion from US
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foreign investments. 440 Nazarbayev acknowledges the fact that his country has much 
to gain from American investments and projects, yet at the same time has treaded 
carefully not to upset Moscow by getting too involved in American projects. In May 
2005, Nazarbayev’s multi-vectored policies in the energy field swung in favour of the 
USA. The temptation to join the westbound B-T-C pipeline was a decision the USA 
had long hoped for. This decision has, nevertheless, not been made official (this will 
be discussed in more detail in the following chapter)
Although Kazakhstan has not been as much of an active participant in the war on terror 
as its neighbours mentioned above, it has seen a vast amount of American economic 
support since independence. In March 2002, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) 
gave Kazakhstan market economy status under US trade law. This status confirms that 
according to Washington, Kazakhstan has undergone substantive market economy 
reforms.441 Yet Kazakhstan’s substantive economic reforms remain controversial, as 
its privatization policies are often described as deeply flawed.442 However, it is 
undisputed that Kazakhstan has made giant steps in economic reform in comparison to 
its neighbours and with the help of US assistance.
Turkmenistan, like Kazakhstan, received less aid aimed at economic reform than the 
other Central Asian countries. US finances are tunnelled through more energy-related 
issues and projects. Turkmenistan’s policy of positive neutrality has prevented it from 
becoming a battleground for competing influences. Turkmenistan has neither been a 
hotspot for Islamic extremism, although the Turkmenbashi’s grip on the media and 
society may be brewing a danger yet to be seen. Regardless of Niyazov’s isolationist 
tendencies, he has been keen to promote his country’s economic sector and gas export 
opportunities. This has been discussed in more detail in the chapter related to energy 
resources and pipelines in Central Asia. His willingness to engage with the outside 
world for the sake of promoting his energy sphere, and his support of the war on terror 
has made him a friend to the USA. As previously explained, the USA prefers to avoid
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issues of democratisation and human rights and concentrates on issues of mutual 
interest. Although Turkmenistan has often been describes as having one of the most 
oppressive regimes in the world, the then Secretary of State Colin Powell described 
US-Turkmen relations as ‘very strong’.443 It is clear that the USA has national interests 
to pursue, which ultimately are also of economic benefit to Ashghabad.
44j Colin Powell, ‘U.S Embassy W elcomes Ambassador Laura E. Kennedy to Turkmenistan’, United 
States M ission in Turkmenistan, d.o October 2001, d.d 5.8.05, http://www.usemb- 
ashgabat.usia.co.at/archive/newsletter5.html
4.5 America’s Impact on Central Asian Culture and Society
The impact of any power, whether Russian, Islamic or American, on society and 
culture is very difficult to measure. The impact of Americanisation, which often 
translates as globalisation is even more difficult, as it has not had as much time to root 
itself into Central Asian society as the other two influences. Importing globalisation 
and seeing the effects it has on certain cultures is a long-term process, but its seeds 
have already been sown in Central Asian society. The United States cultural impact is 
not something that ought to be underestimated simply because of its embryonic state in 
Central Asia. Brzezinski says, “Cultural domination has been an under-appreciated 
facet of American global power. Whatever one may think of its aesthetic values, 
American mass culture exercises a magnetic appeal, especially on the world’s youth. 
Its attraction may be derived from the hedonistic quality of the lifestyle it projects, but 
its global appeal is undeniable”.444
Although Uzbekistan’s foreign policy orientations have been more pro-American than 
any of its neighbours, the effects of American culture are not very prominent on Uzbek 
society. Even after decades of Russian cultural influence, Uzbekistan is not one of the 
most Russified countries in the region. Uzbek society holds firmly onto its traditional 
character and religion. The American way of life, and way of thinking will take very 
long before it has a prominent impact on Uzbek society. McDonalds, Starbucks and 
other symbols of globalisations are not evident in the Uzbek capital, and seem light 
years away from existing in places such as Samarkand and Bukhara. Nevertheless, 
some elements of Americanisation have reached Uzbekistan; American films are 
available as is American music. Most often, however, the music being played in the 
numerous bazaars and coffee shops in Uzbekistan is Uzbek, Russian, Turkish or 
Arabic.445 American global industries such as Coca-Cola found their way into Central 
Asia soon after independence. It is estimated that Coca-Cola is one of the largest
444 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, p. 25
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foreign investors in Uzbekistan.446 English, although the language of the Internet, is 
barely spoken and there exists a feeling amongst many Uzbeks that the Americans are 
‘different’.
Although the Kyrgyz people, especially in the north, are less ethnically traditional in 
their mannerisms than the Uzbeks (this is the result of behavioral Russification) and 
less religious, there generally remains a feeling of mistrust towards America. It is 
important to remember that Central Asia was profoundly Sovietised, and the Soviet 
identity was not frowned upon; therefore it remains difficult for many to relax with 
elements of Americanisation. For example, the American presence in the Kyrgyz 
capital caused frenzy amongst the Kyrgyz farmers as they blamed their bad potato crop 
on the Americans. They were certain that the troops were using some sort of chemicals 
at their base in Manas, which was damaging their potatoes. The Kyrgyz felt an even 
larger divide between them and the Americans when American soldiers ran over two 
Kyrgyz students from the National State University in broad daylight. It was reported 
that the soldiers were not concerned with killing two young people. This caused 
outrage in Bishkek.447
In spite of this, American culture and education remains popular. Kyrgyzstan has the 
only American University in Central Asia in its capital. The American University in 
Bishkek tries to bring its students closer to the American way of thinking. The general 
attitude amongst the staff at the university is that Kyrgyzstan should start looking to 
the USA for guidance and distance itself from Russia. Twenty percent of the students 
at this university are ethnic Russians.448 It is believed that the quickest and most 
effective way to embrace democratisation is to allow the USA to guide Kyrgyzstan 
towards it in whatever way is possible.449 The curriculum is American, and fluency in 
English is compulsory. Its roots started with the creation of the Kyrgyz American
446 Muslim Uzbekistan. ‘When the Coca-Coal Wars came to Uzbekistan’, d.o 21.12.01, d.d 5.8.05, 
http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2001 /08/ennew s30082001 .html
447 Interview with Iris Beybutova
448 Interview with Bakyt Beshimov
449 Beshim ov argued that when it came to competing influences, America was the strongest power in 
Kyrgyzstan because the Kyrgyz could see a future for themselves in a country guided by American 
values. He also stressed that the younger generation embraced elements o f  ‘Americanisation’ as the key 
to a modem and advanced future. It is also important to note that the American State pays all members 
o f  staff, including Beshimov.
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Schools, which became the American University in 1997. One of its main funding 
bodies is the US State Department.450 It is generally hoped that those graduating from 
this university will help narrow the gap between Kyrgyz and American values and 
habits. Obvious symbols of globalisation such as KFC and other fast food restaurants 
do not exist, although in 1996 Coca-Cola paid $16 million to locate itself in 
Bishkek.451
The effects of globalisation in Kazakhstan tell a similar story to that of Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Symbols of globalisation are hardly seen in major cities. Popular food is 
Turkish, Chinese, Russian and Kazakh (which in some ways is a combination of the 
other three); burgers, sausages and other American styled food are only found in 
international hotels.452 The higher standards of living, and the slightly more liberal 
political system in comparison to some of the other Central Asian countries means that 
the average Kazakh is more capable of having regular Internet access and satellite 
television (non-Kazakh or Russian channels). This will have some form of impact on 
the younger generations, which are ultimately living in a more globalised Kazakhstan. 
Nazarbayev talks about globalisation characterising the new post-ideological era, and 
says that the current generation (in Kazakhstan) will decide what form globalisation 
will take.453
English is Kazakhstan’s third language after Russian and Kazakh and there also exists 
an American University in Almaty that promotes the use of the English language and 
helps to bring the two cultures closer.454 What is ironic about this University is that 
although it calls itself the ‘Kazakh-American University’ (KAU) and has the American 
flag at its entrance, it is in fact not an American University at all. It calls itself 
‘American’ with the permission of the American government. Unlike the University in
450 American University-Central A sia, d.d 5.8.05, http://www.auca.kg/about/historv
451 CILICA: Armenia (D ow  Jones N ew s), ‘Coca-Cola to Invest $200 Million in Asia, Caucasus R egion’, 
d.o 5.7.96 d.d 5.8.05, http://www.cilicia.com/armo3dl .html
452 This information is a result o f  personal observations. The Kazakhs have their own version o f  big 
western fast-food chains, for example they have a ‘King Burger’, which is very similar to ‘Burger King’ 
but is Kazakh.
453 Nazarbayev, ‘W elcom e Speech at the 4th Eurasia Media Forum’, Eurasia Media Forum, d.o 21.4.05, 
d.d 2.8.05, http://www.eamedia.Org/2005/kns/01 .php
454 Kazakh-American University. http://www.itte.kz/client/KAU
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Bishkek, it neither receives funding nor was set up by the USA.455 The University is a 
private Kazakh University aimed at providing education for students in English. The 
classes that are not taught in English are taught in Russian. According to Kazakh 
education laws, 75% of any higher education curriculum has to follow the Kazakh 
educational system, which has set programs and courses. This allows Universities to 
dedicate the remaining 25% of the curriculum on whatever subjects they want. The 
KAU has used the remaining 25% of the curriculum on American subjects, such as 
American history and American law 456 Inevitably the KAU produces a cadre of young 
Kazakhs that are more American oriented than students at other Universities. This is 
not because the government is promoting such attitudes, but because the Kazakhs that 
send their children to the University want them to be susceptible and accepting to 
American notions and values. American culture is popular amongst the students of the 
KAU, for many going to study in the USA is what they strive for. Ultimately there is a 
lot of focus on American music, American clothes, learning English etc. Many of these 
young people do not have a great interest in politics; they do not associate American 
culture with American foreign policy.457
American education, which is one of the strongest long-term tools for having any 
impact on a society, is something the American government is keen to promote. There 
exist six ‘EducationUSA’ centres in Kazakhstan. EducationUSA is a global network 
aimed at advising, giving information and promoting higher education in the United 
States. These centres exist throughout Central Asia, and are most numerous in 
Kazakhstan. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs at the U.S Department of 
State supports EducationUSA. This gives many Kazakh youngsters the opportunity to 
get western education, and expand their knowledge of other cultures and other 
‘worlds’; it also brings their way of thinking closer to the American way. While the 
older generations in Central Asia still openly declare that ‘the Americans are from a
455 Interview with Gulnara Kusaienova, Head o f  International Relations Department, The Kazakh- 
American University, Almaty, November 2005
456 Interview with Vladimir Mikhailovich Zalepo, Rector o f  Kazakh-American University, Almaty 
Novem ber 2005
457 Interview with Sidlana Chin, Vice Rector o f  Kazakh-American University, Almaty, November 2005
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different planet’458, the younger generation, especially if they have received some form 
of American education, could be more accepting of American culture.
The last two Central Asian countries appear far from being affected by American 
culture or globalisation. Tajikistan having endured a civil war for most of its 
independent years, which the Americans did not play a role in, appears unprepared for 
elements of globalisation. America’s mass culture in this ethnically Persian, highly 
Islamic and troubled country is not likely to flourish (in the near future) no matter how 
strong American ties may become with Rahmonov and his intelligentsia. Turkmenistan 
also appears distant from the temptations of imitating the American way of life 
however, American organisations, such as the Peace Corps are active in Turkmenistan 
and primarily teach English 459 The Rukhnama, which Niyazov wants his people to 
follow, is not compatible with the American way of thinking. In addition, Niyazov has 
many thoughts on why globalisation is not something that should be over promoted. 
He argues that it is wrong to think that there should not be alternative political 
philosophies to globalisation, and that universal standards for the entire human race 
should not be limited by one trend.460
458 Interview with Iris Beybutova
459 A friend o f  mine has com e across members o f  the Peace Corps in the most remote Turkmen villages 
teaching English. He was told that the Peace Corps is very active in Turkmenistan and is one o f  the few  
American organisations the Turkmen people com e in contact with.
460 N iyazov, ‘Turkmenistan’s President makes Comprehensive Policy Statement on the Eve o f  the UN  
Millennium Summit’, Turkmenistan Embassy Press Release, d.o 21.8.00, d.d 8.8.05, 
http://www.turkmenistanembassy.org/turkmen/news/pressrelease.html
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4.6 Conclusion
Throughout the 1990’s, the USA had been relatively active in the region on a number 
of fronts. It promoted its security role via organisations such as NATO’s PFP 
programme, and Centrasbat. It has equally been generous economically, especially in 
Kazakhstan, where the USA has been interested in promoting the country’s economy 
and energy sphere. America’s relationship with Uzbekistan prior to the war on terror 
show the growing need for Washington to find a political ally in the region. In the late 
1990’s it was predominantly in Uzbekistan where the competing influences of Russia, 
Islam and America clashed the most. America’s bilateral ties with Uzbekistan were 
seen to undermine Russia’s role in the region. The growth of Islamic forces in 
Uzbekistan, which were also present in other Central Asian countries, further revealed 
how the region was developing into a battle-ground for different competing influences. 
By 2001, Islam had become an underlying force, creating one of the largest threats for 
the ruling regimes, and used as a remedy to deal with the worsening political and 
socio-economic environment by certain elements of the population. The events of 
September 11 opened a new chapter for American involvement, in addition to bringing 
it physically to the heart of the region. The USA started developing a web of 
influences covering security, political, economic and cultural policies in all of the 
Central Asian countries. Thus, the post-September 11 era saw an intensification of 
competition in Central Asia. According to the Central Asian specialist, Mehrdad 
Haghayeghi from the Missouri State University, America has made a profound 
contribution to the intensification of power politics, and the USA’s pursuit of unilateral 
policies has understandably put Russia on the offensive.461 In addition, American 
involvement is also having a radicalising effect on Islam, creating an overall arena of 
competition and rivalry.462 America’s growing influence appears to have been the 
trigger which reincarnated the ‘Great Game’ of the 19th century, this time involving 
Russia, Islam and America. The balance of America’s security-based, political,
461 Mehrdad Haghayeghi quoted by Todd Diamond, ‘US Unilateralism Fuels Great Power Politics for 
Rivalry in central A sia’, International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, d.o 
1.10.03, d.d 15.8.05, http://iicas.org/libr en/geopolit/01 10 03.htm
462 Jim Nichol, ‘Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests’, Current 
Politics and Economics o f  Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, v o l.18, no.8, 2003, p. 414
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economic and cultural influences in Central Asian differ greatly from country to 
country. Certain influences are stronger in some countries than in others, depending on 
the geo-political and geo-economic dynamics of each country. Washington’s weakest 
and most counter-productive influences are in politics and culture. As seen above, 
America’s policies at promoting democratisation have been generally unsuccessful463 
and have caused further instability, such as strengthening the authoritarian leaders, 
consequently creating a wider platform for the Islamists to win support from the 
oppressed population. America’s political influence is also associated with triggering 
revolutions aimed at removing existing governments. Russification and Islamic culture 
(at present) cast a stronger shadow over Central Asian identity than American culture. 
Thus politics and culture prevent a large bulk of the population from supporting the 
growth of America’s competing influences.
463 Erin Trouth, ‘Security Dilemmas in Central Asia: Competition for Influence’, Kennan Institute: 
Meeting Report, vo l.l 1, no.4, 2003,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm7topic id=1424&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc id = 41080 
&group id=7718
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5.0 The Energy Resource Dimension
5.1 Resource Wars and Petro-Politics
“Although the Middle East, containing 65.7% of proven oil reserves, will remain 
crucial in oil supply in the coming decades, the world oil balance might be challenged 
by the new resources that are uncovered in Central Asia”.464
This chapter mainly looks at Russian and American competition over the energy 
resources of the two Central Asian Caspian littoral countries-Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. A vast amount of the region’s wealth lies in the Caspian sections 
belonging to these two countries, therefore, this chapter looks at how this wealth is 
being exploited, and how this is affecting the geo-political balance in the region. The 
first sub-section will aim at explaining the status of the Caspian Sea, and how this 
affects each of the five littoral countries. Sub-sections two and three will look at the 
two Central Asian Caspian countries, and analyse the level and type of cooperation and 
dependency that exists between them and the USA and Russia. The last sub-sections 
will look at the remaining three Central Asian countries, and discuss their contribution 
(if any) to the petro-politics of the region, and the resource war between the USA and 
Russia.
Despite over a decade of independence and the temptations of regional and non- 
regional powers to exploit the riches of the Caspian, it has remained relatively 
untouched and undiscovered. One of the main reasons that brought Central Asia to the 
forefront of international affairs is its undisputed and untapped hidden wealth. 
September 11 has pushed the USA into seeking alternative energy supplies to those 
from the Middle East. The effects of September 11 rippled throughout the world, and 
had a particularly negative impact on Saudi Arabia. One of the reasons for this was 
that almost all the highjackers were of Saudi origin. September 11 not only affected
464 Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Towards the Control o f  the Oil Resources in the Caspian Region (hereafter 
Control o f  the Oil Resources). N ew  York, 1999, p. 26
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the Kingdom’s international reputation, especially in the eyes of its most important 
economic partner-the USA, but also caused damage to Saudi society.465
The escalation of tension between these two countries led to Donald Rumsfeld 
announcing that the USA would withdraw 7,000 US military personnel from Saudi 
Arabia, thus terminating a significant military presence in the Kingdom that had lasted 
over a decade.466 The bruised American-Saudi relationship encouraged Washington to 
look elsewhere for new petroleum and gas allies. This further led it to Central Asia and 
the Caspian region.467 The USA’s orientation towards the natural resources of the 
Caspian region could be the start of a gradual withdrawal or at least a move away from 
the level of dependency Washington has on the energy resources of the Arabian Gulf.
Central Asia and the Caspian region may not have the amount of energy resources that 
Saudi Arabia processes, but the region, as previously stated, appears to be a 
comfortable relocation for American business and resource ambitions. The Caspian 
region has larger gas reserves than Saudi Arabia but its oil reserves are much less. Oil 
reserves from the entire region are approximately 18-35 billion barrels,468 while Saudi 
Arabia’s proved oil reserves are approximately 260 billion barrels 469 In fact, it has 
often been argued that one of the main reasons, if not the only reason that the USA has 
decided to stay in Central Asia after the downfall of the Taliban regime, is because it 
wants to root itself as one of the region’s major oil extracting and exporting powers. 
According to Laumulin, “access to energy drives all US policy in the region”.470 
America’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan (and formally in Uzbekistan) has ultimately 
given it a role over the internal affairs of the country (countries) and also a certain 
amount of influence over the region (this has been covered in the previous chapter on
465 J. E Peterson, Saudi Arabia and the Illusion o f  Security (hereafter Saudi Arabia). London, N ew  York, 
2002, 63-64
466 Stephen J. Hedges, ‘Military to Leave Saudi Arabia: U.S M oving Amid Strained Relations, Global 
Securitv.org: Chicago Tribune, d.o 30.4.03, d.d 11.4.05, 
http://www.globalsecuritv.org/org/news/2003/Q30430-psab01 .htm
467 Murat T. Laumulin, Central Asian and the West: The Geopolitical Impact on the Regional Security. 
Almaty, 2004, p. 39
468 Caspian Environment Programme. ‘General Background’, d.o 7.11.04, d.d 22.7.06, 
http://www.caspianenvironment.org/caspian.htm
469 Energy Information Administration, ‘Saudi Arabia’, d.o August 2005, d.d 22.7.06, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html
470 Laumulin, Central Asia and the West: The Geopolitical Impact on the Regional Security, p. 14
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American influences in Central Asia). The USA’s rhetoric in regard to democratisation 
and reform, not only in Central Asia but also in other parts of the former Soviet Union, 
and the American approved revolutions in both Ukraine and Georgia have enabled the 
USA to be regarded as a powerful player in the region.
Bahgat accurately points out the USA’s need for energy resources when he says, 
“with less than three percent of the world’s proven reserves and a share of one quarter 
of global consumption, the United States is the world’s largest oil importer”.471 After 
the disintegration of the USSR, the USA slowly started to promote itself as a potential 
investor and importer of Caspian riches. In 1998, Richard Momingstar- an advisor to 
the President and Assistant Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy diplomacy- 
highlighted the USA’s objectives in the region, which often did not favour Russia. The 
USA was primarily concerned with enhancing commercial opportunities for American 
companies and promoting the energy independence of the Caspian region 472 The US 
strategy often goes against Russian interests. Russia does not like to see its energy 
monopoly of the region challenged, and it definitely does not want the other Caspian 
littoral countries able to transport their resources through non-Russian pipelines that 
bypass Russian territory.473 According to Blandy, “Perhaps the most dangerous factor 
which could initiate a course of miscalculation and precipitate collision lies in the 
uneasy and sometimes antagonising relationship between the United States and Russia, 
for stemming from this position, in and around the Caucasus-Caspian region it is 
possible to hold the view in a very general sense that there are two groups of loosely 
defined political alliances headed by the USA on the one hand and Russia on the 
other”.474 Although Putin has stated that he wishes for Western companies to work 
with Russian ones, neither side would like to see the other becoming too influential in 
the region. It remains the case that both Russia and the USA have different strategies
471 Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Managing Dependence: American-Saudi Oil Relations’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 23, no. 1, winter 2001, p. 1
472 Jan S. Adams, ‘The US-Russian Face-O ff in the Caspian Basin’ (hereafter ‘US-Russian F ace-O ff), 
Problems o f  Post-Communism, vol. 47, no. 1, January/February 2000, p. 52
473 Stephen Blank, ‘The United States and Central A sia’, in Allison and Jonson (eds.) Central Asian 
Security, p. 130
474 C W Blandy, ‘The Caspian: Comminatory Crosscurrents’, Conflict Studies Research Centre. January 
1999, p. 10-11
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and objectives that they would like to follow in the Caspian region, which are 
favourable to their own national interests, and therefore competition will never die out.
The energy producing Caspian countries, and especially American companies have 
much to gain from the construction of pipelines that are not northbound, i.e. those that 
avoid Russia. Westbound pipelines, i.e. those that travel through Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey ensure that the region’s oil and gas reaches western markets at full 
commercial prices.475 Russia has much to gain from importing Central Asian energy at 
less than world prices; this permits it to export more of its own resources to Europe at 
world market prices.476 Caspian energy resources can also be directed southeast bound, 
i.e. towards Iran, Afghanistan and China- these countries are generally experiencing 
energy shortages. Southeast bound pipelines are the most cost-effective, but are 
politically undesirable to the US policy makers. Most of the energy diverted to Iran 
comes from either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. This will be covered in more detail in 
the sub-sections related to these countries. The USA is trying to promote westbound 
routes. It is important to remember that the reasons for constructing pipelines that 
travel through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are not purely economic but also 
political.477 This highlights the competition that is being played out in the region by the 
USA and Russia.
Even before September 11, the USA’s desperate need for energy resources had placed 
it as a potential Russian competitor over the resources of the Caspian Sea. As was seen 
in previous chapters, Russia, since September 11, has consequently reactivated its role 
in the region. This has meant greater participation in the region’s energy sphere; hence 
Russian oil and gas companies have turned their focus to Central Asia. Guseynov 
agrees with this point, and emphasises that in 2001 the geo-political situation in 
Central Asia was starting to threaten Russia’s traditional role, especially as the war on 
the Taliban brought American military bases to the region, and the United States 
started seeking closer cooperation with the Central Asian countries in the political and
475 John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines. London, 1996, p.5
476 Jim Nichol, ‘Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests’, Current 
Politics and Economics o f  Russia. Eastern and Central Europe, vol. 18, no. 5, 2003, N ew  York, p. 426
477 C W Blandy, The Caspian: Comminatory Crosscurrents’, p. 17
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478economic sphere; as a result Russian energy firms stepped up their activities. The 
American invasion of Iraq has caused concern to some of the littoral countries that had 
hoped that American investors would pump their money into the region in return for 
energy deals. The Middle East in comparison to the Caspian region remains better 
connected to world markets, and has a far more accessible and less politicised pipeline 
infrastructure. In the case of Iraq, the pipeline infrastructure and energy reservoirs are 
more under the control and influence of the USA than is the case in the Caspian 
region. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (this will be discussed in 
more detail below) in May 2005 is the start of the Caspian region becoming less 
isolated and better connected to the western world.
Russia has been in a position of power in the Caspian mainly because most functioning 
pipelines are Soviet built, and travel through Russian land. In the past the energy 
resources of the different Soviet Republics were all linked to the internal Soviet 
network; today Russia still processes a monopoly over this network. Therefore, the 
easiest and cheapest way that energy resources from Central Asia can reach world 
markets is by travelling along Russian controlled pipelines. The Caspian countries did 
not initially attract many investors because they were landlocked, and badly connected 
to ports that could enable the transportation of their natural resources. Foreign 
companies and investors were deterred from making plans to broaden the export routes 
of the Caspian for a variety of reasons. One of them was a direct result of the unstable 
nature of the regimes in the region, and the extent to which individuals in these 
regimes are ready to violate, and abrogate existing agreements in order to suit their 
own personal interests. This has resulted in a bad reputation regarding foreign 
investment laws, which has scared many western companies away (this will be 
covered in more detail below). Construction of new pipelines is very costly and often 
involves verbal wars with environmental organisations; these organisations highlight 
the damage that new pipelines cause to the environment, and to people and animals 
that become affected by their construction. American sanctions against Iran have
478 Rauf Guseynov, ‘Russian Energy Companies in Central A sia’ (hereafter ‘Russian Energy 
Companies’), Central Asian and the Caucasus, no. 5(29), 2004, pp. 60-61
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further complicated the investment situation.479 Therefore, it is not surprising that prior 
to September 11, the Arabian Gulf seemed an easier option for investments, as it was 
well connected to world markets. However, events in the international arena have 
given the Caspian region the opportunity to become a major player in the oil and gas- 
exporting world. According to Blank, “not only are Central Asia and the Caucasus 
integral parts of the global war on terror, they are fast becoming pivotal actors in the
i i t  59 480global energy economy .
5.1.1 The Status of the Caspian and its Division
One of the major obstacles facing the five littoral countries- Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran- over the development and exploitation of the 
Caspian has been their lack of agreement over the status of the waters they share. Since 
the disintegration of the USSR, questions have risen regarding the status of the 
Caspian Sea and its seabed. The Caspian is a landlocked body of water; until 1991 its 
status was undisputed between its two littoral countries, Iran and the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the Soviet era two bilateral agreements were signed between these two 
countries that prevented any escalation of tension. One was the 1921 Iranian-Soviet 
friendship treaty. This treaty gave equal access to the sea to both countries. The second 
bilateral treaty was in 1940, which reiterated the common use of the Caspian. These 
two treaties clarified that both countries could freely navigate throughout the Caspian 
waters, and that all resources were to be shared. It is important to remember that at the 
time the treaties were signed, natural resources referred more to fish stocks than oil
481and gas. This was a major area of concern after 1991, when it became evident that 
the five littoral countries were not interested in equally sharing the resources of the 
Caspian, therefore the new littoral countries did not want to be bound by the old 
Soviet-Iranian agreements. What the new Caspian countries want, and this was very 
much supported by the USA, is to divide the seabed and its natural resources into five 
unequal sections corresponding to the coastal length of each country-in other words the
479 Shirin Akiner, ‘Politics o f  Energy in the Caspian Sea’ (hereafter ‘Politics o f  Energy’), Eastern 
Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2002 . second edition, London, 2001, p. 13
480 Stephen Blank, ‘The Future o f  Caspian Security’, Problems o f  Post-Communism, vo l.50, no. 1 
January/Feb 2003, p. 15
481 Lutz Kleveman, The N ew  Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (hereafter Blood and O il). 
London, 2003, p. 146
208
Caspian Sea was to be divided along a median line. According to Haghayeghi, “the 
lop-sidedness of this distribution based on the length of the coastline and a modified 
equidistance line, compelled Iran and, until recently Russia to vehemently object to the
A Q 'yprinciple of national delimitation”. Russia has since changed its opinion after 
discovering an oil field in its section of the Caspian, and after realising that 
compromise was essential if the littoral countries were to develop the untapped 
treasures of the Caspian.
The littoral countries (excluding Iran) have overridden the agreements made between 
the Soviet Union and Iran; this has consequently meant that they approve of the 
applicability of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. If this were not applicable 
then the Caspian would be treated as a lake, meaning that the pre-1991 agreements 
between Iran and the Soviet Union would be still valid.484 Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan (and later Russia) have made it very clear that they accept the 1982 
Convention, and believe that it is applicable to the Caspian Sea. This dispute over 
whether to recognise the status of the 1982 Convention in regards to the Caspian, has 
resulted in tension between the littoral countries. Iran and Azerbaijan have not been far 
from a military confrontation over a disputed area of the Caspian. The dispute over the 
legal status of the Caspian, has affected foreign investors’ enthusiasm over becoming 
involved in the region. The median line solution has been encouraged by the USA; this 
gives Azerbaijan 20.7%, Iran 14.6%, Kazakhstan 29.9%, Russia 15.6% and 
Turkmenistan 19.2%. Iran has voiced its desire to divide the Caspian into five equal 
sections. The other four countries have not approved this as they have far more to gain 
from the median line approach. Russia has not been consistent in its view regarding the 
division of the Sea. It has in the past few years agreed to the median line approach for 
the reasons given above.
482 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, ‘The Coming o f  Conflict to the Caspian Sea’ (hereafter ‘The Coming o f  
Conflict’), Problems o f  Post-Communism, vol. 50, no. 3, May/June 2003, p. 33
483 Valery Asriyan, ‘ Caspian: A Sea o f  Cooperation or an Apple o f  Discord?’, Centre for Defence 
Information, d.o 23.7.03, d.d 22.7.06, http://www.cdi.org/russia/266-l 1 .cfm
484 Hooman Peimani, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political Games and Economic Losses (hereafter 
The Caspian Pipeline D ilemm a). Westport, Connecticut, London, 2001, p. 40
485 Brice M. Clagett, ‘Ownership o f  Seabed and Subsoil Resources in the Caspian Sea Under the Rules 
o f  International Law’, Caspian Crossroads M agazine, v o l.l, Issue no. 3, Fall 1995, 
http://ourworld.compuserve.eom/homepages/usazerb/l 31 .htm
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At a conference aimed at reaching a consensus on the division of the Sea held in 
Moscow in 2002, Russian experts backed the median line approach and argued that it 
would be best to share the waters of the Sea in order to allow free navigation and avoid 
armed clashes between neighbours. This was seen in July 2002 when Iranian gunboats 
forced a BP exploration ship out of Iranian-Azeri disputed waters. Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan have agreed with Russia, while Iran has firmly rejected this suggestion and 
Turkmenistan has very typically not fully supported either side. Turkmenistan’s
A Q I L
hesitancy has helped Iran avoid isolation regarding this dispute. Niyazov has lately 
appeared to be moving towards a semi agreement with Azerbaijan in regards to their 
part of the Caspian. This has been the result of heated debates concerning the 
ownership of disputed offshore fields. So far both sides have agreed on the median line
Aon
solution but remain confrontational about where to draw the median line.
In 1998, Russia and Kazakhstan decided to agree on the division of the northern 
section of the Caspian regardless of the dispute concerning the status of the entire sea. 
Both countries stipulated the median line principle for the northern part of the sea but 
decided to jointly own the waters. This agreement was followed up with the 2002 
agreement, which further endorsed the median line approach for the northern section 
of the sea. The agreement between Moscow and Astana has solved the issue of three 
disputed offshore oilfields, all of which will now be split on a 50:50 basis.488 This has 
ultimately given Russia much influence over Kazakh energy resources. The USA is in 
support of this agreement because it further undermines Iran’s influence on the 
Caspian region.
5.1.2 Competing Influences over Kazakhstan’s Energy Resources
Kazakhstan has had to face the obstacle of independence with far greater advantages 
than most of its neighbours, the main advantage being its enormous economic
486 Sergei Blagov, ‘Troubled Waters in the Caspian Sea’, Center for Defence Information, d.o 28.2.02, 
d.d 10.4.05. http://www.cdi.org/russia/195-7.cfm
487 Mustafa Aydin, ‘Oil, Pipelines and Security: The Geo-Politics o f  the Caspian Region’ (hereafter ‘Oil, 
Pipelines and Security’), in Moshe Gammer (ed.), The Caspian Region: A Re-Emerging Region. 
London, N ew  York, 2004, p. 12
488 Charles Coe, ‘Russia-Kazakh deal to Divide North Caspian Gains US Approval’, Alexander’s Gas 
and Oil Connections: N ews and Trends: Central Asia, vol.7, n o .12, d.o 13.6.02, d.d 12.4.05, 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc22446.htm
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potential.489 Kazakhstan has huge energy reserves estimated at 8.7 trillion US dollars. 
Some of its largest offshore oil fields are at Tengiz, and are the tenth largest oil fields 
in the world, with 6-9 billion barrels of reserves. Kashagan and Karachaganak are the 
other two oilfields; all three fields have attracted foreign investors. The discovery of 
the Kashagan oil field, which is estimated to start production in 2005, promises huge 
profits for Kazakhstan; it has also meant further destabilisation of the geo-political 
balance in the Caspian region. According to the Kazakh North Caspian Operating 
Company (AgipKCO), which is developing the Kashagan oilfields, they have 
discovered oil reserves amounting to 9-13 billion barrels. AgipKCO estimates the field 
to contain 1 billion tons of oil and is thought to be the largest field discovered in the 
last 30 years. The discovery of this oilfield has re-triggered the power scramble for 
raw materials and pipelines amongst the region’s main players. It is estimated that by 
2020, Kazakhstan could be one of the world’s leading oil exporters; the country has 
the potential to sell ten million barrels of crude per day to the world, as much as Saudi 
Arabia sells today.490 Kazakhstan’s energy wealth has the ability to rival that of the 
Persian Gulf, and cause losses to the international oil cartel, OPEC. This is the case, as 
Kazakhstan, a non-member state of OPEC, is not obliged to abide to OPEC rules, such 
as production limits and price agreements. The problem that Kazakhstan has, which 
places the countries of the Persian Gulf in a far more advantageous position, is that it 
has very few export routes to the international markets.491 This is where the new great 
game clearly unfolds.
The Kashagan consortium was founded in 1997. The Kazakh government initially had 
shares in this consortium, but it decided to sell its stake to Inpex (Japan) and Philips 
Petroleum, which is today known as ConocoPhilips. In 2003, BG Group decided to sell 
its share; this was also the time that the Kazakh government was keen to re-enter in the 
share ownership of the Kashagan consortium. The government wanted to buy the BG 
Group share, but the consortium’s partners were not too keen on this proposal. The 
government eventually achieved what it wanted, but not before it had placed pressure
489 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. Stanford, 1995, p. 271
490 Kleveman, Blood and Oil, p. 75
491 ibid. p. 76
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on the consortium partners.492 The government was able to successfully get what it 
wanted as a result of the 2003 changes to the legislation. These changes have been 
covered in more detail below.
In 1995 Kazakhstan adopted its first Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Law; it assured 
foreign investors that their rights were protected especially against expropriation, and 
that the law treated them on the same basis as domestic investors. In general, the 
Kazakh government was trying to improve the investment environment in order to 
encourage western companies to invest. Foreign investors throughout the region have 
often felt that their investments are not protected enough from corruption, criminality, 
and inefficiency.493 The degree of hesitancy on behalf of foreign companies to invest 
varies from country to country. Kazakhstan is perhaps one of the safest countries for 
investment, in spite of the changes made to the FDI law in 2003. According to 
Umurzakov, “the wording of the previous investment law (1995) was more favourable 
and provided more confidence to foreign investors. Before, if investors chose 
international arbitration, in that case supposedly the consent of the state would be 
received automatically. The new law is subject to interpretation as the conditions under 
which agreement is needed, for the choice of international courts in case of dispute 
settlement, are rather vague”.494 Therefore, the environment for foreign investors is by 
far more difficult than it was from 1995 till 2003. The new legislation has increased 
the state’s right to interfere in foreign projects. It has also allowed the state priority 
over any other purchaser when a section of a joint project is up for sale. This 
consequently allows the government greater control of any foreign investment. This 
pre-emptive right by the state was in theory introduced by the legislature, and not the 
executive. However, it is well known that the executive has constantly pursued a 
greater government role in the country’s energy sector and that the legislature is 
completely subdued and under the control of the executive (as was seen in the first 
chapter dealing with the internal politics of Central Asia).495 These new government- 
favouring laws have had a much more deterring effect on western investors than on
492 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘Kazakhstan: Country Report’, January 2005, p. 26
493 Michael Kaser, The Economies o f  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. London, 1997, p.50
494 Kubat Umurzakov, ‘Regional Round Table on Foreign Direct Investment for Central A sia’, United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Dushanbe, 3-4 April 2003, p.38 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/mtg/rrtpaper kazakh.pfd
495 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘Kazakhstan: Country Report’, January 2005, pp. 25-26
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Russian ones, as the Russians remain much more familiar and knowledgeable about 
conducting business in the former Soviet Republics than westerners.
In regards to the littoral countries (excluding Russia and Iran), the USA has shown the 
most amount of interest in Azerbaijan. There are many reasons for this, such as the 
early oil discoveries, the feasibility of export routes and production sharing 
agreements. It is important to point out that Azerbaijan is also the least pro-Russian 
country on the Caspian, and therefore seen as more susceptible to American 
influences. Kazakhstan, as seen in previous chapters, still lies very much in Russia’s 
camp, and Turkmenistan is very difficult to do business with. In order for the USA to 
properly infiltrate the region, it first has to establish a strong presence with the help of 
one of the regional countries. Azerbaijan is the Uzbekistan of the Caspian in regards to 
being the main corridor in which American influences infiltrate the region. 
Washington’s relationship with Baku will ultimately help it in getting closer to Kazakh 
natural resources and ultimately to Kazakh internal affairs. It is important to remember 
that Azerbaijan (and Uzbekistan until early 2005) is a member of the American 
oriented GUUAM. The Russians have been wary of Washington’s involvement in 
Azerbaijan, and have often voiced their opinion that the Caspian countries are fully 
capable of protecting themselves, and their resources from terrorism and smuggling, 
and do not need or want the involvement of any other country from outside the region. 
Moscow was especially concerned when the USA was conducting a plan to secure 
Azerbaijan’s maritime border; it has also issued a few verbal warnings regarding its 
concern over the prospect of US bases being set up in Azerbaijan.496 Ultimately, the 
USA would be able to strike better deals with Kazakhstan if it were already involved 
in investments with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan’s involvement in the BTC pipeline has 
shown this tactic to be accurate (this will be explained in more detail below). 
According to Nichol, the USA is the main instigator for “building oil and gas pipelines 
from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, Georgia, to Turkey, coaxing Kazakhstan to 
use the oil pipeline”.497
496 Rada Guseinova, ‘Is Conflict with US Brewing in Russia’s Backyard?’, The Current Digest o f  the 
Post-Soviet Press. Ohio, vol. 55, no. 40, January 7, 2004, p. 13
497 Jim Nichol, ‘Central Asia: Regional Development and Implications for US Interests’, p. 425
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Even though the USA, and other western countries have increased their initiative to 
explore, and extract the hidden wealth of the Caspian, there still looms the problem of 
efficient transport systems to the world markets. This is one of the reasons that 
westbound pipelines are becoming absolutely necessary if Russia’s monopoly over the 
energy resources of the region is to be challenged. Up until today, most of the regions 
wealth goes to the Black and Baltic Seas, and to Eastern Europe via Russian pipelines. 
In 2001-2002, total export amounted to 46 and 36 million tons, respectively; most of 
this oil ran through Russia before reaching its final destination.498 The most prominent 
westbound pipeline, which avoids Russian territory, and is seen as the most powerful 
political tool in the hand of Washington, is the BTC pipeline. It is important to 
remember that although the BTC is seen by Russia through suspicious eyes, Russia 
does not overtly condemn this project. Russia and the USA are not involved in direct 
competition; each country publicly supports the actions of the other, even if they are 
disadvantageous to its own interests. In regards to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC), which will be covered in more detail below, Bush welcomed its opening, and 
talked about furthering cooperation between Russia, the USA, and Kazakhstan. 
Nevertheless, the administration was still adamant about breaking the Russian 
monopoly of existing pipelines, and pursued the construction of the BTC pipeline, 
which does not include Russian participation.499
Almost ten years after the BTC was first announced as a major project, it was finally 
opened 25 May 2005. This event marked a new stage in the competition between the 
west and Russia over the natural resources of the region. Up until the completion of the 
BTC, Russia, with its northbound pipelines, appeared to be leading the pipeline race. 
The success of the BTC could dramatically alter the geo-political balance of the 
region, giving the west a far greater influence over the energy resources of the 
Caspian. The opening of the pipeline has been described as the biggest investment in 
the region since the collapse of communism, marking the emergence of the Caspian 
region as a new force in the world’s oil markets.500 This project, described as the main 
geo-political project of the USA in the former Soviet states, was supported by
498 Zurab Tevzadze, ‘Caspian Oil: Its Export Routes and Transportation Problems’ (hereafter Caspian 
O il’), Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 1(25), 2004, p.91
499 N ichol, ‘Central Asia: Regional Developm ent and Implications for US Interests’, p.426
500 Vincent Boland, ‘BTC Pipeline the N ew  Silk Road’, Financial Times, 26.5.05, p .8
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Washington with the aim of creating a route that would bypass Russia.501 It is 
estimated that this pipeline will transport 1 million barrels of oil a day from the 
Caspian to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. From the start of this project, the pipeline faced 
numerous obstacles. It is feared that the pipeline, which stretched across increasingly 
unstable countries, may face terrorist attacks from Al-Qaida and other regional 
extremist groups, such as the IMU. It is also feared that the BTC pipeline will fall 
victim to political sabotage from Armenian nationalists aiming to hurting the Azeri 
economy. Iran and Russia are not in favour of this project; Russia sees this route as a 
method in which the USA can control the Caspian region, and cut links between 
Moscow and its former satellites. It was notably absent from the opening ceremony. 
Russia, since the collapse of the USSR, has been an active exporter of natural 
resources to the European markets; the BTC could affect the amount of energy 
resources that Russia could export in the future. Since the BTC project has been 
underway, Russia has also sought to diversify its own export potentials. According 
to Aydin, “if the BTC pipeline is built and put into operation, its main effect will be 
the weakening or even the complete loss of economic and transportation dependence 
of the Central Asian and Caucasian states on Russia”.503
An international consortium of eleven oil companies is developing the BTC pipeline. 
Three of the eleven companies are American: Unocal, Amerada Hess and 
ConocoPhillips. BP is the only British company involved, and is the largest 
stakeholder. It is important to point out that there are no Russian oil companies in this 
project.504 In spite of non-American oil companies’ participation, and BP being the 
largest stakeholder, the BTC pipeline remains a politically motivated American project 
and is strongly backed by Washington.
501 RAI-Novosti, ‘ Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil or Politics’, d.o 6.6.05, d.d 10.6.05, 
http://en.rian.ru/analvsis/20050606/40477558.html
502 Gal Luft, ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Not Yet Finished and Already Threatened’, Institute for the 
Analysis o f  Global Security: Energy Security, d.o 4.11.04, d.d 12.4.05,
http://www. iags.org/n 1104041 .htm
503 Aydin, ‘Oil, Pipelines and Security’, p.20
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The BTC pipeline is of interest and relevance to this thesis not only because it is an 
example of the growing American influence in the region, but also because its success 
very much depends of the participation of Kazakhstan. This pipeline is generally seen 
as unprofitable, unless Kazakh oil is also pumped through it. There appears to be 
insufficient amounts of oil in Azerbaijan to load the pipeline to full capacity.505 Up to 
ten million tons of Kazakh oil could be shipped by tankers to an Azeri terminal and 
pumped through the BTC pipeline.506 The opening ceremony of the BTC not only 
brought together the leaders of the three countries involved, US Energy secretary 
Samuel Bodman, BP’s chief executive Lord Browne but also Nazarbayev. Although 
Nazarbayev attended this ceremony, he did not immediately commit to Kazakh 
participation. One of the reasons for this could have been his reluctance to antagonise 
Moscow.507 In June 2006, Nazarbayev finally committed to shipping oil via the BTC 
pipeline.508 Astana has also made it clear that it is free to also use other export routes509 
and in early 2006 increased the amount of oil pumped through the CPC (this will be 
covered in more detail below). There is also a plan to construct an underwater pipeline 
under the Caspian in order to help the transportation of Kazakh oil to the BTC 
pipeline. The extension would be expensive, and difficult to implement, but Russia has 
undergone a similar project with Turkey- the ‘Blue Stream’ pipeline.510
Russia’s influence over the region very much depends on its ability to remain the most 
important and prominent energy giant. This is a sphere where the westbound (under 
strong American influence) and southeast bound (involving Muslim countries) 
pipelines, in addition to the threat from extremist groups, can cause a lot of harm to 
Russian interests. There are obstacles facing the transportation of oil due to the volatile 
nature of the region. It is very much feared that Islamic extremist groups or Armenians
505 Tevzade, ‘Caspian O il’, p. 96
506 Dina Sarsenova, ‘Kazakh Oil to go Through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipe’, The Times o f  Central Asia 
(Bishkek), 18.3.04, p. 8
507 Ibragim Alibekov (ed.), ‘While Russia Watches, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Explore New T ies’, 
Eurasianet.org. d.o 3.3.04, d.d 12.4.05,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030304.shtml
508 Shahin Abbasov and Khadija Ismailova, ‘BTC: Kazakhstan Finally Commits to the Pipeline’, 
Eurasianet.org. d.o 19.6.06, d.d 22.7.06,
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216
may take advantage of the weak security regarding these pipelines and sabotage them, 
or that the ongoing war in Chechnya is affecting Russia businesses. This was the case 
in 1999, when the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry declared that the Baku- 
Novorossiisk pipeline would be shut down indefinitely. This was a result of the 
ongoing war in Chechnya, and the explosions that damaged a large section of the 
pipeline.511 The damage done was blamed on Chechen extremists, whose actions had 
proven that they were able to disrupt the Russian oil market and help push regional oil 
producing countries (in this case Azerbaijan) further into the hands of western 
investors. This kind of Islamic influence worked to the advantage of US sponsored 
projects, but after September 11 Islamic extremism has targeted both Russian and 
American influences.
The CPC is one of Russia’s strongest political tools of influence over Kazakh natural 
resources. The CPC was completed in 2001, and travels from the Tengiz oilfields in 
Kazakhstan to the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. The Tengiz oilfields have estimated 
recoverable reserves of 6-9 billion barrels. The CPC was originally created as a joint 
venture between the government of Kazakhstan and the government of Oman, which 
was acting through the Oman oil company. It is important to mention that today Russia 
is also considered a founding country of this pipeline. At the start of the project there 
were major delays related to the construction of the pipeline. The two most prominent 
obstacles were that the original route for this pipeline ran through Grozny. The first 
Chechen war resulted in the pipeline being diverted via Daghestan. The second 
obstacle to the construction of this pipeline was that the conditions offered to Chevron 
were considered to be unsatisfactory. In 1996, Chevron was forced out of the project, 
and due to the lack of cooperative understanding the Kazakh government decided to 
terminate the entire agreement. A revised share structure was drafted in 1997, and 
Chevron was once again incorporated into the project in 1998.512 The US government 
is a supporter of this pipeline, especially as TengizChevroil (TCO) develops the 
Tengiz oilfields. It has, however, made its clear that it will continue advocating the 
construction of pipelines that break Russia’s monopoly of existing routes. In April
511 Asia Times Online. ‘Central Asia/Siberia: Russia Turns the Screw on Azerbaijan’, d.o 18.6.99, d.d
15.4.05, http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/AF22AgO 1 .html
512 Akiner, ‘Politics o f  Energy’, pp. 14-15
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2006, Nazarbayev agreed with Putin to greatly expand Kazakhstan’s oil exports to
•  ^1TRussia via the CPC from 28 million metric tons a year to 67 million tons. 
Unsurprisingly, this pipeline is a major economic asset to its partners, and to the 
countries it flows through; it also carries huge political importance. Russia’s LUKoil is 
the largest shareholder and owns 24%, Kazakhstan owns 19%, Oman 7%, and the 
USA 15%. International producing companies share the remaining percentages. 
Undoubtedly, Russia is the main benefactor, especially as the pipeline runs through its
S14territory.
LUKoil has played a dominant role in regards to investments in the Kazakh section of 
the Caspian. In 2004, Putin showed great enthusiasm in guaranteeing that LUKoil 
played a prominent role in the Kazakh section of the Caspian. In 2003, LUKoil and 
Kazmunaygaz515 signed an agreement on the extraction of hydrocarbons in the Kazakh 
and Russian sectors of the Sea.516 In early 2004 LUKoil stepped up its emphasis on 
Kazakhstan by signing an agreement with Kazmunaygaz, which further intensified 
cooperative development of the Kazakh section of the Tyub-Karagan and Atash 
oilfields. In accordance with the agreement signed, LUKoil will acquire a 50% share in 
the Tyub-Karagan oilfield, which is in the Kazakh section of the Sea. The two sides 
also agreed on cooperative prospecting in the Atash offshore field. Oil reserves are 
estimated to be 150 million tons at Tyub-Karagan and 130 million tons at Atash. The 
product sharing agreement in regards to the Tyub-Karagan oilfield has been signed for
r  i 7
40 years. Undisputedly, Russia has a vital influence over the Kazakh sector of the 
Caspian Sea. Putin’s first visit abroad in 2005 was to Kazakhstan; there he emphasised 
the importance of cooperation between Russia and its energy-rich Central Asian 
neighbour. Putin has urged for high level talks between the Caspian littoral countries, 
and hailed the progress Russia and Kazakhstan made in jointly developing oilfields.
5,3 Sergei Blagov, ‘ Russia Registers Significant Victory in Caspian Energy Basin Contest’, 
Eurasianet.org. d.o 5.4.06, d.d 22.7.06,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav040506.shtml
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Nazarbayev, on his part, confirmed that Russia remained his country’s priority 
partner.518 The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which transported oil from Kazakhstan 
to China for the first time in July 2006, has added to the increasing struggle fro Kazakh 
energy resources.519
5.1.3 Competing Influences over Turkmen Energy Resources
Competing influences over Turkmen energy resources are equally active as they are in 
Kazakhstan. Niyazov is not only interested in doing business with the USA and 
Russia, but also with Iran. In spite of the USA’s reluctance that this Central Asian 
country has a firm economic partnership with the Islamic Republic, Niyazov appears 
to have no restrictions in dealing with whomever will supply profit to his country. This 
was particularly seen in his cooperation with the Taliban. Niyazov’s links with the 
Taliban coincided with a time when his Central Asian neighbours were very concerned 
with the rise of Islamic extremism. As will be seen in the chapter concerned with 
Islamic influences over Central Asia, many of the Central Asian Islamic extremist 
groups collaborated with the Taliban, and frequently used Afghanistan as a training 
camp and safe-haven. Niyazov likes his country to be referred to as the second Kuwait. 
It has proven gas reserves of one hundred trillion cubic feet, and many untapped 
reserves waiting to be exploited. This country’s untouched reserves make it a treasure 
of the 21st century, but the nature of the regime and the ambiguous foreign investment 
laws are a constant deterrent to all foreign investors. This country’s only chance of 
really becoming a second Kuwait is by opening itself to foreign markets. It needs to 
attract investors, whose money will be able to transform the country entirely, and end 
the deteriorating socio-economic environment. Unfortunately, the Niyazov regime is 
having difficulty in attracting foreign investors; instead the regime in Ashghabad 
continuously breaks the laws that protect foreign ventures by overriding them with 
presidential decrees.520 This has resulted in tremendous harm to the foreign investment 
milieu.
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The Trans-Afghan pipeline (TAP), which is also sometimes referred to as the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline, has brought Turkmenistan to the center 
of the political struggle fought between giant energy companies. It is important at this 
stage to point out that some of these giant energy firms not only have economic power 
but also political power. Some of them have a strong say in the foreign policy 
orientations of their country. They are the ‘behind the scenes navigators’ of foreign 
affairs. This was most clearly seen with the appointment of Dick Cheney-former CEO 
of Halliburton, as Vice President under the Bush administration. Although this 
argument is not entirely relevant to competing influences over the natural resources of 
the Caspian countries, it does show the importance the US administration places on 
countries and regions rich in energy resources. Operation Enduring Freedom brought 
the USA’s influence closer to Central Asia and the Caspian region. By 1998, Cheney 
(then head of Halliburton) had realised the strategic importance of the Caspian region, 
and voiced his determination to transfer oil and gas through a pipeline that would not 
enhance Russian, Iranian or Chinese political and economic power. He was very much 
in favour of a pipeline through Afghanistan, which would allow the diversification of 
the region’s energy, and most important it would allow the USA to penetrate one of the
• • o  iworld wealthiest regions. The Taliban later proved to be a major obstacle to this 
dream.
In regards to this chapter, the story of the struggle over the TAP between Bridas, an 
Argentinian oil company, and Unocal is only relevant in so far as it involved 
Turkmenistan. Niyazov showed willingness, not only to orientate his country towards 
the USA, but also towards the Taliban in order to achieve a pipeline that could 
diversify gas flows to countries other than those of the CIS. Undoubtedly, the 
Turkmenbashi would like to loosen Russia’s grip on his country’s natural resources 
simply because he would then be able to sell Turkmenistan’s products at a much 
higher price than he is to Ukraine and Russia-his main gas partners.
521 George Monbiot, ‘America’s Pipe Dream’, Guardian Unlimited, d.o 23.10.01, d.d, 18.4.05, 
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Bridas was the first western company to show interest in Turkmenistan’s abundant 
wealth. Just after the collapse of the USSR western foreign companies showed no 
interest in investing in an isolated country, headed by a dictator, and with no binding 
investment laws. In the latter half of the 1990’s the authorities in the country began to 
make promises to treat foreign inventors better, and generally have a better attitude 
towards foreign investments. In reality nothing materialised from these promises, as 
Turkmenistan seemed lost in its Soviet past. By 1992, Bridas had achieved approval 
from the Turkmenbashi to explore Turkmen gas fields. It was agreed that Bridas’ 
production profit would be divided 50-50 between itself and the Turkmenistan 
government. Bridas had also signed an agreement with the Afghan government for the 
construction and operation of a gas pipeline. The situation soon turned very murky 
for Bridas; Niyazov accused them of exploiting his country and demanded to re­
negotiate all previous contracts. With no binding foreign investment law, Bridas was 
powerless. By the mid 1990’s Niyazov had swung to the side of Unocal. The 
Argentinian oil company had realised that it had been caught in the middle of a great 
game, fought between regional and global powers.524
In 1995, a collection of US oil companies, including Unocal formed a private Foreign 
Oil Companies Group in Washington; this was designed to further US interests in the 
Caspian region. This group hired former politicians in order for them to promote the 
group’s case in Washington, for example the advisor of Unocal was Henry Kissinger. 
This ‘Foreign Oil Companies Group’ had the full backing of the US State Department, 
the National Security Council, the CIA and the Department of Energy and
525Commerce. US oil companies were starting to have an influence over American 
foreign policy, consequently the administration was starting to show more interest in 
certain Central Asian countries where Russian influences were not so strong. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were seen too much under the Russian wing. Tajikistan 
was in the middle of a civil war, which was of no interest to the USA; that left 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as the most favourable options. The TAP was an ideal
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project for the USA; it not only avoided Iran, but also signaled support to 
Turkmenistan while at the same time snubbing Russia.
In 1996, Unocal achieved the support it needed from the three countries involved in 
the TAP. Initially, Pakistan under Bhutto refused to allow Unocal to replace Bridas, 
but the fall of Bhutto’s government later that year spelled out success for Unocal as 
they won over the new Pakistani government, and secured their leading position in the 
TAP. It appears that the dispute between Bridas and Unocal was not strictly about 
oil companies wanting to make business deals, but also about the American 
government wanting to place itself in a strategic position of influence by using its oil 
companies. In other words a war of influences over energy was evolving, of which 
Bridas was simply a victim. The American administration was ready to go to all 
lengths in order to anchor itself in the region. According to Rashid, within hours of 
Kabul falling to the Taliban in 1996, Clinton announced that America would form 
diplomatic ties with the new regime. Washington claimed it had no objection to the 
Taliban’s fanatical adherence and interpretation of the Sharia and that it believed the 
Taliban were not anti-western, just anti-modem and did not see any obstacle in 
conducting bilateral relation, especially if that meant securing the construction of the 
TAP. By allowing Unocal to win the bid over the TAP, the Taliban were 
legitimising their power base. Niyazov was equally keen to get American oil 
companies to bid for the development of the country’s oil and gas fields. In the late 
1990’s, Turkmenistan’s cooperation with American oil companies intensified; an 
estimated 240.2 million dollars were spent on project in Turkmenistan. However, 
dispute over the legal status of the Caspian has hindered Turkmen business. In 1998, 
the US oil giant Mobil terminated a business deal with Turkmenistan as a result of 
disputed energy fields between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.529
526 Rashid, Taliban, pp. 161-162
527 Nurev Independent Research, Timeline o f  Competition between Unocal and Bridas for Afghan 
Pipeline: World Press Review, d.o December 2001, d.d 23.4.05, http://www.hartford- 
hwp.com /archives/51/119.html
528 Rashid, Taliban, p. 166
529 Caspian Business Report, vol.2, no. 8, d.o April 30 1998, d.d 24.4.05, 
http://ourworld.copuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/980430c.htm
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The Unocal-Bridas pipeline struggle and the wooing of the Taliban came to a complete 
halt after September 11. In the eyes of the US administration, the Taliban could no 
longer be tolerated, and the once perceived unusual yet innocent adherence to the 
strictest Islamic principles could no longer be justified. The Taliban, although 
previously targeted by US missiles in 1998, were now more than ever seen as a regime 
responsible for harbouring, protecting and sympathising with the world’s most 
ferocious anti-American organisation. Operation Enduring Freedom followed; it was 
aimed at terminating the Taliban regime and consequently Osama Bin Laden’s Al- 
Qaida. As a result of the war, the TAP remains only a proposed pipeline, while 
instability in Afghanistan has been and will remain a major barrier to the development 
of this pipeline. All former negotiations (with the Taliban) have been terminated; the 
region is regarded as even more unstable that it has ever been before, and Niyazov has 
not changed his harsh attitude towards foreign investors. Finance for this 1,680 km 
pipeline, which is estimated to transport 33 bn cu meters of gas an year, is estimated at
3.3 bn US dollars.530
Niyazov’s belief that he is entitled to make any changes he finds suitable to any 
already agreed upon principle or agreement, has not frightened Russia from courting 
Ashghabad. This is not to say that Putin and Niyazov have not had major differences in 
the past few years. This was especially the case when Niyazov unexpectedly decided 
to abrogate the Turkmen-Russian dual citizenship treaty of 1993. This has already 
been covered in the chapter dealing with Russian influences in Central Asia. To a large 
extent, Turkmen-Russian needs for one another in the energy sphere are reciprocal. 
Niyazov cannot really afford to distance himself from Russia because he cannot easily 
find a replacement, and because Russia controls Turkmenistan’s main export routes.531 
At the same Russia will not easily allow Turkmenistan to diversify its exports, 
especially as Niyazov is already asking for more money on his gas exports to Russia 
(and Ukraine).
After failing to find outside investors, Niyazov turned to Putin for a landmark gas deal
in 2003. He signed a 25 year deal with his Russian counterpart to sell Gazprom 6
5j0 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘Turkmenistan: Country Report’, April 2005, p.21
531 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘Turkmenistan: Country Report’, October 2003, pp. 6-7
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billion cubic meters of gas, with volumes set to rise to 10 bcm from 2006 and up to 80 
bcm by 2009.532 This gives Russia a great amount of influence over Turkmenistan, as 
it appears to be the main external player in the energy resource export of 
Turkmenistan. Under this agreement, Russia will pay less than world market prices for 
the gas, giving it the opportunity to export its own gas to Europe at world market 
prices. The 2003 agreement was a continuation from a previous agreement between 
Niyazov and Gazprom President Rem Vyakhirev resulting in an arrangement on a 
price of 36 US dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, 40% of which was paid in cash and the 
rest in comsumer goods. Both agreements seem more favourable to Russia than 
Turkmenistan. Ashghabad is seen to have little choice over the matter, as it has few 
other means of exporting one of its most profit seeking commodities. Ukraine is 
Turkmenistan’s other partner in gas exports. Disagreement, in early 2005, over gas 
prices between Russia, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan, resulted in the latter blocking 
natural gas supplies to its main exporting partners. After turning the gas taps off in 
early 2005, Ukraine agreed to raise the purchasing price for Turkmen gas from 44 US 
dollars to 58 US dollars per one thousand cubic meters; Gazprom refused to follow. 
Turkmenistan wanted Gazprom to match the Ukrainian quota, while Gazprom argued 
that legally the old price agreements were still in force.534 In mid April 2005, Alexei 
Miller, Gazprom’s chief executive officer conducted talks with Niyazov in order to lift 
the embargo imposed by Turkmenistan. Both men agreed on strictly abiding to the 
existing agreement in regards to gas prices. Russia appears to have ultimately won the 
battle over gas prices.535 Turkmenistan cannot afford to antagonise Russia; this 
example is an indication of Russia’s influence over Ashghabad.
Although Russia (and Ukraine) is Turkmenistan’s main exporter of gas, it is not the 
only means that Turkmenistan has to export its natural resources. Iran is another 
partner. Russia’s main threat to its influence in regards to pipeline projects and export
532 The M oscow Times.com . ‘Gazprom Inks 25-Year Turkmen D eal’, d.o 11.4.03, d.d 2.4.05, 
http://them oscowtimes.eom /stories/2003/04/l 1 /042.html
533 BBC N ew s. ‘Turkmenistan Agrees Russian Gas D eal’, d.o 18.12.99, d.d 20.4.05, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/570486.stm
534 Sergei Blagov, ‘Russia Outmanoeuvres Ukraine For Turkmen Gas-For N o w ’, Eurasianet.org, d.o
21.4.05, d.d 25.4.05, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav042105.shtml
535 Gazprom. ‘Gazprom’s Delegation Travels to Turkmenistan’, d.o 15.4.05, d.d 25.4.05, 
http://www.gazprom.com /eng/news/2005/04/16206.shtml
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routes is from western oil companies, mainly American. However, Muslim countries 
such as Iran are also a minor threat to Russia’s energy monopoly. It is essential to 
point out that the real Islamic threat does not come from Muslim countries but from 
Islamic extremists willing to sabotage Russian and western pipelines, consequently 
affecting the business environment in the region. Muslim countries, such as Turkey, 
participate in both Russian- and western backed-projects, as would Iran if given the 
opportunity. It appears that the aim of these Muslim countries is not to monopolise the 
energy routes and exert their dominance in the region, but simply to benefit from the 
wealth of the region and participate in foreign investments. In addition Iranian projects 
have a relatively low capacity, as will be seen below, and do not appear able to rival 
those of Russia and the west. As previously mentioned, the Islamic influence over 
energy resources, mainly affects the Russian and American influences when it comes 
in the form of extremism.
This is not to say that Iranian-backed projects should be underestimated; they are a 
contributing factor to the region’s close alliance and relationship with the Muslim 
world. From all five Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan has the best business 
relationship with Iran. The Korpedzhe-Kurt-Koy (KKK) pipeline is one of the few 
pipelines that directly carries gas outside the former Soviet Union. It was built in 1998, 
and connects Turkmenistan’s Korpedzhe gas field to the Iranian town of Kurt Koy. In 
1998, 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas were delivered to Iran via this pipeline. Gas 
exports are expected to increase each year; this has not been the case so far.536 The 
Kazakh-Turkmen-Iranian (KTI) oil pipeline is still a project on paper. This pipeline is 
estimated to be 1,710 km in length, costing 2 billion dollars, and with the capacity to 
deliver 25 million tons a year.537 Analysts and often the country leaders acknowledge 
that the most cost effective export routes from Central Asia to Europe are those that 
run through Iran. There are certain obstacles with projects that include Iranian 
participation. The most prominent of them are the US sanctions placed on Iran; these 
very much discourage foreign investors.538 Central Asian leaders are also hesitant to
536 M. W esley Shoemaker, Russia and the Commonwealth o f  Independent States. N ew  York, 2004, p. 
288
537 Tevzadze, ‘Caspian O il’, p.94
538 Caspian Sea Overview. ‘Pipeline Routes and Marketing D ifficulties’, d.o 1999, d.d 12.4.05, 
http://www.treemedia.com/cfrlibrary/homepage/overview/q2.html
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pursue cooperation with Iran out of fear of antagonising the USA and deterring it from 
investing in their own country.
5.1.4 The Importance of Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik Energy Resources
The last three Central Asian countries do not enjoy the same amount of natural wealth 
as the two discussed above. Uzbekistan has the largest amount of natural resources in 
comparison to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, Uzbekistan’s importance does not 
lie with its natural wealth; this will be explained in more detail below. It is estimated 
that Uzbekistan has 0.1 of the world’s oil reserves; oil exports form an important 
sector for the Uzbek economy. In recent years, new oil and gas fields have been 
discovered, but the size of these fields is incomparable to those found in Kazakhstan
C-1Q
and Turkmenistan. Gas is one of the country’s main export earners, and Russia is 
one of the most important gas-importing partners for Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also 
exports natural resources to its less privileged neighbours, and at times uses this power 
as a political tool to intimidate them. The real importance of Uzbekistan, especially in 
the eyes of the USA, lies in its essential geo-strategic location and its ambiguous 
relationship with Russia. As was explained in the chapter related to American 
influences in Central Asia, Uzbekistan, since independence, has had the strongest 
relationship with the USA. Until early 2005, Uzbekistan was a member of GUUAM; 
while Azerbaijan is the doorway to the Caspian region, Uzbekistan has been America’s 
entrance to Central Asia. America’s good relationship and influence over the policies 
of Uzbekistan brought it to the heart of the region. It is also important to remember 
that the vast majority of the Central Asian population resides in this country, giving it 
even more prominence in Central Asian affairs. It is also one of the most Islamic 
countries, home to extremist organisations such as the IMU, and harbouring other 
groups such as H T.540
As was explained in the chapter dealing with Russian influences in Central Asia, 
Uzbekistan’s shift in foreign policy in mid 2004 came after the USA intensified its
539 Paul Rivlin, ‘Oil and Gas in the Economies o f  the Caspian Region’, in M oshe Gammer (ed.), The 
Caspian Region: A Re-emerging Region, p. 44
540 Marina Pikulina, ‘Uzbekistan in the Mirror o f  Military Security: A Historical Preface to Current 
Events’ (hereafter ‘Uzbekistan in the Mirror o f  Military Security’), Conflict Studies Research Centre. 
November 1999, p.3
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criticism of the lack of reform in the country, and consequently withheld a large 
amount of financial aid. Tension further intensified after the American-backed 
revolution in Ukraine, during which Karimov supported Yanukovich. Finally the 
events in Andijan resulted in a re-orientation of Uzbek policies away from 
Washington. This was mainly seen with Karimov’s request that Russia join the CACO. 
In the energy sphere, Russia has also been more prominent than in the past. In 
November 2004, Uzbekistan and LUKoil agreed on a 35-year production sharing 
agreement. LUKoil has agreed to invest 1 billion US dollars in the development of a 
gas field in central Uzbekistan. In late 2004, Gazprom also signed a production sharing 
agreement with Uzbekneftegaz.541
Kyrgyzstan, unlike many of it neighbours, lacks any significant energy resources. 
Kyrgyzstan depends on Russia and other Central Asian countries to supply it with 
energy. The natural resources that it does have are: hydroelectricity, gold, mercury, 
uranium and coal. A large portion of the country’s revenue comes from the export of 
gold.542 This country and Tajikistan play no role in the politics of the Caspian region, 
or in the competing influences over energy resources.
Tajikistan, war torn and lacking in energy resources, has not attracted many American 
investments. This is a country where Russian and Islamic influences have competed, 
and remain the most prominent. As has previously been explained, it was in this 
country that the Islamic threat loomed the most, especially between 1992-1997. 
Religious instability in this country posed a threat to the entire region. Tajikistan is 
known to have been the poorest country in the Soviet Union; it has none of the 
characteristics that attract foreign investors. Yet this forgotten ‘failed state’-as it is
often referred to- remains courted by Russia. Russia’s influence over this country has
already been discussed in the chapter dealing with Russian influences in Central Asia. 
Russian investments in this former Soviet Republic far outnumber any other foreign 
investments. In October 2004, Russia invested around 2 billion US dollars in 
Tajikistan’s energy and aluminum sector. Russia has also agreed to complete the 
construction of the Sangtuda hydroelectricity-generating station. Iran has promised to
541 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Uzbekistan: Country Report, March 2005, p.28
542 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Kyrgyzstan: Country Report, February 2005, p. 25
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invest in this power plant as well. Iran’s participation in Tajik affairs has been 
essential; they not only helped bring the Tajik civil war to an end, but have also been 
active in helping the Tajik government regain some of its economic strength.543 Iran 
has never attempted to have an Islamicising influence on the ethnically Persian Tajiks, 
nor on any other Muslim country in the CIS.544 Russia and Tajikistan also agreed that 
RusAL-a Russian aluminum company could further invest around 1.6 billion US 
dollars in Tajikistan’s energy and aluminum sectors.545
543 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Tajikistan: Country Report, March 2005, p. 20
544 Anat Lapidot-Firilla, ‘Dancing with Wolves: Turco-Iranian Relations in Perspective’, in Moshe 
Gammer (ed.), The Caspian Region: A Re-emerging Region, p. 133
545 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Tajikistan: Country Report, March 2005, p. 20
228
5.2 Conclusion
As seen above, Russian and American competition is also active in the sphere of petro- 
politics. In regards to energy resources the third competing influence (Islamic) is the 
weakest. The activities of extremist organisations have so far been limited, while 
regional Muslim countries such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran have not 
used the Islamic card as a tool in this sphere. The struggle over the treasures of the 
Caspian region (by the other two powers) is not only economically motivated but very 
much politically motivated as well. Whichever side can exert the largest amount of 
energy related dominance over this region has an essential geo-strategic lead over the 
other. One of the main reasons why the USA is so interested in this part of the former 
Soviet Empire is a result of its tremendous wealth at a time when the USA is looking 
to diversify its energy partners from the Arabian Gulf. The USA’s success (and 
Russia’s) in achieving a dominant energy role in the Caspian further enables it to have 
a greater influence over the domestic and foreign affairs of the region. Competition 
over energy resources is but another prize in achieving overall prominence and 
importance in this fought over region. As seen above, Russia’s bilateral deals with 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have given it an additional advantage over the USA. 
Russian familiarity with the volatile and unstable (concerning foreign investment laws 
and corruption) business environment of these countries has made doing business with 
them easier than for western and American companies. The opening of the BTC 
pipeline, and Kazakhstan’s agreed participation in this project have symbolised a blow 
to Russia’s reputation as the main energy giant of the region. The completion of the 
BTC project characterises a further step in the competition between these two cold war 
rivals. Russia’s monopoly over the energy resources of Kazakhstan very much depend 
on the success of this new pipeline, and whether or not Russia’s bilateral agreements 
and already existing northbound pipelines are enough to keep Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan faithful allies, especially in the face of future American oriented project. 
According to Igor Torbakov, “A number of energy analysts and strategic planners have 
long argued that the BTC project will likely redraw the geopolitical map of the 
turbulent South Caucasus (and Kazakhstan), reducing the region’s economic reliance
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on Moscow”.546 Moscow’s control over the energy resources of the USSR’s former 
Republics, in addition to the Central Asian ones, is an experiment that is proving to be 
more difficult with time, but for the time being Moscow can still relatively 
comfortably say that it still holds the reins of the vast bulk of Central Asian energy 
exports.
546 Igor Torbakov, ‘W ill Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Carry Revolutionary Ideas Along With Crude?’, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, d.o 27.5.05, d.d 10.6.05, 
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6.0 Islamic Influences and Central Asia
This chapter examines the influences of the third power this thesis is concerned with. 
Islamic influences are not easy to research, as Islam is often not perceived as a power 
with competing influences that affects different aspects and strata of society. The study 
of the relationship of Islam with contemporary Central Asia cannot be overlooked 
when researching what determines the social, political, and economic paths the region 
appears to be taking. Unfortunately most academic literature does not approach Islam 
on the same level as other competing powers (which are most often countries). These 
issues have already been discussed in the introduction. Islam, Russia and America all 
have internal and external influences on the region; at the same time each power can 
also have an effect on the influences of the other powers. In this thesis, Islam is mainly 
seen as deriving its power from the internal environment in each of the Central Asian 
countries. There are also a few examples when Islam acts as an external influence on 
the region. As Islam is not a country and is mainly approached as an internal power, it 
cannot conduct economic agreements or provide for a military base. Hence this chapter 
is mainly concerned with Islam’s cultural and political influences. As with the chapter 
related to Russian influences in Central Asia, the first section briefly looks at the 
Islamic legacy in the region.
It is first important to make clear definitions and clarify the differences and links 
between political, fundamentalist, extremist and secular Islam. Political Islam has 
previously in this thesis been briefly defined as when Islam plays an integral part in 
state affairs, when the state is run according to Islamic norms and rules. Denoeux 
provides a more complex and philosophical definition when he describes it as, “a form 
of intrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations that pursue 
political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by 
imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, re-invented 
concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition”.547
547 Guilain Denoeux, ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam’, Middle East Policy, vol. 9, no. 
2, June 2002, p. 61
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Political Islam includes but is not restricted to Islamic extremism and Islamic 
fundamentalism. Secular Islam can also be political, but is often not. Islamic 
extremism is entirely political and is often related to acts of violence and terrorism. 
The IMU is an example of an Islamic extremist group. Islamic fundamentalism is 
religious and does not necessarily (but may) have political inclinations. HT is a good 
example of how Islamic fundamentalism can overlap with Islamic extremism. HT is a 
non-violent Islamic organisation, which is highly politicised at the same time. Lahoud 
describes Islamic fundamentalism as when a group of Muslims use religion as a tool to 
enhance their political ambitions. It is clear that Lahoud sees Islamic 
fundamentalism as part of political Islam.
Islamic fundamentalism may also overlap with secular Islam, and be religious and 
cultural without being political. Islamic extremism, Islamic fundamentalism and 
secular Islam can also all fall under the umbrella of political Islam to differing degrees, 
although Islamic fundamentalism and especially secular Islam most often lie outside 
the zone of political Islam. As previously argued, secular Islam is often non­
politicised. It is generally seen (according to this thesis as well), as Islam’s cultural 
influence on society. The general increase in the Islamicisation of Central Asian 
society has strengthened secular Islam. The fear is that with the Islamicisation of 
society, there could also develop an Islamicisation of secular Islam. In other words 
there could develop a stronger religious role over commonly though secular activities 
and motivations, such as in business, strategies of social enhancement and 
entertainment.549 The IRP today is a good example of an Islamic fundamentalist 
organisation, which is politicised and also incorporates aspects of secularism.
548 N elly  Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries, London, N ew  York, 
2005, p. 15
549 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a N ew  Ummah. London, 2004, p. 40
232
6.1 Islam before Independence
6.1.1 The Birth of Islam in Central Asia
It was not until 610 that archangel Gabriel came to Mohamed Ibn Abdullah with a 
revelation making him Allah’s messenger on earth. The angel asked Mohamed to read 
three times; each time Mohamed replied ‘I can not read’. The Angel finally said: 
“Read in the name of your Lord, who created man from cloth. Read in the name of 
your God, the most bountiful, who taught by means of the pen, and taught man what 
he did not know”.550 This was the Prophet’s first revelation; one of many that would 
eventually form the Koran. It was during the Omayyad era from 661 to 750 that Islam 
first reached Central Asia. According to Skrine and Ross, “The Arabs spared no effort 
to spread the tenets of Islam, which alone was capable of welding together 
communities differing widely in race, language, and customs”.551 By 667, the 
Omayyad Caliph Mo’awiya, from Damascus, ordered an expedition to spread Islam in 
the area of Korasan (which is present-day Iran and Tajikistan). This was the start of the 
Islamicisation of modern day Central Asia. By 673 his Islamic armies had reached 
present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, they had entered Korasan, charged through 
Bukhara and conquered most of the surrounding area.
The year 705 was the turning point in the history of Islam in Central Asia; this was due 
to the appointment of Kutayba Ibn Muslim as governor of Korasan. Until this point the 
Muslim campaigns were nothing more than raids and invasions into Bukhara and parts 
of Transoxiana, with the consolidation of limited authority. Kutayba was the first Arab 
leader to force the people of this area to acknowledge the Caliph’s supremacy and 
abide to Islam. From that early stage parts of Central Asia (Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan) started their Islamic history. Bukhara became one of the main centres of the 
Islamic world, ranked on the same level as Mecca. In 711 Kutayba intensified his 
campaigns and Samarkand fell under his control; as did the Ferghana valley in 714.
550 The Koran. 96:1-5
551 F.H Skrine and E.D Ross, The Heart o f  A sia. London, 1899, p. 38
552 ibid. pp. 38-40
553 William Eleroy Curtis, Turkestan: The Heart o f  A sia (hereafter Turkestan) London, 1911, p. 146
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By the ninth century Islam had anchored itself in parts of Central Asia, and acquired a 
permanent role in culture and tradition. Islam was adopted easily in certain parts of 
Central Asia due to the life style of those living in the area. The more nomadic the 
inhabitants were the less they adopted Islam; this was due to their lack of 
understanding and willingness to adapt the traditional scholarly Islam of settled areas. 
This was and still is a reason why urbanised Islam is far more powerful than rural 
Islam.554 Therefore, Islam had a greater impact on the sedentary people of Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan than on any other region in present day Central Asia. Although Islam 
reached Kazakhstan at an early date, it did not seem to have an effect on the tribal 
people till the sixteenth century; and even then it was mild. The region’s more 
nomadic people converted more slowly and in a less serious manner.555 This was a 
result of clan and tribe based loyalties; their allegiance to their clan or tribe was 
prioritised over Islam, and undermined the cohesive elements that Islam provided.
6.1.2 Islam in Central Asia During the Russian Empire
Almost all the inhabitants of modern-day Central Asia belong to the Hanafi Mathhab 
(school) of Sunni Islam. A considerable number of them, especially those in the 
Bukhara area, adhered to Sufism; a form of Islamic mysticism, which preached direct 
communication with God. During the Russian Empire’s control of present day Central 
Asia, Islam hardly appeared as a strong political force rivalling that of the Empire’s 
authority. It was tame Islam due to the Russian temptations of modernity, especially in 
the fields of industry, education and technology. Consequently, what evolved was an 
interpretation of Islam compatible with the everyday life of that period.556 This 
interpretation of Islam became known as Jadidism.
6.1.3 Islam in Central Asia during the Soviet Era
Jadidism was a form of religious modernism, an attempt to reform Islam. This 
movement originated in the late nineteenth century, but it became particularly 
prominent and active during the early years of the Soviet period. In the language of the
554 Rashid, Jihad, pp. 26-30
555 Edward W. Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central A sia’ (hereafter ‘Islam, 
Islamism’), Journal o f  International Affairs, vol.56, no.2, Spring 2003, p.23
556 Rashid, Jihad, p. 30
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Gorbachev era, Jadidism was the perestroika and glasnost of religion. Radicalism did 
not feature in the Jadid’s agenda; they were a peaceful movement, asking for religious 
modernity. They were a modernist religious group, who used education as their main 
tool for establishing their movement. Its confrontation with Soviet rule resulted in its 
premature disappearance.
In the early days of the revolution, Lenin knew that he could not afford to lose the 
support of Russia’s Muslims if he wanted his revolution to be successful; at least he 
did not want them to enter the civil war on the White side. In order to guarantee their 
support the new Soviet government published ‘The Declaration of the Rights of the 
Peoples of Russia’. It promised equal sovereignty for all the nations of the former 
Tsarist Empire, the right to self-determination and the cancellation of limitations of a 
national or religious nature. In reality these were empty promises, aimed to buy time 
for the new Soviet government to establish itself. It soon became evident that the 
Soviet government’s promises and assurances were not convincing enough for some 
Central Asians. This resulted in the development of the ‘Basmachi’ movement, which 
was a guerrilla uprising against Soviet rule. This movement had no firm ideology, and 
was very much divided from within. The Basmachi movement was fighting not only 
for Islam and national independence, but was also motivated by bad economic 
conditions, stemming from the ruin of the cotton crop.558 The Basmachi movement 
was defeated by Soviet rule in 1929; many of its leaders and supporters fled to 
Afghanistan. Fifty years later their descendants revived the Basmachi ideals, and once 
again sparked rebellion; this time they were called the Mujahideen, once again their 
mission was to protect Islam and resist the Soviets.559
Not all Muslims agreed with the Basmachi tactics; there were those that were 
sympathetic to Communist rule. These were the Communist Muslims like Sultan- 
Galiev and Mulla-Nur Vahitov. These Islamic Communists preferred to work with the 
Bolsheviks, hoping that they would be allowed to create their own pan-Islamic
557 Amir Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future o f  Islam in the Soviet Union (hereafter Crescent). 
London, 1989, p. 93
558 Geoffrey Wheeler, The People o f  Soviet Central A sia, (hereafter The People), London, 1966, p.53
559 Rashid, Jihad, p. 32
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Republic within the Communist empire.560 The dream of a Tatar-Bashkir Republic 
never came true for Galiev and his followers; once the Communist regime established 
itself it had no reason to appease its Muslim minorities.
The 1930’s were a time of tight Soviet control over the Islamic population (and the 
non-Islamic population). It is important to realise that although the Soviets never 
encouraged Islam or any other form of religion, they did not always target it or forbid 
it.561 In fact, the Soviet constitution included an article on religion, which recognised 
freedom of conscience and religious practice. They did, however, spread anti-Islamic 
propaganda; restrict a large number of clergy and mosques, ban Islamic ceremonies 
and the wearing of the veil, close madrassas and discourage people from reading the 
Koran. The 1930’s were a time of strict Soviet supervision over its Islamic people. 
After Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, Stalin appeased his Muslim population in order to 
get their support during turbulent times. He did this by creating four Islamic Spiritual 
Directorates (ISD). This also allowed the regime to create ‘official Islam’ (asserting 
the kind of Islamic practices that would be tolerated and accepted by the boards-this 
did not properly develop until after the death of Stalin). The four ISDs were: The ISD 
of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan based in Tashkent, the ISD of 
European Russia and Siberia based in Ufa, the ISD of Northern Caucasus based in 
Daghestan, and the ISD of Trans-Caucasia based in Baku.563 In 1944, the regime 
created the ‘Council for Affairs of Religious Cults’ (thus reducing Islam to the status 
of a cult), which was aimed at supervising the activities of the ISDs. This body was 
under the authority of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.564 Khrushchev’s 
policies on Islam were first characterized by a period of liberalisation. This period did 
not last long and was replaced by a period of anti-religious campaigns (1959-64), and 
confined religious activity. This situation was to last until the Gorbachev era.
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It is important to remember that although official Islam laid down many restrictions on 
Islamic practices, unofficial Islam compensated. The regime’s rules only applied to 
official Islam; unofficial Islam was hard to control and was very much the means for 
keeping Islam alive in Central Asia (by being responsible for hundreds of unregistered 
mosques and madrassas). People opened their houses to prayers, performed religious 
ceremonies such as weddings, circumcisions and funerals. Soviet Central Asia’s 
underground Islam never became radicalised. This was a phenomenon that only 
characterised Islam after independence.
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6.2 Islam as a Domestic Religion and Cultural Phenomenon in 
Central Asia.
This section looks at Islam’s cultural influence on the people of Central Asia. It 
analyses the level of understanding and importance of Islam on their lives by 
examining the prominence and degree of Islamicisation in each Central Asian country. 
The role of Islam differs from country to country but the general increase in 
Islamicisation has an effect on the entire region. Strong Islamic currents in one country 
often infiltrate to neighbouring countries. This is a reminder that Islam even in the 
least Islamic countries should not be underestimated.
All native Central Asians are Muslims (except the Bukhara Jews); in general the 
Uzbeks and the Tajiks are more Islamic-oriented than their neighbours (for reasons 
given above). As a result of Central Asia’s relationship with Russia (the degree of 
Russification on everyday life, on politics and identity) Islam has not been able to 
develop and mature in the same way as in other Islamic countries outside the former 
USSR. For example, Friday is a working day in all the Central Asian countries; as in 
Russia, Saturdays and Sundays are the days off in the week. All Central Asian 
countries are secular, and there appears to be a general increase in secular 
Islamicisation in the region. Moderate, secular Islam is maturing and having a more 
prominent imprint on Central Asian national identity; examples of this will be 
discussed below. What has to be kept in mind is that although political Islam is not 
wanted by most Central Asians, a rise in secular Islam amongst the population 
provides an opportunity for Islamic extremism and fundamentalism to slowly nurture 
and develop, especially if the social, political and economic environment encourages 
such developments. Islamic extremism is political and extremist groups often want the 
creation of a government that abides to Islamic norms and rules. They would like to 
see politics conducted according to the Koran and Sharia law (Islamic law). Islamic 
fundamentalists do not necessarily want the implementation of total political Islam. In 
other words, they do not necessarily make it an objective to create an Islamic caliphate. 
The IRP and Hamas are good examples of this kind of political Islam. The majority of
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Central Asians do not abide to the five pillars of Islam, in fact in some areas they 
might not know what the five pillars are. According to Nancy Lubin, one of the 
fundamental pillars of Islam: ‘There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his 
prophet’, was at times not understood (individuals were able to recite it, but not 
translate it from the Arabic)565; these people still firmly considered themselves as 
believers. This is an example of secular Islam.
Kazakhstan
The role of Islam’s cultural influence on Kazakh society and domestic life is important 
in the analysis and assessment of the strength of Islam as a power able to affect the 
mind-set of the population. What role, if any, does it have on society and the behaviour 
of the Kazakh people? Identifying with Islam has been an increasing phenomenon 
since the disintegration of the USSR; it has been a time associated with ‘Islamic 
revival’ and ‘Islamic renaissance’.566 In the search for a Kazakh national identity, 
distinct from that of the Russian, Kazakhs have turned to Islam as a core element of 
their new identity.567 Some Kazakhs feel that the collapse of the USSR created a 
spiritual vacuum; they feel that Islam is the only power that can fill this void in their 
identity. This shows the importance some Kazakhs place on Islam to contribute in 
creating the ‘new’ Kazakh identity. It shows the extent to which Islam has infiltrated 
into the Kazakh mind-set and way of life. Personal Islamic symbols are seen in the 
everyday life of the Kazakh population. For example, a verse from the Koran or the 
word ‘Allah’ in Arabic is often seen hanging from car mirrors, key chains etc.569 In 
addition, there are some prominent mosques in Almaty, such as the one attached to the 
Egyptian University for Islamic Culture. This is an example of an external Islamic 
influence affecting the internal milieu of Kazakhstan. It has to be kept in mind that this 
University is not importing Middle Eastern Islam into Kazakhstan, it is simply
565 Nancy Lubin, ‘Islam and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A V iew  from B elow ’ (hereafter ‘Islam and 
Ethnic Identity’) in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union. 
Gainesville, Tallahassee, 1994, p.57
566 A lexei Malashenko and Ludmila Polonskaia, Islam in Central A sia, Reading, 1994, p. 109
567 It appears that some Kazakhs are happy and content with the degree o f  Russification on their identity; 
and som e would like to distinguish them selves from it. As a result they go in search o f  nourishing their 
Islamic identity by studying Islam in Islamic Universities, such as the Al-Azhar University in Cairo.
568 Bissenova, ‘Central Asian Encounters in the Middle East’, Religion. State & Society, pp. 260-261
569 This was an observation I made while in Almaty
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encouraging Islamic elements in Kazakh culture. Both the Egyptian and Kazakh 
governments finance the university. It was continuously repeated to me that the aim of 
the university was to spread Islamic cultural influences and not to encourage the 
evolution of political Islam. The university was there to help the Kazakhs rediscover 
their Islamic identity. All the girls in the university wore headscarves. I was told that 
Russian cultural influence had become so strong in Kazakhstan that people were at 
times completely out of touch with their Islamic cultural roots. For this reason,
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Nazarbayev requested the establishment of the university. The minaret in the 
mosque next to the university calls out for prayers five times a day; other than in 
Samarkand, Bukhara and the Ferghana Valley, calls for prayers are a rare phenomenon 
in Central Asia.
Uzbekistan
According to Munavvarov, “Islam for the Central Asian region is not a new 
phenomenon but a basis for the unique civilisation of the peoples inhabiting the region. 
The attempt to eradicate Islam... was an unnatural effort doomed to failure from the 
very beginning”.571 Nancy Lubin comments that according to a survey conducted in 
1993 (aimed at assessing the level of Islamicisation in Central Asia) the Uzbeks’
c n j
adherence to Islam appeared to be the highest. Uzbeks go more regularly to mosques 
(especially Friday prayers) than the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, although as stated in the 
introduction, Friday remains part of the working week. Mosques at times can become
G H ' l
so crowded that men are seen praying outside. The activities of these worshippers 
are monitored by the state, and the government closely watches functioning mosques. 
Women in general are more conservatively dressed in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, headscarves are not as frequently seen as in the Middle East, but are 
more common than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as are Islamic symbols and Islamic 
greetings. Madrassas are becoming more and more popular; many parents are 
confident and respectful of the education provided at these Islamic schools. There are
570 Interview with Mahmud Fahmi Hijazy, Dean: Professor, The Egyptian University for Islamic 
Culture, Almaty, Novem ber 2005
571 Zahid I. Munavvarov, ‘Uzbekistan’, in Mesbahi (ed.), Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet 
Union, p. 143
572 Nancy Lubin, ‘Islam and Ethnic Identity’, p. 57
573 1 saw this at the Namozgokhan mosque in Tashkent
240
an increasing percentage of students that graduate from these schools every year. 
These students do not have to pursue a career in anything related to religion; they can 
take any profession that someone would take who did not attend a madrassa.574 The 
madrassas work together with the Uzbek regime, in guaranteeing that Islam has 
boundaries that do not cross over into politics. The boys that graduate from madrassas, 
regardless of the kind of profession they take in later life, are strongly aware of Islamic 
culture and Islamic teachings. This over the years may contribute to the cultural 
Islamicisation of the Uzbek population.
Kyrgyzstan
Islam’s cultural influence in Kyrgyzstan is as mild as in Kazakhstan in some places 
and as volatile as in Uzbekistan in others. Islam’s influence has more prominence in 
the south of the country than in the north, although secular Islam is slowly becoming 
more and more prominent in the north (this point will be supported below).
The Kyrgyz Islamic identity seems to be gradually developing over the years. 
Although mosques are not very common in the north, and in particularly Bishkek, 
small and new mosques are found outside city centres. None of these mosques appear 
to be focal points in Kyrgyz everyday life, as seen in Uzbekistan. In fact, most of the 
time these mosques stand empty and are relatively bare.575 Most Kyrgyz will 
emphasise that they are Muslims but that they do not practise Islam. Headscarves are 
rarely seen and Islamic greetings are rarely heard. Nevertheless, over the years the 
Kyrgyz appear to have become more in touch with Islamic culture.576 The country 
appears to be going down a path of secular Islamicisation; Islam is becoming part of 
their everyday life and slowly infiltrating into national identity. As Malashenko says, 
Islam’s influence is “felt on the mutual perceptions of people living there (Central
574 This information was gathered at the Kukeldash Madrassa in Tashkent by speaking to students and 
the head-teacher.
575 This was an observation made while visiting mosques in the Chui and Issyk- Kul oblasts.
576 My first visit to Bishkek was in September 2004; my follow ing visit was in Novem ber 2005. In the 
space o f  14 months small changes towards how Islam was perceived were noticed. During my last visit, 
I realised that in many restaurants and cafes a ‘Halal’ sign was placed that had not been there 
previously. In addition many restaurants also had small verses from the Koran hung up on their walls, 
and even pictures o f  Mecca.
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Asia)”.577 The Islamic situation in the south is considerably different, especially in the 
oblasts in the Ferghana Valley. Islam is more rooted in people’s behaviour, culture and 
identity. Mosques are frequently found, with regular worshippers. Headscarves are 
much more frequently seen, women are more conservatively dressed and Islamic 
customs and pillars, such as Ramadan and Eid, are abided to.
Tajikistan
The Tajik civil war was a reminder to all those in Central Asia that Islam had the 
potential to mobilise a large bulk of the population. Its wide support base indicated its 
strong cultural and political influences. The civil war was a message to Central Asian 
leaders that Islam was a power not to be under-estimated in the region. The survival of 
the IRP’s struggle from 1992-1997 is evidence that this Islamic party was supported by 
a large bulk of the population. Important elements of its popularity lay in the fact that 
it was an Islamic movement, promoting the revival of Islamic culture and habits and 
also one that showed flexibility in regards to politics. Its objectives have not been 
aimed at the creation of an Islamic caliphate. For many it appeared to be the best 
alternative to the regime in power. It has been estimated that as early as 1992, the 
IRP had twenty thousand followers. It was also acknowledged by the democrats, who 
created a joint coalition with the IRP called the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), that 
without the Islamists they would not have been able to oppose the regime with such
f 7Q
great support from the masses.
The Tajik people’s adherence to Islam becomes clear during the holy month of 
Ramadan, where it is estimated that 99% of rural people fast and 60% of people living 
in cities. It is also estimated that there are 5,000 mosques open for daily prayers, in 
addition to 237 mosques specifically used for Friday prayers580; registration of 
mosques is not compulsory although some mosques are still closed by the government
577 A lexei Malashenko, ‘Islam in Central A sia’ in Allison and Jonson (eds.), Central Asian Security, p. 
51
578 Yaacov R o’i, Islam in the CIS: A Threat to Stability (hereafter Islam in the CIS). London, 2001, p. 
41
579 A zizN iyazi, ‘Tajikistan’, in Mesbahi (ed.), p. 183
580 ‘Tajikistan: International Religious Freedom Report’, U.S Department o f  State, d.o 2001, d.d
24.5.04, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001 /5 7 19.htm
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authorities for not being registered. It is unknown how many Ismaili (Shi’ite) places of 
worship there are in the country, as the government does not keep track of them. “The 
total Tajikistani population is about six million persons, 90% of whom are the most 
devoted Muslims in Mid-Asia and the most observing of religious duties and Islamic 
identity”.581
Turkmenistan
The Turkmens, like the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz, are tribal nomadic people, hence 
many sources indicate that Turkmenistan is the area least interested in Islam. The 
Turkmenbashi promotes cultural Islam, such as acknowledging and celebrating the 
Islamic New Year, Eid and Ramadan. The Turkmen people approach elements of 
Islam, allowed by Niyazov, as symbols of their Turkmen identity. The fact that the 
Turkmenbashi controls what characteristics of Islam can be followed, make it very 
difficult to assess how strong Islamic influences really are. Turkmen participation in 
mosque prayers is very limited but they do abide to Islamic norms on occasions such 
as weddings, funerals and pilgrimages. The Turkmenbashi has dedicated a lot of 
effort in building new and very grand mosques, although it appears that these mosques 
are not being built for the promotion of Islam or the encouragement of prayers but for 
the Turkmenbashi’s own personal glorification.583
From all the Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan has always had the least number of 
mosques and lowest extent of religious practices. There do exist voluntary cultural 
societies whose views are rather extreme. One such group is the ‘Sunnah Society’; this 
group wants the implementation of strict Islamic morality.584
581 ‘Tajikistan: Eastern Spirit in Ramadan’, IslamOnline.net. d.o 19.11.03, d.d 3.5.04, 
http://www.islamonline.net/english/ArtCulture/2003/l 1/article 12.shtml
582 ‘R eligion’, U.S Library o f  Congress, d.d 23.5.04, http://countrystudies.us/turkmenistan/14.htm
583 I was told by a friend who went to Ashghabad that most o f  the new mosques in the city have 
sentences from the Rukhnama below  Koranic verses on the walls.
584 Malashenko and Polonskaia, Islam in Central A sia, p. 138
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6.3 Official Islam in Central Asia
This section looks at politically approved and state sponsored Islam in each of the five 
Central Asian countries.
Kazakhstan
The Kazakh Constitution is less precise in matters of religion than the Constitutions of 
other Central Asian countries. It says: “The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself a 
democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are an individual, his 
life, rights and freedoms”, “Everyone shall have the right to determine and indicate or 
not to indicate his national, party and religious affiliation” and “Everyone has the right
c o r
of freedom of conscience”. This generally says that there is respect for religious 
freedom without government interference. With the escalation of Islamic extremism 
and fundamentalism in the region (and the world) the government has become more 
alert to the potentials of Kazakh Islamicisation. Kazakhstan is known for its tolerance 
of religious activities in comparison to its neighbours. Prior to April 2001, the 
‘National Religious Law’ was very flexible with Islamic organisations and did not 
require religious organisations to register. It stated that all persons are free to practise 
their religion alone or together with others. It did, however, say that organisations that 
wish to establish a legal status must register. The law only required ten signatures 
before an organisation could be registered. By 2001, the threat of Islamic extremism 
was seriously troubling the Kazakh government; this was perhaps due to the activities 
of the IMU, HT, and the growing power of the Taliban (more on these issues in the 
next section). As part of a campaign to control Islamic extremism, the government
coz
produced amendments to the National Religious Law. The new religious law came 
under strong criticism by religious groups, human rights activists and the OSCE. The 
new law stated that all unregistered religious groups would be banned; it also required
585 The Constitution o f  the Republic o f  Kazakhstan. Section one, Article one, Clause one, Section two, 
Article nineteen, Clause One and Section two, Article twenty-two, Clause one, d.o 1997, d.d 24.5.04, 
http://www.president.kz/artcles/state/state container.asp?Ing=en&art=constitution
586 ‘Kazakhstan: International Religious Freedom Report’, U .S Department o f  State, d.o 26.10.01, d.d
23.5.04, http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5574.htm
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all missionaries to register and did not permit the registration of Muslim organisations 
that did not confirm to the rules of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in 
Kazakhstan. The creation of Islamic centres of worship also required the approval of 
the Spiritual Administration; and the number of people required to register a religious
r o7
organisation rose from 10 to 50. These tight restrictions on religious freedom did 
not last very long, and by April 2002 the situation had improved; the new restrictive 
amendments were cancelled and the religious situation has greatly improved since 
then. Even though Kazakhstan appears to have been immune to Islamic extremism this 
does not mean that the situation will always remain this way.
Nazarbaev, although an atheist, has not hesitated from using the Islamic card when he 
has felt the need to. Kazakhstan, like the other Central Asian countries, is a permanent 
member of the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC). One of the OIC’s main 
objectives is to “promote Islamic solidarity among its member states and to strengthen 
the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to safeguarding their dignity,
coo
independence and national rights”.
Uzbekistan
The Islamic connection was not only vital as a component in the creation of national 
identities in Central Asia, but also as a cohesive element tying all the Central Asians 
together, giving them a shared and single identity. Karimov swore himself into office 
with one hand on the Koran and went to Mecca for Hajj; this was a message that Islam 
would have a strong role in Uzbek life. Perhaps today, Karimov regrets having 
encouraged that notion, as Islam has the ability of not only being a cohesive force, but 
also a force that can tear a country apart and plunge it into civil war, as seen in 
Tajikistan.
587 Igor Rotar, ‘Kazakhstan: N ew  Restrictive Religion Law G oes to Upper H ouse’, Keston News 
Service, d.o 23.1.02, d.d, 23.4 04, http://www.starlightsite.co.uk/keston/kns/2002/020123KA-01 .htm
588 Edmund Herzig, ‘Islam, Trans-nationalism, and Sub-regionalism in the CIS’ (hereafter ‘Islam, 
Transnationalism’) in Renata Dwan and Oleksande Pavliuk (eds.), Building Security in the N ew  States 
o f  Eurasia, Armonk, N Y , London, 2000, pp. 246-247
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As a secular state, Uzbekistan in theory guarantees religious freedom to all its citizens. 
Articles 29 and 31 in the Uzbek Constitution state: “Each person has the right of 
freedom of thought, speech and belief’ and “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed for
r on
all. Each person has the right to practice any, or no, religion”. In Uzbekistan religion 
is separate from the state and the state likes to separate religion from institutions that 
have the potential to mould and nurture the minds of individuals, such as schools, 
universities and the media. Article 7 in ‘The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 
Freedom of Worship and Religious Organisations’ says, “The education system in the 
Republic of Uzbekistan is separate from religion. Introduction of religious subjects 
into the academic curriculum is inadmissible. The right to secular education is 
guaranteed to the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan irrespective of their religious 
convictions”.590 The Uzbek government is very concerned with keeping control of 
Islamic religious education. This is clearly seen in article 9 of Uzbekistan’s law on 
religion: “Religious schools obtain the right to operate after their registration at the 
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and receiving a corresponding 
licence. Citizens can enter a higher or secondary religious school after receiving 
general compulsory secondary education in accordance with the law of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on education. People teaching religious subjects in religious schools should 
have religious education and can work with permission from a corresponding central 
administration body. Private teaching of religious principles is prohibited”.591 The 
Islamic University of Tashkent was established in 1999 by the government; it offers 
both Islamic and secular subjects and has over 750 students.592 Students interested in 
Islamic subjects have the opportunity to study all aspects of Islamic scholarship 
including jurisdiction, Quranic Arabic, Quranic tafsir (exegesis), and hadith (narration 
of the Prophet). Women are also allowed to study at this university but are not eligible
589 The Constitution o f  the Republic o f  Uzbekistan, d.o 8.12.92, d.d 1.5.04, 
http://www.ecostan.org/laws/uzb/uzbekistancon eng.html
590 The Law o f  the Republic o f  Uzbekistan On Freedom o f  Worship and Religious Organisations (New  
Version) as published in ‘Narodnoye S lovo’ from BBC, courtesy o f  Felix Corley, d.o 15.5.98, d.d
8.5.04, http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/uzbeklaw.htm l
591 ibid.
592Igor Rotar (Central Asia Correspondent), The Muslim N ew s. ‘Uzbekistan: State Control o f  Islamic 
Religious Education’, d.o 14.5.04, d.d 18.5.04, 
http://www.m uslim news.co.uk/news/new.php?article=7355
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to become Imams.593 Almost all women at this university wear the Hijab.594 There also 
exists an Islamic Institute in Tashkent; which hosts students from around the Islamic 
world. Although all the teachers are Uzbek, they have almost all had their Islamic 
education abroad, such as in Egypt, Libya and Syria. Most Imams in Uzbekistan 
graduate from this institution.595
People’s devotion towards Islam is further seen with the constant increase in the 
number of mosques in Uzbekistan. In 1991 there were approximately 89 mosques and 
one madrassa; by the year 2003 the number of mosques has gone up to over 2000 and 
there were 10 madrassas.596 The number of mosques and madrassas is constantly 
increasing; the government’s 1998 ‘Law on Religion’ tried to control this 
mushrooming of mosques; but has not appeared too successful. Today it is estimated 
that the number of mosques has reached approximately 5000 and is still on the
597increase.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan’s secular identity is very much highlighted in its constitution. Chapter one, 
section two, article one, clause one, and chapter one, section two, article eight, clause 
three say: “The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a sovereign, unitary, democratic 
Republic, constructed on the basis of a legal secular state” and “Religions and all cults
TQO
shall be separated from the State”. Kyrgyzstan’s State Commission on Religious 
Affairs is generally tolerant and stands for freedom of conscience and monitors laws 
on religion. The 1997 presidential decree states that all religious organisations must be 
registered with the Commission and the Ministry of Justice before they can be 
recognised and function as a religious organisation. The government recognised
593 Interview with Zukhriddin M. Khusnidinov, Rector o f  Tashkent Islamic University, Member o f  the 
Council o f  Ministers and Political Advisor to Karimov, Tashkent, September 2004
594 This was a personal observation made while spending time at the university, September 2004
595 Hedieh Mirahmadi, General Secretary o f  the Islamic Supreme Council o f  America, The Islamic 
Renaissance o f  Uzbekistan (hereafter Islamic Renaissance), d.d 17.5.04, 
http://iahon.mfa.uz/Z P News/muslims.html
596 ‘Uzbekistan struggles with post-communist future’, The Washington Tim es, d.o 27.12.03, d.d
19.5.04, http://www.uzland.uz/2003/december/29/04.htm
597 ‘Uzbekistan’, Religious Freedom World Report: Prepared by the International Coalition for Religious 
Freedom, d.o 12.5.04, d.d 17.5.04, http://www.religiousfreedom.com/wrpt/fsu/uzbekistan.htm
598 Constitution o f  the Kyrgyz Republic. 5.5.03, http://www.kvrgyzstan.Org/Law/constitution.htm#c 1 b
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Islamic holidays as well as Russian Orthodox holidays.599 The decree also required 
people travelling to the Middle East for religious education to register. Only suspected 
members of HT are refused registration.600 This, however, does not mean that the 
rights of believers are not violated. In southern Kyrgyzstan teachers were told to forbid 
children from performing their daily prayers, and not allowing girls to wear the hijab 
(head scarf).601 Governmental abuse of religious freedom became apparent when 
schools in Jalalabad in southern Kyrgyzstan did not allow their female pupils to attend 
classes if they wore the hijab. Disputes erupted over whether this was an infringement 
on their constitutional rights. Angered believers argued that the constitution and the 
law of religion clearly stated that everyone would be guaranteed freedom of worship as
f\09long as their actions did not go against the existing regime.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan (as already mentioned in the second chapter) is the only Central Asian 
country where an Islamic party is represented in the government. Tajikistan is also the 
only country with a legal Islamic party (IRP). The Tajik Constitution clearly says that 
the country is secular; but the UTO (mainly composed of Islamists) has 30% of posts 
in national and local government bodies. This was the condition that resulted in the 
end of the civil war, and the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC). The UTO’s contribution in government affairs is slowly becoming 
marginalised, which is very much angering the UTO leadership as their participation in 
government affairs was a prerequisite to peace. Rahmonov’s attempts to dwarf the role 
of the opposition became clear with the amendments to the Tajik Constitution. The 
changes to Article 28 of the Constitution were the main cause of concern. The terms 
‘religious’, ‘democratic’ and ‘atheist’ parties were replaced with the general term
599‘ Kyrgyzstan: International Religious Freedom Report’, US Department o f  State, d.o 26.10.01, d.d 
15.3.07, http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5598.htm
600 Igor Rotar, ‘Kyrgyzstan: Religious Freedom Survey’, Forum 18. d.o 7.1.04, d.d 12.3.07, 
http://www.fomm 18.org/Archive.php?article id=222
601 Ibid.
602 Abdumalik Sharpov, ‘ The Wearing o f  the Hijab Remains a Problem o f  Secondary Schools in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan’, Ferghana.ru, d.o 21.2.07, d.d 18.3.07, 
http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=851
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‘political parties’. The head of the opposition, Said Nuri, has said that article 28 “was a 
pivotal point of the peace in the country” and should therefore never be amended.
Turkmenistan
Article 11 of the Turkmen Constitution says, “The government guarantees freedom of 
religion and faith and the equality of religions and faiths before the law. Religious 
organisations are separate from the government, and may not perform governmental 
functions”.604 In reality the government guarantees none of the above; and has slowly 
been increasing its role in religious issues. The November 2003 new law on religious 
activities even further curtailed the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of 
association. This law “bans any activity by unregistered religious groups. To obtain 
permission to operate legally, a group must demonstrate, among other things, that it 
has 500 members”605; consequently a large number of small groups are not able to 
register. This law sparked tremendous disapproval and disappointment to the extent 
that the US Helsinki Commission wanted to designate Turkmenistan as a ‘Country of 
Particular Concern’ in the face of mounting control of those seeking to practise their 
faith.606 This was regarded as a violation of religious freedom; and consequently put 
Turkmenistan on the USA’s list of countries liable to US trade sanctions. In a 
desperate attempt by Niyazov to avoid sanctions, in March 2004 he announced that the 
requirements for registration of religious organisations were to be changed. The 
changes were very minimal; however the new legislation removed the requirement for 
a religious group to have 500 members before being able to register. It still remains 
virtually impossible for groups to register, as the fee for registration is equivalent to
An 7ten times the average monthly wage.
603 ‘Tajikistan Daily D igest’, Eurasianet.org. d.o 19.3.03, d.d 2.3.04, 
http://www.erasianet.org/resource/taiikistan/hvpermail/200303/0016.shtml
604 Constitution o f  Turkmenistan, d.o 1992, d.d 20.5.04, 
http://www.ecostan.org/laws/turlm/turkmenistancon.html
605 ‘Turkmenistan Enacts Highly Repressive Law Against R eligion’, Comm ission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: United States Helsinki Com m ission, d.o 2 .12.03, d.d 13.5.04, 
http://www.csce.gov/press csce.cfm ?press id=334
606 ibid.
607 Economist Intelligence Unit. ‘Turkmenistan Country Report’, London, N ew  York, Hong Kong, April 
2004
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6.4 Political Islam and Islamic Organisations in Central Asia
The causes behind the rise of Islamic extremism, and the potential prospects of the 
development of political Islam in some of the Central Asian countries are some of the 
issues this section aims to discuss. This section also analyses the main Islamic 
organisations in the region, their agendas and their influence in each Central Asian 
country.
The gradual rise of secular Islam (as seen in the previous section), Islamic extremism 
and the prospects of political Islam have characterised post-independence Central 
Asia. Although the region’s Soviet legacy and high degree of Russification have kept it 
immune to Islam in comparison to some of its neighbouring countries in the region, its 
internal political system and types of leaderships have fuelled Islamic extremism and
/n o
made it one of the main methods of resistance. Religious extremism and 
fundamentalism over the years, and in different countries of the Muslim world, has 
proved to be the salvation for those living in a system of political oppression, 
economic stagnation and social dislocation. These are the conditions that the secular 
elites provide, which fuel the desperation of certain strata of the population. According 
to Walker, “the deep roots of militancy can be found in the region’s dire socio­
economic conditions”.609 When a political system is failing to meet the most 
fundamental demands of its citizens, social, economic and political frustrations 
become eruptive. These structural strains produce collective anger and a desire for 
change.610 Certain movements appear able to provide support and a notion of stability 
for these collective grievances. Hence the growing authoritarianism of the Central 
Asian leaders is not only fuelling sentiments of Islamic extremism but also running the 
risk of making political Islam a more favourable option to secular authoritarianism.
608 Edward W. Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central A sia’, Journal o f  International 
Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 21
609 ibid. p .  39
610 N. Smelser, The Theory o f  Collective Behaviour. N ew  York, 1963, p. 102
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Uzbekistan
Since independence, Uzbekistan has been one of the centres for Islamic activity and 
the evolution of political Islam. As previously stated in this chapter, one of the reasons 
for this is because of the Uzbek people’s long and firm relationship with Islam. The 
Uzbeks have been known as one of the most Islamicised people of Central Asia. 
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s Islamic situation today cannot be blamed on its Islamic 
legacy. As will be discussed below, Uzbekistan harbours some of the most threatening 
and powerful Islamic parties in the region. In the process of protecting his regime’s 
power-base, Karimov has subsequently intensified cultural and political Islamic 
influences.
Uzbekistan’s first indication that political Islam and Islamic organisations would have 
a large influence on the country was as early as 1991. An Islamic organisation called 
‘Adolat’, which was founded in the city of Namangan in the Ferghana Valley, took 
control of the city and declared that it was more effective at dealing with crime, 
poverty and hardship than the Karimov regime. This was the first indication that 
political Islam would be Karimov’s main rival, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. As 
a result of this incident, Karimov launched (one of many campaigns that would 
characterise his growing authoritarianism and political oppression) a nation-wide 
crackdown on all Islamic organisations.611 The Ferghana Valley has been the epicentre 
of Islamic activity not only for Uzbekistan but also for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that 
also share the Valley. It is where Islamic extremism and fundamentalism flourish and 
where political Islam has its strongest roots. The Valley is severely over-populated;
home to approximately 10 million people and has one of the worst employment
612rates. It is one of the most conflict-prone regions in Central Asia, and suffers from a 
wide-range of social, economic and political problems.613 Even those closely 
associated with the Karimov regime will acknowledge that one of the main reasons for
611 Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central A sia’, p. 37
612 Kenneth W eisbrode, Central Asia: Prize or Quicksand? N ew  York, 2001, p.46
613 Barnett R. Rubin, Blood on the Doorstep, N ew  York, 2002, p. 106
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the rise of extremism and political Islam is the socio-economic situation, and that 
tackling this issue can greatly reduce Islam becoming a strong power in the region.614
The IMU is Uzbekistan’s homegrown organisation. Its origins can be traced to Adolat; 
when Adolat was disbanded some of its more radicalised members fled to Tajikistan 
where they joined the IRP and fought in the Tajik civil war. Both its key figures 
Tokhir Yuldeshev and Juma Namangani established their power-base in Tajikistan 
from 1992 to 1997. When the peace agreement was signed in 1997, marking the end of 
the Tajik civil war, the more radicalised members of the IRP, including Yuldeshev and 
Namangani fled Tajikistan, refusing to enter a coalition with the secular Rahmonov 
regime. At the same time, Karimov launched a new campaign severely cracking down 
on religious individuals and Islamic organisations, this time also including relatives of 
suspected Islamists. As a result of this crackdown, victims of Karimov’s campaign had 
only Namangani and Yuldeshev to help them resist Karimov’s wrath. As a result the 
IMU was created; its new headquarters were with the Taliban in Afghanistan.615
The Tashkent bombings on 16 February 1999 were the first clash between the IMU 
and the Uzbek authorities. This event was the start of a nation-wide crackdown on 
organisations and individuals that adhered to any form and level of Islam. This also 
provided for Karimov an excuse to crackdown on all opposition, Islamic or not. “By 
forcing all opposition underground into increasingly extremist positions, the autocratic 
leaders have fostered an environment in which the population has begun to embrace a 
volatile force, Islamic militancy”.616 Six bombs (planted in cars) exploded near 
government institutions in Tashkent; for the first time the stability of Uzbekistan and 
its neighbours was put into question. Within hours of the explosions Karimov had not 
only blamed the IMU but also named the leader of Erk (Mohammed Solih) as a 
suspect. The implication of Solih did not come as a surprise as he had run against 
Karimov in the 1991 presidential election; Karimov for years had been desperate to
614 Interview with Zukhriddin M. Khusnidinov, Rector o f  Tashkent Islamic University, Member o f  the 
Council o f  Ministers and Political Advisor to Karimov, Tashkent, September 2004
615 Rashid. Jihad, p. 145-147
6,6 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Asking for Holy War: Ruling Out Democracy Results in Militant Islamic 
O pposition’, International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, d.o 9.11.00 d.d
2.4.04, http://iicas.org/english/enlibrarv/libr 22 11 00 l.htm
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eliminate him as an oppositional figure.617 As a result of the bombings, hundreds of
mosques were closed throughout the country; the Karimov regime argued that it was in
618 •mosques that the IMU was plotting terrorist activities against the regime. As often is 
the case with Islam, when pushed underground it radicalises and appears to be the 
salvation for all those suffering under an oppressive political situation. A few months 
later the IMU declared Jihad against the Karimov regime, which was soon followed by 
an escalation of violence that would not only affect Uzbekistan but also Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan.619
The first attack by the IMU occurred in Batken, in Kyrgyzstan. This armed incursion 
lasted from August to September 1999. This did not only highlight the strength of the 
IMU and their ability to spread to other Central Asian countries; it also highlighted the 
Uzbek authorities’ aggression to eliminate the IMU. As a result of the incursion, the 
Karimov regime, without the permission of the Kyrgyz government, sent warplanes 
over Kyrgyzstan in order to kill the insurgents. This act caused tension between the 
two countries, especially as the Kyrgyz government not only felt that its country’s 
sovereignty and integrity had been violated, but also because it was verbally attacked 
and blamed by Karimov for being unable to resist armed incursions. As a result, 
Akayev went to the Russians for help.
The IMU returned to Afghanistan in the winter on 1999 and intended to strengthen 
their fighting skills before a new campaign. It was during this time that Osama Bin 
Laden supplied and funded the IMU. There is no clear indication revealing the amount 
of support given to the IMU by Bin Laden; but it is clear that Namangani and Bin 
Laden had a close relationship. Namangani is often referred to as Bin Laden’s right- 
hand man, and died fighting against the Americans in Tora-Bora in Afghanistan in
617 Asia Times Online. Central A sia/ Siberia. Newsline: Central Asia. Transcaucasia and Russia. Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Tashkent Bombings: Opposition Leader A ccused’, 
http://www.atim es.com/c-asia/AC09Ag01 .html, d.o 9.3 .99,d.d 3.4.04
618 A large number o f  mosques 1 visited in Uzbekistan were non-functioning mosques. I was told that 
this had been the case since the Tashkent bombings in 1999. The government had ordered that these 
m osques be closed to worshippers.
619 Abdumannob Polat and Nickolai Butkevich, ‘Unravelling the Mystery o f  the Tashkent Bom bings’, 
International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, d.o 4.12.00, d.d 22.7.06  
http://iicas.org/english/Krsten 4 12 OO.htm
620 Yaacov R o’i, Islam in the CIS, p 76.
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2001.621 The second Batken incursion occurred in the summer of 2000. Namangani 
returned to Tajikistan, with hundreds of well-trained IMU fighters. His aim was to 
move his men into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and launch several attacks from 
different directions aimed at the Uzbek government. Once again one of the main 
locations for attack was Batken, and once again the Kyrgyz government and its people 
found themselves in the middle of a bloody fight between the IMU and the Uzbek 
government.622 On September 15, the Karimov regime finally received the backing 
from the American Administration it had long hoped for. The Department of State
623designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under American Law.
By the summer of 2001, the region was getting prepared for another attack by the 
IMU. Over the years the IMU network had become more widespread and 
sophisticated. Just as the IMU was escalating its activity in the summer/autumn of 
2001, the September 11 events occurred. The aftermath of September 11 and the war 
on Afghanistan appeared to have saved the Central Asian regimes from further IMU 
incursions. The IMU’s increasing power from 1999 to 2001 made the prospects of 
political Islam not only a nation-wide concern but also loomed over the future security 
of Central Asia.624
Since the start of the war on terror and America’s campaign in Afghanistan, the IMU 
has been greatly weakened. The main navigators of Islamic influences today appear to 
be HT, although the force of the IMU has by no means disappeared. Events in March 
2004 brought the IMU to the forefront of the Uzbek political stage. A series of 
explosions in Bukhara and Tashkent, killing over forty people, was traced to the IMU. 
In July of the same year an Islamic organisation, thought to be either HT or the IMU
625was believed to have carried out the first suicide bombings. The target of their wrath
621 People’s Daily (Beijing), ‘Tajik Sources Confirm Death o f  Bin Laden’s 2nd S e lf ,  d.o 20.11.01, d.d
5.4.04, http://fpeng.peopledailv.com.cn/20011 l/20 /en g20011120 84994.shtml
622 Rashid, Jihad, pp. 167-180
623 Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S Department o f  State: Office o f  the Spokesman, 
Intent to Designate as Foreign Terrorist Organisation the Islamic Movement o f  Uzbekistan, d.o 15.9.00, 
d.d 7.4.04, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/09/irp-00Q915-uzbekl .htni
624 Interview with Zukhriddin Khusnidinov
625 Having dedicated time and effort researching these two organisations it appears more likely that the 
IMU or a revived version o f  the IMU were responsible for this event. Throughout its existence in 
Central Asia, HT has never been engaged in acts o f  violence. This characteristic (amongst others) is
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this time extended to Karimov’s foreign friends. The American and Israeli embassies 
were targeted making this event the first instance where the centre of the conflict no 
longer revolved around the internal situation in Uzbekistan and Karimov’s growing 
authoritarianism, but also on Karimov’s foreign policy and a response to ‘the war on 
terror’ seen by many extremists as ‘a war on Islam’. This is an example when 
Central Asian Islamic organisations are affected by external Islamic influences.
HT appears to be the strongest Islamic organisation in Central Asia today. Unlike the 
IMU it has branches throughout the region and the broadest support base. The 
organisation is not homegrown and has its roots in the Middle East and headquarters in 
London. HT in Central Asia has a regional agenda and not a global one. Its concerns 
and objectives are bound to the region. Although HT globally advocates the creation 
on a worldwide Islamic caliphate, HT’s rhetoric in Central Asia is only aimed at 
Central Asia.627 Its centre of activity is in the Ferghana Valley, in particularly in the 
Uzbek section of the Valley. It has two characteristics that make it particularly 
appealing to impoverished and politically oppressed citizens. Unlike many Islamic 
extremist organisations it has never been involved in acts of violence (although the 
Karimov regime has tried to prove the opposite). According to people inside and 
outside Central Asia, it has never been involved in guerrilla activities, kidnappings or 
any acts of terror. It advocates itself through peaceful means. It inspires to spread 
Islam by slowly educating and enlightening people about Islam. It does so by 
spreading Islamic leaflets and booklets in the Ferghana Valley about the justice and 
equality that Islam can bring to society. HT does not like the idea of forcing Islam on a 
society; it believes that Islam should evolve from the bottom upward and not the other 
way round. Its objectives are to persuade society to accept the ideas it is spreading. It is 
believed that in 2006 the number of members in HT in Uzbekistan is from 10,000 to
fO Q15,000. HT is also open to the use of modern technology to spread its influence,
responsible for HT’s popularity in the region. It does not appear rational that HT would divert from its 
known objectives o f  peaceful Islamic struggle.
626 Svante E. Cornell, ‘Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic 
Movement o f  Uzbekistan’, Terrorism and Political V iolence, vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 632-633  
Interview with Mahmud Fahmi Hijazy, Dean: Professor, The Egyptian University for Islamic
Culture, Almaty, Novem ber 2005
628 Rashid, Jihad, p. 132
629 Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islam i’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 58, no. 2, March 2006, pp. 265-266
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such as the Internet. These signs of compatibility with the 21st century make it more 
appealing to the younger generations.630 “The party aims are the correct revival of the
631Umma through enlightened thought”.
HT’s mobilising powers became evident during the Andijan massacres in May 2005. 
The events that occurred in May 2005 in the Ferghana Valley revealed the strength of 
Islam with its competing influences more than any other event in recent Uzbek history. 
The violence was triggered by the trial of 23 businessmen in Andijan for belonging to 
‘Akramiya’, one of HT’s branch organisations. On 12 May gunmen stormed the jail 
where the businessmen were held and released everyone in prison. The next day a 
group of people gathered in the centre of Andijan against what they considered was the 
unfair treatment of these businessmen. As the day passed the atmosphere became more 
volatile and tense. It is believed that many of the protesters had gathered in the square 
not demanding the creation of an Islamic caliphate but asking for better social, political 
and economic conditions. It was the authorities’ reaction to this crowd that provoked 
Islamic resistance and behaviour in Andijan and other areas of the Ferghana Valley. It 
is estimated that over 500 innocent civilians, including women and children were 
killed in Andijan by the Uzbek authorities. It was no surprise that the Andijan events 
fuelled Islamic sentiments.
What happened in the city of Korasuv, another centre for HT activity, indicated the 
level of Islamicisation in the Ferghana Valley. It was also a reminder that although 
many in the country did not prefer the creation of an Islamic state, it remained an 
option at times better than what the Karimov regime was offering. Following the 
massacre at Andijan, a group of Islamic activists in Korasuv held an uprising and 
declared that they wanted to establish an Islamic administration based on the Koran.633 
The Uzbek army eventually recaptured the city and the Islamic uprising was crushed. 
Islam’s political influence had once again shown the extent of its strength.
630 Interview with Mahmud Fahmi Hijazy
631 HT official website, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english
632 ‘Uzbekistan: The Blood-Red Revolution’, The Economist. May l st-27th 2005, p. 67
633 Ian MacWilliam, ‘Uzbek Rebel Spells Out A im s’, BBC N EW S, d.o 18.5.05, d.d 20.4.06, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4558759.stm
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The second characteristic, which helps make HT popular with a wide support base, is 
its economic assistance and support to the impoverished population.634 This is a 
mobilising characteristic of many Islamic organisations (Hamas is a good example of 
this). HT does not have the same level of economic resources as some Islamic 
organisations in the Middle East but what it does provide earns it respect and 
adherence from the local population. Many of its high-ranking members (especially in 
the Ferghana Valley) own small businesses, and provide employment to the people of 
the town. HT members also collect donations after Friday prayers or important Islamic 
festivals and distribute them to the poorest and most needy.
Tabligh Jamaat is another Islamic organisation, which is particularly active in 
Uzbekistan. It does not have the same level of popularity as the other organisations 
discussed above, but is becoming a growing threat to the Uzbek regime. The 
organisation’s roots are in India, and it was first introduced to Uzbekistan in the 
1970’s. It aims to encourage people to follow the norms of Islam as stated in the 
Koran; in the past few years it has attracted many that are opposed to the Karimov 
regime.636
Kyrgyzstan
Islamic extremism and political Islam have been on the rise in Kyrgyzstan regardless 
of the high levels of Russification in the north of the country. As mentioned above, 
part of the Ferghana Valley is also situated in Kyrgyzstan and shares many of the 
social, economic and political conditions as in the Uzbek part of the Valley. Korasuv, 
for example, lies very close to the Kyrgyz borders and many Islamic activists fled to 
Kyrgyzstan as a result of the Andijan massacres. There exist between two to three 
thousand HT members in Kyrgyzstan; HT has even been reported to be functioning in 
the north of the country as well. As with the case in Uzbekistan, the secular 
authoritarian regime of Akayev and the increasing similar one of Bakiyev are the
634 The sources o f  HT’s finances are unknown. The organisation has a strong hierarchical system, 
therefore only those at the very top know where the money com es from.
635 Interview with Mahmud Fahmi Hijazy
636 Gulnoza Saidazimova, ‘Uzbekistan: Tabligh Jamaat Group Added to Uzbek Government’s 
Blacklist’, Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, d.o 20.12.04, d.d 23.4.06, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/6ebc842e-4779
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reasons for the rise in Islamic extremism and the strength in Islam’s political 
influence.637 In the city of Osh in the Ferghana Valley, HT members stand in market 
places and talk about the corruptness of Bakiyev regime, and how an Islamic regime 
would be able to deal with the hardships of Kyrgyz life in ways the government has 
proved unable to. This kind of talk often attracts half a dozen people to stand and listen 
to the benefits of political Islam.
Kazakhstan
Islam’s political influence in Kazakhstan is not as strong as the two countries 
mentioned above. Kazakhstan has better social and economic conditions than any of its 
neighbours; this reduces the risks of collective grievance, which inspires Islamic 
extremism. Kazakhstan also has a mild Islamic legacy and does not border the 
Ferghana Valley. In spite of this there is some HT activity in Kazakhstan, especially in 
the south of the country in and near Uzbek-populated Chimkent. In addition, the threat 
of political Islam gaining strong influence in any of the other Central Asian countries 
is also a risk to Kazakhstan as Islamic organisations could spill over into Kazakhstan. 
It was particularly alarming for the Kazakh government to discover that members of 
Tabligh Jamaat functioned in the country.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country where an Islamic organisation is not only 
legal but constitutes part of the government. The role of the IRP in the Tajik 
government has already been covered in the chapter related to the internal politics of 
the region. The IRP is neither a purely Tajik organisation (like the IMU is for 
Uzbekistan), nor a word-wide Islamic organisation like HT. It is a regional Islamic 
organisation, present predominantly in Tajikistan but also in other Central Asian 
countries and Russia. The roots of the IRP in Tajikistan can be traced back to the
637 Igor Rotar, Interview with Sadykzhan Kumuluddin, President o f  the Islamic Centre o f  the Republic 
o f  Kyrgyzstan and Former Mufti, The Jamestown Foundation, d.o 3.12.04, d.d 23.4.06, 
http://jamestown.org/news details.php?news id=34
638 Interview with Iris Beybutova, November 2005
639 A lex A lexiev, ‘Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions’, Middle East Forum: Middle East 
Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005, http://www.meforum.org/article/686
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Basmachis. Other than those reviving the Basmachi ideology, members of the 
organisation include the unofficial ulema that was forced underground during the 
Soviet period, the official ulema, and Sufi followers.640
The civil war in Tajikistan became the most striking evidence of how Islam’s cultural 
and political influences could play a pivotal role in plunging a country into civil war. 
The role of the IRP was an example to other Central Asian countries that Islam had the 
potential of shaking the political and social structures of a country. According to 
Olimova, “even though Islam failed to over-ride the internal Tajik division, a radical 
politicised Islam emerged out of the crisis as the most effective opposition force”.641 
The eventual legalisation of the IRP served as a good example of how to tame Islamic 
organisation.
Throughout the civil war, the IRP had a wide range of members in its ranks. There 
were those that promoted Islamic extremism, violence and the creation of an Islamic 
state, and those that were more concerned with spreading a moderate and spiritual 
form of Islam. The latter group of people, led by Nuri, became the representatives of 
the IRP after the civil war. Although Rahmonov’s elite has persistently tried to limit 
the political scope of the IRP, it has remained a relatively strong alternative to the 
Rahmonov regime. In addition, it has also developed a socio-economic development 
programme aimed at providing aid, support and advice to women and the youth. The 
IRP has become living evidence of how an Islamic party, with a legitimate political 
role, can function in a secular state.642
Turkmenistan
Although Turkmenistan has all the social, political and economic malaise that have 
contributed to the evolution of Islamic extremism and political Islam in some of the 
Central Asian countries, Islamic influences appear to be mild. This is a phenomenon
Rashid, Jihad, pp. 95-96
641 Saodat Olimova, ‘Islam and the Tajik Conflict’, in Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower (eds.), 
Islam and Central A sia. Washington, D.C, 2000
642 Saodat Olimova and Muzaffar Olimov, ‘The Islamic Renaissance Party’, Conciliation Resources, d.d 
21.4.06, http://www.c-r.org/accord/taiik/accord 10/islamic.shtml
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that has remains relatively unexplained, especially when one considers the rise of 
Islam as a power not only in Central Asia but also globally. There are a variety of 
reasons, which provide an explanation for Turkmenistan’s immunity to political and 
extremist Islam. A strong Islamic legacy does not exist amongst the traditionally 
nomadic people of the country. Ethnic and tribal loyalties still very much exist in 
Turkmenistan; this has inevitably diluted the mobilising effect of Islam. Turkmenistan 
does not border the Ferghana Valley and although this country borders Afghanistan, its 
experience as a Soviet Republic has limited the influence of Islam on culture, making 
it years behind the levels of Islamicisation in Afghanistan. Niyazov’s policies to isolate 
Turkmenistan and the Turkmen people have also contributed to this country being 
sheltered from Islamic influences. While other Central Asian countries provoked 
Islamic extremists by supporting the war on terror, by either just saying they supported 
it, sending troops to Iraq or allowing American military bases to be set up on their soil, 
Niyazov remained neutral on this issue.643 Niyazov’s complete manipulation of all 
state apparatus, total domination of his population and the merging of anything related 
to Islam with the state (which revolves around him) has made Islamic influences hard 
to research. If they exist they are very much underground, and secretive. This does not 
mean they will remain this way forever. In regards to Islamic extremism and political 
Islam in Turkmenistan, only time will tell the magnitude of influence.
643 Swati Parashar, ‘Turkmenistan: A Central Asian State without Religious Extremism’, Observer 
Research Foundation, d.o 30.9.04, d.d 1.5.06, http://observerindia.com/analvsis/A275.htm
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6.5 External Islamic Influences on Central Asia: The Impact of 
Afghanistan and the Arab Countries on Politics and Society in 
Central Asia
As previously discussed in this chapter there are a variety of factors, which have 
contributed to the rise of Islamic awareness in Central Asia. Although this thesis 
argues that the growth of Islamic influences is mainly a result of internal factors in 
Central Asia, this section shows how external Islamic influences have also played a 
role in the Islamicisation of Central Asia. This section will look at the Taliban as an 
external Islamic influence and also at other external Islamic influences coming from 
the Arab world.
The Taliban’s shadow over Central Asia did not only encourage a wave of Islamic 
awareness, and support Islamic extremist movements; in some countries it also 
contributed to the further political crackdown on civil liberties in the name of 
combating extremism and terrorism. Therefore, the Taliban regime had an effect on 
most of the ruling elites of Central Asia as well as on society. In addition, the Taliban 
have been weakened but not defeated; their underground existence still contributes to 
the unstable situation in the region. The continued struggle for survival of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan is portrayed regularly through their frequent attacks on American 
forces.644
The Taliban found their roots in an Islamic school in Pakistan, which encouraged a 
school of thought called ‘deobandism’. The movement’s triumph with the Afghan 
people was a result of many years of civil war, instability and profound frustration. 
The exhausted Afghan people were ready to accept the strictest forms of discipline if 
security was guaranteed.645 Instability and people’s desperate need for security and
644 AlJazeera.Net. ‘Blast Hits US Convoy in Afghanistan’, d.o 13.6.05, d.d 13.6.05, 
http://english.aliazeera.net/NR/exeres/992881 D A-6406-4
645 Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A M odem  History. London, N ew  York, 2002, p.78
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peace brought the Taliban to power. This is a lesson the Central Asian leaders should 
examine thoroughly; the more desolate the main bulk of the population is, the more 
likely they are to adopt desperate measures to alleviate the imbroglio they live in. 
Although there exist many similarities between the Afghans and the Central Asians, 
there exists one great difference, which makes them very distinct from one another. 
The effects of Russification in all its forms have created an environment, which has 
helped repel the Islamic influence of the Taliban. Peter Marsden supports this point 
when he argues that the Soviet experience in Central Asia has created a different 
society to the one that exists in Afghanistan.646 It has been argued that the Taliban 
regime, and their protection of Al-Qaida has triggered a ‘new cold war’. A conflict 
between the west (mainly the USA) and the Islamic world has unfolded post 
September 11 (although the origins of this run back for decades).647 This issue is of 
relevance to this section, and to Central Asia because it cannot be assumed that 
because this region is so deeply Russified, it will remain immune to the wave of 
Islamicisation affecting most of the Muslim world.
The collapse of Najibullah’s regime in Afghanistan in 1992, and the start of the Tajik 
civil war marked the start of a period of intense Russian and Central Asian fear 
regarding the rise of Islamic movements and extremist organisations. Throughout the 
early 1990’s most leaders in the region feared that extremism and fundamentalism 
would spread from one country to another like a contagious disease. From the three 
Central Asian countries that border Afghanistan (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan), Uzbekistan was the most concerned and active in protecting its borders 
with Afghanistan. Karimov feared that if the Taliban controlled Afghanistan then there 
would be floods of Afghani refugees trying to gain access to Uzbekistan and other 
parts of Central Asia. His main fear focused on the religious influences these refugees 
would bring with them. He knew that this form of imported Islamicisation would be 
welcomed amongst certain Islamists in his country.648
646 Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan. Cape Town, Kuala Lumpur, N ew  
Delhi, 2002, p. 143
647 Fred Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences. 
London, 2002, p.36
648 Anthony Hyman, ‘Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban’, in William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism  
Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. London, 2001, pp. 110-111
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In 1996 a new stage of concern over the rise of the Taliban emerged. This was a result 
of the Taliban’s victory in Kabul. An emergency meeting followed in Almaty in 
October 1996 of four Central Asian presidents (Niyazov did not attend), and the 
Russian prime minister (ETtsin was ill). This further highlights the joint security 
concerns that bind Russia and Central Asia. This was one of the first incidents where 
Russia and the Central Asian countries openly spoke about combating the threat to 
‘regional stability’. The participants of the Almaty meeting issued a warning to the 
Taliban not to expand beyond the borders of Afghanistan.649 The Almaty meeting was 
evidence that Russian and the Central Asian leaders, were by far more troubled over 
the emergence of a strong Islamic organisation than any other regional or western 
country. This fear further intensified in 1997/1998, when the Taliban triumphed in 
Mazar i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan.
The Tashkent bombings in 1999, and the IMU incursions on Batken in 1999 and 2000 
aimed at toppling the Karimov regime, marked the escalating power of the Taliban. 
Although the Taliban cannot be blamed for Karimov’s increasingly repressive 
measures against Islamic and non-Islamic movements (which also contributed to these 
incidents), they can be given partial responsibility for Karimov’s paranoia in regards to 
the rise of political Islam in Uzbekistan. The IMU is not a creation of the Taliban, but 
its strength can be attributed to the support it received from Afghanistan. After the 
Tajik civil war ended, Afghanistan was used by the IMU as a safe haven and training 
ground for offensives into Uzbekistan. The two incursions on Batken (discussed in the 
previous section) would have been harder to implement had it not been for the aid 
given to them by the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Yuldeshev, the IMU leader, had come into 
contact with the Taliban in 1997, and was certain that they would help, and train his 
organisation against the Uzbek government. Not only did the IMU and the Taliban 
share similar beliefs regarding the creation of an Islamic state, they both had to gain 
from the downfall of the Karimov regime, which had declared itself anti-Taliban and 
had supported the anti-Taliban opposition.650 The IMU’s contact with Bin Laden651 
(thanks to the Taliban) have given it a calibre of training that it would have otherwise
649 ibid. p. 106
650 Rashid, Jihad, pp. 147-148
651 Rohan Gunaratna, ‘A l-Q aeda’, in Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (eds.), Global Responses to 
Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. N ew  York. London, 2003, p.37
263
never have achieved. A combination of Karimov’s continued radical authoritarianism 
and the IMU’s professional training has kept this notorious and feared Islamic 
organisation still alive in the region.
The Taliban regime and the civil war in Tajikistan are regularly associated together-as 
if the latter was a result of the former. It has often been argued in Moscow and in the 
Central Asian capitals that the events in Afghanistan had a direct impact on the Tajik 
civil war and on the events in Andijan in May 2005. It has been more convenient for 
the Central Asian governments to put the blame on Kabul, than find reasons that they 
were responsible for.652 Moscow on the other hand has not wished to antagonise any of 
the regimes by putting the blame on them either. The IRP undisputedly had links with 
the ethnic Tajik Mujahiddin (especially Massoud), and many of its members had been 
profoundly influenced by the war in Afghanistan. In 1995, one of the UTO’s 
headquarters was in Afghanistan; from there they frequently launched guerrilla attacks 
on the Tajik government. The ethnic Tajik Mujahiddin and the IRP had similar 
ideological motives, motives that were more concerned with fighting a communist 
styled regime than the spread of Wahhabism. Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby 
connect these two groups when they say, “In many ways the Tajik opposition 
correlated with Afghan resistance”. There were also those in the IRP with more 
fanatic views. After the peace agreement in 1997, which ended the civil war, those 
members created the IMU.
Today the IRP has proved to be a moderate Islamic party willing to live in a secular 
state so long as it is legal, and has a voice in government matters. The IRP is and 
always has been a completely different Islamic organisation to the IMU, HT and the 
Taliban. Other Islamic parties have not offered room for compromise, nor have other 
Central Asian governments. There was also fear that the floods of refugees from 
Afghanistan might help spread religious ideas.654 Rahmonov was angered by the
652 Hyman, ‘Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban’, p. 104
653 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah. Marx, and Muiahid. Boulder, Colorado, 
Oxford, 2002, p. 175
654 Bahar Jalali, ‘Islam as a Political Force in Central A sia’, International Research and Exchanges 
Board, d.o 27.1.00, d.d 17.6.05, http://www.irex.org/pubs/policv/islam.asp
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international community’s lack of interest with what was happening in his country.655 
This is one of the reasons that further bind Tajikistan to Russia. Russia’s military aid 
and peace negotiations helped pull the country out of further turmoil.
Although Kyrgyzstan does not share a border with Afghanistan it is a country prone to 
Islamicisation. The prominent divide between the north and south, in terms of the 
effects of Russification and Islamic awareness, have caused much concern to Bishkek. 
This was further intensified with the increasing power of the Taliban. Bishkek’s main 
area of concern was the Gorno-Badakhshan region in Tajikistan, which provides a 
buffer zone between Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. It was a region notoriously known 
for being congested with Tajik Islamic fighters.656
Akayev’s concern regarding the stability of his country was further intensified after the 
fall of Mazar i-Sharif, and the apparent collapse of the anti-Taliban forces. He 
immediately called an emergency meeting for the other Central Asian leaders and 
Russia. At this meeting it was decided that joint military forces and security chiefs
AS 7would make a tour inspection on the Kyrgyz Osh region in the Ferghana Valley.
Akayev’s fears regarding the safety of his country from the Islamic threat in 
Afghanistan became a reality in the summer of 1999 and 2000. Kyrgyzstan was 
targeted by the IMU, which was being protected and nourished by the Taliban, as a 
route for gaining access to Uzbekistan. The Batken incidents (already discussed in this 
chapter) automatically made the Taliban regime of grave concern to Kyrgyzstan. 
Batken was evolving into a recruiting ground for the IMU. It became the location 
where Kyrgyz extremists found their way to Taliban and IMU camps.658 The Taliban 
regime, even though it did not border all Central Asian countries, was bound to have a 
limited but noticeable impact on most of the region.
655 Hyman, ‘Russia, Central Asian and the Taliban’, p. 109
656 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise o f  the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilisation. Civil War, and the 
Future o f  the Region (hereafter The Rise o f  the Taliban in Afghanistan). N ew  York, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, 2002, p. 190
657 Hyman, ‘Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban’, p .l 12
658 Rashid, Jihad, p. 162
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As the power of the Taliban became more prominent, the worries of an Islamic spill 
over or ideological seep into Central Asia became a growing concern for all the 
Central Asian leaders-all but Niyazov. Niyazov’s lack of concern in regards to the 
volatile and fanatic Islamic force growing next door to Turkmenistan is a further 
reflection of how disillusioned he is with his own power.
Niyazov officially took a neutral position towards the Taliban and abstained from the 
meeting in Almaty. Turkmen officials insisted that the growing force of the Taliban 
was not expected to create any complications for Turkmenistan.659 Niyazov repeatedly 
stated that not only do the Turkmen people and the Afghan people have fraternal and 
historic ties, but also that his country had a good relationship with the Taliban and 
consequently refuses to meddle in Afghan internal affairs.660 Turkmenistan’s only sign 
of concern with the Taliban occurred after September 11. It was perhaps only at this 
stage that Niyazov realised that the threat the Taliban and Al-Qaida had emitted had 
not only been regional but global as well. At this stage he supported the formation of a 
permanent UN body under strict guidelines and clear goals to combat the activities of 
the Taliban and Al-Qaida. He refused to allow the USA to conduct military operations 
against Afghanistan from his country.661
There were other advantages for Niyazov in recognising the Taliban regime and 
refusing to join the anti-Taliban coalition, which Russia and the other Central Asian 
countries had helped set up. Niyazov’s firm relationship with Russia (this has been 
discussed in the chapter dealing with Russian influences in Central Asia) has not 
stopped the Turkmenbashi from wanting to divert his energy exports away from 
Russia, and towards other markets. Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkmenistan 
was the only Central Asian country willing to woo the Taliban in order to guarantee 
the development of the Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan pipeline (already discussed in 
chapter 5).662
659 Hyman, ‘Russia, Central Asia and the Taliban’, p .l 12
660 Marsden, The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan, p. 138
661 Shams-Ud-Din and Bhaswati Sarkar, Afghanistan and Central Asia in the N ew  Great Game. N ew  
Delhi, 2003, p. 144
662 Rashid, Taliban, p. 152
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Kazakhstan appeared to be the country least affected by the Taliban regime. Unlike the 
other four Central Asian countries, it neither shares a border with Afghanistan nor has 
regions where extremism flourishes, such as in the Ferghana Valley. It is one of the 
most linguistically and behaviorally Russified countries in Central Asia, and the least 
Islamic. The fear, however, was not that Islamic movements would suddenly evolve in 
Kazakhstan, but that the Taliban’s influence over the more religious Central Asian 
countries and Islamic organisations would eventually infiltrate into Kazakh society. 
Astana regarded the Taliban issue as a regional problem, and not only a threat to the 
countries it was most prone to influence. Nazarbayev was so alarmed at the Taliban’s
/ /T
elevation to power, that he hosted the Almaty meeting after the fall of Kabul.
Other Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East, have had external Islamic 
influences on the region as well. After independence, as seen in the literature written 
soon after 1991,664 the Middle East was predicted to have a large impact on the 
development of the region because of the religious ties. Later literature places less 
emphasis on the Middle East and Central Asia and it became evident that Middle 
Eastern Islamic influences were limited. Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia have undeniably played a role in the Islamic revival of the region, but their 
efforts have not resulted in major change. Countries like Egypt are geographically far, 
and do not have the financial means to get heavily involved in the Islamic revival of 
Central Asia. In addition, the Egypt government is facing its own problems with the 
Islamic Brotherhood. Projects such as the creation of the Egyptian Islamic University 
in Almaty have developed between the Egyptian and Kazakh governments and are 
examples of government controlled Middle Eastern Islamic influences. These kinds of 
influences tend to have less radicalising affects, and certainly do not encourage 
political or extremist Islam. Arab countries have played a large role in offering Islamic 
education to Central Asia students. Alima Bissenova gives a good account of this in 
chapter 3 and the problems that can arise as a result of mixed Russian and Islamic 
identities.665 Since independence a large number of Central Asians have travelled to 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo to learn about Islam. These individuals return home
663 Mehrotra, Taliban and the Afghan Turmoil, p. 110
664 See footnote 16 as an example.
665 See footnote 195
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bringing with them Islamic influences from the Middle East, which can slowly affect 
the culture of their society.666
As a result of its financial means, Saudi Arabia has played a considerable role in the 
revival of Islam in Central Asia. The Saudi Arabian government and Saudi Arabian 
wealthy individuals have played a role in this. After independence some of the Central 
Asian leaders were eager to form ties with the Islamic Kingdom in the hope of 
receiving financial assistance. The Central Asian leaders were willing to allow the 
Saudi government to ship millions of Korans to the region and to construct numerous 
religious establishments and madrassas.667 In the early 1990’s and in 1999, the Saudi 
government paid all expenses for those who wanted to go on the holy pilgrimage to 
Mecca.668
The main Islamic threat coming from Saudi Arabia was from missionaries. These 
missionaries flocked to the region to preach and open schools. At first they were 
welcomed, later the Central Asian authorities realised the radicalising affects these 
people were having on their population and put entry restrictions on them or expelled 
them 669
One of the most radicalising external Islamic influences has come in the form of 
Wahhabism. The origins of this movement come from Saudi Arabia and have had 
some impact on Central Asian politics and society. During the Soviet-Afghan war, 
many Arab volunteers went to Afghanistan to help fight the Soviets. They reached 
Afghanistan through Muslim Brotherhood networks funded by Saudi Arabia. In the 
1990’s some of the most religious movements became even more radicalised and anti- 
western. These were the movements that Arab volunteers came in contact with when 
they travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan after the collapse of the USSR. These 
volunteers became further radicalised once in Afghanistan and have consequently
666 Shirin Akiner, ‘The Contestation o f  Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia (hereafter ‘The Contestation o f  
Islam’), in Hannah Carter and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Middle East’s Relations with Asia 
and Russia. London, N ew  York, 2004, p. 86
667 Martha Brill Olcott, Central A sia’s N ew  States: Independence. Foreign Policy and Regional Security. 
Washington, D.C, 1996, pp. 31-33
668 Akiner, ‘The Contestation o f  Islam’, p. 86
669 ibid. p. 87
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played a large role in Wahhabi teaching in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. 
The education funding has almost entirely come from Saudi Arabian sources.
Saudi Arabia was also eager to lead the way in the Islamic revival of the region out of 
fear that Iran may get involved. The Iranian clerics were aware that they could not 
export an Iranian styled revolution to Central Asia for a variety of reasons and 
exhibited caution in their relationship with Central Asia, even towards the ethnically 
Persian Tajiks.671 Iran realised that building Shia Islam in a deeply Sovietized, 
predominantly Sunni region was almost impossible. In addition it was concerned not to 
antagonise Russia.
670 Olivier Roy, ‘Present Patterns o f  Islamism in Central A sia’, in Carter and Ehteshami (eds.), The 
Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia, p.61
671 Graham E. Fuller, ‘The Impact o f  Central Asia on the Middle East’, in David Menashri (ed.), Central 
Asia Meets the Middle East. London, Portland, OR, 1998, pp. 220-236
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6.6 Conclusion
As shown in this chapter, Islam holds its power on Central Asia through its cultural 
and political influences. The strength and gradual growth of secular Islam is a sign of 
the importance of Islam on Central Asian society. Section 6.2 shows how secular Islam 
is becoming more prominent in Central Asia (to a lesser extent in Turkmenistan). This 
form of Islamic evolution is particularly striking for Kazakhstan and northern 
Kyrgyzstan, which do not have a strong historic Islamic culture. It shows how even the 
least Islamicised countries in the region are increasingly interacting with Islam and 
how symbols of religion are regularly seen and felt in everyday life. Secular Islam in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan is more firmly consolidated. It plays a 
stronger role on people’s identity and the ways they behave, dress etc. The real status 
of Islam in Turkmenistan, both secular and political, is harder to detect because of the 
severe restrictions on individual freedom.
As previously stated the secular Islamicisation of society can play a role in the 
development of more extreme Islam and an increased tolerance to political Islam, 
especially if political Islam does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic 
caliphate. In addition, the regimes, and their way of governing has contributed to the 
escalation of a more extreme and politicised Islam as an alternative to the status quo. 
This has escalated the position of Islam and given it competing influences capable of 
leading Central Asian society and politics. This is particularly the case in Uzbekistan 
where secular Islam is strong and is coupled with a regime that encourages militancy 
through the treatment of its population. Islamic organisations have been the most 
active in Uzbekistan; consequently control of extremism and fundamentalism in this 
country could help limit the spread of extremism and fundamentalism in the region. 
The severe conditions in the Ferghana Valley and its history of being the core of 
Islamic activity means that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also under strong Islamic 
influences. External Islamic influences should not be exaggerated, as they are not the 
main trigger for the increased Islamicisation of the region; however, the Taliban and 
Saudi Arabia have added to the strength of Islam in Central Asia.
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7.0 Conclusion
7.1 Cooperation or Competition?
The objective of this thesis has been to determine whether Russian, Islamic or 
American influences have been the strongest since 1991. Central Asia, since the early 
years of its independence, has found itself once again host to different influences 
battling one another in order to prevail as the most powerful and determining force in 
the region. This thesis argues that the ‘new great game’ between Russian, Islamic and 
American influences in Central Asia evolved in the mid to late 1990’s and not after the 
war on terror as commonly thought. Therefore, from the early years of independence, 
competition and not cooperation has been the underlying tendency amongst the 
competing powers. This thesis shows how the rivalry for influence in Central Asia was 
present long before the war on terror, which witnessed only a brief period of 
cooperation between the USA and Russia in order to defeat the common threat in 
Afghanistan. This was a brief time of agreement in an era characterised by 
competition.
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in an array of speculations regarding which 
powers would become influential in the newly-independent ‘Islamic’ former Soviet 
Republics. By the mid-1990’s, Russia and the USA had surfaced as potential players in 
Central Asia, and contrary to speculation neither Iran nor Turkey appeared to have had 
a strong influence over any of the Central Asian countries. Therefore, Islamic 
influences in this thesis mainly refer to domestic Islam, manifesting internally, 
although there are also some external Islamic influences affecting the region. Islam 
showed its force and the effects it could have on not only particular Central Asian 
countries but on the entire region throughout the Tajik civil war. The civil war in 
Tajikistan was one of the first indications that Islam could develop into a power 
capable of having a profound affect on the development of the region.
This thesis has identified these three powers as the main players in Central Asia for 
reasons discussed in the introduction and throughout the different chapters. ‘Influence’ 
as far as this work is concerned, relates to security, politics, economics and culture. In
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order to assess which power is strongest in the region, it has been essential to look at 
how Russia, Islam and the USA have interacted in the security, political, economic and 
cultural spheres of each country and amongst different strata of the population. This is 
how this thesis measures competing influences. Therefore, this thesis has given a 
method by which to measure influences and a definition of what is meant by 
influences. This thesis not only compares two primarily external powers with an 
internal power but also shows how external powers can have internal effects. 
Therefore this thesis contributes in showing how Islam is an equal competitor to the 
two external powers in the ‘new great game’.
As previously stated, this thesis does not regard China as a ‘power’ at the same level of 
competition as Russia, Islam and the USA. China is undisputably becoming more and 
more prominent in the Central Asian economic and energy fields, in addition to having 
a lot of influence over the SCO, which is growing in size and importance in the 
political, security and economic spheres. In spite of this, this thesis argues that China 
will limit its rivalry with Russia over Central Asia so long as the USA is a power with 
competing influences in the region. Both Russia and China prioritise marginalising and 
limiting American influences. So long as they have this in common they are less likely 
to look at one another as rivals. In addition, although Chinese economic influences are 
growing in the region, there still remains a lot of suspicion regarding Chinese political 
influences. The Central Asian leaders look at Russia as a buffer against Chinese 
political influences. The Central Asian population in general is also not accustomed to 
Chinese culture and language. What remains to be seen is whether any Central Asian 
country will look to China as a guarantee against increasing Russian influences, 
similar to how Uzbekistan looked to America until the Andijan incident.
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7.2 Summary of Chapters
In order to justify the conclusion of which power has been the most prominent in the 
region since 1991, it is first essential to reiterate the separate conclusions of each 
chapter, which have resulted in the final assessment of which direction the Central 
Asian countries appear to have taken.
7.2.1 The Internal Politics of the Central Asian Countries
As this thesis is concerned with politics it was essential to start research with the 
internal political situation of each Central Asian country. Although this chapter is 
concerned with democratisation and why it failed, it starts by examining the effects of 
perestroika on Central Asia. From this early stage, when most of the other Soviet 
Republics and Eastern Europe were rejoicing from breaking away from the Russian 
sphere of influence, Central Asia was not. Russia had not only been responsible for 
creating the five Central Asian states, it had also conducted their political affairs. By 
the time of independence little was known of how to run different governmental 
infrastructures and foreign policy affairs. The lack of a strong national identity has 
been one of the reasons why democratisation failed in the region. In many ways, it 
appeared that the collapse of the USSR had created far more problems than the 
benefits independence brought with it.
This chapter discusses what is needed for the success of democratisation and gives 
reasons for its failure in all five countries. Political parties are discussed, as is their 
lack of focus and clear understanding of nationhood. This was a result of the creation 
of Central Asia by the Soviet Union and the lack of any previous experience of nation 
building. Many of the national and democratic movements that evolved after 
independence lacked direction and were unable to maintain popular support. There was 
no pressure from below for these movements to set up a clear national agenda as a 
result of the populations’ lack of national consciousness. In addition, tribal and clan 
loyalties remained at times stronger than national sentiments.
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The lack of nationalism not only affected the population and the success of political 
parties; it also had an impact on the elites. The elites did not want to democratize as 
this threatened to weaken their power base. All the Central Asian leaders are product 
of the Soviet Union and are surrounded by like-minded people. The growth of 
authoritarianism and the continuation of political systems based on the Soviet political 
model have increased Russian political influences in the region. All these factors have 
largely contributed to the failure of democratisation.
Thus this chapter looks at the efforts made towards democratisation and gives reasons 
for its ultimate failure. Although each country is distinctly different in the way it 
conducts foreign policy, in its national concerns, ethnic composition, economic 
potential, levels of Islamicisation and levels of democratisation, there still remain 
fundamental links that affect and encompass the entire region. Each country must be 
looked at separately in terms of how the different influences play out; it is also 
essential to remember that these influences interact from country to country and affect 
the region. This chapter introduces the internal political dynamics and internal 
structure of the Central Asian countries, which aids in the analysis of why certain 
influences are more successful in some countries than in others.
This chapter, therefore, draws attention to the dependence of the Central Asian 
countries on Russia before independence and their difficulties in adapting to the status 
quo after the collapse of the USSR. Their lack of interest in independence, and the 
fragility of their political systems have showed that there was no real alternative to the 
traditions left by the Soviet period. Independence came at the wrong time, with no 
distinct political figures or movements offering to lead the way.
7.2.2 Russian Influences in Central Asia
The different branches of Russian influences are analysed here. This chapter is the 
most complex and the longest as a result of the depth of Russian influences in Central 
Asia. In addition, Russia’s role in the region is by far more researched than Islamic and 
American influences, although there still remain some research weaknesses. It is 
important to point out that Russia’s cultural influence is the branch of Russian 
influences which is generally poorly researched. Not enough emphasis is placed on the
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importance of Russification on Central Asian culture. Often when Russification is 
discussed is refers to linguistic Russification, which is usually not given the 
importance it deserves. Officially there are limits to the use of the Russian language, 
but unofficially Russian is not only the language used by most government 
representatives, between Central Asian countries but also between the Central Asians 
in one country; the levels of this vary considerable from country to country. The wide 
use of the Russian language is a strong indication of Russia’s status in Central Asia. In 
this chapter, however, the main contribution to the importance of Russification is the 
attention given to behavioral Russification, which refers to the Russified identity of a 
large bulk of the Central Asian population. This will be discussed in more detail 
below.
The first section of this chapter covers the Russian Empire’s involvement in the region. 
The most important point to remember during this period is that the Russian Empire 
was not seen as an invader, especially in areas such as in modern-day Kazakhstan. In 
other areas of modem day Central Asia, they met with little resistance; therefore, 
Russia’s first contact with modern-day Central Asia was not associated with conquest, 
as in other areas incorporated into the Russian Empire. The USSR’s incorporation of 
Central Asia not only saw the creation of five separate countries, but also symbolised 
an era of modernisation and education. The Russian and Soviet Empire’s experience in 
Central Asia contributes to the long and common history between Russia and the 
Central Asian countries, characterised by more positive Russian contributions to the 
region than negative. This is a period of history which although thoroughly researched 
cannot go unmentioned as it provides an explanation to why Central Asia’s 
relationship with Moscow differed to other regions also incorporated into the Russian 
and Soviet spheres.
The next section in this chapter refers to the core of what has made Russia the most 
wanted and prevailing influence over the region, and a challenge to all those that try to 
usurp its role. This section deals with both linguistic and behavioral Russification and 
makes distinctions between Sovietization and Russification. Central Asia has been 
profoundly influenced by Russian culture, mentality and general way of conduct. 
Limits on linguistic Russification have been attempted because linguistic Russification
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can easily be identified. Behavioral Russification has often gone unnoticed, and has 
not previously been defined. This phenomenon has given both Central Asians and 
Russians a similar way of conduct, therefore a similar identity. Behavioral 
Russification is a profound contributor and asset to Russia remaining the most 
dominant power in Central Asia; it has affected all strata of the population, including 
those that are openly Muslim or Westernised.
Security also forms a pillar in Russian influences in Central Asia; it is an influence, 
which has faced strong competition from the USA, especially after September 11. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Russia has fought back to maintain its role as a prominent 
security provider. It is responsible for the creation of organisations such as the CST, 
which developed into the CSTO. Regardless of the actual efficiency of regional 
defence organisations and anti-terrorist centres led by Russia, they appear to offer a 
better alternative to the non-Russian ones, which have proved totally inefficient, such 
as Centrasbat. The SCO, which is headed by Russia and China, is officially aimed at 
fighting extremism, terrorism and separatism. It is not only responsible for providing 
security; it also promotes greater economic cooperation between member states. This 
organisation is gradually growing in prominence. The S5 was not formally created 
until 1997; in 2001 it underwent its first major evolution and became know as the 
SCO. Since America reinstated its role in Central Asia, following the events of 
September 11, the SCO has been increasingly seen as an alliance between Russia and 
China aimed, amongst other things, to limit the increasing American influences in the 
region. The SCO’s tasks are becoming more and more multi-vectored, and it is 
becoming one of the most important and effective regional organisations.
Despite America’s role in defeating the Taliban regime, which had become a serious 
security threat to Central Asian security and stability, Russia has remained active and 
central in Central Asian security. Although China is becoming more prominent in 
Central Asian affairs, it will not challenge Russia’s role so long as the Americans 
remain a common threat. In addition, Russian and Central Asian security is more 
interlinked than that of American or Chinese security with Central Asia. The question 
of security in this chapter is not only related to Russia providing security to Central 
Asia, but also with the role Central Asia plays in the security of Russia. The main
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question this section asks is why it has been so important for Russian security to 
remain influential in Central Asia? Keeping the region immune from extremism is one 
of Moscow’s main priorities. This section, therefore, examines the links between 
Chechen and Central Asian extremists. The links found between these groups have 
made Central Asia essential for Russia’s national and security interests. Russia’s 
intervention in the Tajik civil war was an issue of Russian security as much as it was a 
solution to stabilise Tajikistan. Extremism in Central Asia is a threat to Russia and its 
population of around 20 million Muslims. This chapter also challenges the term 
international terrorism when referring to Central Asian groups, and gives reasons why 
this applies more to organisations such as Al-Qaida. Islamic extremist movements do 
not all speak through one voice. Chechen extremists and the IMU can coordinate their 
activities because they function in the same region- this could be called regional 
terrorism. It would be very difficult to find links between the IMU and extremist 
movements in the Middle East, each have their own political agenda and their own 
distinct objectives. Putin and Bush both use the term international terrorism to justify 
their policies, although Russia’s war on terror appears to be more regional than global; 
this is an area that very much separates Russian objectives from American. They are 
each fighting extremism in their own way, and have different enemies in mind. This is 
very much characterised by their very different relationship with Iran.
The USA’s increased military presence in Central Asia prompted Putin to act quickly 
to reinstate Russia’s military involvement in the region. Russia felt threatened that 
American military presence was going to facilitate the USA’s dominance of Central 
Asia. Russia’s military deployment in Bishkek and Dushanbe were a direct response to 
K2 and Manas airbases. Putin was not going to allow the USA an advantage over 
Russia in any sphere related to Central Asia. As a result two parallel security branches 
have taken shape in Central Asia, each one trying to outdo the other. The Russian 
security presence is an indication that although Russia’s role globally has been 
thwarted by the USA, Russia will not let this happen regionally. This has also helped 
Putin demonstrate to his people (and the world) that Russia remains a great power.
Russia’s interest in Central Asia also derives from the existence of a large number of 
ethnic Russians in the Central Asian countries. Russia feels it has a duty to protect its
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people in the former Soviet Republics. Critics of Russian foreign policy argue that this 
has given Russia an excuse to control the political orientations of countries with a large 
Russian population. The minorities card can be a useful tool for Russia to impose its 
influence over certain countries, especially in Kazakhstan, however this chapter has 
shown that Moscow’s strong relationship with all the Central Asian countries in 
particular with Kazakhstan goes beyond the issue of the Russian minority.
Russia’s political influence is very much interlinked with security issues, as seen with 
the minority’s example. Central Asia’s political systems (and Russia’s to a lesser 
extent) increasingly resemble the Soviet political model; there is a rise in 
authoritarianism, and opposition parties are suffering severe government control. The 
Central Asian leaders are looking for support in Moscow, as they know Moscow will 
not challenge or criticise their internal policies, nor encourage any form of opposition. 
This notion has increased since the Ukrainian and the Kyrgyz revolutions. Political 
support from Russia is a guarantee of security at a time when too much American 
interference in the political sphere is seen as a threat encouraging regime change. This 
was clearly seen with Putin’s support of Karimov during the Andijan incidents. Russia 
cannot be criticised for the lack of democratic values in Central Asia because it never 
declared that it was going to tackle such issues. Protection of human rights and the 
implementation of reform have always been an American characteristic, and although 
Putin cannot be given credit for the political milieu in Central Asia, he can neither be 
held responsible for it, as it has never been a Russian objective.
Russia’s economic relationship with Central Asia, as its security and political 
relationship, is reciprocal. Both Russia and Central Asia have much to gain from 
regional economic organisations. The initial triggered for increased attention on 
regionalisation, especially in the political and economic spheres, came as a result of 
Moscow’s disappointment with the support it was receiving from the west. Russia 
began to realise that its national interest lay in regionalisation. The political shift was 
seen in the early 1990’s; the economic reorientation came later. Another reason for 
Russia’s regional economic agenda came as a result of increased American presence in 
Central Asia. Putin’s greatest achievement in economic regionalisation with Central 
Asia came with the invitation to join the CACO in 2004. Russia, since joining the
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CACO, which has now merged with the EurAsEC, has tried to broaden the scope of 
this primarily economic organisation by also introducing a political and defence 
agenda. The aim for doing so was to create a bigger challenge to US influences. This is 
yet another example of Russian perseverance not to allow any other country to take its 
role in the region. The CSTO focuses on keeping Russia dominant in defence and 
security matters, the SCO has multi-vectored aims, primarily dealing with security but 
also with, economics and politics, and the CACO/EurAsEC aims to achieve Russian 
dominance through economic tactics, although it also overlaps with the objectives of 
the other two organisations. The end result is that Russia has created a web of 
influences, encompassing all the essential spheres that it could be challenged on by the 
USA. This is competition for influence through organisations. The creation of regional 
organisations has been a very effective way for Russia to remain pivotal in Central 
Asian affairs. It is also important to point out that these organisations are not only 
working for the advantage of Moscow but also for Central Asia. Any form of 
regionalism is a positive step for the Central Asians who need to work together to 
create an effective, political, security and economic system. This task has been the 
most successful with Russian participation, especially as Russia is also a regional 
country often suffering from similar problems.
7.2.3 American Influences in Central Asia
This chapter traces the evolution of America foreign policy towards Central Asia and 
the gradual infiltration of its influences on Central Asian governments and society. It 
shows how American interaction with the Central Asian countries, since independence, 
has been primarily characterised by competition with Russia and not cooperation. Prior 
to September 11, NATO’s PFP, and organisations such as GUUAM were seen to 
challenge the security umbrella that Russia had tried to build over what it regarded as 
its own sphere of influence. Washington’s wooing of the Karimov regime was seen as 
a method of gaining further access to the heart of Central Asia. Karimov was seen as 
America’s key to future involvement in the region. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
caught the attention of the USA long before 2001 as a result of their energy wealth, 
while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remained relatively left out of Washington’s agenda.
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The events of September 11 changed the geo-strategic balance of the region. 
Washington’s involvement intensified, as a web of influences was created challenging 
those of Russia. America had a new strategy in Central Asia; the war on terror enabled 
it to become politically, economically and culturally active in the region. In addition, 
US troops had bases on Central Asian soil, which further added to their network of 
influences. Russia’s reaction to these developments and the growing role of Islam, 
which has intensified since 2001, have given birth to the ‘new great game’.
America has undisputedly been the reason for the defeat of the Taliban regime, which 
was a threat to stability in the region. Along with the downfall of the Taliban, 
organisations such as the IMU have been weakened. American military interaction in 
Afghanistan and the existence of American bases ended the wave of incursions into 
Kyrgyzstan aimed at the Uzbek regime. This consequently reduced the IMU’s Islamic 
threat that struck the region at the end of the last decade. Washington’s tactics of 
accommodating the regime’s authoritarianism, and repressive policies have caused a 
new wave of extremism. It has often been argued that Washington’s political 
influences have been counterproductive, only adding to the rise of anger toward the 
regimes, anger that often takes an Islamic form. It is generally feared by the Central 
Asian leaders, especially by Karimov, that too much American interference in internal 
matters sows the seeds for a coloured revolution. Consequently the Central Asian 
leaders have become weary of allowing the USA too close to their power base.
Washington’s economic influence, in terms of financial aid, investments and petro- 
politics is strength to its role in the region. No other country has the potential to 
provide assistance to the same extent as the USA. The Central Asian countries are in 
need of economic assistance and a way to divert their energy resources to the 
international markets. The USA can help them achieve this. Washington’s cultural 
influence is weak, so far Russia’s cultural influence followed by that of Islam are the 
main pillars of the Central Asian culture and identity. This does not mean that the 
temptations of globalisation and the American way of life will not evolve over time.
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Washington’s security influence has been prominent and positive in many respects; it 
showed to be the most effective at diluting the Islamic threat from regional Islamic 
organisations that struck the region at the end of the 1990’s. Unfortunately American 
security has been interlinked with its political role. Providing security from Islamic 
extremism without causing a popular Islamic backlash or causing the regimes to fear a 
coloured revolution has been a great challenge for Washington. Its failure in this 
sphere has weakened both political and security-based influences. As stated above, 
America’s economic influences are strong; Washington has used this advantage to 
strengthen its other influences. This was most clearly seen with Bakiyev’s and 
Rahmonov’s decision to allow American and coalition forces to remain in their 
countries, despite the SCO declaration for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the 
region.
7.2.4 The Energy Resource Dimension
This chapter is an extension to the economic influences on Central Asia from all three 
powers. Petro-politics contributes vastly to the levels of competition between the main 
players in Central Asia. The competition in this field is primarily between the USA 
and Russia; these two countries since the collapse of the USSR have been battling for 
greater control of this specific area of the economy. This chapter has shown that the 
Caspian littoral countries’ untapped wealth has been one of the reasons that have 
brought Central Asia to the forefront of America’s agenda in the region. The USA’s 
need for greater supplies of natural resources has been portrayed by American oil 
companies’ interest for the exploration and development of oil and gas fields, 
particularly in Kazakhstan. This is a process, which has been developing since the 
disintegration of the USSR and especially after the soaring of relations between the 
USA and Saudi Arabia after September 11. America’s renewed political and security 
role in the region post September 11, have further increased the risk for Russia 
maintaining its energy monopoly of the region.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the pivotal countries in the resource war between 
Russia and America. Islam’s role in this sphere is limited, as it is primarily an internal 
power unable to implement projects or construct pipelines. It does, however, have the 
power to affect the success of Russian and American pipelines by contributing to
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instability in the countries that these pipelines pass through. This chapter shows how 
northbound pipelines, which are dominated by Russia, are the most numerous and 
effective. The westbound direction, which is mainly supported by the USA, has the 
potential of having an enormous impact on the geo-political and geo-economic balance 
of the region. The completion of the BTC pipeline has caused concern for Russia, as 
Washington appears to have been successful at creating a pipeline that not only 
excludes Russian companies, but also enables Kazakhstan to direct its energy flow 
away from Russian control. The success of this pipeline is a threat to Russia’s 
dominant energy role in the region, especially as it offers alternative markets 
consequently reducing Russian dependency. This has been one of the greatest 
challenges to the tight network of export routes under Russian guidance. The southeast 
bound direction largely involves pipelines that are not sponsored by the USA or 
Russia, although the construction of the TAP could change this. Southeast bound 
pipelines primarily involve the participation of Islamic countries, especially Iran. Both 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have plans and/or actual pipelines that carry their 
resources to the Islamic Republic. Although these links enhance the relationship 
between Central Asia (especially Turkmenistan) and Iran, they do not contribute to the 
strengthening of the Islamic influences in Central Asia, they merely challenge the USA 
wishes to isolate Iran. It is important to remember that the BTC, the CPC and other 
pipelines that symbolise American or Russian economic influence are also used as 
political tools to further enhance American or Russian participation in the region.
Whichever power can hold the reins on Kazakh and Turkmen energy flows is also in 
an advantageous position vis-a-vis other aspects of Kazakh and Turkmen affairs. 
Energy-related projects and pipeline construction in this relatively untouched part of 
the world are one of the main reasons why America and to a lesser extent Russia are so 
actively competing for influence in this region. Energy-related opportunities are vital 
for the economies of Central Asia, and the power that can offer the most amount of 
assistance will increase its overall influence over the region. This is most clearly seen 
with Niyazov’s determination to start talks on the TAP with the USA; he was even 
willing to recognise the legitimacy of the Taliban in order for this pipeline to succeed. 
If the TAP develops into a real project, Niyazov would be able to diversify his energy 
flow away from Russia; this would strengthen the USA’s relationship with Ashghabad,
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consequently advancing America’s position in the new great game. It is important to 
remember that although words between Ashghabad and Washington have been 
exchanged regarding the TAP, the reality still remains that the country’s main energy 
deal, conducted by the Turkmenbashi, was with Putin in 2003. Even though 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are not directly involved in this resource war, 
success in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will affect Russian and American political 
and security related leverage into these countries. Therefore, the game of petro-politics 
is not only about winning over Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan; it also has far wider 
implications. Despite the competition Moscow is experiencing in this vital branch of 
the economy, that has historically been under its control, the region remains more 
involved and dependent on Russian energy deals and Russian sponsored pipeline 
projects than American.
7.2.5 Islamic Influences and Central Asia
This chapter researches the impact and importance of secular and political Islam in 
Central Asia, and its strength to grip the region and navigate it down an Islamic path. 
Again each country is analysed separately, as Islamicisation has had different affects 
on each country. The origins of Islam are traced in order to highlight its importance 
throughout the history of Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan where 
it formed a core section of their identity. The impact of Islam is then briefly analysed 
throughout the eras of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.
The following two sections look at cultural Islam and state-sponsored Islam. The first 
of these two sections looks specifically at Islam as a domestic religion and cultural 
phenomenon; it is concerned with secular Islamic influences on the different 
nationalities and the role this has on culture. It traces the rise of secular Islam even in 
the least Islamicised countries, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The following 
section examines politically approved Islam in each of the five countries.
This chapter also attempts to give reasons why Islamic extremism has been on an 
increase since independence. Islamic extremism is a very difficult concept to analyse 
as it results from many factors. What this chapter makes clear is that the main causes 
of extremism, in Central Asia, are internal. Islamic influences coming from
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Afghanistan and the Middle East are also covered. Although poverty, oppression and 
social derangements cannot be the sole causes of extremism they are a lethal fuel for it. 
Islam has the ability to portray itself as the answer, the saviour of people that need 
mobilising means to show their misery and anger at the main bodies of authority.
Islamic organisations are the political tools in which Islamic extremism gives an 
alternative to the population from the status quo. The Islamic influence on political 
conduct gives rise to political Islam, which is a mounting influence and a threat to all 
the governments of Central Asia. Political Islam knows no borders, and can influence 
the oppressed people of the least Islamic Central Asian countries. The region is very 
vulnerable in this respect; Islamicisation in one country could have a destabilising 
affect on all the rest. In addition the rise of Islamic movements and political Islam does 
not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Islam can play a role in 
politics, while still holding onto some secular characteristics. This makes the rise of 
Islamic parties even more threatening to the Central Asian regimes, as their support 
base could be large. The most prominent Islamic group after the war in Afghanistan 
became HT, which has cells in all of the Central Asian countries. HT does not only 
offer an alternative political agenda, but has also become increasingly popular with the 
population as a result of its peaceful and persuasive methods at winning support; it also 
offers a welfare programme. In other words it plays a social role in the lives of those 
that are under its guidance.
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7.3 Which Power has the strongest Competing Influences and Why?
As seen throughout this thesis, Russia, in spite of increasing challenges from the other 
two powers, has remained the strongest power. Linguistic and particularly behavioural 
Russification appear to be deeply rooted in the Central Asian identity and make 
Russia’s cultural influence very strong. The growth of secular Islam is the greatest 
challenge to Russia’s cultural influence, especially as it appears to be gradually rising. 
Although Russia has strongly tried to maintain an economic presence through 
organisations such as the CACO/EurAsEC, what has aided with its economic influence 
in the region is its political influence on the Central Asian regimes. For example, 
Karimov facilitated Russia’s participation in the CACO as a way of guaranteeing 
Russian political support at a time when Washington looked to be challenging his 
internal politics. This is an example of how competing influences can be interlinked. 
Although America economically is the strongest power, and can offer more economic 
assistance to the Central Asian countries than Russia, the Central Asian leaders fear 
that this may encourage Washington to expand its other influences, particularly its 
political influence. Russia has maintained its dominance over the region’s energy 
resources and export routes, although the USA’s prominence in this sphere is slowly 
increasing. Politically, Russia is seen as the most favourable power to interact in the 
region’s internal affairs. The fear of political Islam looms over a large bulk of the 
population and particularly for the secular regimes. The growth of secular Islam, the 
rising prominence of organisations such as HT, the continued authoritarianism of the 
elites and American support of the leaders (as was the case with Karimov before 
Andijan) has encouraged the rise of political Islam. This has further pushed the Central 
Asian leaders towards Russian political support. Growing authoritarianism and an 
increased threat o f ‘coloured revolutions’ has also further aligned the Soviet-bred elites 
to look to Russia out of fear that American political influence will weaken their power- 
base. Russia’s security-related influence is strongly challenged by Washington; 
organisations such as the SCO and CSTO help strengthen Russia’s security role. 
Although the security of the region from the escalation of Islamic extremism is an 
issue that affects both Russia and the Central Asian countries, it was Washington that
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reduced the risk of the Talibanisation of Central Asia. American security assistance 
has been essential to the region and has challenged Islamic extremism. Although 
Washington’s military presence in the region reduces the chances of the Taliban 
regrouping and thus weakens the strength of some Central Asian Islamic organisations, 
it also allows the USA to interfere in the internal politics of the country it is based in. 
This inevitably means increased economic assistance for the host country but also 
exposes the regime to criticism and helps fuel Islamic sentiments, which the regimes 
fear. Thus Russia’s political, cultural, economic and security-related influences enable 
it to remain the most effective and strongest power in the region.
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